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ABSTRACT 
The prevailing view of the history of tax interpretation is one of legal 
formalism. According to this account of judicial discovery and application of 
legislative rules, there is no room for judicial law making. 
Chapter One introduces this mainstream account of tax interpretation over the 
last three centuries, noting the various permutations of this legal formalist 
account. The chapter also notes the significance of this account to liberal legal 
theory. 
Chapters two, three, four and five examine the merits of the mainstream account 
in particular contexts. Chapter two examines the interpretation of tax legislation 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and argues that the 
evidence does not support the liberal legalist account of that history. It will be 
argued that the courts were only granted jurisdiction to hear a limited range of 
tax appeals in order to secure a tactical advantage for the central government in 
the administration of certain taxes. This tactical advantage was assured as, 
contrary to the prevailing account of tax history, the courts adopted a pro 
revenue construction of tax legislation until well into the nineteenth century. 
Chapter three examines the interpretation of the income tax in the latter years of 
Victorian England - a statutory right of appeal against tax assessments only 
having been created in 1874. Although judges of this era occasionally referred 
to the rhetoric of strict or literal construction of tax legislation, it will be argued 
that the plethora of competing judicial views as to the proper understanding of 
fundamental elements of the income tax suggests that there was considerable 
confusion as to the scope of the income tax base. Whilst accepting that the 
existence of this confusion does not preclude the prospect of legal determinacy, 
it will be argued that a theory of law as rhetoric offers an appealing account of 
this judicial confusion. It will be argued that the competing interpretations of 
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the income tax are attributable to the competing understandings of the meaning 
of 'income' developed by different segments of the community in Victorian 
England. Thus the rhetoric of strict or literal construction of tax legislation 
(which was by no means the only interpretative rhetoric of the period) was of 
little importance in the actual interpretative process during this period because it 
ignored the competing interpretations of just what the 'literal' meaning of 
'income' was. 
It is generally accepted that during the twentieth century in both England and 
Australia the courts continued to adopt a literal interpretation of tax legislation 
until the 1980's. Taking up the interpretation of the Australian federal income 
tax which was introduced in 1915, it will be argued in chapter four that once 
again the application of a 'literal' meaning proved problematic to the courts. 
Focusing upon the statutory requirement that companies distribute to 
shareholders a minimum percentage of their profits (which effectively enforced 
the double taxation of corporate profits - firstly in the hands of the company and 
secondly in the hands of the shareholders), it will be argued that the courts 
sought to achieve some sense of equity by restricting the operation of the 
sufficient distribution requirement wherever possible. The means of achieving 
this understanding of tax equity was to adopt the 'literal' meaning of the 
provisions. The argument of chapter four is that, once again, the courts were 
confronted with competing interpretations of the proper application of the 
income tax, and that the liberal rhetoric of literal determinacy served an 
important function in legitimating the role of the courts in a manner consistent 
with the prevalent understanding of the rule of law. 
Chapter five continues this appraisal of the mainstream account of tax 
interpretation by examining the interpretation of the Australian income tax in 
the years after the 'tax avoidance crisis' of the 1970's. In more recent times it is 
generally accepted that the courts have spumed the literalist cant of earlier 
generations of judges and moved towards a purposive construction of tax 
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legislation. This shift is judicial methodology is commonly perceived as a 
response to the perceived need for the judiciary to play a more pro-active role in 
combating the scourge of tax avoidance. In chapter five the merits of this 
account will be examined by considering recent High Court judgments upon the 
interpretation of the anti-avoidance provisions found in the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). 
In chapter six the theoretical shortcomings of the determinacy thesis will be 
examined, and an alternative theory of law as rhetoric will be proposed. While 
accepting that a theory of law as rhetoric cannot be proven as necessarily right, 
it will be argued that this alternative theory of law offers a plausible account for 
the development of legal doctrine, such that the predominance of liberal legal 
theory is called into question. Liberal legal theory, in other words, becomes just 
one of any number of competing interpretations of legal institutions, and a 
theoretically implausible one at that. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by suggesting that the theory of law as 
rhetoric, developed in chapter six, is consistent with the case studies found in 
chapters two to five. It is therefore suggested that a theory of law as rhetoric 
offers a more substantial historiographical foundation to the account of tax 
interpretation since 1688 than the widespread acceptance of judicial descriptions 
of judicial practice. Chapter seven also includes a discussion of some of the 
more significant implications the implications for our understanding of the 
history of judicial tax interpretation and also for the Australian taxation system 
which arise out of the theory of indeterminate law advanced in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
A Overview 
Modem commentators suggest that until the late 1970' s the Australian courts 
adopted the long held practice of the British courts by interpreting tax 
legislation according to its strict literal meaning, resolving any ambiguity in 
favour of the taxpayer. 1 However, in the 1970's the axiomatic status of this 
strict literalism was challenged upon the basis that it promoted tax avoidance 
and thereby threatened the integrity of the federal tax system and the 
foundations of the modem state. In response to this crisis of legitimacy it is 
generally accepted that the courts adopted an alternative interpretative 
methodology which focused upon discovering the legislative purpose of tax 
legislation. 
According to this account of tax interpretation, both the literalist and purposive 
interpretative methodologies are alternative means for discovering the one 
'right' meaning which is objectively 'there' within the legislative text. 
However, upon closer examination of the case law in Australia in the twentieth 
century, and the earlier British case law, it is apparent that this portrayal of tax 
interpretation creates a myth. Rather than being of ancient origin, it was only in 
the nineteenth century that the courts endorsed the rhetoric of a determinate, 
literal statutory meaning awaiting discovery. Moreover, even after the courts 
adopted this rhetoric, the judicial interpretation of tax legislation was far more 
pragmatic than the rhetoric of legal determinacy would suggest. At times the 
courts adopted the 'literal' meaning, at other times a 'technical' legal meaning, 
at other times the 'business or commercial' meaning, at other times the 
1 In the opening paragraphs I will sketch the subject of the thesis without referring the reader to 
the relevant literature. However, in the latter part of the introduction the relevant literature will 
be discussed in more detail. I will return to the literature, where relevant, throughout the thesis. 
1 
undesirable consequences of the literal meaning were considered to warrant an 
alternative interpretation and at yet other times the perceived purpose of the 
legislation was endorsed. There was always an array of authorised interpretative 
rhetorics which enabled the courts to appear to apply 'the' meaning of the 
statute while in fact choosing from among any number of plausible alternative 
interpretations. Rather than being constrained by 'the law', adjudication upon 
'the law' was characterised by the judicial selection of the outcome which was 
most appealing from any one or more of a number of standpoints. While the 
existence of choice is a necessary part of the process of adjudication between 
competing interpretations, there is nothing in the judgments which suggests that 
such choices were necessarily determined by 'the law'. 
Aside from exposing the historical inaccuracies which the mythical depiction of 
judicial tax interpretation perpetuates, a close examination of the tax case law 
therefore raises central jurisprudential issues which the myth has obscured. One 
of the keystones of modem legal theory, adopted by many tax commentators and 
the judiciary alike, is that the law is a formal system of objectively discoverable 
rules. According to this formalist account, determinate law created by 
democratically elected members of parliament and discovered and applied by 
neutral judicial arbiters is the hallmark of the modem Australian democratic 
system of government. However, a close examination of the tax cases suggests 
that judicial interpretation of tax legislation is pragmatic rather than formal, and 
it is therefore clear that this formalist theorisation of adjudication is inadequate. 
A theorisation of tax interpretation must therefore account for a judiciary which, 
over 150 years, has adopted the rhetoric of determinate law while engaging in a 
pragmatic interpretative enterprise. Further, any theorisation of pragmatic 
adjudication which rejects the prospect of 'one right answer' must consider the 
implications for the legitimation of the judicial function. Having thus outlined 
the subject and significance of the thesis, it is necessary to retrace our steps and 
develop some key aspects of the conventional account of tax interpretation. 
2 
B Taxation and the Liberal State 
Taxation law has attracted considerable attention in liberal political theory 
because a tax diminishes the very property rights of individuals which the 
modem liberal state was, at least in part, purportedly created to protect.2 The 
apparent contradiction of the state confiscating3 private property in order to 
protect private property has been rationalised in more recent times upon the 
consensual foundation of the modem democratic state - a community of 
individuals is taken to confer a mandate upon the democratically elected 
legislature to impose a tax for the benefit of the commonweal.4 It is for this 
reason that the seventeenth century revolution in English constitutional affairs, 
of which a significant feature was the extension of parliamentary control over 
what were formerly the Crown's arbitrary taxing powers, is considered a 
watershed in the formation of the modem state. 5 Thereafter, a tax could only be 
2 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, JW Gough (ed), (1955) sec 124. Although it 
should be noted that the ideology of the welfare state may also be traced back at least to the 
eighteenth century; see, for example, Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, W Todd (ed), (1976) Bk 2. For an alternative theorisation of liberal political 
theory, which deemphasised this fascination with rights, see: Judith Shklar, Ordinary Voices 
(1984); Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (1990). Notwithstanding alternative theorisations 
of liberal theory such as Shklar's, the prevailing view of tax is that it diminishes private 
consumption in order to enhance public consumption; Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave, 
Public Finance in Theory and Practice (1984) ch 1. For further discussion of the often 
competing ideologies with respect to the imposition of taxation see Louis Eisenstein, Ideologies 
of Taxation (1961). 
3 For judicial recognition of the confiscatory nature of taxation see Government of India v 
Taylor [1955] AC 491. 
4 Locke, above n 2, sec 138. Locke's enunciation of this rationalisation of taxation drew upon 
earlier expressions of this approach such as that of the Petition of Right 1627 (Eng) 3 Car 1, c 1, 
s 1: 'Your subjects have inherited this freedom: that they should not be compelled to contribute 
to any taxe tallage ayd or other like charge not sett by comon consent in Parliament'. For earlier 
expressions of this principle see: the Statute concerning Tallage 1297 (Eng) 25 Edw 1; the Ship 
Money Act 1640 (Eng) 16 Car 1, c 14 and the Bill of Rights 1688 (Eng) 1 Will & Mar Sess 2, c 
2, s 1. For critical discussion of this principle see Richard Musgrave and Alan Peacock (eds), 
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (1958) xv - xix; Richard Epstein, 'Taxation, 
Regulation and Confiscation' (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 433, 437. 
5 See, for example, D Williams, 'Three Hundred Years On: Are our Tax Bills Right Yet?' 
(1989) 11 British Tax Review 370. 
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imposed under a statute which had been initiated by a majority of 
democratically elected members in the House of Commons.6 
Implicit in this rationalisation of taxation within the liberal state is the liberal 
theorisation of the law and legal process which offers the assurance that 'the 
law' passed by the democratically elected Parliament is 'the law' that is 
ultimately imposed upon the subject.7 Proponents of the 'rule of law' freely 
acknowledge that the creation of statute law is inevitably a political process, but 
maintain that judicial adjudication upon determinate law is wholly segregated 
from any arbitrary influences. 8 According to the model of formal justice9 
underpinning this 'rule of law', the segregation of politics from law depends 
upon the ability of neutral arbiters to discover the determinate meaning of 
authorised legal texts.10 The determinate legal meaning is discovered by an 
6 Of course, any legislation also needed to pass the House of Lords and the Crown, but after 
1688 only the House of Commons could initiate Bills proposing the imposition of a tax. The 
peculiar position of finance legislation is preserved in the Australian constitution, s 53 providing 
that tax measures may only be initiated by the House of Representatives which was originally 
considered to be 'the people's House'. 
7 The concept of the rule of law has a long history, for prominent elaborations of it see, for 
example, Locke, above n 2, sec 125; Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution (first published 1885, 5th ed, 1897); TRS Allan, 'Legislative Supremacy and 
the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism' (1985) 44 Cambridge Law Journal 111; 
TRS Allan, 'The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty' [1985] Public Law 614; Geoffrey de Q. 
Walker, The rule of law: foundation of constitutional democracy (1988). 
8 For a generic theory of liberal legalism see: Andrew Altman; Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal 
Critique (1990) 27; Neil MacCormick, 'Reconstruction after Deconstruction' (1990) 10 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 539. HLA Hart is often categorised as a liberal legalist. However, to 
the extent that he is understood to suggest that in 'hard' cases judges will make law after 
considering a range of 'political' considerations such as the consequences and morality of the 
proposed rule, this lawmaking function of the judiciary may be inconsistent with a liberal theory 
of law; see HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, J Raz and PA Bulloch (eds), (first published 1961, 
1994 ed). For further discussion of this point see Allan Hutchinson, 'A Postmodern's Hart: 
Taking Rules Sceptically' (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 788; Mark Burton, 'The Song 
Remains the Same - The Search for Interpretive Constraint and the Rhetoric of Legal Theory 
from Hart to Hutchinson' (1997) 20 University of New South Wales Law Journal 407. 
9 For the contrast between formal and substantive justice see Duncan Kennedy, 'Legal 
Formality' (1976) Journal of Legal Studies 356; Duncan Kennedy, 'Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication' (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685; PS Atiyah and Robert 
Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal 
Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions (1987). 
10 The framing and status of the rules according to which a text becomes 'authorised' are the 
subject of considerable debate. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that, according to the 
4 
uncontroversial process which insulates the application of the law from the 
creation of law .11 This theorisation of the rule of law is commonly combined 
with legalism, which acknowledges the centrality of the courts in the 
enforcement of the law .12 Despite concerted attacks from the realist and critical 
legal studies 'schools', 13 liberal legalism remains the dominant legal discourse 
in the Australian community.14 
There are two fundamental elements to the liberal legalist portrayal of legal 
interpretation. The first is the neutrality of the interpreters, and the second is the 
neutrality of the process by which determinate meaning is discovered. With 
respect to the first aspect, the courts are considered to be the appropriate vehicle 
generic liberal theory being described here, authorised texts would include, in the context of the 
common law system, previous judgments and legislation. 
11 Altman, above n 8, 27. 
12 For a critical elaboration of this understanding of the term 'legalism' see Harry Arthurs, 
Without the Law': Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England 
(1985). It should be noted that some authors use 'legalism' to denote a particular type of 
interpretative formalism; see, for example, Judith Shklar, Legalism (1964). For a non legalist 
theory of tax administration, see Yuri Grbich, 'Operational Strategies for Improving Australian 
Tax Legislation' (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 266; see also Edward L Rubin, 'Law and 
Legislation in the Administrative State' (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 369. 
13 Although it must be accepted that in Australia the realist and Critical Legal Studies critiques 
of mainstream legal theory were more subdued; notwithstanding the work of eminent scholars 
such as Julius Stone's The Province and Function of Law (1961). The critical legal studies 
literature is immense, however for an overview of the fractured nature of critical legal studies 
see David Kairys (ed), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (1982); Alan Hunt, 'The 
Theory of Critical Legal Studies' (1986) 6 Oxford Journal Legal Studies 1; Allan Hutchinson 
and Patrick Monahan 'Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of 
American Legal Thought' (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 199; Roberto Unger, The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement (1986). There has been substantial debate as to whether the critical 
legal studies critique of 'liberal legal theory' is in fact based upon misinterpretations of the work 
of several quite different liberal legalists; see, for example, William Ewald, 'Unger's 
Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study' (1987-88) 97 Yale Law Journal 665; Martin Krygier, 
'Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory - A Response to Alan Hunt' (1987) 7 Oxford Journal 
Legal Studies 26, 28. 
14 Robert Gordon, 'Critical Legal Histories' (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57, 58-9 n 8. Of 
course, speaking of a theory of liberal legalism is an oversimplification as 'liberal legalism' 
describes a range of theories which offer variations upon several themes. Further, any 'liberal' 
legal theory focuses upon certain aspects of a liberal worldview while implicitly assuming many 
other aspects of that worldview. However, having acknowledged the inevitable shortcomings of 
any thumbnail sketch of such a polymorphous theory, for the purposes of this thesis a liberal 
theory of law maintains that the rights of the individual as against the state and other individuals 
are governed by the rule of determinate law. 
5 
for rational adjudication upon legal rights because it is judicial impartiality 
which is the vital condition of possibility for rational judgment uninfluenced by 
'political' considerations. Is In regard to the second aspect, the neutral discovery 
of determinate meaning is possible because legal texts are perceived as univocal 
in all cases. I6 In the absence of a univocal legal text, the methodical judicial 
application of determinate law would be displaced by the perceived 
'nightmare,i7 of indeterminate legal texts which would compel judges to 
pragmatically make 'law' in every case. The determinacy of the law is therefore 
the keystone underpinning what are commonly taken to be the fundamental 
constitutional principles of modem Anglo-Australian law - the rule of law and 
the separation of the judicial power from the political power of government. Is 
The determinacy thesis is at least superficially attractive for a number of 
reasons. I9 One view suggests that the rule of determinate law is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition to the fulfilment of liberal values centring upon 
. ct• •ct al 20 m 1v1 u autonomy. Determinate law enables individuals to plan their 
affairs, knowing that they are acting within the confines of the law and are 
therefore legally free from successful state or private intervention.2I This 
15 Walker, above n 7, 36-40. 
16 See, for example, Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (1990) 27; Hart, 
above n 8, 124, where Hart argues that meaning is generally conventionally determined from the 
outset, penumbra! cases aside; Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev edn, 1969) ch 2; Ronald 
Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) viii-ix, 76-86. 
17 Hart discusses the perceived nightmare of indeterminate legal texts in HLA Hart, 'American 
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream' (1983) 11 Georgia 
Law Review 969. 
18 Walker, above n 7, 3. 
19 Although the determinacy thesis has thus far been portrayed as a part of a liberal legal theory, 
it should also be noted that many who would not necessarily describe themselves as liberals 
either subscribe to the normative vision of determinate law or at least acknowledge the 
normative appeal of determinate law; see, for example, Martha Minow, 'Interpreting rights: an 
essay for Robert Cover' (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1860, 1910; E P Thompson, Whigs and 
Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1975) 258-269. 
20 Altman, above n 8, 13; Duncan Kennedy, 'Legal Formality' (1976) Journal of Legal Studies 
351, 370ff. For a genealogy of the concept of the autonomous individual see Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: the making of the modem identity (1989). 
21 See John Locke, above n 2, para 137; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 239-40; TRS 
Allan, 'Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism', above n 
6 
rationale for legal determinacy suggests that, for a legal rule to be 'determinate', 
the meaning must be fixed.from the inception of the rule. Under this rationale a 
liberal legalist cannot accept a theory of interpretation which acknowledges that 
legal meanings may change over time, even if the law is determinate at any 
particular time, because such ephemeral meaning is of no use to a citizen 
wishing to arrange their affairs upon the basis that legal meaning will remain 
constant. This requirement for certainty in the future application of legal rules 
may be called 'prospective determinacy'. 
A second rationale for legal determinacy emphasises the need to protect the 
individual from arbitrary decisionmaking by the administrative and judicial 
arms of government.22 By contrast to the first rationale of legal determinacy, 
this rationale can accommodate a theory of interpretation which acknowledges 
that meaning may change over time, but nevertheless requires that meaning is 
determinate at the time the law is applied to the circumstances of a particular 
case. This might arise, for example, if it is accepted within a community that 
the ordinary meaning of a term differs to what it used to mean. Under this 
theory of interpretation, a judge must identify the nature of the community 
consensus upon the meaning of a particular legal rule at the time that it is to be 
applied. 23 The ascertainment of legal meaning is therefore not left to the 
subjective whim of a judge, as some realist and critical legal scholars suggest,24 
but is in some way 'discovered' by the judge. This approach could be called 
7, 118; Neil MacCormick, 'The Ethics of Legalism' (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 184, 184. In the 
context of taxation law see, for example, Robin Speed, 'The High Court and Part IVA' (1986) 
Australian Tax Review 156, 157; Daniel Sandler, A Request for Rulings (1994). The perfect 
operation of the rule of law depends, of course, upon enforcement mechanisms being adequate 
such that the law is followed or enforced in all cases. 
22 For the origins of the separation of powers doctrine see W Holdsworth, A History of English 
Law (1964) vol 10, 255-6. 
23 See, for example, the dissenting judgment of McTiernan and Jacobs JJ in A-G (Cth) ex rel 
McKinlay v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 36. 
24 See, for example, Gary Peller, 'The Metaphysics of American Law' (1985) 73 California Law 
Review 1151, 1167-1175; Mark Tushnet, 'Does Constitutional Theory Matter? A Comment' 
(1987) 65 Texas Law Review 777; Clare Dalton, 'An Essay in Deconstruction of Contract 
Doctrine' (1985) 94 Yale Law Journal 997, 1002. 
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one of retrospective determinacy because the determinate legal meaning is only 
established at the time of judgment and operates retrospectively with respect to 
the affairs of the person subject to the law. 25 
Aside from these normative justifications of the determinacy thesis, it is also 
generally accepted that it offers an accurate description of the judicial 
interpretation of legislation. The starting point of this descriptive account26 of 
legal determinacy is the emergence of a more independent, tenured judiciary 
after the constitutional revolution in seventeenth century England.27 With this 
condition of possibility for independent adjudication seemingly assured, it is 
generally assumed that the English courts reconsidered their function in light of 
the rhetoric of individual rights of the new liberal political order.28 
Accordingly, after 1688 the courts adopted a more robust understanding of their 
role in guarding the 'legal' rights of individuals against arbitrary interference by 
the state. The courts therefore enforced 'the law', which was conceived as a 
more or less objectively identifiable body of rules with determinate meaning. In 
the context of the interpretation of tax legislation, it is generally accepted that 
25 For differing versions of this concept of retrospective determinacy see HLA Hart, 'Positivism 
and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 595, 614; Fuller, above 
n 16, ch 2; Neil MacCormick, 'Reconstruction after Deconstruction' (1990) 10 Law and 
Philosophy 539, 549; Judith Shklar, Legalism (1964); Duncan Kennedy, 'Legal Formality' 
(1976) Journal of Legal Studies 351; Roberto Unger, above n 13, 1. 
26 See, for example, R Cross, Statutory Interpretation, J Bell and G Engle (eds), (1987), ch 1; 
DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation (4th ed, 1996) ch 9; see also the historical 
account of SE Thorne in his introduction to Sir T Egerton, A Discourse Upon the Exposicion 
and understandinge of statutes with Sir Thomas Egerton's Additions S Thorne (ed) (1942) 84; 
W Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History (2nd ed, 1957) ch 30; JA Corry, 'Administrative Law 
and the Interpretation of Statutes' (1935) 1 University of Toronto Law Journal 286. 
27 Originally judges had held office at the pleasure of the Crown, but in 1701 many of the 
elements of modern judicial independence were promulgated in the Act of Settlement 1701 (Eng) 
12 & 13 Will 3, c 2, s 3. However, under (1701) 6 Anne, c 7 (Eng) (An Act for the security of 
her Majesties person), s 8 judges and other nominated officers of the Crown retained office for 
six months after the death of the monarch. Life tenure for judges was only adopted in 1760 with 
the passing ofl Geo III c 23 (An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown ... ) (UK). 
28 For discussion of the emergence of judicial independence in the eighteenth century and its 
impact upon the process of judging see Holdsworth, above n 22, vol 10, 647; Walker, above n 7, 
ch 3. 
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the method of discovering the determinate meaning of tax legislation has passed 
through at least two distinct phases over the course of the last three centuries. 
1 The Literal Meaning 
The reconsideration of the judicial role in the new constitutional epoch is 
generally considered to have precipitated a greater willingness on the part of the 
judiciary to focus upon the literal meaning of legislation, as opposed to adopting 
an 'equitable' or purposive construction of legislation.29 In the context of tax 
law, the courts purportedly embraced legal formalism by categorising tax 
legislation as 'penal', upon the basis that the imposition of a tax compelled the 
transfer of private property to the state.30 In order to protect the rights of the 
individual from such 'penal' legislation, the eighteenth century English courts 
purportedly adopted the rule that tax legislation must be interpreted strictly 
against the Crown.31 This meant that the courts would adopt a literal 
29 See generally Corry, above n 26; J Macrossan, 'Judicial Interpretation' (1984) 58 Australian 
Law Journal 547, 551. For a similar account of the emergence of formalism in the context of 
the common law see PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (1979); see also 
RB Ferguson, 'The Horwitz Thesis and Common Law Discourse in England' (1983) 3 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 34. 
3° For the early recognition of this approach on the part of the commentators see, for example, F 
Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes (1848) vol 2, 646; W Benning, A General Treatise on 
Statutes: Their Rules of Construction (2nd ed, 1848) Pt 1, 646-7. 
31 Partington v Attorney General (1869) LR 4 E & I App HL 100, 122 (Lord Cairns). For the 
modern portrayal of this strict construction of tax legislation see, for example, Douglas Brown, 
'The Canons of Construction of Taxation and Revenue Legislation' [1976] Australian Tax 
Review 81, 86; Ivor Richardson, 'Appellate Court Responsibilities and Tax Avoidance' (1985) 2 
Australian Tax Forum 3; Sir A Mason, 'Taxation Policy and the Courts' (1990) 2 The CCH 
Journal of Australian Taxation 40, 41-2; H Monroe, 'Fiscal Statutes: A Drafting Disaster' 
(1979) British Tax Review 265, 265; JD O'Meally, 'The Interpretation of Taxation Law' in 
Refresher Series on Taxation Law and Practice (1946) 1; John Clark, 'Statutory Drafting' 
(1980) British Tax Review 326, 327; D Goldberg, 'Your Subjects Inherited What Freedom?' 
(1975) British Tax Review 87, 87; GL Davies, 'The Role of Courts in Construing the Income 
Tax Assessment Act' (1980) 15 Taxation in Australia 749, 752-3. Occasionally some 
reservations regarding the impact of this principle were expressed; see, for example, Sir Anthony 
Mason, 'Where Now?' (1975) 49 Australian Law Journal 570, 574. One of the few, albeit 
brief, examples of acknowledgment of the existence of a pro revenue construction of tax 
legislation may be seen in DW Williams, 'Taxing Statutes are Taxing Statutes: The 
Interpretation of Revenue Legislation' (1978) 41 Modern Law Review 404, 409-10. In part the 
dearth of critical discussion of the interpretation of Australian taxation law may be attributable 
9 
interpretation of tax legislation, but in the event of any ambiguity, the ambiguity 
would generally be resolved in favour of the taxpayer.32 Within this broad 
framework there are a number of differences between the commentators. Some 
suggest that the strict construction rule was replaced by the general literal rule in 
the nineteenth century,33 while others suggest that the strict construction rule 
survives to the present day.34 Moreover, some commentators have questioned 
the differentiation between the literal rule and the strict construction rule, 
suggesting that the courts in any event focus upon ascertaining the meaning of 
the legislation. 35 At the least, it seems to be generally accepted that some form 
of the literal rule of interpretation underpinned the judicial interpretation of tax 
legislation until relatively recently. Indeed, even at the time of writing some 
judges continued to refer to the literal meaning of tax legislation in arriving at 
their respective decisions.36 
The concept of literal meaning has been understood from the perspective of both 
of the rationales of legal determinacy outlined above. According to the 
'literalist' version of the determinacy thesis, the meaning of statutory words is 
determined according to the acontextual meaning of the words found in the 
statute. This theorisation of legal determinacy draws upon analytic theories of 
language, which focus upon identifying the necessary conditions before a 
statement will be true. According to such analytic theories of language, any 
to the fact that it was only after the 1960's that the publication of secondary material on taxation 
began to proliferate, for reasons which it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine. 
32 Attorney-Genera/for Canada v Hallett and Carey Ltd (1952] AC 450, 472 (Lord Radcliffe). 
For discussion of this principle see FAR Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (2nd ed, 1992) 381-
3. 
33 See, for example, AG v Sil/em (1864) 2 H & C 431, 509. 
34 DJ Gifford and K Gifford, How to Understand an Act of Parliament 1994 (8th edn) 159-60. 
35 Robert Allerdice, 'The Swinging Pendulum: Judicial Trends in the Interpretation of Revenue 
Statutes' (1996) 19 University of New South Wales Law Journal 162, 164-5. 
36 Thus, for example, in Consolidated Press Holdings v FCT 98 ATC 5009 Hill J suggested that 
it was the function of the courts to ascertain the legislative purpose by considering the meaning 
of the words used in the legislation (at 5,017). For further discussion of this approach to 
statutory interpretation see DG Hill, 'A Judicial Perspective on Tax Law Reform' (1998) 72 
Australian Law Journal 685. 
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statement can be dissected into its truth conditions. Applying these theories to 
the statutory context, they would suggest that the meaning of any statutory rule 
is objectively 'there' within the rule itself. Accordingly, the judge objectively 
ascertains the objective meaning of the relevant statutory words.37 One reason 
for the survival of this literalist theory is that it can accommodate both 
prospective and retrospective rationalisations of the determinacy thesis. To 
those endorsing the prospective understanding of determinacy, the courts should 
follow the meaning of the words in existence at the time the Act of Parliament is 
made.38 On the other hand, those who adhere to the rationalisation of legal 
determinacy in terms of retrospective determinacy maintain that the courts 
should adopt the meaning of the Act of Parliament in existence at the time of the 
judgment and that meaning need not necessarily be the same as the meaning 
when it was created.39 Under this view, any change in the literal meaning of a 
statutory term is effected by a communal consensus rather than by the unilateral 
action of a judge. According to either account, then, statutes embody clear law 
passed by a democratically elected Parliament which are mechanically applied 
by neutral arbiters. 
2 The Purposive Construction of Tax Legislation 
Towards the end of the 1970's the literalist methodology was subjected to 
considerable criticism. The perceived shortcoming of literalism was that it 
37 Allan, Legislative Supremacy, above n 7, 117, 118; Dworkin, Law's Empire, above n 16, 17. 
This approach to statutory meaning was also adopted by Hart at some points in his work; see 
Hart, above n 8, 127-8. 
38 This prospective determinacy appears to underpin a number of tax judgments. See, 
for example, Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 
129, 161-2, (Higgins J); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Westraders Pty Ltd (1980) 144 
CLR 55, 59-60 (Barwick CJ); Hepp/es v FCT9l ATC 4808, 4818-19 (Deane J). 
39 This may be the approach adopted by Oliver Wendell Holmes; see Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
'The Theory of Legal Interpretation' (1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 417, 419-20; A-G (Cth) ex 
rel McKinlay v The Commonwealth above note 23, 36 (McTiernan and Jacobs JJ). 
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emphasised the word and ignored the intention underlying the word.40 Although 
it was generally accepted that there was a literal meaning of any text, 
intentionalist theories of meaning suggest that language is an imperfect medium 
for the communication of ideas and so the legislature does not necessarily say 
what it means. Advocates of a purposive construction therefore propose that the 
intention or purpose 'behind the legislative words' ought be paramount.41 In the 
context of tax interpretation, literalism was considered to be evidence of a 
judicial willingness to lend undue assistance to taxpayers by upholding tax 
avoidance arrangements which subverted the underlying legislative intention.42 
The application of the strict construction rule is therefore commonly blamed for 
precipitating a crisis of legitimacy within the Australian legal system in the 
1970' s which was perceived as a threat to the integrity of the Australian taxation 
system43 and also as a threat to the public respect for the Australian legal 
system. In response to this crisis there was a widespread reexamination of the 
assumptions underpinning the literalist methodology and a marked shift to a 
purposive interpretative rhetoric. This purposive method was considered 
especially appropriate in the context of statutory provisions designed to reduce 
4° Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 
297; for recent authority in the United Kingdom to similar effect see Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) 
v Hart [1993] AC 593, 617 (Lord Griffiths). This was not an innovative insight, for an earlier 
statement of the same approach see River Wear Commissioners v Adamson ((1877) 2 App Cas 
743, 763. Also note the Acts Interpretation Act, 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 15AB, 15AC, 15AD. The 
longstanding common law rules of statutory interpretation often referred to as the 'golden rule' 
and the 'mischief rule' reflect the fact that intentionalist theories of interpretation have coexisted 
alongside the literal rule for several centuries; Pearce and Geddes, above n 26, 24; Jocelynne 
Scutt, 'Statutory Interpretation and Recourse to Extrinsic Aids' (1984) 58 Australian Law 
Journal 483; Jeffrey Barnes, 'Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory of 
the Disorder of Law' (Pt 1) (1994) 22 Federal Law Review 116; Jeffrey Barnes, 'Statutory 
Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory of the Disorder of Law' (Pt 2) (1995) 23 
Federal Law Review 77. 
41 Walker above n 7, 172; Allan above n 7, 139. 
42 Geoffrey Lehmann, 'The Income Tax Judgments of Sir Garfield Barwick: A Study in the 
Failure of the New Legalism' (1983) 9 Monash University Law Review 115. 
43 See, for example, Richard Krever, 'Avoidance, Evasion and Reform: Who Dismantled and 
Who's Rebuilding the Australian Income Tax System?' (1987) 10 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 215; J Macrossan, above n 29, 551. 
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tax avoidance,44 although it is now generally accepted that the courts adopt an 
intentionalist method with respect to all legislation.45 
This purposive theory of interpretation has been understood in various ways, 
which once again are more or less consistent with the alternative rationalisations 
of legal determinacy outlined above.46 For example, one approach suggests that 
the law comprises only those matters which were, or could reasonably have 
been, within the contemplation of the legislature at the time that the relevant 
statute was made.47 In the context of the income tax, for example, it might be 
argued that the profit under a sophisticated interest rate swap agreement could 
not possibly have been within the contemplation of the Parliament in 1936 when 
the earlier version of the income tax was introduced, and therefore that such 
profits could not comprise income for the purposes of that legislation.48 This 
version of purposive theory achieves a happy medium between the poles of 
flexibility and constraint. The scope of the legislation is in one sense 
determinate because 'the law' is the hypothetical answer of the enacting 
Parliament to the hypothetical question, while at the same time the 'purpose' of 
the legislation can be adapted to new developments in the social world. 
An alternative version of purposive theory suggests that the 'intention' of the 
statute includes those matters which the legislature making the law would have 
44 See, for example, Greenberg v !RC [1972] AC 109 at 137; !RC v Joiner [1975] 1WLR1701, 
1706; FCT v Students World (Australia) Pty Ltd 78 ATC 4040; FCT v Lutovi Investments Pty 
Ltd 78 ATC 4708. For further discussion of the approach adopted in these cases see Pearce and 
Geddes, above n 26, 238-40. 
45 See DG Hill, 'Great Expectations: What do we expect from judges in tax cases?' (1995) 30 
Taxation in Australia 21; Macrossan, above n 29; M Smith et al, Legal Process Commentary 
and Materials (6th ed, 1994) 319; but cf Allerdice, above n 35. 
46 For critical discussions of various theories of legislative intention see M Moore, 'The 
Semantics of Judging' (1981) 54 Southern California Law Review 151; M Radin, 'Statutory 
Interpretation' (1930) 43 Harvard Law Review 863, 875; Dworkin, above n 16, 53-65, Jeffery 
Goldsworthy, 'Originalism in constitutional interpretation' (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 1. 
47 Black - Clawson Ltd v Papierwerke Wallhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591, 614 (Lord 
Reid). 
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included if they had been specifically asked. Under this view, it might be 
argued that the assessability of a profit under an interest rate swap agreement 
would depend upon the answer to the hypothetical question asked of the 1936 
Commonwealth Parliament 'would you have included this profit in assessable 
income?' This version of purposive theory accepts that legislative meaning 
changes over time, as the hypothetical question would be answered having 
regard to the original legislative purpose understood in the particular context at 
the time the legislation was interpreted. 
Once again, all of the variations of purposive theory have the perceived merit 
that the judge is considered to play a 'passive' role in merely discovering the 
legislative purpose evidenced by the legislative text and, perhaps, the authorised 
'extrinsic' materials. 
3 Henneneutic Theories of Legal Detenninacy 
More recently some eminent current and retired judges have expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the view that judges merely discover the literal meaning of 
legislation or the legislative purpose. These judges and other commentators 
argue that judges must have recourse to fundamental communal moral norms in 
'making' law in some sense.49 This assertion of judicial activism may be 
considered to be anathema to the liberal legalist theorisation of law outlined 
above. However, a closer reading of these discussions of judicial 'lawmaking' 
suggests that such endorsements of 'judicial activism' may not represent the 
radical departure from literalism or purposive interpretation that they seem to 
48 This, of course, raises all sorts of additional issues, such as whether legislation which has been 
repeatedly amended without specific reference to such receipts implicitly includes those receipts 
within the tax net or not. 
49 Sir Anthony Mason, 'Changing the Law in a Changing Society' (1993) 67 Australian Law 
Journal 568; DG Hill, 'Great Expectations: What do we expect from judges in tax cases?' 
(1995) 30 Taxation in Australia 21. At various points in his work Yuri Grbich combines both 
hermeneutic and purposive theories of interpretation; Y Grbich, 'The Duke of Westminster's 
Graven Idol on Extending Property Authorities into Tax and Back Again' (1978) 9 Federal Law 
Review 183, 214, 216-7. 
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propound. On one view, such hermeneutic theories of judicial activism may 
merely emphasise the objectivism of literalism or intentionalism: 
In the case of statutes which impinge upon fundamental values, it is 
possible to say that an unambiguous and unmistakeable expression of 
intention is required to justify an interpretation which trenches upon the 
values. To insist upon the expression of such an intention is to enhance 
the legislative process by compelling those who introduce legislation to 
make plain to the legislature what the effect of the legislation will be. 50 
However, even if this legal hermeneutics does not lead one back to literalism or 
purposive interpretation, proponents of this 'activism' acknowledge that judges 
do not make law according to their own subjective standards of justice.51 
Rather, it is suggested that there is always a 'right' answer to a legal question, 
that right answer being determined by recourse to the moral and political norms 
of a particular community.52 This theory may be consistent with both of the 
rationalisations of legal determinacy outlined above,53 or alternatively may 
merely accord with the second rationale of retrospective determinacy. 
50 Personal communication from Sir Anthony Mason to Professor John Braithwaite, quoted in 
John Braithwaite, 'Community Values and Australian Jurisprudence' (1995) 17 Sydney Law 
Review 350, 366. 
51 This reconsideration of the judicial function, and in particular the consideration of the extent 
to which judges can be said to 'make' law, repeats the more fully reasoned examination of this 
issue in the debates between HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. 
52 Dietrich v R (1992) 109 ALR 385 at 402-3 (Brennan J); but cf Service Station Association Ltd 
v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 393 at 405. For extra curial judicial 
statements to similar effect see: Sir Anthony Mason, 'Future Directions in Australian Law' 
(1987) 13 Monash University Law Review 146, 158-9; Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Role of a 
Constitutional Court in a Federation - A Comparison of the Australian and the United States 
Experience' (1986) 16 Federal Law Review l, 5; Hill, above n 49; Mason, above n 49; Sir 
Anthony Mason, 'Courts and Community Values' (1996) 6 Eureka Street 32; Michael McHugh, 
'The Law-making function of the Judicial Process' (Pt 1) (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 15; 
Michael McHugh, 'The Law-making function of the Judicial Process' (Pt 2) (1988) 62 
Australian Law Journal 116. See also: Dworkin, above n 16, viii-ix, 76-86; John Braithwaite, 
above n 50. For criticism of this approach generally see Paul Finn, 'Of Power and the People: 
Ends and Methods in Australian Judge-Made Law' (1994) 1 Judicial Review 255. In the context 
of the Australian income tax see: RK O'Connor, 'Analysis and implications of the Gulland, 
Watson and Pincus cases on s 260' (1986) Butterworths Weekly Tax Bulletin 22. 
53 Ronald Dworkin, for example, maintains that the courts interpret preexisting principles of the 
law in a manner which satisfies the requirement of prospective determinacy whilst 
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C Text and Context 
The fact that there are now literalist, purposive and hermeneutic accounts 
purporting to describe the process of tax interpretation indicates that there is no 
longer the consensus upon the interpretative axioms that there perhaps was at 
one time in the legal community. The profession and academy have fractured 
into a number of schools offering competing theories of legislative determinacy 
in the context of taxation law. The key point of contention between each of 
these rival accounts of legal determinacy is the extent to which what is 
perceived to be the potentially disruptive social context of the legislation is 
recognised as an influence upon the outcome of the interpretative process. 
Determinacy theorists are mindful of what they consider to be the nightmarish 
world depicted in deconstructive writing54 - one of the key elements of 
deconstructive theory being that one cannot help but incorporate the context of a 
text in attributing meaning, and that by thus admitting context we are drawn into 
the continual slippage of meaning in a process which defies the closure of 
determinate meaning. 
From the preceding outline of alternative accounts of the determinacy thesis, it 
may be seen that these accounts either limit the relevance of the social context 
of the text and the interpretative act or exclude any role for this context 
altogether. Under a strict literal rule framed in accordance with the precepts of 
prospective determinacy, the acontextual ascertainment of acontextual legal 
meanings elides any judicial reference to the social and legislative context in 
which the legislation is being applied. By contrast, a literalist account framed in 
terms of retrospective determinacy clearly incorporates a role for the context of 
the text in the process of interpretation, as it requires the judge to determine the 
meaning of statutory words for her or his community at the time that the 
simultaneously recognising that legal principles may be interpreted in light of changing social 
conditions; Dworkin, above n 16. 
54 Altman, above n 8. 
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legislation is to be applied. A purposive theory may also allow reference to a 
prescribed range of 'authorised' contextual materials in establishing the 
legislative intention. 55 Alternatively, and depending upon the breadth with 
which the legislative intention is stated, reference to the legislative intention 
could be understood to require an appreciation of the broad social context in 
which the legislation is to be applied. For example, if the legislative intention is 
understood to be the creation of a 'just' legal system,56 it would seem that the 
judge could quite legitimately construct a theory of justice in accordance with 
communal morality and interpret the legislation in a manner which was 
considered to further the dictates of that scheme of justice. Under this 'broad' 
version of purposive theory, in a practical sense there would be little difference 
between a purposive theory and a hermeneutic theory of interpretation. 
According to hermeneutic theory, any legislation forms just one part of the 
social context which the judge must interpret as a whole in identifying the 
'right' legislative meaning. Hermeneutic theories of meaning may therefore 
admit a role for the social and moral context of a text in the ascertainment of 
meaning, but it is a sanitised understanding of context founded upon the 
assumption of coherence. 
D The Path Ahead 
All theories of legal determinacy therefore regulate the potentially disruptive 
influence of the statutory context, by eliminating recourse to context altogether 
or admitting only a coherent social or moral context past the portals of the 
courts. The plurality of context depicted by some deconstructive writing is, 
therefore, nowhere to be seen. The recognition of context and the determination 
of its role within a theory of tax interpretation is therefore not an idle 
55 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB; for a discussion of s 15AB see: P Brazil 'Reform 
of Statutory Interpretation - the Australian Experience of Use of Extrinsic Materials: With a 
Postscript on Simpler Drafting' (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 503. 
56 M Radin, 'Statutory Interpretation' (1930) 43 Harvard Law Review 863, 877. 
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philosophical question of the 'how many angels can dance on the head of a pin' 
kind. The prospect of a legal system founded upon indeterminate legal texts and 
judicial lawmaking (in a more radical sense than that contemplated within 
hermeneutic theory) threatens the very foundations of liberal legal theory. The 
central question of this thesis, then, is whether the contemporary adherence to 
formal theories of law in both descriptive and normative terms is a case of 
wishful thinking. 
The first task of this thesis is therefore to examine the judicial interpretation of 
tax legislation in the United Kingdom since 1689, and in Australia after 1900, in 
order to determine whether the formalist account of tax interpretation is 
convincing. Over the past 300 years there have been thousands of tax cases 
involving a wide range of taxes. A comprehensive appraisal of the applicability 
of the determinacy thesis to each of these cases is clearly impossible within the 
limits of this thesis. It is therefore necessary to restrict the historical account of 
the judicial interpretation of tax legislation by undertaking a number of case 
studies which focus upon the judicial interpretation of tax legislation in several 
historical periods. To this end, the judicial interpretation of the window tax in 
the eighteenth century, the interpretation of the income tax in the United 
Kingdom in the nineteenth century, and the interpretation of the income tax in 
Australia in the twentieth century, have been selected as appropriate subjects for 
the purposes of this thesis. The justification for examining the judicial 
interpretation of each of these taxes will be considered at the beginning of each 
case study. 
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CHAPTER Two: RECONCILING THE RHETORIC OF RIGHTS WITH THE PRO 
REVENUE CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LEGISLATION IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
ENGLAND 
A Introduction 
In chapter one it was noted that the generally accepted account of early tax 
interpretation suggests that tax legislation was categorised by the courts as 
'penal' because the imposition of a tax was perceived to compel the transfer of 
private property to the state. In order to protect the rights of the individual from 
such penal legislation, it is generally assumed, the eighteenth century English 
courts adopted the rule that tax legislation must be interpreted strictly against 
the crown. The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether this formalist 
account of early tax interpretation is convincing. Of course, a comprehensive 
analysis of the interpretation of taxation legislation in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the hitherto 
unexamined1 judicial interpretation of the window tax will be considered in 
appraising the merits of the formalist account of early tax interpretation. 
Although relatively small in terms of its revenue yield,2 the window tax is an 
ideal object of study for the purposes of examining tax interpretation after the 
constitutional revolution of 1688. First introduced in 1696,3 the window tax 
was a product of what was, at least in theory, the new constitutional epoch in 
1 A peripheral aspect of Ward's works upon the administration of the window tax was some 
consideration of the administrative interpretation of the window tax, but he did not include the 
judicial interpretation of the window tax within the scope of his study; see: W Ward, The 
administration of the window and assessed taxes 1696-1798 (1963); W Ward, 'The 
administration of the window and assessed taxes 1696-1798' (1952) 67 English Historical 
Review 522. 
2 For the ascendancy of the indirect taxes over the direct taxes including the window tax and 
land tax, see: P Mathias and P O'Brien, 'Taxation in Britain and France, 1715 -1810' (1976) 5 
Journal of European Economic History 601. 
3 (1696) 7 & 8 Will & M, c 18 (An Act for granting to His Majesty several Rates or Duties ... ) 
(Eng). 
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which the crown had ceded control over taxation to Parliament.4 Given that the 
introduction of the window tax coincided with the emergence of judicial 
independence after the Act of Settlement 1701,5 the interpretation of the window 
tax was not governed by earlier judicial interpretations adopted in the time of 
the theoretical, and more or less practical, monarchic control of the central 
government.6 Further, given the recent success of the Glorious Revolution in 
securing parliamentary control over the imposition of taxation, the interpretation 
of the window tax was undertaken in the epoch when the rhetoric of individual 
property rights was in its ascendancy.7 Introduced in the new era of 
parliamentary control, and interpreted by independent judges purportedly 
imbued with the ideology of liberal property rights, one would be hard pressed 
to find a tax which was more likely to have been interpreted according to a 
formalist methodology. As such, the window tax represents an ideal subject for 
testing the formalist accounts of tax interpretation in eighteenth century 
England. 
There are also more practical reasons for examining the interpretation of the 
window tax. Without embarking upon a detailed history of taxation in the 
United Kingdom8 it is sufficient for present purposes to note that the principal 
4 It is generally recognised that while 1688 was a milestone on the path to a constitutional 
monarchy, it by no means cemented the authority of parliament over the powers of the monarch. 
For discussion of this in relation to the tax power see: Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue 
(1988) 127-32. 
5 For further discussion of this aspect see text accompanying nn 172-180 below. 
6 While it is clear that the doctrine of precedent was in its infancy, even in the absence of such a 
doctrine it would be reasonable to expect that, had there been earlier decisions upon the window 
tax, the courts would have regard to the tenor of those decisions in adjudicating upon subsequent 
cases. For discussion of earlier use of precedents see: W Prest, 'The Dialectical Origins of 
Finch's Law' (1977) Cambridge Law Journal 326; BJ Shapiro, 'Law and Science in 
Seventeenth Century England' (1969) 21 Stanford Law Review 727. 
7 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, J W Gough (ed), (1955) sec 124; for general 
discussion of the status of property in the eighteenth century milieu see: Paul Langford, Public 
Life and the Propertied Englishman 1689-1798 (1991). 
8 For which see: W Taylor, The History of the Taxation of England (1853); S Dowell, A History 
of Taxation and Taxes in England (3rd ed, 1965); BEV Sabine, A Short History of Taxation 
(1980); J Coffield, A Popular History of Taxation (1970). 
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forms of taxation imposed by the central govemment9 in the late seventeenth 
century were customs duties, excise duties and various forms of direct taxes. 
The principal forms of direct taxes in this era10 were the so called land tax of 
1688,11 the window tax of 169612 and the sporadic poll tax. 13 As the window 
tax was one of the few taxes for which there was a statutory right of appeal to 
the courts in the eighteenth century, there are only a small number of case 
reports regarding the substantive provisions of eighteenth century tax 
legislation, 14 of which the window tax cases form a significant part. 
Further, unlike many other taxes of relatively short duration, 15 the window tax 
survived for over 150 years, 16 and therefore provides a picture of the early 
interpretation of tax legislation over a considerable period. The longevity of the 
window tax, and its 'visibility' arising from its direct nature, also meant that it 
was of sufficient importance upon the social landscape to generate a document 
trail in the form of legislative amendments, reported judicial decisions, 
administrative papers and social commentary upon the tax. The 'footprint' of 
the window tax upon the pages of history is therefore of sufficient size to enable 
the development of an account of its interpretation. 
9 Note that the local administration also imposed a range of taxes for the purposes of funding 
specific projects such as roads, bridges and poorhouses. 
10 Note that the hearth tax of (1662) 3 & 4 Car II, c 10 (An Act for Establishing an additional 
Revenue upon his Majesty ... ) (Eng) was repealed by (1688) 1 Will & M, c 10 (An Act for Taking 
away the Revenue arising ... ) (Eng). 
11 (1688) 1 Will & M, c 20 (An Act for a Grant to their Majesties of an Aid ... ) (Eng). Although 
the statute also imposed a tax upon personal property and some forms of income, the 
administration of the tax failed to enforce the tax on personal property and income, and so the 
tax was in practice a tax upon land. 
12 See above n 3. 
13 See, for example, (1690) 2 Will & M, Sess 1, c 2 (An Act for raising Money by a Poll) (Eng). 
14 Although there are many decisions regarding the failure of tax collectors to remit collected 
taxes to the central government. 
15 For example, the hearth tax, noted above at n 10. Towards the close of the eighteenth century 
a number of taxes upon indicia of wealth such as servants, silverplate and carriages were 
imposed but were of relatively short duration. 
16 The window tax was repealed by (1851) 14 & 15 Viet, c 36 (An Act to repeal the Duties 
payable on Dwelling Houses ... ) (Eng). 
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B Legislative History of the Window Tax - An Overview 
As already noted, the window tax was introduced in 1696 for an initial term of 
seven years17 with the stated object of recouping losses arising from the wear 
and clipping of the currency. 18 Although it had been amended with some 
regularity, 19 the original window tax was repealed and replaced with a revised 
window tax in 1748.20 This revised version was repeatedly amended until its 
repeal and replacement in 1765.21 The window tax was subsequently repealed 
and replaced in 1784,22 1798,23 1803,24 and 1808.25 The window tax was finally 
repealed in 1851 26 as the seemingly insurmountable shortcomings of the tax 
precipitated its demise.27 
There were at least two significant features of the window tax legislation over 
the course of its 150 year life. The first was that the window tax was expressed 
in broad terms, being imposed upon the occupier of each 'inhabited dwelling 
17 This was subsequently extended by (1697) 8 & 9 Will, c 20, s 15 (An Act for making good the 
Deficiencies of several Funds ... ) (Eng) and (1701) 1 Anne, Sess 1, c 13 (An Act for making 
good Deficiencies ... ) (Eng), and was made perpetual by (1706) 5 Anne, c 13 (An Act for 
continuing the Duties upon Houses ... ) (Eng). 
18 Treasury had expressed concern regarding the debasement of the currency in 1695; see, for 
example, W Shaw (ed), Calendar of Treasury Books (1969), vol 10, 1144-7, 1385, 1396-7. 
19 For the legislative history of the window tax from 1696 see: (1696) 7 & 8 Will & M, c 18; 
(1697) 8 & 9 Will, c 20; (1701) 1 Anne, Sess 1, c 13; (1706) 5 Anne, c 13; (1709) 8 Anne, c 4 
(An Act for continuing Part of the Duties ... ) (Eng); (1716) 3 Geo I, c 8, s 17; (1718) 5 Geo I, c 
3, s 22; (1718) 5 Geo I, c 19; (1719) 6 Geo I, c 21, s 61; (1747) 20 Geo II, c 3 (An Act for 
repealing the several Rates and Duties upon Houses, Windows and Lights ... ) (Eng); (1747) 20 
Geo II, c 42 (An Act to enforce the Execution of an Act of this Session of Parliament .. .) (Eng). 
20 (1747) 20 Geo II, c 3 (An Act for repealing the several Rates and Duties upon Houses, 
Windows and Lights ... ) (Eng). 
21 ( 1766) 6 Geo III, c 38, s 1 (An Act for repealing the several Duties upon Houses, Windows, 
and Lights ... ) (Eng). 
22 (1784) 24 Geo III, c 38 (An Act for repealing several Duties on Tea ... ) (Eng). 
23 (1798 38 Geo III, c 40 (An Act for repealing the Duties on Houses, Windows, and Lights ... ) 
(Eng). 
24 (1803) 43 Geo III, c 161, s 84 (An Act for repealing the several Duties under the 
Management of the Commissioners for the Affairs of Taxes ... ) (Eng). 
25 (1808) 48 Geo III, c 55 (An Act for repealing the Duties of Assessed Taxes ... ) (Eng). 
26 (1851) 14 & 15 Viet, c 36. 
27 Some attention to the deleterious consequences for public health arising from the window tax 
may be found in the pamphlet literature. See, for example, Anon, Suggestions for the Repeal of 
the Assessed Taxes and the substitution of an equitable property and income tax (1848) 3. 
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house' with respect to the number of windows in such buildings.28 There was 
no statutory definition of these key elements of the window tax base, such 
matters being left to the tax administration to resolve. Indeed, the window tax 
typified the brevity of the legislation of the period, there being just a handful of 
specific provisions dealing with particular circumstances.29 
The second feature of the legislation is the repeated revision of the window tax 
legislation over its one hundred and fifty five year life. The legislature 
introduced a host of amendments to the window tax base as the perceived need 
to cater for an increasing number of 'special' cases arose. The mainstream 
account of the changing tax legislation of this period suggests that the trend 
towards the detailed elaboration of the tax base is to be explained by the need to 
shore up the tax base against the strict construction of 'penal' tax legislation by 
the judiciary.30 This is only a part of the truth. Certainly, there were 
amendments to the legislation which attempted to shore up the window tax base. 
Thus, for example, in 1747 it had come to light that taxpayers were evading the 
tax by blocking windows in anticipation of the assessor's inspection and 
subsequently reopening them. To overcome this practice, an anti avoidance 
provision imposing a penalty for such evasion was inserted into the Act.31 
However, in an apparent contradiction of the perceived trend to the detailed 
statutory elaboration of the tax base, throughout the life of the window tax the 
28 Thus, for example, even in 1798 the legislature continued to impose liability to the tax with 
respect to the windows or lights of inhabited houses without any further elaboration upon the 
meaning of these terms; see (1798) 38 Geo III, c 40 (An Act for repealing the Duties on Houses, 
Windows, and Lights, on Inhabited Houses ... ) (Eng) s 2. 
29 The main category of exemption was for houses exempt from the poor rate. Note that the 
exemption of those excluded from the poor rate underwent some development. According to 
(1747) 20 Geo II, c 3 (An Act for repealing the several Rates and Duties upon Houses, Windows 
and Lights ... ) (Eng), s 29 the inhabitant of the house had to be exempt from the church and poor 
rates and the house had to be a cottage with 9 windows or less. In (1784) 24 Geo III, c 38, s 18 
the exemption was extended by the removal of the second requirement. 
30 See, for example, JA Corry, 'Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes' (1935) 1 
University of Toronto Law Journal 286. Corry suggests that the eighteenth century is marked by 
a shift to increasingly detailed legislation. 
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core elements of the window tax were never specifically defined by the 
legislature. 'Inhabited dwelling house' and 'window' were supposedly left to 
the perils of strict judicial interpretation. Further, far from the legislature having 
to create increasingly detailed legislation to shore up the tax base, a review of 
the amendments to the window tax suggests that a large number of the reforms 
to the window tax had the opposite effect of exempting various taxpayers from 
liability. Thus, for example, the dairy industry secured the exemption of 
windows in dairies and cheese rooms,32 while in the early nineteenth century 
other specific exemptions were granted with respect to rooms used for licensed 
chapels,33 rooms used for carrying on manufacture,34 mills or places of 
manufacture guarded by a resident employee,35 rooms used by professional 
persons36 and unfurnished houses in the care of a servant. 37 
The absence of any concerted attempt on the part of the legislature to 
comprehensively define the window tax base, and indeed the substantial number 
of specific exempting provisions amongst the legislative amendments to the 
window tax legislation, are the first clues which suggest that the generally 
accepted account of tax interpretation may be somewhat inaccurate. Had the 
courts been strictly interpreting the window tax legislation against the Crown, 
consistent with the generally accepted account of tax interpretation, it might 
31 (1747) 20 Geo II, c 3 (An Act for repealing the several Rates and Duties upon Houses, 
Windows and Lights ... ) (Eng), s 39. 
32 (1796) 36 Geo III c 117 (An Act to exempt certain windows) (Eng). For discussion of this 
amendment see: A Haldane (Lord Duncan), A Speech delivered in the House of Commons on 
Thursday February 24 1848 on a motion for leave to bring in a bill for the repeal of the 
window-tax (1848) 15. 
33 (1802) 42 Geo III, c 34 (An Act for granting to his Majesty certain additional Duties on 
Windows ... ) (Eng), s 10. 
34 (1810) 50 Geo III, c 104 (An Act for altering the Amount of certain Duties of Assessed Taxes 
.. .) (Eng), s 8. 
35 (1817) 57 Geo III, c 25 (An Act to explain and amend an Act, ... for repealing the Duties of 
Assessed Taxes .. .) (Eng), s 4. 
36 (1824) 5 Geo IV, c 44 (An Act for allowing Persons to compound for their Assessed Taxes ... ) 
(Eng), s 4. 
37 (1825) 6 Geo IV, c 7 (An Act for the further Repeal of certain Duties of Assessed Taxes ... ) 
(Eng), s 3. 
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have been expected that the government of the day would have done its utmost 
to protect the revenue by enacting increasingly detailed definitions of the key 
elements of the window tax base. The fact that the legislature did not concern 
itself with even the most rudimentary definition of 'window' or 'inhabited 
house', while enacting a steady stream of specific exemptions from the tax base, 
therefore seems contrary to what might have been expected had the generally 
accepted account of tax interpretation been accurate. To unravel this mystery it 
is therefore necessary to consider the elements of the generally accepted account 
of tax interpretation. The starting point for this inquiry is to consider whether 
taxation in general, and the window tax in particular, were considered by 
contemporary political economists and other commentators to be 'penal' 
impositions upon the subject. 
1 Eighteenth Century Taxation - Penal Imposition or Payment under (Social) 
Contract? 
Social contract theory constituted the foundation of mainstream social policy, 
including tax policy, during the late seventeenth and the entire eighteenth 
centuries.38 The belief that individuals had gathered together, in entrusting the 
state to act for their collective welfare, underpinned the prevailing benefit theory 
of taxation. According to the benefit theory of taxation, individuals were 
obliged to contribute to the maintenance of the state in proportion to the benefits 
that they derived from the state: 
The expense of government is like the expense of management to the 
joint tenants of a great estate who are all obliged to contribute in 
proportion to their respective interests in the estate.39 
38 Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (1959) 63; E R A Seligman, Progressive 
Taxation in Theory and Practice (1908) 159. 
39 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations, RH Campbell, 
AS Skinner, W Todd (eds), (1976) 825. See also: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1914) 184 (Part 
II, ch 30): 'For the impositions that are laid on the people by the sovereign power, are nothing 
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This benefit theory played a significant role in the characterisation of tax 
legislation in the eighteenth century public policy literature. The 
conceptualisation of taxes in terms of a purchase of state provided services by 
the subject, such as the protection of property, the survival of the realm and the 
maintenance of social order,40 meant that taxes were not necessarily viewed in 
the penal light that modem commentators suggest. This awareness of the 
beneficial aspects of taxation is indicated by the fact that, although it was 
accepted that taxes constituted the confiscation of private property by the state, 
very little ink was used in the theoretical literature upon attacking taxes upon 
the basis of their confiscatory nature: 
Every tax, however, is to the person who pays it a badge, not of slavery, 
but of liberty. It denotes that he is subject to government, indeed, but 
that, as he has some property, that he cannot himself be the property of a 
master.41 
This is not to say that all taxes were automatically accepted by the general 
population, as the evidence of fierce debates upon the respective merits of 
particular taxes is overwhelming and there is ample evidence of tax evasion and 
tax avoidance.42 However, it is significant that in the contemporary literature 
there is little or no reference to the 'penal' nature of taxation.43 The point is that 
else but the wages due to them that hold the public sword, to defend private men in the exercise 
of their several trades, and callings.' Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 
(1977) Bk XIII, ch 1 'public revenues are a portion that each subject gives of his property, in 
order to secure or enjoy the remainder'. For discussion of the benefit theory of taxation 
generally see: GS Cooper 'The Benefit Theory of Taxation' (1994) 11 Australian Tax Forum 
397, 434-5. 
40 A point to which I will return later in this chapter, see the text below, under the heading 'The 
Legitimation of the Pro Revenue Rule of Construction', commencing at p 66. 
41 Smith above n 39, 857. 
42 For discussion of tax evasion in the eighteenth century see: C Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers' in 
Douglas Hay, P Linbaugh and E P Thompson (eds), Albion's Fatal Tree - Crime and Society in 
Eighteenth Century England (1975). For further discussion of this point see the text below 
under the heading 'The Weakness of the Taxation System'. 
43 W Kennedy, English Taxation 1640-1799 (1913) chs 5, 9; Brewer notes that, given the high 
level of taxation imposed in England, the absence of any concerted opposition to taxes in 
eighteenth century England is extraordinary; see: John Brewer, The Sinews of Power (1989) 22-
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taxation per se was not necessarily considered to be 'penal', although particular 
taxes were considered to be more or less 'fair'. 
C The Contemporary Appraisal of the Window Tax 
1 The Window Tax and Benefit Theory 
Leaving to one side this influence of benefit theory upon the characterisation of 
tax legislation generally, for a number of reasons the window tax itself was 
considered more favourably than a number of other taxes. Turning firstly to the 
appraisal of the window tax from the perspective of the benefit theory of 
taxation, although benefit theory was often cited by the contemporary 
commentators, there was considerable debate as to how it was to be understood 
in practice.44 Even within Hobbes' work it is possible to discern an 
ambivalence as to the nature of the benefit that a subject derived from the state. 
At one point he indicated that the fundamental benefit derived from the 
existence of the state was 'the enjoyment of life', which he suggested was 
equally dear to rich and poor alike.45 However Hobbes continued by noting that 
wealthier citizens benefited from the provision of state protection of their 
private property. Whereas the first definition of 'benefit' would suggest that a 
flat tax was appropriate, the second definition of 'benefit' was consistent with 
the imposition of taxation according to the ability of the taxpayer to harness his 
or her wealth in paying the tax. Hobbes resolved the apparent conflict by 
accepting that the fundamental benefit should effectively be provided free of 
3. See also: John Brewer, 'The English state and fiscal appropriation, 1688-1789' (1988) 16 
Politics and Society 344. 
44 For an excellent review of the eighteenth century tax policy literature, see: W Kennedy, above 
n 43; Cooper, above n 39; HM Groves and D Curran (eds), Tax Philosophers: Two Hundred 
Years of Thought in Great Britain and the United States (1974). 
45 Hobbes, above n 39, 184 (Pt II, ch 30). 
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charge,46 while the wealthier members of any community ought pay for the 
protection of their wealth. However, the recognition that wealth was an 
appropriate basis for measuring a subject's benefit raised the question of how 
wealth was to be measured. Hobbes was not alone in suggesting that the 
'benefit' derived by an individual equated with their consumption.47 Others 
maintained that the taxation of property was a superior basis of taxation.48 To 
others, the fact that wealthy traders with high business profits were in a position 
to escape both the property taxes (by holding little landed property) and the 
consumption taxes (by consuming relatively little) suggested that various 
alternative taxes upon revenue ought be adopted.49 This debate about the proper 
application of the benefit principle highlights the polymorphous character of the 
benefit concept - some equated benefit with consumption, others equated benefit 
with propertied wealth and others equated benefit with income. 
Notwithstanding this debate concerning the nature of the benefit concept, the 
window tax was viewed favourably from the standpoint of benefit theory. It 
seems that the assumed correlation between the number of windows in a 
taxpayer's house and the 'benefit' derived by the taxpayer from the protection 
afforded by the state, the graduated nature of the window tax, 50 and the 
exemption of the poor from the tax meant that it could at least superficially be 
characterised as one in accordance with the benefit principle.51 This is not to 
say that the window tax was universally considered to be the perfect tax. Some 
46 Another commentator argued that the lower classes ought be excluded from any liability to 
taxation because it was already their 'lot' to fight wars and provide their labour; John Cary, 
noted in Kennedy above note 43, 88. 
47 Hobbes, above n 39, 184; for discussion of this aspect of Hobbes' work see: Cooper, above n 
39, 431-5. 
48 For discussion of some proponents of a property tax see: E L Hargreaves, The National Debt 
(1930) 31-6, 82. 
49 Smith, above n 39, vol ii, 825. 
5° Favourable comment upon this aspect of the window tax may be seen in The London 
Magazine (1747), 123. 
51 Indeed, in 1778 Lord North justified the window tax on this ground: W Cobbett (ed), The 
Parliamentary History of England from the earliest period to the year 1803 (1814), vol 19, 872. 
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commentators, for example, pointed to instances where the number of windows 
in a house did not constitute an accurate measure of the benefit derived by the 
occupant from the state. 52 The dearth of objections to the window tax in the 
contemporary tax policy literature therefore that the eighteenth century English 
community was prepared to overlook the shortcomings of the window tax in 
light of the generally accepted merits of the tax. 
2 The Visibility of the Window Tax 
The second characteristic of the window tax which enhanced its appeal was its 
direct nature. During the eighteenth century there was a widely held preference 
for direct taxes such as the land tax and the window tax, as opposed to 
'invisible' indirect taxes such as the excise. Beckett attributes this preference to 
the belief that direct taxes granted for a specific purpose and for a limited term 
were the subject of closer Parliamentary scrutiny, by contrast to the traditional 
sources of crown revenue such as customs duties. 53 In a time when the 
supremacy of Parliament was by no means assured, it was feared that indirect 
taxes would all too easily enhance the power of the executive arm of 
government to the detriment of the power of Parliament. 54 
3 The Role of the Local Administration 
Yet another favourable feature of the window tax in the eyes of its 
contemporaries was that it was administered by local government as opposed to 
the centralised administration of the customs and excise. In more recent times 
the social significance of the local government in the United Kingdom over the 
52 See, for example, Smith, above n 39, vol 2, 846. 
53 JV Beckett, 'Land Tax or Excise: The Levying of Taxation in Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Century England' (1985) 100 English Historical Review 285. Indeed, the development of the 
Treasury during the latter stages of the seventeenth century is attributable at least in part to the 
concern of Parliament to entrench stricter controls upon the executive arm; see: Henry 
Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870 (1973) 53-4. 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth century has been subjected to intensive 
reexamination.55 This local administration has been portrayed as a significant 
component of the 'social glue' which contributed to the relative stability within 
English society over the eighteenth century. The local administration of laws 
created by the central government reinforced the status of the local gentry within 
their local communities, afforded them the opportunity for social advancement, 
and served to integrate the central government with the local communities in a 
way which administration by the centralised bureaucracy could rarely hope to 
achieve. In this context the use of the local administration to oversee the 
imposition of the window tax accorded with one significant discourse within the 
community and thereby attracted considerable support. 
It has also been argued that the discretion wielded by the local administration of 
parliamentary taxes meant that any perceived inequity in the operation of such 
laws was considerably tempered. Thus Beckett notes that, in Cumberland, local 
custom as to the assessment of taxes prevailed, regardless of the means of 
assessment prescribed in the relevant statute.56 Further, Braddick has 
emphasised that this aspect of the local administration of parliamentary taxation 
was an important safety valve which served to diffuse what might otherwise 
have been considerable resentment to such taxes. 57 The local administration of 
the window tax therefore arguably served to diffuse tensions that might 
54 For discussion of the tenuous grip that Parliament held over the power to impose taxes, see: 
Levi, above n 4, 127-32; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, above n 43, 143-54. 
55 JV Beckett, 'Local Custom and the "New Taxation" in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries: the Example of Cumberland' (1976) 12 Northern History 105; MJ Braddick, 
Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England: local administration and response 
(1994 ); MJ Braddick, The nerves of state: taxation and the financing of the English state, 1558-
1714 (1996). 
56 Beckett, above n 55, 107ff. 
57 MJ Braddick, above n 55; Braddick, above n 55; Joan Kent, 'The Centre and the Localities: 
State Formation and Parish Government in England circa 1640-1740' (1995) 38 The Historical 
Journal 363; Colin Brooks, 'Public Finance and Political Stability: The Administration of the 
Land Tax 1688-1720' (1974) 17 TheHistoricalJournal281. 
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otherwise have arisen with the imposition of such a tax, thereby making the tax 
more acceptable to some parts of the community. 
4 The Non Intrusive Means of Ascertaining Tax Liability 
Shortly before the introduction of the window tax, the hearth tax had been 
repealed at a time when the government was in dire need of revenue. That the 
hearth tax was repealed at such a time is largely attributable to the sensitivity of 
substantial portions of the English community to intrusions into their dwellings 
by tax 'officers' ascertaining the liability to the hearth tax.58 By contrast, the 
number of windows could generally be assessed without any such intrusion into 
the home,59 such that this potential cause of dissent was effectively eliminated.60 
5 The Acceptance of the Window Tax 
There are therefore a number of reasons for the initial acceptance and 
subsequent retention of the window tax. It is doubtful that the window tax was 
ever considered a perfect tax by eighteenth century standards. However, it is 
clear that the tax catered to many of the pre-eminent demands of eighteenth 
century tax policy such that the tax received considerable communal support. 
Indeed, what is notable about the window tax is that it was the object of 
relatively insignificant adverse comment over the course of the eighteenth 
century.61 
58 Smith, above n 39, vol 2, 846 (Bk 5, ch ii). For discussion of the administration of the hearth 
tax see: Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth Century England, above n 57. 
Resentment to the hearth tax may also be attributable to the earlier farming out (or, in modern 
parlance, the contracting out) of the hearth tax collection to private tax agents. 
59 Although it was necessary to enter dwellings when there was no other access to the back of 
terrace houses, or where it was necessary to determine the number of internal windows. 
60 Indeed, Smith commented favourably upon the administrative aspects of the window tax; 
Smith, above n 39, vol 2, 846 (Bk 5, ch 2). 
61 Whereas other taxes such as the more fiscally significant customs and excise attracted more 
critical scrutiny. This may be attributable to the greater scale and hence, social significance, of 
the indirect taxes. However, the favourable comments of Adam Smith upon the inhabited house 
tax are indicative of the more favourable view of the direct taxes, including the window tax. 
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D The Creation of the Jurisdiction to Hear Window Tax Appeals 
The preceding discussion of the social context of the window tax therefore only 
serves to heighten the mystery of the apparent contradiction between the 
generally accepted account of strict interpretation of tax legislation and the 
historical evidence. The perseverance of the legislature with the generally 
worded window tax legislation, which was generally considered to be 
'beneficial', seems to contradict the account which suggests that the courts 
construed increasingly detailed tax legislation which was considered to be 
'penal.' 
This conflict between the generally accepted account of tax interpretation and 
the historical evidence raises a question regarding the eighteenth century 
perception of the role of the courts in tax administration. It was noted in the 
introduction to this chapter that the generally accepted account of the received 
role of the courts in tax administration after 1688 is that they were considered 
by contemporaries to be defenders of individual rights against illegal 
interference by the state. The creation of a jurisdiction in the courts to hear tax 
matters, shortly after 1688, would be consistent with this historical account. 
Further, the perceived function of the courts as protectors of the rights of 
individuals suggests that the tax administration had the capacity to impose tax to 
the very limits of 'the law'. It is therefore necessary to test these claims against 
the historical evidence. 
1 Local Administration of Central Taxation - An Overview 
Atiyah has observed that it is difficult for modem observers to recreate in the 
mind's eye the nature of social conditions and government in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. 62 It is difficult, for example, for a modem observer to 
understand the extent to which the central government depended upon the local 
62 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979). 
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level of government for the implementation of all manner of legislation, 
including the collection of taxes. The power of the central government in 
modern times may mislead modern observers into assuming that the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries were marked by a gradual assertion of central power 
over the local arm of government. However, there is a wealth of evidence 
which suggests that the emergence of the central power of government was by 
no means an uninterrupted progression to its modern dominance. Indeed, there 
is a substantial body of literature which suggests that the power of local 
government had actually increased dramatically in the course of the seventeenth 
century.63 The fiscal demands of financing an expensive Civil War had 
precipitated a new phase in the development of the taxing state, as parliamentary 
taxes were administered by the gentry at the local level at a time when the yield 
of direct taxes was the predominant source of central revenue.64 Although the 
relative fiscal importance of the direct taxes ebbed in the latter stages of the 
seventeenth century as successive governments experimented with various 
centrally administered indirect taxes, the administration of the direct taxes of the 
eighteenth century continued this tradition of dependence by the central 
government upon local administration in the hands of the local gentry.65 
The eighteenth century is therefore marked by a considerable reliance by the 
central government upon the local level of government. This raises the question 
of the extent to which the central government was in a position to control local 
government in collecting the parliamentary taxes. The need to bring the 
decentralised local administration of county and parish government under 
centralised control had been recognised in the Tudor and early Stuart periods, 
when the Privy Council, the Star Chamber and the Provincial Councils had been 
63 See the discussion above, under the heading 'The Role of the Local Administration'. 
64 Braddick notes that in the period 1649-1659 the locally administered direct taxes raised 
55.22% of national revenue: Braddick, The nerves of state, above n 57, 10. 
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granted jurisdiction to exercise control over decisions made at the local 
government level.66 By the Restoration these sites of centralised control over 
the local administration had been abolished67 and there was no general statutory 
right of appeal to the central courts with respect to decisions taken at the local 
level.68 Nevertheless, the common law courts retained some control over errant 
local administrators and justices by virtue of the prerogative writs, presentment 
and indictment, and also by suit brought against the justices by a private citizen 
seeking compensation for malfeasance or nonfeasance.69 But leaving aside the 
procedural and practical obstacles to maintaining an effective tax administration 
by recourse to these causes of action, the supervisory powers exercised by the 
central courts were also inapplicable in the case of discretionary powers 
exercised by the local justices in tax matters.70 These practical obstacles 
minimised the number of tax matters brought to the higher courts on the 
prerogative writs.71 
This is not to suggest that local government officials were a law unto 
themselves, ignoring legislation passed by the central government without fear 
of legal or moral retribution. In more recent times there has been a substantial 
amount of work which re-examines the history of central/local relations. It is 
generally recognised that the central government wielded only a tenuous 
influence over local government. However, the modem literature suggests that 
65 Christopher Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution (1969), 140-1; for a discussion of the 
increasing power accorded to Justices of the Peace see: Landau, The Justices of the Peace: 
1679-1760 (1984) 31-4. 
66 W Holdsworth, A History of English Law (6th ed, 1938); vol 4, 77-80; vol 10, 127, 155-8. 
67 See, for example, Anthony Fletcher, Reform in the Provinces: The Government of Stuart 
England (1986); Norma Landau, above n 65. 
68 Holdsworth, above n 66; vol 6, 56-66; vol 10, 126-55. 
69 Ibid; vol 5, 420; vol 10, 133. 
70 The courts had for some considerable time recognised the principle that they could not review 
the exercise of a discretion, see: Holdsworth, above n 66; vol 10, 252-4. 
71 Whilst it might be accepted that not all of the cases on the prerogative writs were reported, the 
proportion of cases taken on the prerogative writs was relatively small. Arthurs has confirmed 
this, at least for the year 1830: see: Harry Arthurs, 'Without the Law' Administrative Justice and 
Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (1985). 
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the history of seventeenth and eighteenth century tax administration is not one 
of local dissent in the face of central legislation, but rather one of a symbiotic 
relationship which developed between the central and local levels of 
government. 72 Such studies therefore present an account of the administration 
of parliamentary taxation which rectifies the perceived shortcomings of earlier 
histories, which were marred by an excessive dependence upon the records of 
the central government. Such records, it is suggested, give a prejudiced view of 
local government by focusing upon the instances of maladministration and other 
administrative shortcomings at the local level. In part, the incentive for local 
administrators to cooperate with the central government is explained by the 
prestige and power flowing to local office holders. 73 Furthermore, the 
preparedness of the local gentry to assume the administration of central laws 
might also be attributable to their recognition of the benefits that the state 
brought to the local community. Amongst other benefits, central government 
could pass laws for the protection of property, laws regulating disputes between 
parishes and laws giving the local gentry greater powers for the fulfilment of 
their public duties. The local gentry could therefore not help but conceive of 
'the central state' as more or less 'their' state and 'there' for them rather than 
some alien power imposing its will upon local communities.74 
Whilst conceding the existence of this local cooperation, this chapter examines 
one aspect of the response of the central government to the perceived 
shortcomings of the local administrators in their administration of the window 
tax.75 
72 See, for example, MJ Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth Century England, 
above n 57, 17-19; cfB EV Sabine, above n 8, 108. 
73 Kent, above n 57; Brooks, above n 57. 
74 Kent, above n 57. 
75 Such a study is therefore not intended to rebut the recent work which has recovered the 
various local histories of early tax administration, but rather to add another dimension to the 
narrative. 
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2 The Window Tax Administration 
As we have already seen, in the eighteenth century the tradition of local 
administration of direct taxes was considered to be an important bulwark of 
parliamentary control over taxation at a time when that control was by no means 
assured, and when it was feared that the indirect taxes of customs and excise 
could all too readily revert to executive control. In 1696 it is therefore 
understandable that the assessment of the window tax was placed under the 
control of the commissioners of the land tax for one year,76 and that the local 
justices of the peace were to assume responsibility for the local administration 
of the tax for the remaining six years that the tax was to apply.77 
The commissioners were to divide according to geographical subdivisions 78 and 
appoint assessors resident within those geographical subdivisions. The task of 
the assessors was to inspect the inhabited houses within their geographical 
division and determine the names of the inhabitants, the number of windows 
and the amount of tax to be paid in respect of each taxable building. The 
assessors were then to submit their certificates of assessment to the 
commissioners within a specified time along with the names of two persons to 
be responsible for collecting the tax and forwarding it to the Receiver-General. 
In 1719 the parish or other place nominating the collectors was made 
responsible for the due performance of the collectors' tasks. 79 
The commissioners were invested with substantial inquisitorial powers of 
review, being required to scrutinise assessor's certificates and examine an 
assessor with a view to establishing whether the assessor had failed to correctly 
assess the residents of the respective parish or district. In the event of such a 
76 (1696) 7 & 8 Will & M, c 18 (Eng), s 6. 
77 (1696) 7 & 8 Will & M, c 18 (Eng); see also: (1697) 8 & 9 Will, c 20 (Eng), s 15. The 
supervision of the commissioners by the justices of the peace was, it has been noted, considered 
necessary in the light of past maladministration by the commissioners in respect of the land tax; 
see: Ward, The Administration of the Window and Assessed Taxes 1696-1798, above note 1, 3. 
78 (1696) 7 & 8 Will & M, c 18 (Eng), s 6. 
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failure, the commissioners were empowered to examine the inhabitant of the 
relevant dwellings in order to ascertain the tax payable.8° Further, the 
commissioners were similarly authorised to conduct appeal hearings in an 
inquisitorial manner, there being no right of appeal from the decision of the 
commissioners. 81 The creation of final powers of determination in the 
commissioners reflects the importance of the local administration in 
implementing initiatives of the central government. The absence of rights of 
appeal beyond the decision of the justices, even to the Quarter Sessions,82 might 
be explained by the perceived need to expedite the collection of revenue83 and 
was also consistent with the tradition of rights of review at the 'administrative' 
level of government. 84 
3 Why was a Right of Appeal to the Common Law Courts Created? 
As Ward has noted, the interests of the central government in the local 
administration of the window tax were to some extent protected by a body of 
Surveyors appointed by the central tax office.85 Notwithstanding this measure, 
79 (1719) 6 Geo I, c 21 (Eng), s 61. 
80 (1696) 7 & 8 Will & M, c 18 (Eng), s 9. 
81 See: (1696) 7 & 8 Will & M, c 18 (Eng), s 13. Although judicial review under the prerogative 
writs remained - in the case of the land tax, see: Concerning the Commissioners of the Land-Tax 
for the City and Liberties of Westminster (1746) Parker 74; 145 ER 717. 
82 This is significant as Holdsworth might be understood to imply that the rights of appeal to the 
Quarter Sessions constituted an important check upon the discretion of the local justice of the 
peace, and therefore was instrumental to the rule of law in eighteenth century England; 
Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 10, 24lff. 
83 There was also no appeal from the commissioners of excise, arguably for the reason of 
expediting the revenue collection; see text accompanying nn 106-107 below. 
84 See: Dowell, above n 8, vol l, 193-200; an early example of this right of administrative 
review is found in Taxation Act 1558 (Eng) 1 Eliz, c 21, s 17 nv; while late seventeenth century 
examples may be seen in An Act to prevent Frauds and Concealments of his Majesty's Customs 
and Subsidies 1660 (Eng) 12 Char II, c 23, s 31; An Act for additional Duty of Excise upon 
Beer, Ale, and other Liquors 1688 (Eng) 1 Will & M, c 24, s 13. Note, however, that the 
adoption of a right of administrative review was by no means universal; see, for example, (1662) 
3 & 4 Char II, c 10 (An Act for Establishing an additional Revenue upon his Majesty ... ) (Eng) 
(establishing the hearth tax). 
85 Ward, The administration of the window and assessed taxes, 1696-1798, above n 1, 2. I am 
indebted to the earlier research conducted by Ward for revealing the sources upon which this 
part of the thesis is founded. 
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over its first fifty years the yield of the window tax declined markedly. 86 Ward 
attributes this decline to the preparedness of the local administrators to 
'ameliorate' the effects of the tax by making favourable assessments, to 
taxpayers engaging in various forms of tax avoidance, to the incompetence of 
significant elements of the administration and also to the limited resources of 
the centralised tax bureaucracy overseeing the operation of the tax. 87 During the 
1740's these shortcomings of the window tax administration became all too 
apparent to the Treasury. Contemporary Treasury correspondence indicates that 
in at least some parts of England the Commissioners were slow to initiate the 
assessment process, 88 in other cases they asserted their independence from 
central control by ignoring instructions from the Surveyors, in other cases they 
acted contrary to the provisions of the legislation89 and in some cases they 
discharged friend's assessments without requiring the taxpayer to declare on 
oath that they fell within an exempt category.90 Indeed, the degree of latitude 
exercised by, if not necessarily allowed to, the local Commissioners is suggested 
by the practice in Cumberland of raising the window tax by a customary rate 
called a purvey.91 For the first fifty years of its life, the window tax legislation 
was therefore open to the vagaries of interpretation at the hands of the local 
administrators of the tax.92 
There was also mounting evidence of the inability of the Surveyors to exercise 
effective control over the tax machinery.93 Revelations of Surveyors too busy, 
86 Ward, 'The administration of the window and assessed taxes 1696-1798', above n 1, 526-9. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Shaw, above n 18, vol xiii, 236, 268, 286, 377, 378. 
89 Shaw, above n 18, vol xiii, 337, 346, 360, 361; United Kingdom, Report to the House of 
Commons presented by the Commissioners of Taxes, Journal of the House of Commons, vol 
xxv, 1March1747, 560. 
90 Shaw, above n 18, vol xiv 116. 
91 Ward, 'The administration of the window and assessed taxes 1696-1798', above n 1, 526. 
92 For a discussion of a particular example, see Landau, above n 67, 31-4; cf BEV Sabine, A 
History of Income Tax (1966) 18. 
93 In part the inefficiency of at least some Surveyors might be attributable to the shortcomings of 
the process by which the Surveyors were selected. Under the system of patronage, appointments 
to public office were not necessarily based upon the merits of the appointee. For the corruption 
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disorganised or disinterested to act created a picture of an ineffectual tax 
administration.94 To be fair, the task of supervising the imposition of a tax upon 
the local community was not always easy or pleasant. There are reports of 
overburdened magistrates in the Cumberland district,95 while in Newark the 
assessment process provoked the mob which 'in a tumultuous and disorderly 
manner and with stones dirt and other things forct the ... officer from his duty. 86 
Reports from the Taxes Commissioners to Treasury explaining the decline in 
window tax revenue also emphasised the difficulties experienced by the 
Surveyors in imposing the window tax in the face of hostility to the tax 
expressed by the Justices of the Peace: 
There is a great decrease everywhere in these duties and that not so 
much from the above negligence [of the local surveyors] as from the 
partial and arbitrary proceedings of the Justices in those parts, who will 
not admit of any surcharges where a regular survey has been made in 
order to advance the duties, but on the contrary strike them off without 
examination, as they did lately in Ludlow, Salop, as also in Brecon town, 
though it appeared that many of the houses had from 30 to 70 lights, and 
that no appeal was made, they alleging it would be a bad example for 
one to pay 30 shillings, whilst others in the same circumstances paid but 
20 shillings: John Sesse, one of the surveyors of Devon, is incapable of 
his duty, but the officer lays the blame upon the Justices of the Peace, 
who suffer the people to come and appeal at any time, and they are taken 
off without the knowledge of the officer who should be present to defend 
his charge; for which the clerks to the said Justices receive a fee. 97 
[The Justices of the Peace] are commissioners for these duties, and from 
whom there is no appeal, excuse when they think fit ... without 
and inefficiency arising from the system of patronage, based upon the medieval conception of a 
public office being a species of property, see: Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 10, 509ff. 
94 Shaw, above n 18, vol v, 277-8. 
95 Shaw, above n 18, vol xii, 337. 
96 Shaw, above n 18, vol xiii, 337. 
97 Shaw, above n 18, vol 5, 278; although the understandable willingness of the Taxes 
Commissioners and the Surveyors to pass the blame onto others, must be borne in mind. 
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administering oath to appellant or officer, and in some places are 
persuaded with difficulty to act at all.98 
In the 17 40' s the Treasury therefore portrayed a tale of tax evasion, 
administrative negligence and subversion at the hands of the local 
administration which depicted a tax administration in need of major reform. 
This was brought to the attention of the House of Commons in 1747, when a 
report detailing the difficulties encountered by the Commissioners of Taxes in 
administering the window tax legislation was presented to the House.99 
Although the report did not mention the maladministration on the part of the 
Surveyors, the commissioners were characterised as generally exercising their 
discretion in favour of the taxpayer at some considerable cost to the central 
revenue: 
From our having been frequently acquainted by several of the 
commissioners of the land tax, and many of our officers, upon their 
attending the commissioners, that they did not think themselves 
authorized by the powers given by the Act, as it now stands, to order the 
assessments to be made according to the instructions given by us to the 
surveyors, as not thinking the Act sufficiently clear and explicit to justify 
them in the execution of it, in consequence of such interpretation, which 
together with the surveyors not being permitted in some places to do 
their duty, and the methods which have been universally practised in 
stopping up windows or lights, to evade the payment of the duties 
granted by the act, have, in our humble opinion, made it necessary to 
have the said Act explained. 100 
A central aspect of the report made by the Commissioners of Taxes to the House 
of Commons was the contention that there was no effective control over the 
arbitrary decisionmaking of the justices of the peace. The report made it clear 
that there was a serious loss to the revenue arising from the failure of the 
98 Shaw, above n 18, vol iii, 157, 312. 
99 United Kingdom, Report to the House of Commons presented by the Commissioners of Taxes, 
above n 89. 
100 Ibid. 
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justices to adopt the interpretation of the law disseminated by the 
Commissioners of Taxes through the network of surveyors. Whether or not 
these reports presented an accurate picture of the administration of the window 
tax at the hands of the local government, the response to this portrayal of a 
defective window tax administration was swift. Firstly, incompetent surveyors 
were replaced and surveyors were thereafter generally appointed by the 
Treasury.101 Secondly, in 1748 the existing legislation was replaced by a 
revised Act which included a right of appeal by way of case stated to the 
Justices of the Courts of Kings Bench, Exchequer or Common Pleas. 102 
With respect to the second response, according to the generally accepted 
historical account, the role of the courts was to protect the individual from 
extralegal exercises of state power. However, the picture of the window tax 
administration sketched in the preceding paragraphs suggests that the 
administration of the tax was far from the model of bureaucratic efficiency 
seemingly assumed in historical accounts of tax interpretation. If the tax 
administration was as inefficient as government reports of 1747 suggest, it 
seems odd that Parliament would seek to protect the rights of the subject against 
the state by creating a right of appeal to the courts in 1748. 
Rather than being created for the purpose of protecting the rights of individual 
taxpayers, the circumstantial material suggests an alternative account of the role 
of the courts in the administration of the eighteenth century window tax. This 
alternative account is that Parliament created the right of appeal in order to 
protect the interests of the central government. Faced with the dire state of the 
window tax administration depicted in the 1747 Report of the Commissioners of 
Taxes, and given the history of supervision of local government by the central 
101 Sabine, above n 92, 22. 
102 (1748) 21 Geo II, c 10, s 10; the appeal was to one of the Justices of the Kings Bench, 
Common Pleas or the Exchequer by way of a case stated after the rights of administrative review 
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courts, it is understandable that the central government once again 103 turned to 
the central power of the courts as a means of constraining errant local 
administrators. Relatively few reports of decisions made under this mechanism 
survive, and there has been no detailed study of this extension of the jurisdiction 
of the central courts. The impact upon the decisionmaking by justices is 
therefore difficult to ascertain. However, even one hundred years later, the 
perceived importance of the courts in supervising the local tax administration 
was recognised by one Tax Surveyor. 104 A consideration of the rights of review 
under other contemporary tax legislation also suggests that this extension of the 
supervisory powers of the central courts was founded upon the pragmatic 
imperative of protecting the central revenue rather than upon the imperative of 
protecting individuals from abuses of state power. From the perspective of the 
discourse of individual rights, it is a striking anomaly that the courts were 
granted jurisdiction with respect to window tax matters but not with respect to 
the far more important sources of government revenue such as customs and 
excise. These indirect taxes were already administered by a highly centralised 
tax bureaucracy which was considered to be the efficient jewel in the 
bureaucratic apparatus. 105 From the pragmatic perspective of a concern for the 
central revenue, it is therefore understandable that it was considered 
unnecessary to grant a jurisdiction to the courts with respect to appeals against 
the imposition of customs duty. Despite contemporary condemnations of the 
absence of rights of review in relation to these indirect taxes, 106 proposals to 
had been exhausted. After 1823 the cases stated to the Justices in this way were annually to be 
laid before Parliament annually, see: (1823) 4 Geo IV c 11, s 7. 
103 The first examples of control exercised by the courts being the power of the Privy Council, 
the Star Chamber, and the Provincial Councils; see above n 66. 
104 United Kingdom, House of Commons, First Report of the Select Committee on the Income 
and Property Taxes, (1852) 185-6 (Evidence presented by Mr Hyde, Surveyor of Taxes). 
105 Brewer, above n 43, passim. 
106 Holdsworth notes that the powers of the excise commissioners, from which there was no 
appeal, were the subject of adverse comment by Blackstone and Johnson, the latter defining an 
excise as 'a hateful tax levied upon commodities, and adjudged not by the common judges of 
property but wretches hired by those to whom Excise is paid.'; see: Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 
10, 454 n 8, 516. 
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limit the powers of the excise commissioners were rejected by the House of 
Commons in 1786 and 1790 on the basis that the efficient collection of the 
revenue called for stringent measures. 107 That the appeal mechanism was 
founded upon pragmatic considerations rather than reflecting an endorsement of 
the protection of the rights of the individual may also be discerned in a 1798 
amendment to the window tax legislation, which imposed penalties upon any 
taxpayer who appealed without success. 108 
From the foregoing discussion it may be seen that, even before considering the 
judicial interpretation of the window tax, some major modifications must be 
made to the generally accepted account of eighteenth century tax interpretation. 
Far from standing between the subject and an efficient tax administration 
willing to impose taxes beyond the limits of the law, the courts were not even 
granted a statutory jurisdiction to hear window tax appeals until sixty years after 
the revolution which had purportedly entrenched the rule of law. In this respect 
at least, the generally accepted account of the role of the courts with respect to 
eighteenth century tax legislation must be modified. This modification of tax 
history to take account of the pragmatic considerations underlying the creation 
of a jurisdiction in the courts to hear tax appeals raises a further question 
regarding the generally accepted account of tax interpretation. If the courts were 
adopting the pro taxpayer construction of tax legislation depicted in twentieth 
century accounts, granting a right of appeal to the courts in window tax matters 
might not have benefited the central revenue at all, or might have been of only 
marginal benefit. If this was the case, why would the legislature invest the 
courts with a jurisdiction to hear window tax appeals? At this point it is 
therefore necessary to turn to the third aspect of the generally accepted account 
107 United Kingdom, House of Lords, Hansard, 26 June 1786 (Lord Loughborough), 177-8; 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansard, 30 April 1790 (Attorney General), 749-50; for 
a discussion of this see: Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 10, 516. 
108 (1798) 38 Geo III c 40. 
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of tax interpretation, and examine whether the courts in fact adopted a strict 
construction of tax legislation. 
E The Judicial Interpretation of the Window Tax 
1 The Interpretation of 'Inhabited Dwelling House' 
From the brief overview of the window tax legislation set out above, it may be 
seen that the operation of the tax depended to a considerable extent upon the 
meanings of the terms 'inhabited dwelling house' and 'window'. The absence of 
any statutory definition of these terms was also noted. Turning first to the 
interpretation of 'inhabited dwelling house', several questions regarding the 
meaning of this key element of the window tax base arose over the course of the 
eighteenth century. In particular, it was unclear whether several otherwise 
distinct buildings which had some form of internal communication should be 
treated as one 'house'. This question was important given the graduated nature 
. of the window tax - generally, the larger 'houses' attracted a larger tax liability, 
as more windows would be assessed to the tax. Secondly, it was not clear 
whether a 'house' which had several uses, and was only partially used as a 
dwelling, should nevertheless be treated in its entirety as an 'inhabited dwelling 
house'. This question was important given the implicit suggestion that the tax 
only applied to buildings used for habitation, and the consequent problem of 
determining whether a building which was only partly used for habitation ought 
be subject to the tax. In 1784 the legislation was amended to specifically 
exempt buildings used for a range of commercial purposes, 109 but this 
exemption did not answer the problem of how a building was to be 
characterised where it was used for several purposes. 
The legislation did not specifically impose tax upon buildings that were only 
partly used for habitation or upon buildings which had some connection with a 
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dwelling house. Nor, might it be added, did the legislature specifically exempt 
such buildings. There was therefore considerable doubt regarding the 
application of the window tax to buildings adjoining a dwelling, or even 
buildings on the same block of land. After 1784 several questions regarding the 
scope of the specific exemption of commercial buildings remained. Had the 
courts been adopting the strict construction rule in this period, it would have 
been reasonable to expect that any ambiguity in the window tax base would be 
resolved in favour of the taxpayer. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
surviving case records to determine whether this was, in fact, the approach 
adopted by the courts. 
(a) 'Dwelling House' 
In the case of Strickland and Grif.fin110 the taxpayers were assessed to the 
window tax with respect to a sugar refinery which was a distinct building used 
solely for the purpose of sugar refining. Although inhabitable, it was not 
inhabited but rather was specifically adapted to its industrial use and was 
insured at a rate appropriate to an industrial building. However, the refinery 
building was connected to another building by a party wall. Refinery employees 
who lived in the adjoining building gained access to the refinery by a doorway 
through the party wall which was closed and locked each night. The refinery 
was assessed for forty five windows on the basis that it was a 'dwelling'. The 
taxpayer appealed and the Commissioners upheld the appeal on the basis that: 
The enumeration and detail of offices in the explanatory act of the 21st 
Geo II doth demonstrate, that dwellings, and the appurtenances of 
dwellings, are the objects of the rate; and further, that they humbly 
109 (1784) 24 Geo III, c 38, s 34. 
no Reported in J Smee (ed), A Complete Collection of Abstracts of Parliament and Cases with 
Opinions of the Judges Upon the Following Taxes: viz Upon Houses, windows, servants, 
horses, carriages and dogs; the duties upon Hairpowder Certificates; and also the Twenty per 
cent upon the Assessed Taxes (1797) vol 2, 405. 
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conceive that the silence which is observed in all the window acts with 
respect to manufactories, is not the result of omission, but of the justice 
and the tenderness of the legislature to manufacturers, who paying the 
window-tax for their dwelling-houses, thereby contribute to that aid to 
his Majesty in full proportion to the rest of the public. 
The case being stated for the opinion of the judges in accordance with the Act, 
the judges111 held that the Commissioners were wrong and that the refinery was 
properly assessed. Clearly there were at least two plausible arguments regarding 
the operation of the window tax legislation in this case. The reference to 
'dwelling house' could have been interpreted broadly to include all structures 
adjoining an inhabited dwelling. Alternatively, 'dwelling house' could have 
been interpreted more restrictively as including only those parts of buildings 
actually used for residential occupation. It is clear that the former, broader 
interpretation was adopted by the Courts notwithstanding the formalist 
submissions of the Commissioners to the effect that something should not be 
subject to tax if it was not expressly taxed. 
A second example of this pro revenue construction of the 'inhabited dwelling 
house' element of the window tax legislation is found in the case of Fly. 112 In 
that case the taxpayer occupied a block of land on which he had a dwelling 
house and, in an entirely separate building, a teahouse. The Surveyor argued 
that window tax should be imposed upon both buildings. Although it might 
seem that this was a vexatious case brought by the Surveyor, both buildings 
were held to have been properly assessed on the basis that there was only one 
means of access to the two buildings from the street, and that they should 
therefore be treated as one building. 
111 The report notes that Mansfield J and nine other judges unanimously overturned the 
Commissioners' decision. 
112 Reported in Smee, above n 110, vol II, 420. 
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Similarly, in the case of John Haynes113 the taxpayer possessed a watermill 
which was accessible from a dwelling house by one door. The watermill and 
the house were for all other purposes distinct buildings, being built with 
different materials and used for quite different purposes. In expressing their 
opinion for the determination of the judges, the commissioners adopted an 
objectivist rhetoric quite in keeping with the rhetoric which twentieth century 
commentators commonly attribute to the courts. This rhetoric would also have 
been adopted by the eighteenth century courts if they had truly envisaged their 
role as appliers of 'the law' in tax matters: 
Where there exists a positive explanatory statute, specifically describing 
what articles shall be charged, we cannot think ourselves authorized to 
form a precedent for extending the law for taxing any article not 
described therein. It does not appear to us that the letter, or even the 
intention of the statute, can comprehend buildings purposely erected for 
the carrying on of manufacture or stowing of commodities for sale, 
although we readily admit it comprehends cellars, chambers, garrets, and 
passages, which are really and actually internal parts of dwelling-houses, 
and yet are applied to the uses aforesaid. A distinction of this kind 
appears to us designed to be made in the last acts of the 18th and 19th of 
his present Majesty, for granting duties on inhabited houses, from which 
distinction may be enforced an intention in the legislature, to excuse 
extensive trades and manufactories in similar cases. We think that a mill 
which is a distinct building, with a specific application, which does not 
come under any of the above recited descriptions, and which 
communicates with a dwelling house by one door only, merely for the 
sake of convenience, cannot, with any propriety, be deemed part of that 
dwelling house. We think also that the legislature could not mean to 
take advantage of such mere convenience to impose a burden on trade, 
which could not otherwise have been imposed. Had manufactories been 
designed subject to the tax, it seems reasonable that they should have 
been explicitly mentioned. 
Once again, the Commissioners were overruled upon appeal to the judges, and 
once again, the record of this decision merely notes the outcome without 
providing any account of the reasons for this decision. 
113 Ibid 442. 
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(b) 'Inhabited' 
The decisions in Strickland, Haynes and Flyn indicate a preparedness on the 
part of the judiciary to adopt a pro revenue construction of 'inhabited dwelling 
house' for the purposes of the window tax. This recognition of a pro revenue 
approach to the interpretation of tax legislation is also suggested by the judicial 
interpretation of the requirement that the window tax only applied to 'inhabited 
dwelling houses'. 
A number of cases suggest that the courts allowed the imposition of the window 
tax where a building was not inhabited as a place of abode. Thus an office used 
solely for the purposes of fulfilling the functions of a justice of the peace, and at 
some distance from the justice's dwelling house, was held to be assessable. 114 
Similarly, a lawyer's offices at some distance from his home were also held to 
be validly assessed. 115 Further, in Broomhead's Case116 a taxpayer owned a 
house which he only used 'to drink a glass of wine in it, when he comes there, 
and has four times since Lady-day last dined there with his family, but never 
lodges in the said house'. Notwithstanding this occasional occupation, the 
judges held that the house was 'inhabited' .117 A similar conclusion was reached 
in Sollett and Glass s Case. 118 In that case the appellants had residences at a 
summer resort and also had lodging houses which were let over the summer 
months. Over the winter months the lodging houses were closed up, but there 
was a notice placed at their entrances to the effect that the buildings were 
available for rent. Both the commissioners and the judges held that the lodging 
houses were inhabited houses, upon the basis that they presumed that 'the said 
Richard Sollett and William Glass made as much money of their said lodging-
114 Johnson's Case, reported in Smee, ibid, 416. 
115 Shaw's Case, reported in Smee, ibid, 483; see also: Ho/ford's Case, reported in Smee, ibid, 
464. 
116 Ibid 385. 
117 Similar decisions may be found at, North Riding LangBurgh East Division; William Tullie 
reported in Smee, ibid, 384; Cardiganshire; George Smedley reported in Smee, ibid, 384. 
118 (1785) 8 Price 127; 146 ER 1152. 
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houses, in one summer, as the annual rent of their said houses would amount to, 
if let by the year.' 119 This decision once again illustrates the preparedness of the 
courts to accord a broad scope to the provisions imposing the window tax upon 
'inhabited dwelling houses'. 
Nevertheless, there were exceptional cases where the courts appeared to 
exercise a discretion in favour of the taxpayer, but from the available records it 
seems that such cases were relatively rare. Thus, for example, a house available 
for lease as a fully furnished house which had been occupied for only six 
months of the year was held to be unoccupied for that period, and an abatement 
of the window tax allowed.120 However, from the available records it seems 
that such a result in favour of the taxpayer was most exceptional, the norm 
being illustrated by the decision in favour of the central revenue in Wright's 
Case, 121 the facts of which were indistinguishable from Durno. 
2 The Interpretation of 'Window' 
Another example of a willingness to adopt a liberal construction favouring the 
revenue even into the nineteenth century is the broad definition of 'window' 
adopted by the judges. For example, a hole for the deposit of coal was held to 
constitute a window, 122 while in another case a cellar grating with iron bars 
which admitted so little light that a candle was required during daylight hours 
was held to constitute a window .123 Further, four perforated zinc plates installed 
for the purposes of ventilating a pantry were held to constitute windows.124 
119 The one line decision of the court reads 'We are of the opinion that the determination of the 
Commissioners is right'. Similar decisions may also be found in Skinner's Case (1787) 8 Price 
124; 146 ER 1153; Wright's Case (1808) 8 Price 125; 146 ER 1154. 
120 James Durno; Kensington gravel pits; reported in Smee, above n 110, vol 11, 397. 
121 (1808) 8 Price 125; 146 ER 1154. 
122 Case 1444 - County of Cambridge, Division of Newmarket, United Kingdom, House of 
Commons, Parliamentary Papers, 1841, vol 20, 379. 
123 Case 1546, nv; noted in Dowell, above n 8, vol 3, 176. 
124 Case 1894, nv; noted in Dowell, ibid, vol 3, 176. 
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3 Filling Legislative Lacunae 
Other cases indicate a willingness of the judges to fill lacunae in favour of the 
revenue. For example, in 1784 it was enacted that a house was not to be 
considered to be inhabited unless it was occupied by the owner or a tenant.125 In 
Levett's Case126 a house was occupied by the owner's brother gratuitously, but 
the Surveyor argued before the commissioners that to exempt the gratuitous 
occupier of premises from the tax was contrary to the 'true intent and meaning 
of the Act'. The commissioners upheld the taxpayer's appeal on the basis of 
what they considered to be the literal meaning of the words of the legislation. 127 
However, the judges overturned the decision of the commissioners, there being 
no record of any reasons given for this decision.128 
In another case129 a house spanned two parishes. If the house was assessed in 
each parish with respect to the windows in the respective parish, the occupier 
would have obtained the benefit of the tax free threshold and the lower marginal 
rates twice over in respect of the same dwelling. The legislation called for 
assessment and collection of the tax at parish level. If the ambiguity had been 
resolved in favour of the taxpayer, the occupier would have obtained the tax 
windfall. However, the judges overturned the decision of the commissioners 
who had adopted an interpretation in favour of the taxpayer. Although no 
reasons are given in the judgment, the court apparently accepted the Surveyor's 
argument that the window tax was not a parochial charge, and that the house 
should accordingly be assessed as if it were in one parish and the potential for 
the tax windfall thereby removed. 
125 (1784) 24 Geo III, c 38, s 38. 
126 Reported in Smee, above n 110, 504. 
127 Ibid; this decision was expressed thus: 'We, the commissioners present at the said appeal, are 
of opinion, that the house in question is, under the express words of the abovementioned clause, 
exempt from the payment of the said duty.' 
128 Ibid, for a similar decision on similar facts see: Edwards Case, reported in Smee, above n 
110, 505. 
129 In re John Moore; Suffolk, Plomesgate Hundred; reported in Smee, ibid, vol II, 423. 
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F Significant Features of the Window Tax Decisions 
For present purposes there are three striking features of these window tax 
decisions. Firstly, from the preceding selection of window tax cases decided 
during the 100 years from 1750 to 1850, it may be seen that the judiciary 
generally adopted a construction of the legislation which favoured the revenue 
in the particular case, and that this approach survived until well into the 
nineteenth century. In itself, this conclusion is enough to warrant a revision of 
the generally accepted account of eighteenth century tax interpretation by the 
courts. However, the window tax cases stand for more than the proposition that 
the courts appear to have found in favour of the revenue authorities. After all, 
such a result might be explained by the fact that the legislation was well drafted 
and that, even though the courts were adopting a strict construction of the 
legislation, they had no option but to find in favour of the revenue authorities. 
This leads one to the second striking feature of the window tax cases, which is 
the methodology of interpretation apparently adopted by the courts. It is clear 
that, in adopting the pro revenue construction of the window tax legislation, the 
judges rejected the submissions of the Commissioners which were founded 
upon a formalist conception of law and the judicial role. Had the courts 
accepted such a formalist understanding of the law, it is quite possible that they 
would have adopted the rhetoric of a strict construction, and at least purported to 
interpret the tax according to its 'literal meaning', or perhaps even more directly 
referred to the legislative intention. While the judgments in the window tax 
cases are exceptionally brief, almost invariably amounting to no more than a one 
sentence statement of the result, it seems that the judges were not applying the 
strict construction rule by resolving statutory ambiguities in favour of the 
taxpayer. The inclusion of solicitors' offices in the meaning of inhabited 
dwelling house, the preparedness to include the windows of buildings which 
shared the same access with an inhabited dwelling house, the preparedness to 
include a wide range of apertures within the purview of the term 'window' and 
the preparedness to resolve legislative lacunae in favour of the revenue 
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authorities all suggest that the courts were not resolving ambiguous statutory 
language in favour of the taxpayer. If anything, such ambiguity was being 
resolved in favour of the revenue authorities. 
The third striking feature of the window tax cases is the brevity of the 
judgments in the superior courts, even by contemporary standards. Modem 
observers accustomed to reading lengthy statements of judicial reasoning might 
have expected that this methodological issue would have attracted close judicial 
scrutiny, or at least that the courts would have prepared statements of reasons 
for preferring the interpretation of the legislation more favourable to the 
revenue. This expectation is all the more reasonable given that the subject of 
taxation had been at the forefront of the constitutional crises of the seventeenth 
century, and remained the subject of considerable public debate over the course 
of the eighteenth century. It is therefore significant that in opting for a broad 
construction of the legislation in favour of the revenue, the courts only rarely 
offered any detailed reasons for preferring such an approach. Of course, it may 
be that the case reporters did not consider it necessary to record those reasons. 
However, Smee's reports of the window tax cases contain quite detailed 
accounts of the cases stated by the Commissioners. 130 It therefore seems fair to 
assume that if the courts had given reasons for their decisions, the case reporter 
would have included those reasons in the record of judgment. 
This diminution of the significance of the reasons for the decision, and in 
particular, any recourse to a formalist rhetoric of discovery of the law, suggests 
that it was the practical consequences of a decision which figured more 
prominently in the legitimation of the judicial function rather than any purported 
adherence to a formalist theory of law. If anything, it was the local government 
Commissioners who were generally in step with what is commonly accepted to 
be the Lockean philosophy of individual rights. The courts, on the other hand, 
130 Smee, above n 110. 
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appear to have ignored the new philosophy of private property and in resorting 
to a more pragmatic rule of statutory construction which asserted the priority of 
the Crown at the expense of the 'rule of law'. 
It was because of this preparedness of the judiciary to forsake the 'rule of law' 
in the context of the window tax that the drafting of the legislation seems to 
contradict the generally accepted account of legislative drafting in the eighteenth 
century. Far from the courts precipitating the need for more detailed legislation 
by their adoption of a literal construction of a 'penal' statute, the opposite was 
the case. Indeed, it was the judiciary' s broad application of the tax to such 
'inhabited houses' as dairies which lead to the legislature being petitioned to 
specifically exempt such commercial buildings.131 Further, in response to the 
judicial preparedness to adopt a broad interpretation of the window tax evident 
in the case law considered above, in 1784 the legislature specifically exempted 
windows which were a part of a dwelling used for the purposes of a 
manufacturory, trade, vocation or calling.132 Similarly, the legislature had 
exempted hospitals, charity schools or houses provided for the reception and 
relief of poor persons.133 By contrast to the broad interpretation of the window 
tax adopted by the courts, the reports to the central government regarding the 
local administration of the tax indicated a need for constraints to be imposed 
upon the local administrators. Of the little detailed statutory elaboration of the 
window tax base that occurred in the eighteenth century, it is therefore 
reasonable to suggest that the bulk of the specific rules were directed to the 
perceived need to provide detailed rules to the local administrators of the tax. 
The development of specific statutory window tax rules may therefore be 
explained by the perceived need to control the local administration rather than 
131 (1796) 36 Geo III, c 117 (An Act to exempt certain windows) (Eng). 
132 (1784) 24 Geo III, c 38, s 34. 
133 (1784) 24 Geo III, c 38, s 35. 
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such rules being attributable to the strict construction of the legislation by the 
courts. 
This account of the pragmatic judicial interpretation of the window tax 
legislation clearly constitutes a major threat to the generally accepted account of 
eighteenth century tax interpretation. At this point the key question is whether 
the pro revenue construction of tax legislation, and the judicial rejection of legal 
formalism in the window tax cases, was generally adopted in the adjudication of 
all tax cases in the eighteenth century. 
G Was the Interpretation of the Window Tax Consistent with the Approach 
Adopted with Respect to Taxing Statutes Generally? 
A review of available case law supports the conclusion that this pro revenue 
construction adopted by the courts in the interpretation of window tax 
legislation was not restricted to the interpretation of the window tax. Thus, in 
Camplin v Bullman134 it was recognised that the construction of tax legislation 
in favour of the revenue was a maxim of general application: 
Before I enter upon the particular consideration of the statute of Tunnage 
and Poundage, I would premise the known distinction between statutes 
which grant a revenue to the King, and statutes, or clauses of statutes, 
which inflict a forfeiture or penalty; the former (especially where the 
revenue is granted for the excellent purposes mentioned in the preamble) 
are to be favourably and beneficially construed for the Crown, but the 
latter are of strict construction, and are not to be extended. 135 
Indeed, the principle that taxing statutes were to be interpreted in favour of the 
Crown was frequently accepted either expressly or impliedly, 136 and was never 
134 (1761) Parker 198, 206; 145 ER 755, 758. 
135 Ibid 206; 758. 
136 Vere v Sampson (1662) Hardres 205; 145 ER 454 adopted a broad reading of the revenue 
statute, although the court did not expressly rely upon the principle that tax legislation was to be 
construed liberally. Nevertheless, the suggestion that a tax act was a penal statute which ought 
be construed strictly was raised by counsel for the defendants but rebutted by counsel for the 
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expressly contradicted, in the case law of the eighteenth century and the early 
nineteenth century. As late as 1815 the Court of Exchequer maintained in 
Attorney-General v Newman137 that 'even if it were a doubtful case on the 
construction of the statutes, it is a clear rule, that the right of the Crown is not to 
be taken away by doubtful words or ambiguous expressions.' 138 There can be 
no doubt that this pro revenue construction had assumed an axiomatic status 
over the course of the eighteenth century, the editors of Blackstone asserting 
that 'it is considered a rule of construction of revenue acts, in ambiguous cases, 
to lean in favour of the revenue. This rule is agreeable to good policy and the 
public interest; but, beyond that, which may be regarded as established law, no 
one can ever be said to have an undue advantage in our courts.' 139 
Aside from the pro revenue construction of tax legislation throughout the 
eighteenth century, there is also some indication of a relaxation of the rules of 
evidence to enable the revenue to prosecute actions for recovery of unpaid taxes. 
Thus, in R v Grimwood14° Chief Baron Thomson observed: 
The admissibility of these books in evidence, has been settled in this 
Court, from time to time to be proper; and, indeed, they are the only 
informant. See also: Holton v Raworth (1664) Hardres 358; 145 ER 496 (argued on behalf of 
the Crown and also implicit in the judgment of Turner B); Terry v Huntington (1669) Hardres 
480, 484; 145 ER 557, 559; Tanner v Allfriend (1718) Bunbury 36; 145 ER 586; Re 
Commissioners of the Land-Tax for the City and Liberties of Westminster (1746) Parker 74; 145 
ER 717; Camp/in v Bullman (1761) Parker 198; 145 ER 755; Attorney-General v The Case 
Plate Glass Company (1792) I Anst 38; 145 ER 793; Attorney General v - (1795) 2 Anst 558; 
561, 145 ER 966, 967; Attorney-General v Brewster (1795) 2 Anst 560; 145 ER 966; Attorney-
General v Newman (1815) I Price 437; 145 ER 1455; Scott v Allsopp (1816) 2 Price 20, 32; 
146 ER 8, 12 (Richards B); Attorney General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183, 189; 146 ER 433, 435 
(Garrow B); In re Wootton (1818) 6 Price 101, 106; 146 ER 754, 755; Attorney General v 
Delano (1819) 6 Price 383, 393; 146 ER 841, 845 (note that the principle that taxing legislation 
ought be construed in favour of the revenue was alluded to by counsel, but not judicially, in this 
decision); Attorney-General v Jefferys (1824) 13 Price 545, 572, 580; 147 ER 1077, 1086 and 
1088; Attorney-General v Slee (1824) M'Cle 568;148 ER 237; R v Tregoning (1828) 2 Y & J 
132, 138; 148 ER 862, 865; Attorney-General v Bell (1828) 2 Y & J 431; 148 ER 987. 
137 (1815) I Price 437, 447; 145 ER 1455, 1458. 
138 Ibid 447;1458. 
139 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1809) vol 1, 323. 
140 (1815) I Price 369; 145 ER 1432. 
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evidence adducible in such cases, consistently with the excise business; 
for if all the officers during the period to which they relate were 
necessarily to be called to substantiate them by proof, there would, in 
. b d f . d . . 141 most mstances e an en o recovermg uties m arrear. 
There is therefore a considerable body of evidence justifying the conclusion that 
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the judiciary, with only 
rare exceptions, 142 construed taxation legislation with the object of favouring the 
revenue.
143 However, there were limits to this pro revenue construction. In 
particular, where the legislature had imposed penalties for a failure by a 
taxpayer to comply with the taxation law, the courts generally had no hesitation 
in identifying such provisions as 'penal', and accordingly adopted the rhetoric of 
a 'strict' construction in applying those provisions.144 
1 The Beginning of the Demise of the Pro Revenue Construction of Tax 
Legislation 
However, by the 1820's the tide was turning against this protective role played 
by the courts, with the first recorded decision declaring a strict construction of 
revenue statutes appearing in Ramsden v Gibbs in 1823.145 In that case Holroyd 
J146 stated that the rule for the construction of revenue statutes was that 'in order 
141 Ibid 372; 1433. 
142 R v Inhabitants of Wimbledon (1797) 3 Anst 855; 145 ER 1061. The outcome of this case 
was effectively reconsidered and a result favourable to the Crown relying upon another 
provision reached shortly afterwards in R v Inhabitants of St. Georges, Hanover Square (1797) 
3 Anst 920; 145 ER 1082. 
143 For discussion of the pro revenue interpretation of tax legislation in the case of tax avoidance, 
see: Ian Ferrier, 'The Meaning of the Statute: Mansfield on Tax Avoidance' [1981] British Tax 
Review 303. 
144 In Doe Qui Tam v Cooper (1719) Bunbury 44; 145 ER 589 the court ordered a taxpayer to 
pay unpaid duty rather than forfeit the dutiable wine, notwithstanding that the relevant 
legislation directed that the wine ought be forfeited to the Crown, the reasons for this decision 
are not provided. Holden Qui Tam v Weeden (1723) Bunbury 177; 145 ER 638; Lister Qui Tam 
v Priestley (1811) Wight 405; 145 ER 1308; Cf Attorney-General v Forge (1801) Forrest 105; 
145 ER 1127. 
145 (1823) 1 B & C 319; 107 ER 119. For the purposes of this thesis I examined every decision 
reported in the English Reports to determine whether it dealt with a taxation matter, and read 
every judgment in those cases which dealt with a taxation matter. 
146 Best J concurring. 
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to make the subject liable to the payment of a tax, the language of an Act of 
Parliament ought to be clear and unequivocal, so as to leave no reasonable doubt 
of the intention of the Legislature to impose a burden upon the subject.' 147 
Given the long history of the rule that revenue statutes were to be construed 
favourably to the revenue, it might have been expected that such a dramatic 
turnaround would have been supported by some reasoning for the change. 
Instead, Holroyd J stated the new approach as if it were long accepted dogma. 
This was quickly followed in 1825 by Bayley J confidently declaring in the case 
of Denn v Diamond148 that 'it is a well settled rule of law, that every charge 
upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language.' 149 
Although advocates of the pro revenue construction fought a rearguard action, it 
ultimately receded from prominence as the formalist rhetoric of literalism and 
strict construction moved to centre stage. The rule requiring a construction 
favourable to the revenue was not expressly referred to after 1815 .150 
Nevertheless, other judges of the Court of Exchequer continued to adopt a 
liberal construction of taxing statutes at least late into the 1820's.151 Thus, in 
Attorney-General v Bell152 the Attorney-General argued that the excise upon 
glass should be interpreted in such a way as to fill a casus omissus. All of the 
judges noted that the intention of the relevant provision was to eliminate the 
prospect of fraud on the revenue, and expressed a willingness to interpret the 
provision accordingly. 153 Vaughan B noted that if the statutory provision were a 
penal provision he would have upheld the interpretation advanced on behalf of 
the taxpayer. However, he continued, as this was a provision requiring the 
147 Ramsden, above n 145, 324; 121. 
148 (1825) 4 B&C 243; 107 ER 1049. 
149 Ibid 245; 1050. 
150 Attorney General v Newman (1815) 1Price437; 145 ER 1455. 
151 Attorney-General v Jefferys (1824) 13 Price 545; 147 ER 1077; Attorney-General v Slee 
(1824) M'Cle 568; 148 ER 237; R v Tregoning (1828) 2 Y & J 132, 138; 148 ER 862, 865; 
Attorney-General v Bell (1828) 2 Y & J 431; 148 ER 987. 
152 (1828) 2 Y & J 431; 148 ER 987. 
153 Ibid 442-443, 992 (Alexander CB); 443, 992 (Garrow B) and 444, 992 (Vaughan B). 
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payment of a duty, the interpretation proffered for the taxpayer 'would in my 
opinion be contrary to the manifest intention of the Legislature, and open a door 
to the commission of the very fraud which the act of Parliament intended to 
guard against.' 154 Further, perhaps in recognition of the doctrine of stare 
decisis, in the context of the window tax the courts continued to adopt a broad 
construction of its terms for some decades.155 
Notwithstanding this rearguard action on the part of judges in favour of the pro 
revenue construction of tax legislation, the principle of strict construction was 
repeated with sufficient regularity in the courts to indicate that it was rapidly 
accepted as the norm for the construction of revenue legislation. 156 Subsequent 
cases rationalised this 'strict' approach to revenue statutes on the basis that they 
were properly characterised as 'penal'. The commentators had therefore 
concluded by the mid-nineteenth century that it was a 'well settled rule of law' 
that tax acts were penal and therefore to be interpreted strictly.157 
H The Interpretation of Tax Legislation Compared with the Interpretation of 
Statutes Generally in the Eighteenth Century 
It is clear that the judicial interpretation of tax legislation in the eighteenth 
century was influenced by a pragmatic concern to protect the interests of the 
central government. This raises the question of whether all legislation was 
interpreted with the pragmatic objective of enhancing the power of the central 
government. During the eighteenth century there were at least two often 
154 Ibid 444, 992; note that, upon a retrial, the jury delivered a special verdict for the taxpayer, 
although the interpretation of the Court of Exchequer was applied, see: Attorney-General v Bell 
(1830) 1 C & J 237; 148 ER 1406. 
155 As noted at n 102 above, after 1823 cases stated to the central courts were laid before the 
Parliament. A review of these case decisions suggests that the courts continued to adopt a broad 
construction of the window tax legislation until it was repealed in 1851. See the discussion of 
the case law above, particularly under the heading 'Window'. 
156 Ramsden v Gibbs (1823) 1 B & C 319; 108 ER 119; Attwood v Small (1827) 7 B&C 389; 
108 ER 768; Denn v Diamond (1827) 7 B & C 389; 108 ER 768; Doe v Snaith (1832) 8 Bing 
153; 131 ER 352, 359; Re Bruce (1832) 2 C & J 436; 149 ER 185 
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overlapping discourses with respect to the interpretation of all legislation. Both 
of these discourses tended towards an emphasis upon the rights of the individual 
and might quite readily have provided sufficient justification for the eighteenth 
century courts to adopt a narrow reading of tax legislation. 
The first discourse had developed during the seventeenth century, and suggested 
that legislation ought be categorised as either 'penal' or 'beneficial', with 
unique rules of construction applicable to each category. Thus, when writing in 
the early seventeenth century concerning a statute empowering nominated 
Commissioners to impose rates for the construction of sewers, Callis argued that 
'this statute ... [shall] be expounded with as much favourable equity as can be, to 
enlarge the letter of the law in the sense of construction; because it tends so 
much to the advancement of the commonwealth.' 158 That the application of this 
categorisation of statutes entailed some arbitrary distinctions because 'every 
statute is penal to somebody' was raised by counsel in Platt v The Sheriffs of 
London. 159 Notwithstanding these problems of definition it is generally 
accepted that, over the course of the eighteenth century, a growing recognition 
of individual rights was reflected in the adoption of a rhetoric which emphasised 
the necessity of a 'literal' or 'narrow' interpretation of 'penal' legislation. Thus, 
with respect to criminal offences, it has been argued that this trend towards a 
narrow construction was the judicial response to the introduction of the death 
penalty across a broad range of crimes, particularly those against property. 160 
157 See, for example, F Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes (1848), vol 2, 646. 
158 Robert Callis, The Reading of that Famous and Learned Gentleman, Robert Callis 
Esq ... upon the Statute of 23 H. 8 cap.5 of Sewers (1685), 95-6; for a discussion of Callis' work 
see: Clive Holmes, 'Statutory Interpretation in the Early Seventeenth Century: The Courts, the 
Council and the Commissioners of Sewers' in J Guy and H Beale, Law and Social Change in 
British History: Papers Presented to the Bristol Legal History Conference 14-17 July 1981 
(1984) 107. 
159 (1551) 1 Plow 35, 36; 75 ER 57, 59. 
160 See, for example, Sir Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law (1948) vol 1, 
83-91, 97-103; Douglas Hay, 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law' in Douglas Hay, P 
Linbaugh and EP Thompson (eds), Albion's Fatal Tree - Crime and Society in Eighteenth 
Century England (1975) 17 at 32. Hay argues that this strict construction was merely part of a 
broader process by which the ruling class wielded authority in order to retain control without the 
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From the late seventeenth century, some statutes affecting property rights were 
also classified as penal. Thus, a statute awarding costs fell within the 'penal' 
category, 161 while statutes imposing a fine, 162 excluding certain women from a 
dowry, 163 allowing the summary appropriation of property164 and those 
imposing fees and taxes under private Acts of Parliament165 were also included 
within the 'penal' category over the course of the eighteenth century. 
This preparedness, on the part of the courts, to include a wide range of statutes 
within the 'penal' category has lead some commentators to suggest that there 
was a discourse which embraced a narrow, literal construction of all statutes 
during the course of the eighteenth century.166 This second discourse was 
founded upon the acceptance of the separation of powers and judicial deference 
to the sovereign lawmaking power invested in Parliament and the executive. 
Regardless of the relative strengths of these two discourses, the preceding 
overview of the judicial interpretation of tax legislation during the eighteenth 
century portrays the judicial resistance to the inclusion of legislation imposing 
public taxation within the 'penal' category. Further, the preceding overview of 
the relevant case law also suggests that the courts accepted that the rhetoric of 
individual rights had no direct application to the interpretation of tax legislation. 
This exclusion of tax legislation from the strict construction maxim is 
remarkable for two reasons. Firstly, the pro revenue construction of tax 
legislation is startling when it is recalled that it had been disputes about the 
need for a substantial police force. See also: D Lieberman, The Province of Legislation 
Determined (1989) 14-18. 
161 Cone v Bowles (1691) 1Salk205; 91ER182. 
162 Hooker v Wilks (1740) Barnes 12; 94 ER 783. 
163 Kent v Whitby (1738) 3 Bro Parl Cas 487; 1ER1451. 
164 
'All Acts which compel a man to part with his property in a summary way must ever be 
pursued strictly, and the power be fully set forth whereon such an authority is given, derogatory 
to the common law.' Anon (1774) Loft 438; 98 ER 735; Rex v Croke 1 Cowp 26, 29; 98 ER 
948, 950 (Lord Mansfield). 
165 Gildart v Gladstone (1809) 11East675, 685; 103 ER 1167, 1171. 
166 Corry, above n 30, 296. 
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power of the Crown to arbitrarily impose taxes which had precipitated the 
constitutional crises of the seventeenth century. Given the constitutional 
conflicts of the recent past regarding the power to impose taxes, it might have 
been expected that the strict construction rule would have been applied to tax 
legislation much earlier, and perhaps even been amongst the first categories of 
statutes to fall within the scope of the rule. Instead, it was not until the third 
decade of the nineteenth century that some members of the judiciary signalled a 
change to a more overtly formalist rhetoric in the context of tax interpretation. 
Only after the mid-nineteenth century was the strict construction rule generally 
considered to apply to legislation imposing public taxation. It is therefore clear 
that the liberal theory espoused by John Locke was not immediately adopted by 
the judiciary with respect to taxation statutes in the way that some 
commentators would appear to suggest. 167 The second striking aspect of this 
judicial intransigence with respect to the pro revenue construction maxim is that 
it is found in an era in which the courts were clearly prepared to redefine their 
powers in light of the new constitutional epoch. 168 An essential part of this 
redefinition of judicial power required a reconsideration of the approach 
adopted in interpreting statutes. In the eighteenth century all of the rules of 
statutory construction were therefore open to review. Some, such as the rules 
for construing criminal statutes, were altered markedly as the judiciary 
reconsidered its function. Other rules, such as that favouring the revenue in tax 
statutes, remained unchanged until at least the third decade of the nineteenth 
century when the first steps towards a narrow construction were taken. 
167 Corry does not expressly consider the interpretation of taxation legislation, but it is implicit in 
his thesis that taxation statutes also received a strict construction during the eighteenth century; 
ibid, 295-296. 
168 For a discussion of the relationship between the judiciary and the political sphere in this 
period see: Daniel Duman, The Judicial Bench in England 1727-1875 (1982). 
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I What was the Basis for the Pro Revenue Approach Adopted by the Courts 
During the Eighteenth Century? 
From the preceding overview of the interpretation of tax legislation in the period 
1689 to 1830 it may be seen that a judicial rhetoric of formalism in the context 
of tax legislation did not emerge until the 1820's, and that prior to that time the 
courts had been adopting anything but a formalist interpretative methodology. 
The longevity and general application of the pro revenue construction doctrine 
suggests that it was not an historical anomaly, the product of an idiosyncratic 
judge or some form of 'mistake' in the sense suggested by Dworkin. 169 Further, 
it is clear that the persistence of the pro revenue rule of construction was not just 
an instance of acquiescence in the status quo by eighteenth century taxpayers. 
There is evidence that the judges expressly declined the invitations of taxpayers 
and the local administration to adopt a strict construction of revenue statutes 
instead of a pro revenue construction.170 
This delayed emergence of legal formalism, in the context of the interpretation 
of tax legislation, until long after a formalist rhetoric had been adopted in other 
fields of law leads to the conclusion that the mainstream account of tax 
interpretation in the eighteenth century is less than convincing. 171 Given that 
the interpretation of tax legislation was driven by the pragmatic standpoint of 
the imperative of protecting the revenue, rather than from the formal perspective 
of applying the determinate meaning of the legislation, it is clear that the 
function of the courts could not have been legitimised to contemporary 
observers in terms of the need to protect the rights of the individual against 
'penal' laws such as tax legislation. 
169 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 240. 
170 In Vere v Sampson (1662) Hardres 205; 145 ER 454 the suggestion that a tax act was a penal 
statute and ought be construed strictly was raised by counsel for the defendants but rebutted by 
counsel for the informant; see also: AG v Cavendish (1810) 145 ER 1183 at 1186; Attorney-
General v Borrodaile (1814) 1 Price 148, 157; 145 ER 1359, 1362. 
171 See, for example, Corry, above n 30. 
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This pragmatic adjudication of tax cases in the eighteenth century therefore 
raises a number of questions regarding the contemporary perception of the role 
of the courts in eighteenth century tax adjudication. Why was it considered 
appropriate that tax legislation, one of the most obvious intrusions upon private 
property by the state, ought be interpreted with a view to enhancing the intrusive 
powers of the state with respect to the property rights of individuals? How 
could the courts have established their claim to legitimacy in the eyes of the 
eighteenth century community when they seemed to stand still against what is 
represented as the irrepressible force of the liberal ideology of the sanctity of 
property? Why was it that, in only a handful of relatively insignificant cases, 
the courts were granted a jurisdiction to hear tax appeals, leaving the 
administration of the more significant taxes such as customs and excise to the 
exercise of executive power which was largely beyond judicial supervision? 
Does this limited jurisdiction of the courts, and the pro revenue construction of 
the tax legislation over which the courts had jurisdiction, suggest that the 
eighteenth century British community was less committed to the rule of law 
than is commonly portrayed in modern discussions of eighteenth century tax 
interpretation? 
1 A Partial Judiciary? 
These are fundamental questions, answers to which must be attempted if a more 
accurate picture of eighteenth century tax adjudication is to be developed. 
However, before attempting to answer these questions it is necessary to exclude 
one possible answer. One possible explanation for the pro revenue 
interpretation adopted by the judiciary is that at least some of the institutions 
and doctrines of the 'Dark Ages' survived long after 1689. It might be suggested 
that the 'political' arm of government, including the monarch, continued to 
influence or control the judiciary until the nineteenth century. Judges mindful 
of their future might therefore have adopted a construction of tax legislation 
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favourable to the central government. It is therefore necessary to take a few 
moments to discount this explanation of the pro revenue rule of interpretation. 
In the seventeenth century the monarch could have used the power of appointing 
and dismissing judges to the advantage of the revenue, by appointing only those 
committed to the protection of the Crown revenue and dismissing those who 
threatened to undermine the revenue. 172 However, after the Act of Settlement 
1701 judges were generally appointed during good behaviour for the life of the 
monarch, the only means by which they could be removed being upon an 
address to both houses of Parliament173 and their subsequent dismissal by the 
monarch.174 Moreover, in 1760 George III acceded to the throne, relinquishing 
his right to dismiss judges appointed by his predecessor. Parliament was quick 
to pass legislation embodying this further protection of judicial independence 
into the statute law .175 Thus, by 1701 the judiciary had achieved considerable 
formal independence from the Crown, and the process was complete in 1761. 
The survival of the pro revenue doctrine long after the demise of the monarch's 
formal control over judicial appointments would therefore seem to discount the 
suggestion of monarchic control over the judiciary as the source of the pro 
revenue doctrine. 
172 There is no doubt that the monarch had used the power to appoint and dismiss judges to stack 
the court in favour of the Crown interests, particularly in the reigns of Charles II and James II. 
For a discussion of this see: Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 6, 503-514. For the king's suggestion 
that nominations for the bench be screened by the treasury to ensure that judicial appointees 
would act in the interests of the Crown see: Shaw, above n 18, vol 3, 344, 351. It should be 
noted that, notwithstanding the power of the monarch, the judges did not always comply with the 
wishes of the Crown - for examples of this drawn from the early seventeenth century see: 
Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 5, 351-2. 
173 (1701) 12 & 13 William III c 2, s 3. 
174 The Act of Settlement also required that judicial salaries be ascertained such that the 
possibility of judges being placed under political pressure by arbitrary variations to their income 
was reduced. 
175 (1760) I Geo III c 23; note that by (1707) 6 Anne, c 7 (An Act for the Security of her 
Majesty's Person and Government) (Eng) s 8 judges and other nominated officers of the Crown 
had retained office for six months after the termination of the Crown. 
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However, while the monarch had ceded formal control over judicial 
appointments, informal influence remained. 176 Until the formation of political 
allegiances along party lines in the early nineteenth century, the House of 
Commons was only loosely divided between the landed interests and the 
moneyed interest. In the absence of any concentration of power within 
Parliament, the Crown retained considerable influence over appointees to high 
government office. It might therefore be argued that appointees to judicial 
office would be expected to maintain views conducive to the monarch's 
interests. 177 Further, the monarch had ceded formal control over judicial 
appointments to the government, itself interested in maximising the revenue. 
According to this hypothetical· argument, the prospect of promotion to higher 
judicial office, known as translation, 178 would secure the ongoing allegiance of 
the judiciary to protecting the interests of the government. 
However, it has already been noted that, even when the king held de jure power 
over the appointment and dismissal of judges, the judges would not necessarily 
adopt views in accordance with the king's interest. 179 It is therefore a most 
implausible account which suggests that judges were motivated by self interest 
in maintaining the pro revenue construction rule, particularly when that doctrine 
was sustained without serious judicial challenge by generations of judges over 
176 For discussion of the monarch's power during the eighteenth century see, for example, JAW 
Gunn, 'Influence, Parties and the Constitution: Changing Attitudes 1783 - 1832' (1974) 17 
Historical Journal 301; JH Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability: England 1675 - 1725 
(1967); H Havighurst, 'The Judiciary and Politics in the Reign of Charles II' (1950) 66 Law 
Quarterly Review 62. Holdsworth details how George III endeavoured, and to some extent 
succeeded, in expanding the power of the monarch until the rise of the younger Pitt, which 
marked the beginning of a steady decline in monarchical power until the Reform Act of 1832, 
which removed any real prospect of George Ill's 'personal' form of government; see: 
Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 10, 86ff. 
177 Blackstone noted that the decline in the de jure power of the king was not necessarily 
matched by a decline in the de facto power of the king: Blackstone, above n 139, vol 1, 325-6. 
178 In the period 1727 to 187 5 almost one half of the appointees to the offices of Lord 
Chancellor and Chief Justice were by way of the process of translation: Duman, above n 168, 
90. 
179 See n 172 above; see also: CM Gray, 'Introduction to Matthew Hale' in The History of the 
Common Law of England (1971) xvi. 
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150 years. Such a theory of conspiracy and cynicism does not explain why the 
pro revenue construction rhetoric was jettisoned in the early nineteenth century. 
Moreover, there is an element of truth in Thompson's suggestion that a partial 
legal administration could not hope to retain any legitimacy over such a long 
period. 180 If the pro revenue rule of construction had been adopted in spite of 
widespread communal dissent, one might have expected that the judicial 
interpretation of tax legislation would have attracted at least some critical 
comment. There is no suggestion in the contemporary secondary literature that 
the pro revenue doctrine was anything but a legitimate exercise of judicial 
power. 
2 The Legitimation of the Pro Revenue Rule of Construction 
The pro revenue rule of tax interpretation is therefore not a case of judicial 
complicity in the imposition of central government power over the cries of a 
dissenting general public. Why, then, did this community, which was in the 
process of embracing the values of a liberal legal order and formalist 
interpretative methodologies with respect to other legislation, treat the pro 
revenue construction of tax legislation as unremarkable? In the ordinary course 
of events it would be usual to consider the judgments of the courts in attempting 
an answer to this question. In the context of eighteenth century tax 
interpretation, however, the dearth of case reports containing detailed judicial 
reasoning eliminates this avenue of research. But a study of judicial reasoning 
is not the only means of answering the question posed above. An alternative 
approach is to construct an understanding of the eighteenth century judicial 
mind by locating the judiciary within their social context. By locating the 
judiciary within their social context, it is possible to construct an explanation of 
why the pro revenue approach seemed to be the 'natural' approach from the 
180 EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1975) 262. 
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perspective of the contemporary mind. The dearth of tax decisions181 may 
therefore be a positive benefit in that we are compelled to adopt an alternative 
mode of historical inquiry, examining the linkage of the tax judgments with the 
social milieu of the eighteenth century. Thus while I have argued that the 
judiciary was not captured by the executive arm of government, this is not to say 
that the judiciary was autonomous from its social context. 
In chapter one it was noted that one part of the mainstream account of tax 
interpretation suggests that tax legislation is in a special category of legislation 
because it overrides the property rights of the individual for the benefit of the 
state. This account emphasises the status of individual property rights by 
suggesting that such penal legislation should be interpreted restrictively, so that 
the rights of individual subjects are preserved to the fullest extent possible 
within the law. This emphasis upon the penal nature of tax legislation 
downplays the rationalisation of the perceived necessity of taxes. The emphasis 
is upon the rights of the individual rather than upon the perceived necessity of 
funding a state created to supervise the liberal 'justice' of the emergent political 
order after 1688. If the penality of taxes and the need to protect individual 
property rights from such penal impositions is accepted, the strict construction 
rule is an appropriate interpretative rhetoric. On the other hand, if the need to 
assure the survival of the state is accorded a predominant role, it might be 
expected that the strict construction rhetoric will at least be moderated by an 
interpretative discourse which acknowledges the need to assure the revenue base 
of the state. It is this latter aspect of tax legislation which was implicit in the 
eighteenth century tax policy literature. Although it cannot be doubted that the 
confiscatory nature of taxes was accepted, the tax policy literature of the day did 
not dwell upon the penal aspect of taxation. Instead, the literature moved on to 
181 Owing to the general absence of a right of judicial review with respect to most taxes in the 
eighteenth century; see at nn 74-75 above. 
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various elaborations of how the revenue of the state might most equitably be 
raised. 
This acknowledgement of the link between the survival of the state and the 
collection of revenue leads to an alternative account of eighteenth century tax 
interpretation. This alternative account suggests that the legitimacy of the pro 
revenue rule of construction adopted throughout the eighteenth century may be 
reconciled with the emergence of a liberal political order. On this view, the pro 
revenue rule of interpretation arose out of the generally accepted perception that 
the survival of the emerging liberal state had to be assured, even if this meant 
that the rhetoric of individual property rights was tempered in particular 
circumstances. One key aspect of this account is the proposition that a 
significant part of the eighteenth century English community accepted, for any 
one or more of a number of reasons, that the survival of the fledgling 
'democratic' state depended upon its ability to raise taxes. This raises the 
question of why the survival of the new state was perceived as 'good' from the 
diverse standpoints of members of the eighteenth century English community? 
Of course, any attempt to answer this question must be framed in terms of broad 
generalisations. But having acknowledged the shortcomings of such 
inescapable generalisations, I will proceed to a consideration of why at least 
some significant segments of the eighteenth century English community might 
have believed that they had a vested interest in the survival of the new political 
order, such that they could then quite logically have acceded to the pro revenue 
construction of tax legislation as a legitimate exercise of judicial power. 
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3 The Political Power of the Landed and Moneyed Classes 
The Restoration of Charles II to a throne bereft, in at least a practical sense, of 
much of its former power, 182 confirmed the authority of the landed and 
commercial interest. The Navigation Acts, the dismemberment of feudal work 
relations by statute and by statutory interpretation, 183 the abolition of feudal 
tenures except copyhold, the restriction upon the movement of the poorer 
classes embodied in the Act of Settlement of 1662184 and the enclosure of 
common lands are but part of a larger picture of a society no longer drawn more 
or less along feudal lines but upon the creed of private property. Whilst the 
landed and moneyed interests were not necessarily identical, it has been 
suggested that the achievement of Wal pole in the early eighteenth century was 
to reconcile these conflicting factions of the Whig party in maintaining the 
Whig control of Parliament.185 For much of the eighteenth century, it has been 
argued, there was a Whig oligarchy which laid the foundations for an era in 
which it was readily accepted that Parliament largely represented the 
understanding of the national interest projected by the landed and moneyed 
interests. 186 The eighteenth century, then, was a period in which those few who 
satisfied the threshold of the property franchise and were therefore directly 
represented in Parliament would most clearly have had a vested interest in the 
preservation of the fledgling 'democratic' state. 187 
182 The loss of the king's power, in practical terms, to impose taxes without the consent of 
Parliament and the erosion of the kings other sources of revenue (such as the abolition in 1646 
of feudal tenures and the Court of Wards) was critical in this regard. 
183 Hill, above n 65, 174. 
184 The effect of which was to allow the private appropriation and enclosure of the common 
lands, Hill, above n 65, 177; P Styles, 'The Evolution of the Law of Settlement' (1963) 9 
University of Birmingham Historical Journal 33. 
185 JH Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole (1968); noted in Hill, above n 65, 218. 
186 G Holmes and D Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy 1722-1783 (1993). 
187 Brewer, above n 43; Langford, above n 7, ch 5. 
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4 The Financial Interest of the Landed and Moneyed Interests in the New Order 
The landed and moneyed classes also had a direct financial interest in the 
maintenance of the state after the Restoration. The abolition of feudal tenures 
(except copyhold)188 in 1646,189 and the development of the strict settlement in 
the 1640's, allowed the propertied to bequeath their estates to the first male heir, 
but meant that many other male offspring of the propertied classes were 
compelled to pursue their fortunes in the government service. 19° Furthermore, 
the financing of wars by raising considerable loans, made by the propertied 
classes on the security of taxation revenue, was significant in allying the central 
government with those with property and/or commercial wealth. 191 
While the emergent political order after 1688 clearly advantaged many of those 
with property, it is doubtful that the landed and moneyed classes adopted a 
purely self interested standpoint in maintaining their support for the new state. 
The so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688 marked a critical phase in the 
development of the ideology of the rule of law. The earlier abolition of feudal 
tenures, the abolition of arbitrary taxation and the entrenchment of parliament as 
the lawmaking authority were perceived as a victory not only for the propertied 
classes, but for all born under the ideology of the 'free born Englishman'. 192 
This essentially peaceful revolution was, in the eyes of the propertied classes, a 
victory for the best of possible worlds in which individual enterprise would be 
rewarded and the fruits of such enterprise would be protected by the state. 193 
188 For a discussion of the significance of the abolition of feudal tenures see: HJ Perkins, The 
Social Causes of the British Industrial Revolution' (1968) 18 Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, Fifth Series, 123. 
189 This abolition was confirmed in 1660 by (1660) 12 Charles II, c 24. 
190 Hill, above n 65, 147, 148. 
191 Ibid 184. 
192 See: Daniel Defoe, True Born Englishman, quoted in Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 6, 61 n 1. 
193 Locke, above note 7, passim. 
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5 The Significance of the New State to the Lower Classes 
Even to the lower classes, there were good reasons for accepting that the 
preservation of the parliamentary state was in their interests. It cannot be 
doubted that there was a systematic and even at times brutal oppression of 
dissenting voices by the Whig oligarchy of the eighteenth century. 194 But this 
does not mean that the lower classes were merely oppressed, powerless and 
mute before the Whig juggernaut. Thompson and others have described the 
tradition of dissent and the rhetoric of the rule of law which underpinned the 
construct of the 'free born Englishman' .195 Whilst noting that the freedom was 
largely for male Protestants of property, Corrigan and Sayer have traced the 
popularisation of the association of the emergent state and a 'government for 
all' rhetoric. 196 The ideology of individual freedom ushered in by the emergent 
liberal state therefore promised a new era of rights, self respect, personal dignity 
and individual responsibility to the labouring poor. As Porter has noted, there 
were enough 'promises of ambition, self respect, new enjoyments, polite values 
and fashionable lifestyles' to induce many in the lower orders to believe that the 
new state was for the best. 197 The rights discourse of liberal individualism was 
therefore not solely the tool of the 'ruling class( es)', but was also relied upon by 
the lower classes in advancing their own claims for political representation, 
property rights and the protection of the state. It is therefore understandable that 
the formal equality promised by the rule of law rhetoric appeared attractive not 
only to the 'true' Whig constituency, who perhaps stood to gain most from the 
freedom of capital and person prescribed by possessive individualism, but to a 
far wider portion of the community emerging from feudal ties. 
194 EP Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (1968) ch 5. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English state formation as cultural 
revolution (1985). 
197 R Porter, English society in the eighteenth century (1982) 359. 
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The eighteenth century also saw the continuation of a state legitimated in part by 
a Manichean discourse of national identity contrasted with foreign cultures. 198 
This discourse is apparent in the wide recognition of the 'free born 
Englishman', no Popery populism, 199 fears regarding the survival of the 
Hanoverian succession, and the empire building inherited from Tudor times and 
furthered during the eighteenth century by the prosecution of numerous wars. 
This unifying national discourse was sponsored by the state and tended towards 
the legitimation of the state as the representative of one national identity. 
Whilst this discourse of unity never achieved totality, it was nevertheless a 
significant element of the acceptance of the Whig state by a diverse range of 
people across the social spectrum, rather than just the ruling Whig oligarchy.200 
Of course, none of the foregoing discussion warrants the conclusion that 
significant parts of the eighteenth century English community would tolerate 
any measures designed to assure the survival of the new political order. The 
fear and loathing of state intrusion is all too apparent wherever one turns in 
examining eighteenth century England.201 What this discussion suggests, 
however, is that this fear and loathing was substantially tempered by a widely 
accepted belief that the survival of the state was essential, subject to appropriate 
checks being imposed upon state power. 
6 Threats to the New State 
This brief account of the reception of the new political order within the 
eighteenth century English community goes some way to explaining why the 
198 Corrigan and Sayer, above n 196. 
199 Thompson above n 195. 
200 Corrigan and Sayer, above n 196, passim. 
201 The work of John Locke (above n 7) and Adam Smith (above n 39, 845-6) illustrates the 
point that state power was constrained to some extent by public opinion regarding the 'proper' 
degree of state interference in daily life. In the context of taxation, the abolition of the hearth 
tax owing to popular resentment is one clear example of the importance of public opinion in 
shaping tax policy. 
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pro revenue rule of construction was accepted by the courts in the eighteenth 
century. If the new liberal political order was perceived by at least some 
significant segments of the English community as the best of possible worlds, 
then it is understandable that the judiciary would seek to assure the survival of 
that order. However, over the course of the eighteenth century there was a more 
urgent reason for the insistence of the judiciary that tax legislation be interpreted 
in favour of the Crown. The new liberal political state faced dissent from within 
while simultaneously waging war with foreign powers for much of the 
eighteenth century. It is therefore appropriate to briefly review the nature of 
some of the more significant threats to the new state before drawing some 
conclusions regarding the interpretation of tax legislation. 
7 Social Unrest 
Notwithstanding the power of the unifying discourse of one national identity, it 
is clear that the English society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was 
anything but a harmonious world in which all acquiesced in the new order of the 
Whig oligarchy.202 The ideology of freedom and the rule of law, which brought 
the landed and moneyed classes to political power, also spawned an 
undercurrent of dissent which threatened the legitimacy of their rule. The 
rhetoric of rights found, for example, in Locke's Two Treatises on 
Government203 not only served to rationalise the revolution of 1688 to the new 
ruling classes, but resonated with the calls for individual rights of dissenters 
such as Torn Paine in his Rights of Man. 204 Attempts were made to stifle such 
dissent by enforcing the law with respect to seditious libel205 and also by less 
direct means such as the imposition of stamp duties upon pamphlets and 
202 An aspect more closely examined by Corrigan and Sayer, above n 196, ch 4. 
203 Above n 7 
204 Tom Paine, Rights of Man (1969). 
205 F Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776 (1952). 
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newspapers from 1712.206 Whether or not these measures were effective, they 
are indicative of the sense of insecurity felt by at least some of those with a 
vested interest in the new state. This sense of insecurity was doubtless fuelled 
by periods of social unrest and riot, which arose with sufficient frequency 
throughout the eighteenth century to remind those with a direct say in 
Parliament of the threat to their power posed by an organised revolt. 
This sense of insecurity was not a new experience for the English. It has been 
suggested that there were more internal disturbances in England in the period 
1450 to 1640 than in any other European country.207 During the course of the 
eighteenth century the threat of social revolution remained. Rude identified 275 
uprisings in the period 1735 to 1800. 208 Although it has been noted that the 
selection of this period produces a distorted picture, as it ignores the relative 
calm of the preceding seventy years.209 Nevertheless, it is significant that over 
the period in which the courts had jurisdiction to hear appeals on the window 
tax, 'the mob' was never far from popular consciousness. Over the eighteenth 
century there were numerous causes pursued by 'the mob' including the 
religious fervour of 1688, 210 the Gordon riots of 1780, 211 the mechanisation of 
industry,212 turnpikes, enclosures of common lands, high grain prices213 and 
other incidents of an economy undergoing dramatic change. 214 In London there 
were major riots in 1688, 1710, 1715, 1733, 1736, 1753, 1768 and 1780. In 
206 (1711) 10 Anne c 19 (An Act for laying several Duties upon all soap and paper ... ) (Eng), s 
111; the effect of this measure would, no doubt, have been to reduce the circulation of 
newspapers and pamphlets catering for the lower classes. 
207 Pitirim Sorokin, noted in Hill, above n 65, 119. 
208 G Rude, The Crowd in History, 1730-1848 (1981). 
209 Holmes and Szechi, above n 186, 173. 
210 WL Sachse, The Mob in the Revolution of 1688' (1964) 4 Journal of British Studies 23. 
211 Other riots at least partially founded upon religious prejudice included the Sacheverell riots 
of 1710, the riots of 1715-1716, and the riots concerning the Jewish Naturalisation Bill of 1753; 
see: G Holmes, The Sacheverell Riots: The Church and the Crowd in Early Eighteenth-Century 
London', (1976) 72 Past and Present 55. 
212 Hill, above n 65, 265-6. 
213 See: RB Rose, '18th Century Price-Riots, the French Revolution and the Jacobin Maximum' 
( 1959) 4 International Review of Social History 435. 
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17 66 alone there were twenty four riots against high prices. 215 Such social 
unrest may seem trifling to modem eyes as there was no social revolution on the 
scale of those which occurred in France in 1789 or Russia in 1917.216 But the 
eighteenth century cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be described as one 
of social peace. 217 
The psychological impact of recurrent periods of social unrest can only have 
been heightened by a government which could be anything but authoritarian. 
The means by which the 'ruling class' retained power in Britain has been the 
subject of considerable speculation, given that the state did not have the 
resources of a political police such as existed in France.218 Certainly, for much 
of the period currently under review, the military was at least technically 
available to quell any social disturbance at the request of the local justice.219 
But for a host of reasons eighteenth century Britain was far from an 
authoritarian regime in which there was an overt confidence in the power of the 
state. There certainly was a ruling oligarchy for much of the eighteenth century, 
but it cannot be said to have ruled in complete disregard of public opinion and 
without fear of being overthrown by the 'lower sort'. The relative stability of 
the English political system during the eighteenth century is arguably 
attributable to considerable flexibility exercised at all levels of government, 
thereby moderating to some extent the impact of government policies and 
reducing the prospect of dissent. 220 But such flexibility is as much the mark of 
governors insecure in their position as it is of a stable political system. 
214 Thompson, above n 195, 66. 
215 Hill, above n 65, 266. 
216 Holmes and Szechi, above n 186, 179. 
217 Cf Atiyah, above n 62, 23. 
218 See, for example, Hay, above n 160, 49ff; Thompson above n 180, 264ff. 
219 See the Riot Act of 1714 (1 Geo I, Stat 2, c 5); see: Holmes and Szechi, above n 186, ch 12; 
in the riots of 1780 285 rioters were killed by the military and a further 25 were subsequently 
hanged. 
220 See the material cited at nn 55-57 above. 
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8 The Weakness of the Taxation System 
The demands of financing various wars during the eighteenth century cannot be 
underestimated in any discussion of taxation history. England was formally at 
war for 63 of the 126 years spanning 1689 to 1815.221 The strain of funding 
such wars is apparent in the fact that military expenditure in periods of war 
often exceeded three quarters of total government expenditure, while peace time 
levels of military expenditure were generally in the range of 30-40% of total 
government expenditure. 222 It would therefore be reasonable to expect that the 
central government endeavoured to maximise taxation revenue, not only by 
introducing a diverse array of taxes, but also by seeking an efficient tax 
administration. 
An effective tax administration in the eighteenth century would have required, 
at the least, efficient administrators at all levels of the tax administration, 
administrative powers adequate to the fulfilment of the administrative function 
and adequate central supervision of the local tax administration. Unfortunately, 
the evidence suggests that none of these critical factors was present throughout 
the eighteenth century. 223 From the top down the revenue was subjected to 
what, even according to the standards of the time, can only be described as 
extraordinary abuse. At the legislative level the success of revenue bills in 
parliament was often motivated by the desire of parliamentary factions to 
maximise opportunities for tax evasion in their respective regions.224 At the 
administrative level, for most of the eighteenth century the power of the central 
government was restricted by a lack of resources and by the medieval concept of 
221 PK O'Brien, The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815' (1988) 41 Economic 
History Review (2nd ser) 1. 
222 Ibid 2. 
223 W Ward, A History of the Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century (1953); Ward, 'The 
Administration of the Window and Assessed Taxes, 1696-1798' above n 1; Paul Langford, A 
Polite and Commercial People (1989) 692ff. 
224 Smith above n 39, 828; Beckett above note 53; Langford above n 7, ch 5. 
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public office which fostered a corrupt and inefficient administration. 225 As we 
have seen, responsibility for the administration of the assessed taxes was left to 
the local government with what can only be described as inadequate central 
supervision. Whether or not the vast majority of local administrators performed 
their duties in a professional manner, the evidence is more than sufficient to 
suggest that there was a generally held belief that the local administration of 
parliamentary taxation left something to be desired, and that there was little that 
the central revenue office could do about it. 226 Further, even where taxes were 
administered directly by a relatively efficient centralised bureaucracy, as was the 
case with customs and excise duties, evasion existed on what can only be 
described as a massive scale. It has been suggested that the trade statistics for 
the eighteenth century are inaccurate as smuggling may have added between 15 
and 20% to the import figure. 227 In 1784 it was reported that there were armed 
cutters deployed by smugglers in flagrant defiance of the customs service.228 
The tax system of eighteenth century Britain was, neither by modem nor 
contemporary standards, a model of efficiency. 
225 Holdsworth, above n 66, vol 10, 512ff. 
226 O'Brien, above n 221, 3-4; United Kingdom, House of Commons, 1st and 2nd Reports of 
Select Committees on Illicit Practices to Defraud the Revenue, Parliamentary Papers, First 
Series, 1783, vol 11, 228, 263, 282. 
227 Holmes and Szechi, above n 186, 149. For detailed discussion of the size of tax evasion in 
the form of smuggling see: C Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers' in Hay, Albions Fatal Tree, above n 
160, 119-166; United Kingdom, House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee 
appointed to inquire into the Frauds and Abuses of the Customs, to the prejudice of Trade and 
the diminution of the Revenue, (1733), Parliamentary Papers, First Series, vol 1, 601; United 
Kingdom, House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee Appointed to Inquire into the 
Practice of Smuggling (1745) Commons Journal, vol 25, 101-110; see also: William Phillips, 
'The Smugglers' [1966] British Tax Review 28. 
228 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Report upon Illicit Practices in Defrauding the 
Revenue and the most effectual methods of preventing the same, Second Report, 1783, 
Parliamentary Papers, First series, vol 11, 263. 
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J Conclusion: Reconciling the Pro Revenue Construction with a Rhetoric of 
Rights 
The first problematic feature of eighteenth century tax interpretation is the tardy 
and piecemeal recognition of a role for the courts in tax administration, in 
apparent disregard of the dictates of liberal political theory purportedly 
embraced by eighteenth century England. The second problematic feature of 
eighteenth century tax interpretation is that the courts apparently rejected the 
emerging ideology of individual rights by adopting a pro revenue rule of 
construction. Only by having regard to the wider social context of the 
eighteenth century English community is it possible to reconcile these 
problematic aspects of the interpretation of tax legislation in the eighteenth 
century with the emergence of a liberal political order. 
The commitment of a substantial part of the eighteenth century English 
community to the new political order, which embodied the aspirations of many 
to a country in which the liberal values underpinned social life, cannot be 
underestimated. The tyrannical potential of state power and the importance of 
the taxing power to the state had been etched upon the British mind during the 
seventeenth century. Rising out of the ashes of the constitutional conflicts of 
the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century understanding of English 
constitutional law was of a finely balanced system of checks and balances 
founded upon the separation of powers between the central and the local 
branches of government, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary which 
ensured the protection of the rights of the individual. 229 But this recognition of 
the existence of individual rights, and the role of the state in fostering the social 
environment in which those rights might flourish, was problematical. The 
apparent contradiction between individual and state was resolved by accepting 
229 Montesquieu, above n 39. For consideration of the significance of Montesquieu's 
understanding of the English constitution to eighteenth century English consciousness see: 
Holdsworth, op cit (n 66), vol 10, passim. 
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that in some cases individual rights might have to be compromised in order to 
assure the existence of what was understandably perceived at the time to be a 
fragile political order. Thus, in each case where the perceived rights of the 
individual were threatened, the perceived importance of those rights was 
balanced with the need to assure the existence of the state. 
England's blue water defence strategy placed significant demands upon the 
taxation system at a time when there could have been little confidence in the 
ability of that system to raise the necessary revenue in an efficient manner. 
From the perspective of those at the centre of government, the tax 
administration needed all of the assistance that could be mustered in bringing in 
the revenue. In the face of continuing threats to the survival of the new social 
order posed by the perennial threat from foreign powers, widespread and 
frequent social unrest and widespread tax avoidance and evasion, it was 
understandable that the central government would select the most efficient 
means of raising revenue which was tolerable to the community. In the case of 
taxes under the control of what was perceived to be a relatively efficient central 
administration, such as excise and customs, it was considered that there was no 
need for judicial review and, further, that judicial review would only constitute 
an impediment to the efficient administration of those taxes. By contrast, in the 
case of those taxes administered by what was perceived to be a relatively 
inefficient local administration, the combination of judicial review and the pro 
revenue construction of tax legislation were legitimated as one means of 
supplementing the weak control of the central government wielded through the 
Tax Office and the Treasury. In this context it is understandable that, when 
granted a jurisdiction to hear substantive tax matters, a judiciary acquainted with 
the political theory of Hobbes and Locke accorded central importance to the 
survival of the state in maintaining some semblance of social order. This 
interrelationship between the fiscal viability of the state, compliance with the 
law, the maintenance of the rule of law and the survival of the 'new' political 
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order was captured in 1783 by the House of Commons Committee appointed to 
inquire into the frauds upon the revenue: 
It farther deserves remark, that enormities of such violence and extent 
amount to a partial state of anarchy and rebellion, and have a tendency to 
weaken and impair every idea of a regular government, and all due 
submission to the laws of the land. 230 
It is for this reason that, despite the English psyche being deeply imbued with a 
rights rhetoric, the courts and the legislature adopted the apparently 
contradictory approach of often ignoring their usual concern for the protection 
of private property in order to save the political order which promised so much 
for individual rights generally. Far from the eighteenth century being a period 
of strict construction of tax legislation by the courts, it was a period in which tax 
administration was dominated by pragmatic concerns. The exclusion of the 
courts from hearing disputes regarding the most important taxes of customs and 
excise, and the pro revenue rule of construction, typify the pragmatism that 
pervaded the legal domain of that period. 
230 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Report upon Illicit Practices in Defrauding the 
Revenue and the most effectual methods of preventing the same, First Report, 1783, 
Parliamentary Papers, First series, vol 11, 228, 229. 
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CHAPTER THREE - INTERPRETATION OF THE INCOME TAX IN VICTORIAN 
ENGLAND 
A Introduction 
From the preceding chapter it may be seen that it was not until the early 
nineteenth century that the first signs of a formalist interpretative rhetoric were 
adopted by the courts when interpreting tax legislation. According to this 
rhetoric, the courts concentrated upon discovering the objectified and 
determinate literal meaning of tax legislation without any regard to the 
consequences of their decisions or the contexts in which those decisions were 
enforced.1 This interpretative rhetoric of the courts was adopted by the 
commentators, such that the strict construction rule assumed an axiomatic status 
by the mid nineteenth century. The mainstream account of tax interpretation 
therefore maintains that there is no clearer example of a literalist interpretative 
methodology than the interpretation of tax legislation in the nineteenth century.2 
There are three key elements within this mainstream account of nineteenth 
century tax interpretation. The first is that there was one determinate literal 
meaning of tax legislation which was discoverable by the judiciary in the 
process of resolving tax disputes. The second is that there was a uniform 
understanding of the literalist approach to statutory interpretation, and that 
approach was not only the dominant, but the only method of tax interpretation 
adopted by the courts of the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century. The 
1 Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100; The Queen v Judge of City of London 
Court [1892) 1 QB 273, 301-302. 
2 D Williams, 'Taxing Statutes are Taxing Statutes: The Interpretation of Revenue Legislation• 
(1978) 41 Modern Law Review 412; Sir A Mason, 'Taxation Policy and the Courts' (1990) 2 
The CCH Journal of Australian Taxation 40, 41-2; JA Corry, 'Administrative Law and the 
Interpretation of Statutes' (1935) 1 University of Toronto Law Journal 286, 296, although Corry 
does not deal specifically with revenue legislation; H Monroe, 'Fiscal Statutes: A Drafting 
Disaster' (1979) British Tax Review 265, 265; D Goldberg, 'Your Subjects Inherited What 
Freedom?' (1975) British Tax Review 87, 87; where Goldberg implies that the strict construction 
rule may be traced back to the Petition of Right 1627 3 Car l, c 1, s 1; R Stevens, Law and 
Politics (1979) 100-101. 
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purpose of this chapter is to consider whether these propositions comprise an 
accurate depiction of the judicial interpretation of tax legislation in the 
nineteenth century. 
For the purpose of this chapter the judicial interpretation of the British income 
tax legislation in the last decades of the nineteenth century will be examined. 
According to the generally accepted historical account of tax interpretation, the 
income tax legislation was predisposed towards a literal interpretation by the 
courts.3 The British income tax legislation generally divided assessable receipts 
according to their source.4 With respect to each category of receipts, the 
legislation incorporated a schedule of specific rules (referred to as 'Cases') 
governing the assessability of the relevant category of receipts. By specifically 
enumerating the categories of taxable receipts rather than expressing a general 
concept of income, it has been suggested that the legislature induced the courts 
to adopt a literal interpretation of each item on the schedular checklist, without 
giving any consideration to an overarching concept of income. As a result, the 
courts merely determined whether a particular receipt fell within the literal 
meaning of any of the statutory Schedules, paying no heed to more general 
considerations such as the legislative intention or policy considerations. Thus, 
if the interpretation of tax legislation during the nineteenth century was 
emblematic of the literalist methodology, there was purportedly no clearer case 
of a literalist interpretation of tax legislation than the interpretation of the 
income tax in Victorian England. A case study of the judicial interpretation of 
3 Graeme Cooper, Robert Deutsch and Richard Krever, Income Taxation: Commentary and 
Materials, (2nd edn, 1993) 3-6, 3-7; W Brudno and L Hollman, The Taxation of Capital Gains 
in the United States and the United Kingdom' (1958) British Tax Review 26, 30; Jeffrey 
Waincymer, Australian Income Tax Principles and Policy (2nd ed, 1993) 98; Richard Vann, 
'Income as a Tax Base' in Richard Krever (ed), Australian Taxation: Principles and Practice 
(1987) 65. 
4 The differentiation of income according to its source reflected the differentiation of income 
adopted in eighteenth century tax policy literature; see, for example, Adam Smith, An Inquiry 
into the Nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations, RH Campbell, AS Skinner, W Todd (eds), 
(1976), vol ii, 817-906. 
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the Victorian income tax is therefore a logical choice in considering whether the 
mainstream portrayal of tax interpretation is accurate. 
B The Introduction of the Income Tax5 
In chapter two it was noted that the eighteenth century tax policy literature 
reflects the general concern to shelter the lower classes from the growing burden 
of taxation required to fund British foreign policy. Successive governments 
therefore experimented with taxes upon 'luxury' goods until the indirect tax 
system was stretched to what was considered to be its capacity to yield 
additional revenue. After 1747 additional revenue was raised by a variety of 
direct taxes upon such items as silver plate, carriages and hair powder. The 
desperate scramble for additional government revenue culminated in the 
composite expenditure/income tax of the 'Triple Assessment' in 1798,6 a tax 
which promised more revenue than it ultimately delivered.7 The Triple 
Assessment imposed additional tax upon a taxpayer according to the amount of 
tax paid on their expenditure in the previous year, although the amount of tax 
payable was limited to ten per cent of the taxpayer's income. The inability of a 
threadbare direct tax administration to cope with the considerable administrative 
5 There is a substantial body of research concerning the introduction of the English income tax in 
the era of the Napoleonic wars and so the circumstances of the introduction of the tax will only 
be briefly outlined here. For further information concerning the early income tax see: A Hope-
Jones, Income Tax in the Napoleonic Wars (1939); A Farnsworth, Addington, Author of the 
Modern Income Tax (1951); ER A Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory 
and Practice (2nd ed, 1914). It should be noted that these accounts regarding the income tax 
during the Napoleonic have been corrected in several important respects: William Phillips, 'A 
New Light on Addington's Income Tax' (1967] British Tax Review 271. For a more general 
history of the income tax see: Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England (3rd 
ed, 1965). 
6 (1798) 38 Geo III, c 16 (An Act for granting to His Majesty an Aid and Contribution for the 
Prosecution of the War) (Eng). 
7 Pitt had predicted that the tax would raise four and a half million pounds, when in fact it raised 
less than two million pounds; United Kingdom, First Report from the Select Committee on the 
Income and Property Tax, (House of Commons Papers, Session 354, 1852, vol 9, 3; United 
Kingdom, Report of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1870) 120. 
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superv1s1on necessary in scrutinising taxpayers' claims concerning their 
respective incomes precipitated its demise. 8 
The one constant throughout this period was the resistance to the introduction of 
an income tax, primarily upon the basis that such a tax constituted an intrusive 
and non voluntary imposition which contravened the fundamental rights of the 
free born English person.9 Even in 1792, Pitt observed: 
If the amount of every man's property could be ascertained, it would be 
a most desirable thing to make the people contribute to the public 
exigence in proportion to their wealth. But there existed no means of 
ascertaining the property of individuals, except such as were of a nature 
not to be resorted to. 10 
Notwithstanding these earlier reservations, just six years later the dire need for 
additional revenue to finance the war with Napoleon forced Pitt to adopt what 
was considered to be the extreme measure of an income tax in a context where 
there was no successful precedent11 of such a tax. The sense of desperation is 
almost palpable in the record of Pitt's speech to the House of Commons upon 
the introduction of the income tax bill. 12 Venting his frustration at the 
considerable evasion which had undermined the various expenditure taxes, Pitt 
expressed the hope that the introduction of the income tax would usher in a new 
8 Note that, while the permanent establishment of the revenue arm of government had grown 
dramatically in the eighteenth century, the preponderance of staff were concentrated in 
collecting the customs and excises; see: John Brewer, The Sinews of Power (1989) Tables 3.2, 
3.3, 66-7. 
9 An early instance of this resistance to 'intrusive' taxes may be seen in the repeal of the hearth 
tax: (1662) 3 & 4 Car II, c 10 (An Act for Establishing an additional Revenue upon his 
Majesty ... ) (Eng); repealed by (1688) 1 Will & M, c 10 (An Act for Taking away the Revenue 
arising ... ) (Eng). 
10 William Pitt, Speeches of William Pitt (ed Hathaway) (1806), vol 3, 231. 
11 Note that the long running land tax of (1692) 4 Will and Mary c 1 had included a tax upon 
various categories of income and personal wealth, but owing to the shortcomings of the local 
administration, the tax had generally only been imposed upon landed wealth; BEV Sabine, A 
History of Income Tax (1966) 16. 
12 United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons, 3 December 1798, vol 34, coll 1-6. 
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era of fiscal success. 13 Taxing income, he suggested, would overcome tax 
evasion by compelling people to pay tax upon receipt of income rather than 
upon expenditure. 
The income tax was less than successful in overcoming this problem of tax 
avoidance in its first years. 14 However, after key amendments to the structure of 
the legislation and the administration of the tax, 15 it proved to be relatively 
successful in raising much needed revenue during the period of the Napoleonic 
wars. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence of widespread evasion of the 
tax, particularly by the business community.16 
The early income tax was widely perceived as a particularly onerous measure, 
justified only because of the unique exigencies of the war.17 At the cessation of 
hostilities the income tax was the subject of widespread public hostility and it 
was allowed to lapse shortly thereafter.18 From 1815 until 1841 the income tax 
was allowed to lay dormant. The accession to power of Peel's Conservatives on 
a platform of free trade once again precipitated a need to find additional sources 
of revenue to replace the foregone customs revenue.19 The government dusted 
off the income tax of the Napoleonic wars and reintroduced it in substantially 
the same form, albeit as a temporary measure. From 1842 the 'temporary' 
13 Ibid. 
14 Cf Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (1988) 140. Pitt had estimated that the income tax 
would raise £10,000,000 in its first year of operation, when in actual fact it raised just 
£6,000,000. For the 1801 year Pitt estimated that the tax would raise £6,000,000, when in actual 
fact it raised just £5,300,000. For discussion of the income tax yield in these early years, and the 
specific shortcomings of the tax, see: Farnsworth, above n 5, 18-26. 
15 The Income Tax Act I803 (Eng) 43 Geo III, c 122; Addington's most significant alterations 
were the introduction of the schedular categorisation of various forms of income and also the 
introduction of withholding of tax by a payor on behalf of the payee with respect to payments of 
interest, dividends, rent, income from investment funds and emoluments of Crown servants. For 
studies of the introduction of the income tax by William Pitt in 1799 and its modification by 
Henry Addington in 1803, see: A Farnsworth, above n 5; A Hope-Jones, Income Tax in the 
Napoleonic Wars (1939); Meade Emory, 'The Early English Income Tax: A Heritage for the 
Contemporary' (1965) 9 American Journal of Legal History 286. 
16 Hope Jones, above n 15, 117-8. 
17 Ibid, ch 7. 
18 Sabine, above n 11, 42-5; Levi, above n 14, 140-3. 
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income tax was renewed in order to meet the fluctuating demand for additional 
revenue arising from war, indirect tax reductions and the vicissitudes of 
government revenue.20 By the last decade of the nineteenth century even those 
most opposed to the income tax had come to accept that fiscal circumstances 
dictated the retention of the tax.21 Although there were some amendments over 
this period, the income tax legislation throughout the Victorian era was largely 
unchanged from the legislation comprising the Income Tax Act 184222 as 
amended by the Income Tax Act 1853.23 Indeed, the form of the Act was in 
many respects identical with Addington's 1803 revision of the legislation first 
introduced by Pitt. 24 Even in the 1930' s one commentator suggested that little 
had changed since the introduction of Pitt's income tax.25 
The long title of the Act stated that it was 'an Act for granting to Her Majesty 
Duties on Profits arising from Property, Professions, Trades, and Offices.' 
There were five Schedules dividing the profits referred to in the preamble into 
categories to which differing rules of assessment would apply. Within each 
Schedule there were specific rules dealing with particular 'Cases' of the form of 
income dealt with by the Schedule. The taxable 'profits' were divided according 
to the source of the income. Thus Schedule A applied to profits arising from the 
ownership (legal or beneficial) of real property, Schedule B generally applied to 
19 Sir Morton Peto, Taxation: Its Levy and Expenditure, Past and Future (1866), 7. 
2° For a history of the income tax explaining its survival despite repeated election campaigns 
conducted on the basis of abolition of the tax, see: Sabine, above n 11, chaps 6 and 7. 
21 Ibid, 109-11. 
22 The Income Tax Act I842 (Eng) 5 & 6 Viet, c 35. It should be noted that this Act was only 
given a short title in 1892 by the Short Titles Act 1892 (Eng) 55 Vic c 10, s 2. The long title to 
the Act was 'An Act for granting to Her Majesty Duties on Profits arising from Property, 
Professions, Trades, and Offices, until the Sixth Day of April One thousand eight hundred and 
forty-five'. 
23 The Income Tax Act 1853 (UK) 16 & 17 Viet c 34. It was only after the passing of this Act 
that income tax was payable in Ireland. Once again, it was only by the Short Titles Act 1892 that 
this Act received a short title. The long title to the Act was similar to that of the 1842 Act, viz 
'An Act for granting to Her Majesty Duties on Profits arising from Property, Professions, trades, 
and Offices'. 
24 Although Shehab notes that there were some relatively minor alterations to the earlier 
legislation; F Shehab, Progressive Taxation (1953) 86. 
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the annual value of occupied land not already taxed under Schedule A (except, 
inter alia, dwelling houses) and therefore primarily imposed a tax upon farmers 
with respect to their farming profits (although the quantum of those profits was 
deemed to be a fixed proportion of the rent paid for the land). Schedule C 
applied to various classes of 'unearned' income such as interest and annuities. 
Schedule E assessed various categories of income and, independently, profits, 
derived by the taxpayer from public office. Schedule D applied to income from 
trade and professions and included a 'catch-all' provision whereby 'any annual 
profits or gains not falling under any of the foregoing cases and not charged by 
virtue of Schedule A, Schedule B, Schedule C or Schedule E' would be 
subjected to income tax. 
C One Income Concept? 
1 The Relevance of the Income Concept to the Interpretation of 'Profits and 
Gains' 
From the preceding discussion it may be seen that the operative provisions of 
the income tax legislation had always referred to 'profits' and 'gains'. 
According to the generally accepted account of tax interpretation, the courts of 
the nineteenth century adopted the strict literal meaning of 'profits' and 'gains' 
in applying the income tax legislation. As this account of tax interpretation is 
clearly founded upon the proposition that there was one generally accepted 
meaning of the legislative terms, it is appropriate at this point to consider 
whether the meaning of 'profits and gains' was as unproblematic as the 
mainstream account of tax interpretation would suggest. 
25 F Hole, 'Introduction' in AL R Boydon, Income Tax and Surtax Practice (1933). 
87 
Notwithstanding the references to 'profits and gains' in the operative provisions 
of the Act, they were generally understood to impose a tax upon 'income' .26 
This understanding was reinforced when the title of the legislation was belatedly 
changed in 1892 to the Income Tax Act.27 The Oxford English Dictionary 
indicates that the first recorded use of the word 'income' in the English 
language may be found in 1603.28 It might therefore be thought that a word of 
such long standing in English usage, with such a relatively straightforward 
definition, might have been a relatively unproblematic keystone to the income 
tax. Indeed, when introducing the Income Tax Bill into the House of Commons, 
Pitt seemed to assume that the income concept was well understood, as 
Cobbett's report of Pitt's speech suggests that no consideration was given to the 
nature of that concept.29 
2 The Income Concept in Nineteenth Century Britain 
Had there been a generally accepted understanding of income in the nineteenth 
century British community, it might have been expected that that understanding 
would have attracted some consideration in the contemporary tax policy 
literature. In chapter two it was noted that much of the consideration of taxation 
policy during the eighteenth century was founded upon the view that all 
members of a community ought contribute to the maintenance of the state in 
26 Thus in 1803, in what is understood to be the official explanatory pamphlet accompanying the 
legislation, An Exposition of the Act for a contribution on property, professions, trades, and 
offices; in which the principles and provisions of the Act are fully considered, with a view to 
facilitate its execution, both with respect to persons chargeable, as persons liable, to the tax by 
way of deduction, and the officers chosen to carry it into effect, it was acknowledged that the tax 
applied to 'income', notwithstanding that the operative provisions referred to profits and gains. 
For discussion of the source of this document see: Sabine, above n 11, 36 n22; see also the 
evidence of Mr Charles Pressly, Commissioner of Taxes in United Kingdom, First Report from 
the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax; Together with the Minutes of Evidence 
and Index (Hume Report) (1852) 8. 
27 See: above n 22. 
28 Being the work of one R Johnson, Kingdom and Commonwealth (1603) 196. 
29 United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons, 3 December 1798 col 4-22 (William Pitt, 
Prime Minister). 
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proportion to the benefit that they derived from the existence of the state.30 
Further, it was noted that the concept of benefit developed in the eighteenth 
century focused upon the protection of private property afforded by the state 
such that the benefit theory of taxation had been reconciled with the imposition 
of taxation according to the relative wealth of the subject. A range of options 
for measuring the relative wealth of the subject had been canvassed, from 
consumption to property to revenue. In the mid-nineteenth century John Stuart 
Mill rejected the benefit theory of taxation, arguing that the proper maxim was 
that a fair tax system could only be founded upon equality of sacrifice.31 
Although there is some debate about whether this rhetorical shift represented 
any substantive shift in tax policy,32 for present purposes it is sufficient to note 
that n.either Smith nor Mill offered a detailed appraisal of the income concept 
from the perspective of the benefit or ability concepts. They both acknowledged 
that an income tax had some advantages if it could be tolerated by the public 
and was properly administered,33 but arrived at this conclusion without offering 
any detailed consideration of the income concept. For example, both authors 
ignored the problem of whether 'income' entailed the change in net wealth of 
the individual over a specified period of time or whether 'income' was the flow 
of fruits from capital assets regardless of any consequent diminution of the 
capital asset, as in the case of wasting assets.34 
This dearth of contemporary literature upon the income concept may be 
explained by the fact that at the time it was considered that there was no need 
30 See the text in chapter two under the heading 'Eighteenth Century Taxation - Penal Imposition 
or Payment under (Social) Contract'. 
31 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, WJ Ashley (ed), (1923), 604 (bk 5, chap 2, 
sec 2). 
32 Graeme Cooper, 'The Benefit Theory of Taxation' (1994) 11 Australian Tax Forum 397. 
33 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R H Campbell, 
AS Skinner and W Todd (eds) (1976), 866-8; John Stuart Mill, above n 31, 829-831. 
34 See, for example, Smith's treatment of interest receipts, where he acknowledges that they are a 
proper subject of taxation but also accepts that administering the imposition of tax upon interest 
would be problematic: Smith above n 33, 848-9. Classic examples of the conversion of capital 
into an income flow being annuities and mining rights. 
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for any elaboration of the income concept. From the discussion of the local 
administration of direct taxation in chapter two, it may be seen that the 
application of taxes upon various forms of income was undertaken with a 
considerable degree of discretion exercised at the local level of government. 35 
Even when Pitt's more fully developed income tax was introduced, there is a 
wealth of evidence indicating that the local administration of the tax subverted 
any attempts to establish a uniformly applied interpretation of the income 
concept. 36 It was therefore generally accepted that the arbitrary administration 
of direct taxes made any detailed elaboration of the income concept relatively 
worthless. 37 Any consideration of the ethical foundations of taxation was 
therefore ultimately forced to confront a number of pragmatic considerations 
which played a significant role in shaping the tax policy discussion of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Given that income was conceived in terms 
of an unrealisable ideal, it is understandable that leading contemporary political 
economists chose to focus upon the more 'realistic', and more fiscally 
significant, forms of taxation such as customs and excise. The absence of any 
detailed examination of the income concept was therefore understandably 
35 See chapter two, pp 10-16. 
36 See, for example, the evidence presented to the Select Committee on the Income and Property 
Tax by Mr J Lee (Surveyor of Taxes in Birmingham), Second Report from the Select Committee 
on the Income and Property Tax, above n 26, 397-8; see also the evidence of Mr John 
Nicholson (Surveyor of Taxes at Manchester) ibid, 361-2. 
37 For Adam Smith's dismissal of an income tax upon the basis that it would be difficult to 
administer see: Smith, above n 33, 867-9. Groves has also noted that the brevity of Mill's 
consideration of the meaning of equal sacrifice in the taxation context is attributable to the 
contemporary view that such a study would be superfluous, as the tax administration would 
never be in a position to measure sacrifice; Harry Groves, Tax Philosophers (1974) 33. With 
respect to Mill's preference for a house tax over an income tax, see his evidence presented to the 
Select Committee on the income tax at: Second Report from the Select Committee on the Income 
and Property Tax, above n 26, 313-4. Even when it was suggested that taxation according to 
ability to pay mandated the conversion of the income tax to a property tax to enable the more 
accurate measurement of changes in net wealth of taxpayers, evidence presented to the 1852 
Select Committee by the then Commissioner of Taxes was to the effect that the implementation 
of a tax upon net wealth would be administratively impractical; Second Report from the Select 
Committee on the Income and Property Tax, 245-6 (evidence of Mr Charles Pressly, 
Commissioner of Taxes). It is for this reason, Groves suggests, that both Smith and Mill opted 
for a house tax as the most appropriate means of taxing wealth, because the quality of a 
taxpayer's residence was taken to be a readily measured indicator of wealth; Groves, 35. 
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ignored until the income tax began to emerge as a significant source of 
government revenue and, conversely, a significant imposition upon taxpayers.38 
However, the absence of any detailed elaboration of the income concept in the 
contemporary tax policy literature does not mean that the income concept was 
meaningless to members of the eighteenth and nineteenth century English 
communities. Rather, there were several irreconcilable concepts of income 
applied in different contexts within the nineteenth century English community. 
It is therefore necessary to consider the influence of these alternative concepts of 
income upon the English income tax legislation. 
3 The Fractured Concept of Income Within the Income Tax Legislation 
(a) The Equivalence of Income with Gross Revenue Flows 
Since Elizabeth I introduced the poor rate the courts had been accustomed to 
adjudging cases dealing with the assessment to rates imposed upon the profits of 
land.39 In this sense 'profits' had been given a technical legal meaning 
indicating the income flow from the land less the expenses of collecting that 
flow,40 rather than meaning a gain over historical cost analogous to the 
accounting definition of profit (income less a broader range of expenses). 
This technical meaning seems to have been incorporated to a varying degree in 
Schedules A, B and C. In Schedule A the assessment of the annual value of the 
38 Over the course of the nineteenth century the nominal rate of income tax did not rise above 
10% of a taxpayer's income, the tax being imposed at a flat rate. For much of the nineteenth 
century the rate of tax was less than 5%; Sabine, above n 11, 111-5. 
39 Coltness Iron Co v Black (1881) 1TC287. 
40 Ibid; see also the Act of 1601 and (1836) 6 & 7 Will IV c 96, s 1, which provided that 'no rate 
... be allowed ... which shall be made upon an estimate of the net annual value ... that is to say of 
the rent at which the same (hereditaments) might reasonably be expected to let ... free from all 
rates and taxes ... and deducting therefrom the probable average cost of the repairs, insurance, 
and other expenses, if any necessary to maintain them in a state to command such rent.' See also 
R v The Inhabitants of Kingswinford (1827) 7 B & C 236; 108 ER 711. 
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land was calculated by reference to the gross profits derived from the land,41 
with limited specific provisions granting certain exemptions and allowances. 
This suggests that the legislature had merely adopted the scheme of assessment 
from the rating acts, by which the land holder was assumed to generate a profit 
from the ownership of the land regardless of whether a net profit was actually 
derived. There is no doubt that this approach was administratively expedient, as 
it obviated the need for record keeping on the part of landowners, and also 
minimised opportunities to evade the income tax by inflating expenses.42 
fudeed, a deduction for repairs had been allowed under the income tax of 
Napoleonic times, but had been repealed in response to evidence of tax 
evasion.43 As a result, only limited expenses were expressly allowable as 
deductions from gross receipts under Schedule A.44 Under Schedule B, the 
occupants of farming land were assumed to generate a profit from the land 
equivalent to a fixed percentage of the rental value of the land. By imposing tax 
upon a deemed return from the land under Schedules A and B, the legislature 
therefore adopted a unique concept of income remote from any concept of actual 
revenue flows or some understanding of the taxpayer's ability to pay the tax, a 
feature which attracted considerable criticism.45 
41 In the original act of 1799 a procedure for determining the actual profits from the land was 
prescribed, but owing to considerable evasion the 1803 legislation set down the assumed rate of 
return method for determining profits from land; see: Anon, above n 26, 13-14. 
42 For parliamentary consideration of this topic towards the end of the nineteenth century see: 
United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons, 19 June 1884, 891-3, (Mr Clare Read); United 
Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons, 19 June 1884, 901-2 (Mr Gladstone, Prime Minister); 
United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons, 30 April 1885, 1165-6 (Mr J Hubbard). 
43 The deduction was originally allowed under the 1803 legislation, but was omitted in the 
revised legislation of (1806) 46 Geo III c 65 (Eng). For discussion of this point see: A Guide to 
the Property Act 46 Geo III with Tables of Calculation, forms of proceeding, cases of 
illustration, and explanatory notes, taken from the best authorities (1807) 14. 
44 For example, under the third paragraph of General Rule V, Schedule A of the Income Tax Act 
I842, an allowance in respect of repairs of churches and other buildings was specifically 
provided. 
45 See, for example, J R McCulloch, Treatise on the Principles and Practical Influence of 
Taxation and the Funding System (1845) 131. 
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Under Schedule C there was no resort to a deemed rate of return upon capital 
investment, income tax being imposed upon actual gross 'profits'. Thus, for 
example, annuities were brought into assessment without any allowance for the 
diminution of the capital sum comprising the source of the annuity. Although 
the taxation of gross actual revenue flows might be perceived as some 
improvement upon Schedule A in terms of equity, the taxation of gross flows 
without any attention to the 'real' gain derived by the taxpayer from the 
investment attracted considerable critical comment.46 
(b) The Equivalence of Income to Gross Revenue Flows Less Some Expenses 
Schedule D generally applied to the burgeoning manufacturing, commercial and 
service sectors of the economy. Although Schedules A, B and C broadly took 
actual or deemed gross revenue flows as the foundation for measuring the 
taxpayer's income, Schedule D allowed a wider range of deductions from 
'profits or gains'. Schedule D seemed to reflect an intention to accommodate 
the 'business interest' by imposing liability upon a different concept of profits 
closer to some notion of 'actual' profit recognised by the business community. 
This horizontal inequity between the first three Schedules and Schedule D 
supports the proposition that there was no general concept of income underlying 
the legislation.47 
46 For criticism of which see: M Peto, Taxation: Its Levy and Expenditure (1866) 54; evidence 
presented to the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax contained in its First Report, 
above n 26, (evidence presented by Samuel Brown, Actuary of Mutual Life Assurance Society), 
74. 
47 In the 1852 Select Committee Report this inequity was identified as a significant cause of 
disquiet amongst the taxpaying community: see, for example, United Kingdom, Second Report 
from the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax, above n 26, 48 (evidence of Mr 
Ebenezer Erskine); 165 (evidence of Mr Francis Neison). The uncertainty as to the nature of the 
income concept is reflected in the long running debate regarding the differential treatment of 
'precarious' and 'secure' incomes. The differential treatment of profits between Schedules A 
and D may have been linked to the perceived inequity of taxing 'precarious' income from the 
provision of personal services at the same rate as 'secure' income from property. Thus 
Gladstone noted that the modes of assessment adopted for the 'secure' income under Schedule A 
and the 'insecure' income of Schedule D, respectively, incorporated a degree of differentiation 
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( c) The Equivalence of Income to Net Gains 
The reference in Case VI of Schedule D to 'gains not otherwise assessed under 
the provisions of the Act' might suggest that the income tax was a first, perhaps 
flawed, attempt to tax some wider notion of 'real economic gain' 48 in addition 
to the taxation of gross and/or net revenue flows. 49 Such an approach was 
supported by Pitt's references to income as the proper measure of one's ability 
to contribute to the commonweal.5° Further, in the explanatory pamphlet 
published with the 1803 income tax legislation, it was suggested that the 
purpose of the tax was to impose a tax liability upon the receipts of a person 
which constituted his or her income available for 'discretionary expenditure' .51 
One implication of this concept of income was that the income tax would apply 
both to revenue flows and accretions to wealth which contributed to this 
'discretionary expenditure' .52 
This understanding of 'profits and gains' was consistent with the concept of 
income increasingly adopted within the commercial community of Victorian 
of income within the 1852 Act: United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons, 18 April 1853, 
1366-72 (William Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer). 
48 According to the modern understanding, a gains concept of income is understood in the terms 
outlined by Henry Simons: Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938) ch 2. 
49 See, for example, Richard Vann, 'Income as a Tax Base' in Richard Krever (ed), Australian 
Taxation: Principles and Practice (1987) 65; cf Richard Krever, 'The Ironic Australian Legacy 
of Eisner v Macomber' (1990) 7 Australian Tax Forum 191, 193-4. 
50 United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons, coll 4-22, (William Pitt, Prime Minister). 
Pitt referred to his desire to 'proportion the burden to the real ability' (at col 5) and seemed to 
suggest that the tax would apply to both income and wealth when he indicated that the purpose 
of the measure was to apply to both income and wealth: 'At the same time I felt, that although 
the assessed taxes furnished the most comprehensive and efficient scale of contribution, there 
necessarily must be much income, much wealth, great means, which were not included in its 
application. It now appears that not by any error in the calculation of our resources, not by any 
exaggeration of our wealth, but by the general facility of modification, by the anxiety to render 
the measure as little oppressive as possible, a defalcation has arisen which ought not to have 
taken place.' (col 4) The juxtaposition of income and wealth at the least suggested that the 
income tax was intended to impose a liability upon disposable income, rather than gross flows. 
51 Anon, above n 26, 2. 
52 Hubbard was to return to this concept of income in his evidence to the Hubbard Committee in 
1861, although he noted that the corollary that this meant that savings ought be excluded from 
the tax base was somewhat problematic; see: United Kingdom, Report from the Select 
Committee on the Income and Property Tax (1861) 61-94. 
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England. The new industrial age spawned commercial concerns which needed 
accurate financial information in order to raise finance, determine profit 
distributions and to conduct business more generally. To cater for this hunger 
for more accurate financial information, the emergent profession of accounting 
was developing specific rules governing the measurement of profit for an 
accounting period. 53 As the nineteenth century progressed, it is clear that the 
judiciary was prepared to accommodate accounting or business concepts of 
profits for the purposes of company law.54 It is therefore understandable that 
many within the business community argued that the commercial understanding 
of 'profits' ought to be adopted for the purposes of the income tax. Given the 
rhetoric of ability to pay which attended the introduction of the income tax,55 
and given that accounting practise focused upon ascertaining the true financial 
position of an enterprise, it was argued that accounting profits equated with the 
ability of the taxpayer to pay tax.56 In 1852 some of those presenting evidence 
before the Select Committee noted that deductions on account of bad debts 
written off, repairs, depreciation, amortisation, insurance, payments made to 
53 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the development of accounting principles, for a 
discussion of this subject see, for example, Nicholas Stacey, English Accountancy: A study in 
social and economic history, 1800-1954 (1954). 
54 Thus in Davison v Gillies (1879) LR 16 Ch D 347n Jessel MR accepted that the profits of a 
company could quite legitimately be calculated after taking into account commercially accepted 
deductions for items such as depreciation and capital writeoffs. For further discussion of the 
incorporation of accounting principles into the company law field see: W Strachan 'The 
Differentiation of Capital and Income' (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 274. 
55 Most clearly evidenced by the view that the tax would only apply to the income available for 
'discretionary expenditure', see: Anon, above n 51; see also Pitt's speech when introducing the 
income tax bill; above n 29. 
56 Much of this literature arose in the context of the debate concerning the differentiation of 
precarious incomes from permanent incomes for income tax purposes. See: evidence presented 
to 1852 Select Committee by Thomas Rowe Edmonds, Actuary of the Legal and General 
Assurance Office; Second Report from the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax, 
1852, above n 26, 122. See also Julius Partridge, Papers on Taxation: direct and indirect 
(1861); see also the work of P Hallett of the Economic Section of the British Association, 
discussed in Shehab above n 24, 165ff. But cf Richard Krever, 'Avoidance, Evasion and 
Reform: Who Dismantled and Who's Rebuilding the Australian Income Tax System?' (1987) 10 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 215 where Krever argues that the 'science' of 
public finance, which advocated the equivalence of income with ability to pay in terms of market 
power, was only in its infancy until the late twentieth century. 
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retiring partners in the form of 'golden handshakes' and interest were generally 
considered to be quite properly taken into account in arriving at a profit figure. 57 
However the taxation of 'real' economic gains according to generally accepted 
accounting standards was apparently contradicted by the specific deduction 
provisions found in Schedule D. Firstly, the Act expressly excluded deductions 
with respect to capital costs. No deduction, for example, was allowable with 
respect to the costs of repairs to premises occupied for the purposes of the 
taxpayer's business, or for amounts 'employed or intended to be employed as 
capital'.58 When the position of a taxpayer holding a wasting capital asset is 
considered, this legislative exclusion clearly ran contrary to any principle of 
ability to pay understood in terms of taxation upon 'real' gains. Secondly, 
although it was generally accepted for accounting purposes that interest was a 
legitimate deduction from revenue in arriving at a profit/loss figure, the income 
tax legislation did not allow any deduction with respect to interest incurred in 
the course of the taxpayer's business.59 This measure meant that interest income 
was taxed twice, albeit in the hands of different taxpayers. 60 The third 
57 Evidence of Mr Dickens and Mr Cane, First Report from the Select Committee on the Income 
and Property Tax, above n 26, 152-3. 
58 Income Tax Act 1853, s 100, Schedule D, Case 1Rule3. 
59 Income Tax Act 1853 s 100, Schedule D, Rule 4 which excluded 'annual interest, while 
Schedule D Rule 3 was subsequently interpreted to exclude interest expenses with respect to 
amounts borrowed which were to be employed as capital: The Anglo-Continental Guano Works 
v Bell (1894) 3 TC 239. 
60 According to the explanatory pamphlet accompanying the income tax legislation of 1803, 
above n 26, it had originally been considered improper to compel disclosure of the identity of 
creditors, and under the original Act of 1799 interest had been deductible. Taxpayers had 
availed themselves of the opportunity to evade tax by overstating the quantum of the debt in 
order to inflate their deductions, knowing that the creditor would not have to include the non-
existent interest income in their own income. In 1803 Addington introduced a system where 
income tax was deducted at the source of the income by the payor, who remitted the tax to the 
tax office. After the introduction of this withholding system, tax upon interest was withheld by 
the debtor who therefore no longer had an incentive to overstate the quantum of the debt. The 
second innovation introduced by the 1803 legislation to combat tax evasion was to exclude 
interest from the list of allowable deductions. Although the 1803 pamphlet suggests that the 
exclusion of deductibility protected the revenue, this result was achieved at the cost of tax equity 
if the income concept was understood in some sense of economic gain. In a flat rate income tax 
system where there were no tax rebates to creditors not liable to income tax and whose interest 
income had been taxed at source, the new treatment of interest income introduced in 1803 in a 
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indication that the Parliament had not intended to tax net economic gains may 
be seen in the rules regarding deductions under Schedule D, Cases 1 and 2. The 
general deduction provision, comprising the first of the rules applicable to Cases 
1 and 2, was expressed in the following way: 
In estimating the balance of the profits or gains ... to be charged 
according to either of the first or second cases, no sum shall be set 
against or deducted from, or allowed to be set against or deducted from 
such profits or gains, for any disbursements or expenses whatever, not 
being money wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the 
purposes of such trade.61 
This provision was problematic in that it suggested that the 'profits or gains' 
were a gross figure from which the allowable deductions were taken away in 
arriving at the 'balance of profits or gains'. The statutory reference to 'gains' 
could therefore not be a net figure representing the 'real' economic position of 
the taxpayer. For the reference to 'gains' in Schedule D to be construed as an 
imposition of income tax according to the taxpayer's 'real' ability to pay, the 
courts would have had to ignore the statutory exclusion of deductions not 
expressly allowed for under the Act,62 and also the express deduction provisions 
such as those contained in Schedule D. The final indication that the legislation 
was not intended to apply to some broad notion of gain was that losses under 
one Schedule were not available to be set off against profits under another 
Schedule, despite the recommendation in favour of this amendment at the 
committee stage in the House of Commons.63 
The income tax legislation therefore included provisions which might have 
suggested that 'income' embraced some notion of real gains measured according 
sense imposed double taxation upon interest in all cases. Tax was now imposed once in the 
hands of the debtor (whose profits were inflated by the exclusion of interest from deductibility) 
and once in the hands of the creditor. 
61 Income Tax Act I 842, s 100, Schedule D, Rules applying to Cases 1 and 2, Rule 1. 
62 Income Tax Act I 842, s 159. 
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to accounting standards, but also incorporated provisions which appeared to 
exclude this conclusion. This legislative ambivalence mirrored the ambivalence 
of the contemporary literature upon this matter. On the one hand, there was a 
considerable body of opinion which suggested that the income tax ought be 
extended to impose a tax upon 'property' in the sense of net wealth.64 On the 
other hand, there was a substantial body of opinion which conceded that an ideal 
income tax might apply to 'property', but accepted that the limitations of the tax 
administration meant that this was an impossible ideal.65 Although the latter 
view generally prevailed, the point for present purposes is that at the time it was 
not clear whether the legislation was intended to apply to a wide range of 
economic gains, and that it was only the administrative difficulties that 
precluded this broad income tax from being enforced, or whether the meaning of 
the income tax legislation excluded such a broad concept of income from the 
outset.66 
63 Sabine, above n 11, 62; this apparent anomaly was finally overridden by (1890) 53 & 54 Viet, 
c 8 s 23. 
64 See the material cited at n 56 above. 
65 At that time there were no legal powers to compel taxpayers to provide information regarding 
income and many business taxpayers simply did not keep adequate records of their receipts and 
expenditure, particularly farmers (evidence presented by Mr J Nicholson, Surveyor of Taxes in 
Manchester, First Report from the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax, above n 
26, 351). The limits of the tax administration of the early Victorian period are indicated by the 
Tax Office Solicitor's observation in 1852 that there were relatively few prosecutions for 
evasion of the income tax because of the difficulty of gathering sufficient evidence to establish 
that a fraud had been perpetrated; First Report from the Select Committee on the Income and 
Property Tax, 50 (evidence presented by Mr J Timms, Solicitor of Inland Revenue). 
66 Even in more recent times the uncertainty as to which is the appropriate ideal has continued to 
plague the tax reform literature. The work of the 'founding father' of modern income tax policy 
reflects this uncertainty; see: Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938), ch 2; Boris 
Bittker, 'A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform' (1967) 80 Harvard 
Law Review 925; Mark Burton, 'Economic Income and the Search for a Fair and Simple Income 
Tax' Australasian Tax Teachers Conference, Brisbane, 19 January 1996. 
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(d) The Formulation of the Income Concept by Reference to a Combination of 
the Preceding Three Concepts of Income 
Although it may have been accepted that the income tax legislation did not 
uniformly assess all 'real' gains, the general provisions of the Act might have 
been understood to assess revenue flows while Case VI of Schedule D assessed 
gains in wealth over and above those revenue flows. However, it has already 
been noted that some of the specific rules under the other Cases of Schedule D 
were apparently founded upon a concept of income which differed from 'real' 
gains. This attempt to reconcile Case VI with the other provisions of the 
legislation would therefore have meant that the reference to 'profits and gains' 
in the other Cases of Schedule D had a different meaning to 'profits and gains' 
under Case VI of Schedule D. Whilst it is possible for a term to assume 
different meanings in the same Act of Parliament, there is a general presumption 
that this is not the case.67 Indeed, the indeterminate nature of the scope of Case 
VI of Schedule D was implicitly acknowledged in the contemporary official 
literature published as a guide to taxpayers, it being left to the taxpayer to 
exercise his or her own judgement on this matter and trust that the 
Commissioners of Appeal would agree.68 
D The survival of the fractured income tax 
Although the title of the legislation and the contemporary official literature 
suggested that there was one income concept embodied in the legislation,69 the 
67 In more recent times, this proposition was recognised by Lee J in Wilson v Commissioner of 
Stamp Duties (1986) 6 NSWLR 410 at 418-19. 
68 Anon, above n 26, 32. 
69 
'The income of Persons presents itself as the most obvious subject of equal taxation, without 
permanently affecting property from which the Income is derived. Income is continually 
renewing itself. The amount is ascertainable by positive evidence, and cannot be a subject of 
difficult enquiry, and seems peculiarly adapted to be the subject of a tax to provide for annual 
supplies.' Anon, Observations Upon the Act for Taxing Income In Which the Principles and 
Provisions of the Act are Fully Considered With a View to Facilitate its Execution, Both with 
Respect to Persons Chargeable, and the Officers Chosen to Carry it Into Effect (1799) 3-4. 
'The principle of the Income Tax, as the word "income" seems to imply, is an impost on that 
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preceding discussion suggests that there was more than one concept of income 
underlying the legislation.70 The statutory references to 'profits or gains' could 
have been understood to adopt some notion of accounting profits recognised by 
business people in ascertaining business profits, some broader notion of real 
economic gains, a technical meaning adopted for the purposes of the rating 
legislation or some combination of the above three.71 Yet no one concept of 
income could be adopted throughout the act without altering what seemed to be 
the intended scope of some of the provisions under the various schedules. 
Despite this uncertainty regarding the scope of the income tax base and the 
substantive criticisms of the legislation after 1842, the legislation remained 
largely in its original form. There were three reasons for this legislative inertia. 
portion of property, annually acquired, which remains at the discretionary disposal of the 
ultimate proprietor. On this idea the Income Tax was formed. It called upon the ultimate 
proprietor to account for that portion of his property, from all and whatever sources it was 
derived. Comprehending all, without distinguishing any of the sources, it laid an equal 
contribution (with certain qualifications) on the mass of annual acquirement, after making those 
deductions or allowances necessarily incurred in acquiring or maintaining that property, or 
which were incidental to it.' ibid, 2. 
7° For the view that the legislature originally borrowed from trust notions of income in framing 
the income tax, see: Ross Parsons, 'Income Tax - An Institution in Decay?' (1986) 12 
Melbourne University Law Review 77. However, in the same article Parsons indicates that the 
trust notion of income has been adopted by the courts in interpreting the income tax; ibid, 82. 
These views are quite inconsistent. The first view is inconsistent with the portrayal of the nature 
of the income concept in nineteenth century England set out in this chapter. The second view, 
however, may well be consistent to a significant degree with the argument developed in this 
chapter with respect to the judicial interpretation of the income concept. Commentators seem to 
have adopted the second version: Graeme Cooper, Robert Deutsch and Richard Krever, Income 
Taxation Commentary and Materials (2nd ed, 1993) 3-6; Fiona Schaeffer, 'The Uneasy Alliance 
between the judicial and economic concepts of income: the treatment of capital gains' (1992) 5 
Business and Corporate Law Journal l. For the earlier suggestion that the judicial 
interpretation of the English income tax might be rationalised from the perspective of trust 
notions of income see: W Strachan 'The Differentiation of Capital and Income' (1902) 18 Law 
Quarterly Review 274; W Strachan, 'Economic and Legal Differentiation of Capital and 
Income' (1910) 26 Law Quarterly Review 40; W Strachan, 'Capital and Income (Lifeowner and 
Remainderman)' (1912) 28 Law Quarterly Review 175; W Strachan, 'Capital and Income Under 
the Income Tax Acts' (1913) 29 Law Quarterly Review 163. 
71 William Pitt's speech when introducing the income tax bill in 1798 (above n 29) neatly 
illustrates the apparent confusion of competing concepts of income - at some points Pitt refers to 
'real ability' (col 4), at other points 'gross receipts' (land rent, col 11-12 and at other points 
'imputed gross receipts' less a circumscribed range of deductions (farming income from land 
with allowance for repairs, col 12). 
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Firstly, for 30 years after the revival of the income tax in 1842 it was 
consistently maintained that the income tax was only a short term expedient 
rather than a permanent tax. After all, the tax was introduced for just three years 
in 1842 and for varying terms for the next 30 years.72 On the basis that the tax 
was only a temporary measure, there was perhaps some understandable 
reluctance to devote considerable resources to the revision of what was only a 
temporary fiscal measure. 
Secondly, the absence of any consensus upon the ideal concept of income 
undermined any calls for a wholesale revision of the tax. As a result, the two 
Select Committees convened by the House of Commons in 1852 and 1861 were 
unable to agree upon any recommendations for reform: 
Your Committee, however, after full consideration, have arrived at the 
conclusion that the plan proposed by their Chairman does not afford a 
basis for a practicable and equitable re-adjustment of the Income Tax; 
and they feel so strongly the dangers and ill consequences to be 
apprehended from an attempt to unsettle the present basis of the tax, 
without a clear perception of the mode in which it is to be reconstructed, 
that they are not prepared to offer to Your Honourable House any 
suggestions for its amendment. This tax having now been made the 
subject of investigation before two Committees and no proposal for its 
amendment having been found satisfactory, Your Committee are brought 
to the conclusion that the objections which are urged against it, are 
objections to its nature and essence rather than to the particular shape 
which has been given to it.73 
72 In 1845 8 & 9 Viet c 4 (Eng) (An Act to continue for three years the duties on profits ... ) 
reimposed the tax for an additional 3 years; in 1848 11 & 12 Viet c 8 (Eng) (An Act to continue 
for three years the duties on profits ... ) reimposed the tax for an additional 3 years; in 1851 the 
income tax was reimposed for just one year by 14 Viet c 2 (Eng) (An Act to continue for three 
years the duties on profits ... ). In 1852 the tax was imposed for just one more year by 14 & 15 
Viet c 12 (Eng) (An Act to continue for three years the duties on profits ... ); in 1853 it was 
imposed for a further seven years by the Income Tax Act I 853 (UK) 16 & 17 Viet c 34. 
73 Report from the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax, above n 52, iii-iv. To 
similar effect see: United Kingdom, Twenty-Eighth Report of the Commissioners of Her 
Majesty's Inland Revenue (1884-1885) 84-5. 
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Thirdly, for the 100 years after its reintroduction, the income tax was not a mass 
tax with relatively high rates of taxation, by contrast to the modem income tax. 
Rather, the rate of income tax remained relatively low and the exemption 
threshold was maintained at such a level as to exclude the bulk of wage and 
salary eamers.74 As with the window tax in the seventeenth century, the income 
tax was a relatively small part of the total tax structure throughout the 
nineteenth century.75 It is therefore understandable that there were only 
piecemeal efforts to resolve the perceived inconsistencies of the income tax 
legislation over this period.76 
E Early Administrative Interpretations of the Income Tax and the Creation of 
the Statutory Right of Appeal to the Courts 
Under the first income tax of the Napoleonic wars, the prevailing pro-revenue 
construction of tax legislation had been adopted when an income tax matter had 
reached the courts. As such, any difficulties with competing interpretations of 
the legislation were resolved in favour of the revenue.77 From 1842 until 1875 
there was no statutory right of appeal in income tax matters, and so the courts 
were largely sheltered from the need to interpret the income tax.78 However, 
this does not mean that the competing interpretations of the tax were irrelevant 
74 In the first decades of the income tax the tax-free threshold was £150. According to R Dudley 
Baxter only a small percentage of the population received income in excess of this threshold see: 
Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (1969) 154. 
75 Sabine, above n 11, passim. 
76 Sabine, above n 11, 245-6. 
77 Attorney General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183; 146 ER 433. 
78 The reason for this has variously been suggested as the fact that the income tax was initially 
perceived as a war measure; V Grout and BEV Sabine, 'The First Hundred Years of Tax Cases' 
(Pt 1) (1976) British Tax Review 75 ; V Grout and BEV Sabine, 'The First Hundred Years of 
Tax Cases' (Pt 2) (1976) British Tax Review 239; or that the income tax would not have passed 
through Parliament if it had been thought that an appeal to the courts would lead to compulsory 
disclosure of the taxpayer's financial affairs H Monroe, Intolerable Inquisition? (1981) 44-6. 
Upon reintroducing the income tax in 1842, Sir Robert Peel suggested that there had been a 
tradition of local administration founded upon the principle that a subject ought not be required 
to disclose his or her affairs to anyone other than their immediate neighbours rather than the 
central administration; House of Commons, Hansard, 18 March 1842, 911 (Sir Robert Peel, 
Prime Minister). 
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to the administration of the income tax until 1875. Prior to that time, Pitt's 
adaptation of the local administration of the inhabited house tax had left the 
administration of the income tax in the hands of the local administration, 
supervised by Commissioners of Appeal and the Tax Inspectors of the Tax 
Office. The fact that at least some branches of this local administration and the 
local Commissioners of Appeal adopted a diverse array of interpretations of the 
income tax is apparent from the 1852 Select Committee report. Thus whilst it 
seems to have been generally accepted that Schedules A and C taxed gross 
receipts regardless of any diminution of the capital assets from which such 
flows were derived,79 Schedule D was applied with a considerable degree of 
latitude on the part of the local administration. Although there was no express 
allowance for depreciation in the legislation, for example, in at least some 
districts such an allowance was granted. 80 On the other hand, there is evidence 
that some Commissioners adopted the Board's opinion of how an appeal ought 
be decided.81 
The period of 1842 to 1875 was therefore a period in which the confrontation of 
taxpayer and Tax Office regarding the competing conceptions of income for the 
purposes of the income tax was moderated by the discretion of the local 
administrators. 82 At the time that the statutory right of appeal to the courts was 
79 See, for example, the evidence presented by Mr Hyde to the 1852 Select Committee; First 
Report from the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax, above n 26, 171. 
80 The Surveyor of the City of London commented: '[w]e generally take, in the great 
manufacturing districts, the scale [of depreciation] allowed by the manufacturers themselves 
sitting as Commissioners.'(see: United Kingdom, above n 26, question 1285; while in 
Birmingham the Surveyor noted that he allowed the cost of repairs but not depreciation (ibid, 
questions 369-390). 
81 Ibid, 298-9 (evidence of Mr George Offor). 
82 Aside from the inequity arising from the inconsistent application of the income tax across 
England in this period, the breadth of discretion vested in the Commissioners and the way in 
which it was exercised in some cases also raised concerns as to the professionalism of the local 
administration. That the central Tax Office was frustrated by this discretion exercised at the 
local level is apparent from the evidence presented to the 1852 Select Committee. In his 
evidence presented to the Committee, one Surveyor of Taxes suggested that there was a 
considerable need for the Surveyor to have a right of appeal against the decision of the 
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granted, the courts were propelled into a whirlpool of competing interpretations 
of the income concept. At the same time, the mainstream account of tax 
interpretation suggests, legal formalism was approaching its zenith. According 
to the generally accepted account of tax interpretation, the legal formalism of 
the courts displaced the discretion of the local tax administration, and ushered in 
a new era where the liabilities of taxpayers were clearly determined according to 
'the literal meaning' of the law. According to this account, the existence of 
competing interpretations of a statute did not mean that the income tax 
legislation was indeterminate, because it was the function of the courts to 
consider such competing interpretations and discover the one true meaning of 
the legislative words. The courts purportedly focused upon the semantic 
meaning of the statutory words in isolation from the context in which the 
legislation was applied, regardless of any perceived injustice which might arise 
from applying the literal meaning. 
There is no doubt that there is a large number of judicial statements which lend 
a veneer of credibility to this account of tax interpretation in Victorian England. 
The decision of Lord Cairns in 1869 is often cited as authority for the 
proposition that a strict literalism was entrenched by the time that the statutory 
right of appeal to the courts was created: 
If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he 
must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial 
mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, 
cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, 
however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might appear to 
be.s3 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, it has been suggested, the courts 
adopted an even more strident declaration of the literalist method advocated in 
Commissioners (or Special Commissioners as the case may be) in order to ensure that the 
Commissioners were acting impartially: ibid, 186. 
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earlier periods. 84 This portrayal of the courts at the zenith of a literalistic 
formalism seems consistent with decisions such as Bowers v Harding: 
But we are. here to administer the law as we find it, and though Mr. 
Dicey has pointed out to us what are anomalies, which I am afraid must 
always exist in the incidence of taxation under any Act of Parliament 
which has to provide for a tax such as the Income Tax, still I cannot 
myself think that there is any real difficulty in applying the statute to the 
circumstances of this case. 85 
It seems clear from statements such as that of Lord Cairns in Partington and that 
of Pollock B in Bowers that the courts had clearly rejected the consideration of 
pragmatic consequences acknowledged by the golden rule,86 at least in the 
context of tax decisions. Further, in a subsequent decision Lord Halsbury 
maintained that a literalist methodology was no different to a purposive reading 
of the statute: 
I do not think it is competent to any court to proceed upon the 
assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake. Whatever the real 
facts may be, I think a court of law is bound to proceed upon the 
assumption that the Legislature is an ideal person that does not make 
mistakes. It must be assumed that it has intended what it has said, and I 
think any other view of the mode in which one must approach the 
interpretation of a statute would give authority for an interpretation of 
the language of an Act of Parliament which would be attended with the 
most serious consequences. 87 
Over the course of the last decade of the nineteenth century Lord Halsbury, in 
particular, enunciated the rationale for this strict literalism by drawing upon 
various aspects of contemporary political philosophy. In his dissenting 
judgment in The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v 
83 Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100 (Lord Cairns). 
84 A Blackshield, The Revolt Against Legal Formalism (1979), 4; B Abel Smith and R Stevens, 
Lawyers and the Courts (1967) 121-5. 
85 Bowers v Harding (1891) 3 TC 22, 25 (Pollock B). 
86 Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 106; (1843-60) All ER 21, 36 (Lord Wensleydale). 
87 (1891) 3 TC 53, 71. 
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Pemsel, 88 his Lordship clearly endorsed the sanctity of individual property rights 
by stressing that the only purpose of tax legislation was 'to raise money', 89 and 
that it was therefore for the legislature to ensure that a tax was clearly imposed. 
In the later case of Gresham Life Society v Bishop90 his Lordship acknowledged 
the Diceyan theorisation of the sovereignty of Parliament by suggesting that the 
rationale for a literal interpretation of legislation was that Parliament could 
readily change the legislative rulebook if some undesirable circumstances arose: 
It cannot be said that the use of artificial meaning to be attached to 
ordinary language is either unknown or unusual in legislation; and if it 
was intended to make this a special subject of taxation, to be taxed 
whenever and wherever an equivalent amount was credited or booked or 
in any other way recognised as having come under the dominion of the 
owner in this country, nothing could have been easier than to enact it in 
plain terms.91 
There are therefore ample contemporary judicial statements which suggest that 
the courts uniformly accepted as a matter of principle that they ought adopt the 
strict construction of tax legislation according to the literal meaning of the 
statutory terms. However, regardless of whether literalism means that the courts 
apply the acontextual meaning of the words, the meaning of the words 
determined at the time the legislation is made or the meaning of the statutory 
words at the time they are interpreted by the courts, this portrayal of literalism in 
the context of the income tax of Victorian Britain is problematic. The preceding 
discussion suggests that there was no one generally accepted understanding of 
the terms 'profits or gains' in Victorian England. At the least, those terms seem 
to have been understood in various contexts in terms of gross flows, accretions 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid 73. A literalist rhetoric was adopted by Halsbury with respect to all statutes; see, for 
example, Earl Grey v Att General [1900] AC 124; Fielden v Morley Corp [1900] AC 133; 
Smith v Lion Brewery [1911] AC 150 at 157. For a slightly earlier affirmation of 'literalism', 
see: Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Angus and Co (1889) 23 QB 579, 593. 
90 (1902) 4 TC 464. 
91 Ibid 473. See also: San Paulo Railway Company Limited v Carter (1895) 3 TC 407, 410; 
Andrews v Mayor (1892) 3 TC 236, 238 (Collins J). 
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to net wealth or profits for accounting purposes. This suggests that the courts of 
Victorian Britain could not have applied the 'literal' meaning that they expressly 
endorsed. If the judiciary was not adopting the interpretative approach that it 
said it was applying, what approach was it adopting? 
F Judicial Interpretations of the Income Tax Base 
1 Early Judicial Ambivalence 
The early case law suggests that in the first years after the right of appeal to the 
courts was granted, the courts adopted widely differing interpretations of 
'profits and gains' for the purpose of the income tax. In some early decisions 
the courts seemed to accept that the income tax was intended to assess the 
ability of a taxpayer to pay tax in a global sense, such that all accretions to the 
taxpayer's wealth would be liable to income tax. For example, in Attorney-
General v Black?2 Martin B commented that Schedules A, B, C and E: 
[W]ould seem a sufficiently large net to include every description of 
property; but to prevent any doubt we have section 100 [incorporating 
Schedule D], which imposes a duty on every description of property or 
profit not contained in the foregoing schedules. In fact, the care 
displayed in embracing every possible source of profit is, I may say, 
carried to an almost ludicrous extent; it is practically impossible to 
escape the operation of the Act.93 
Although Martin B left the meaning of profit to be determined, the tenor of his 
observation and his reference to 'every description of property' indicates that he 
considered that the income tax caste a broad net across a wide range of gains 
which contemporary economists categorised as a property tax. 94 The references 
to the taxation of 'property' in the preceding extract were therefore most 
significant. The broad scope of Schedule D Case VI was also accepted in Re 
92 (1871) 1 TC 52. 
93 Ibid 53; see also: Attorney-General v Black (1871) 1 TC 54, 54 (Lord Blackburn). 
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Strong,95 where a gift presented to a minister of religion by his congregation 
was considered to fall not only within the meaning of 'emolument' for the 
purposes of Schedule E, but also was considered to be a 'gain' under Schedule 
D. 
However this judicial flirtation with a broad notion of income, which drew upon 
the economist's concept of a property tax, was never received into the 
mainstream interpretation of the income tax. In Knowles v McAdam96 the 
suggestion that income ought be understood in terms of 'economic gain' was 
expressly rejected by Cleasby J, who noted that a testamentary gift was not 
income to the beneficiary because such a receipt was a capital sum which did 
not fall within the 'annual profit' of the taxpayer.97 In other cases the 
deductibility of certain expenses was rejected. The reasoning underlying this 
conclusion was that to allow such deductions would be inconsistent with the 
express provision of the legislation, notwithstanding that such deductions would 
have been quite consistent with a concept of income understood in terms of 
economic gain.98 This rejection of the economic concept of income was 
founded upon the view that the reference to 'profits' ought be understood in its 
technical sense. This meant that 'income' connoted a flow of revenue from a 
capital source or from particular earning activities such as employment, and did 
not include accretions to capital or other accretions to wealth. Notwithstanding 
the occasional recognition of the equivalence of 'economic gains' or 'property' 
with income, the economic discourse was marginalised by the judiciary of 
Victorian England. 
94 For discussion of the property tax see: United Kingdom, above n 52, passim. 
95 (1878) 1 TC 207. 
96 (1877) 1TC161. 
97 Ibid 168. 
98 See, for example, Addie & Sons v Commissioners for General Purposes (1875) 1 TC 1; 
Forder v Handyside and Co Ltd (1876) 1TC63; Caledonian Railway Company v Banks (1880) 
1 TC 487; Watney v Musgrave (1880) 1 TC 272, 276; for a later case to similar effect see: 
Brickwood v Reynolds (1897) 3 TC 600. 
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2 Accounting Practice and the Calculation of Profit 
While a gains concept of income was rarely referred to, elements of this concept 
of gain may be seen in an alternative concept of income which was considered 
more seriously by the courts. It has already been noted that the emergent 
accounting profession was developing standards for the measurement of profits 
for commercial purposes, and so it was understandable that the accounting 
measurement of profits was considered by some to offer a valid measurement of 
profits for income tax purposes.99 Those advocating the applicability of 
accounting concepts of income and profits therefore maintained that the 
'ordinary' meaning of those terms ought be considered to be the meaning 
adopted for accounting purposes. This argument was raised in relation to two 
issues in the Victorian income tax cases. The first concerned the extent to 
which various business expenses could be deducted from the gross income 
figure in arriving at a profit amount upon which income tax would be assessed. 
The second concerned the treatment of extraordinary receipts outside the 
ordinary course of the taxpayer's business. 10° For the purposes of this chapter it 
will be sufficient to consider the judicial response to the first issue. 
With respect to the first issue in Imperial Fire Insurance Company v Wilson 101 
the insurer had prepared its accounts by taking premiums received and 
deducting administrative expenses and the cost of claims made in order to arrive 
at a profit/loss result. The insurer had historically submitted the profit/loss 
figure calculated in this way for the purposes of the income tax. However, for 
the purposes of the income tax in the most recent accounting period, the insurer 
had, for the first time, taken account of unearned premiums by matching the 
99 For a discussion of the development of the law in regard to the measurement of distributable 
profits for the purposes of company law see: RM Bryden, 'The Law of Dividends' in Jacob 
Ziegel, Studies in Canadian Company Law (1967) 270-307. 
100 Note that some, such as Krever, above n 56, overlook the first category of cases in suggesting 
that the recognition of a more restricted concept of income invariably worked in favour of the 
taxpayer. 
IOI (1875) 1TC71. 
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period of the risk covered for each premium to the relevant accounting period. 
At the same time, the taxpayer prepared its accounting profit/loss statement 
according to its past practice, whereby there was no matching of premiums to 
the accounting period. The court considered that the Commissioner was 
justified in adopting the method of accounting which the taxpayer had used in 
drawing up its profit/loss statement, rather than the method used in preparing its 
tax return. This conclusion meant that the taxpayer was assessed upon all 
premiums received notwithstanding that a part of the premiums was in a sense 
'unearned income' as it related in part to the relevant income year, and in part to 
the subsequent year. Further, although the matter was not specifically raised on 
appeal, the court accepted that the taxpayer could not anticipate unnotified 
insurance claims in reaching its profit/loss result for income tax purposes, 
notwithstanding that the court accepted that such anticipated losses could be 
actuarially quantified. 102 For present purposes, the case is significant in that the 
court acknowledged that the taxpayer's accounting practice was crucial to the 
outcome of the case. Indeed, Amphlett B noted that, if the taxpayer had 
changed its accounting method, it may have been possible for the taxpayer to 
compel the Commissioners to accept the amended method of accounting. 103 
The decision in Imperial Fire Insurance Company therefore suggested that it 
was legitimate to take account of commercial or accounting practise in 
interpreting the tax legislation, a view which was subsequently endorsed in a 
number of cases. 104 
102 This principle was thereafter accepted in the absence of statistical evidence by which the 
insurance contracts written by a particular taxpayer were analysed such that it was possible to 
identify the extent to which the insured remained exposed to unexpired risks at the end of the 
relevant accounting period. See, for example, The General Accident Fire and Life Assurance 
Corporation v M'Gowan (1907) 5 TC 308. 
103 Ibid 76; see also the decision of Huddleston B, 76. 
104 See, for example, Highland Railway Co v Balderston (1889) 2 TC 485 where the Scottish 
Court of Exchequer held that the taxpayer's bookkeeping practice was not determinative of the 
meaning to be attributed to statutory words, although it was implicit in the judgment that the 
business treatment of an expense will be a critical factor in the absence of any statutory rule 
suggesting a contrary meaning. 
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However, in some cases there seemed to be a conflict between the accounting 
measurement of the profits of an enterprise and the measurement of profits 
required under the income tax legislation. As has already been noted, the 
uncertainty regarding the proper application of the income tax legislation was 
exacerbated by the fact that the income tax legislation incorporated several 
inconsistent concepts of income under the various Schedules and, indeed, even 
within the particular Schedules. The crucial issue confronting the courts was 
therefore the extent to which accounting practice ought influence the meaning of 
profits under the income tax. This question arose once again in Knowles v 
McAdam, 105 where the taxpayer had been assessed with respect to the profits of 
a coal mine, but sought to claim an allowance in recognition of the diminishing 
value of the resource as it was depleted. The decisions in the Court of 
Exchequer focused upon the meaning of 'profits' in 'ordinary' parlance. In a 
decision which implicitly acknowledged generally accepted accounting practice, 
all of the members of the court considered that the capital value of the mine was 
legitimately amortised over its lifespan in ascertaining the profits of the mining 
enterprise for the purposes of the income tax. 
However there was by no means judicial unanimity upon the extent to which the 
Act defined the income tax base in accordance with accepted accounting 
practice. Indeed, the first case in the first volume of the Tax Cases 106 reflects a 
denial of accounting practice in determining taxable profits. In that case the 
taxpayer sought to deduct an amount in recognition of the depreciating value of 
mine shafts it had constructed. However, the deduction was expressly rejected 
on the basis that such expenditure fell within the specific exclusion of 'any sum 
employed or intended to be employed as capital in such trade, manufacture, 
adventure or concern'. The Court accepted the accounting definition of 'capital'. 
Noting that the amount expended for the sinking of the mine shaft would be 
105 (1877) 1 TC 161. 
106 Addie & Sons v Commissioners for General Purposes (1875) 1TC1. 
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treated as capital in the taxpayer's books, the court concluded that it should be 
treated as capital for the purposes of the income tax.107 However, in a 
significant departure from accounting practice and despite its partial 
acknowledgment of accounting practice with respect to the definition of capital, 
the Court held that the 'special rules of the Income Tax Act'108 indicated that no 
amortisation could be allowed in respect of the capital investment in the mine 
shafts. 
3 The Search for Coherence 
Within the first five years in which there had been a statutory right of appeal to 
the courts the judiciary had, in different cases, adopted all of the competing 
interpretations of the income concept which had been canvassed in the 
contemporary literature. Although the economic concept of income was 
allowed to slip into obscurity, the disorder of the law in this field was apparent 
in the conflicting decisions of Addie and Knowles. In Addie the court had 
acknowledged the discourse of the business community by adopting the 
accounting concept of 'profits' and downplaying those parts of the legislation 
which suggested that no amortisation expense was allowable under the Act. In 
Knowles, on the other hand, the court considered that it was bound to give 
greater emphasis to the technical meaning of 'profits' in accordance with the 
rules governing the measurement of profits for income tax purposes. Clearly, 
the two cases illustrate the fundamental conflict of competing standpoints 
within Victorian England regarding the meaning of 'profit', and hence the 
absence of one 'literal' meaning of the term. This conflict was made all the 
more problematic by the fact that, no matter which approach was adopted, the 
result would seem to contradict at least one conception of justice. On the one 
hand, if the courts adopted the accounting concept of profits, the express 
107 Ibid 3. 
108 Ibid 3. 
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exclusion of any deduction not otherwise allowed under the Act was rendered 
otiose. This seemed to contradict the ideal of formal justice which the courts 
regularly espoused. On the other hand, if the technical meaning of 'profits' in 
terms of gross flows was adopted, this seemed to breach notions of substantive 
equity. As noted previously, a subject of considerable debate had been the fact 
that Schedule A brought actual or imputed gross profits into account while 
Schedule D was taken to bring gross profits net of some expenses into account. 
In 1868 the assessment of mines, railways, ironworks, gasworks and similar 
ventures had been transferred from Schedule A to Schedule D, apparently with 
the intention that such ventures ought be able to avail themselves of the same 
tax administration mechanisms as other business ventures. 109 However, many 
business ventures remained within the domain of Schedules A and B, and so the 
perceived inequity of differential treatment of different categories of business 
profits remained. The early interpretation of the income tax is therefore marked 
by a conflict between competing conceptions of income, and also by the 
competition between rival notions of justice. These fundamental conflicts had 
to be resolved if the judicial pretensions to discovery of determinate legal 
meaning were to prevail. 
These conflicts arose for examination in the House of Lords in Coltness Iron Co 
v Black. 110 In Coltness the taxpayer carried on a mining business and was 
assessed for the annual value of the mines it owned (determined according to 
the profits therefrom). The issue was whether the taxpayer was entitled to claim 
a deduction for the amortised cost of sinking its mines. If the deduction for 
mine shaft expenses had been allowed in Coltness, the calculation of the 
taxpayer's profit for taxation purposes would have been the same as the 
calculation of the taxpayer's accounting profit. The case therefore called for a 
109 (1868) 29 Vic c 36, s 8. For official comment upon this reform see: United Kingdom, 
Twenty-Fourth Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue, House of 
Commons, Parliamentary Papers (1881) vol 29: 181, 258-9. 
uo(l881) 1 TC311. 
113 
reconsideration of the decision in Knowles. In rejecting that decision, the House 
of Lords ignored arguments founded upon the 'ordinary' meaning of 'profits', 
and instead maintained that the legislative intent evidenced by the words of the 
legislation was determinative: 
But the object is to grant a revenue at all events, even though a possible 
nearer approximation to equality may be sacrificed in order more easily 
and certainly to raise that revenue; and I think the only safe rule is to 
look at the words of the enactments, and see what is the intention 
expressed by those words.111 
The basis of the House of Lords decision was that the legislature had intended to 
adopt the technical meaning of 'profits' as used in the rating acts. The rating 
acts taxed the annual value of property according to the annual income flowing 
from the property, 112 irrespective of the wasting character of some forms of 
property (such as mineral deposits): 
But the argument that no income tax should be imposed on what is 
perhaps not quite accurately called rent reserved on a mineral lease, 
because it is a payment by instalments of the price of minerals forming 
part of the land (any more than on the price paid down in one sum for 
the out and out purchase of the minerals forming part of the land), is, I 
think, untenable. Even if it had not been as decided in the King v 
Attwood ... the constant course from the statute of Elizabeth downwards 
to construe an annual tax imposed on coal mines, quarries, and the like, 
as being imposed on that which is produced from them. 113 
In reaching this conclusion Lord Blackburn considered the overall scheme of the 
Act. His Lordship noted that, whilst the specific Schedules generally taxed 
'profits', the argument that that term was intended in its 'ordinary' commercial 
sense was precluded by the fact that the allowance of specific deductions from 
'profits' implied that 'profits' meant gross receipts. Further, his Lordship noted 
rn Ibid 317. 
112 Ibid 317 (Lord Blackburn); the adoption of the method of taxation of the rating acts was 
implicit in the decision of Lord Penzance. 
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that the statutory prohibition of any deductions not expressly allowed under the 
Act precluded the taxpayer's claim. 114 Thus, according to Lord Blackbum, 
'profits' was to be taken in its technical sense. His Lordship concluded that only 
expenses incurred in deriving the income flow and those expenses expressly 
allowed as deductions under the Income Tax Act 1852 were to be taken into 
account in arriving at a profit figure. 115 
Given Lord Blackburn's preparedness to adopt a 'flow' concept of profits and 
also his acknowledgement that only those expenses expressly allowed as 
deductions from profits under the Act should be taken into account in 
computing taxable income, his allowance of 'working expenses' as legitimate 
deductions is problematic. If 'profits' meant gross receipts from which certain 
statutorily enumerated expenses could be deducted in arriving at taxable 
income, it is unclear how 'working expenses' could legitimately be taken into 
account other than by recourse to the express deduction provisions. 
Alternatively, if 'profits' meant gross receipts less certain working expenses and 
statutory deductions, it is unclear why the taxpayer's claim for amortisation of a 
wasting asset was considered to fall outside the category of 'working expenses'. 
Neither of the more detailed decisions of Lord Penzance and Lord Blackbum 
expressly set out the basis for taking working expenses into account, or any 
criteria for identifying the working expenses of any income earning activity. 
More specifically, it is not apparent from any of the judgments why the cost of 
sinking a mine pit was considered to fall outside the category of 'working 
expenses'. Nevertheless, after Coltness it was accepted that no deduction was 
113 Ibid 321 (Lord Blackburn); 314 (Lord Penzance). 
114 See also: Gillatt and Watts v Colquhoun (1884) 2 TC 76, 83-4 (Smith J). 
115 Ibid 323 (Lord Blackburn); 314 (Lord Penzance). 
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available under Schedule D for the depreciation or amortisation of capital assets, 
unless the Act was considered to specifically allow such a deduction.116 
The ramifications of the Coltness decision extended beyond the interpretation of 
Schedule D. All of the categories of income listed in the Schedules except 
Schedule D were generally to be ascertained according to the profits of the 
taxpayer from a particular source. Further, it was subsequently implied that 
'gains' added little to 'profits' for the purposes of Schedule D.117 The decision 
in Coltness therefore suggested that, in the absence of any specific provision to 
the contrary, the profits of the taxpayer for the purposes of all of the Schedules 
to the Act were the flows to the taxpayer, less the working expenses, regardless 
of whether the taxpayer derived an accounting profit. The effect of the decision 
in Coltness was that 'profits' had the same 'technical legal meaning' under both 
Schedules A and D, an approach affirmed in subsequent cases. 118 
While the House of Lords had purported to apply the literal meaning of the 
Income Tax Act 1853, the decision in Coltness indicated that the House of Lords 
was prepared to construct an underlying concept of income from the ad hoc 
116 The decision in Coltness was followed in Gil/at v Colquhoun (1884) 2 TC 76 (amortisation 
of leasehold interest); The City of London Contract Corporation v Styles (1887) 2 TC 239 
(purchase price of unexecuted contracts); The Alianza Co Ltd v Bell ( 1904) 5 TC 60; 5 TC 172 
(deduction with respect to depletion of mineral resource); Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v 
Lucas (1883) 2 TC 25 (application of revenue to payment of interest and also to a sinking fund 
for extinguishment of debt incurred in construction wharves and docks). An allowance for 
depreciation under Schedule D was inserted in 1878 by the Customs and Inland Revenue Act 
1878 (Eng), s 12, although no capital writeoff for capital items was included in the Act. More 
generally, it was recognised that the accounting treatment of a particular expense was not 
deterrninati ve of the treatment of the particular expense for the purposes of the income tax; see, 
for example, Arizana Copper Co v Smiles (1891) 3 TC 149, 153. 
117 Gresham Life Assurance Society v Styles (1892) 3 TC 185, 188-9. 
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'We constantly in law talk of profits of land. The old conveyances used to talk of the rents, 
issues, and profits of land, but those profits are what you get out of the land after deducting the 
expenses of getting them. The profits of a farm in that sense are not quite the same as the profits 
of the farmer, but may be fairly described as the net produce of the land. It is plain that that is 
the meaning to be attributed to the word in the 2nd and 3rd rules in Schedule A.' Mersey Docks 
and Harbour Board v Lucas (1881) 1 TC 386, 461-2 (Lindley MR); see also: Erichsen v Last 
(1881) 4 TC 422, 426, 428; Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Lucas (1883) 2 TC 25 (House 
of Lords); Morant v Wheal Grenville Mining Co (1894) 3 TC 298. Although there were some 
dissentients. See, for example, Duke of Norfolk v Lamarque (1890) 2 TC 579, 582 (Pollock B). 
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collection of taxing provisions comprising the income tax legislation. Starting 
from the presupposition that substantive justice mandated that businesses ought 
to be treated in a similar way under both Schedules A and D, the House of Lords 
had confronted the quandary of determining which part of the Income Tax Act 
1853 it should ignore. In Knowles the Court of Appeal had been swayed by 
considerations of substantive justice, and had attempted to create some level of 
horizontal equity between Schedules A and D. This had been achieved by a 
relaxation of a formalist rhetoric. The Court of Appeal ignored the statutory 
restriction of deductions to those which were expressly allowed for in the 
legislation. In Coltness, the House of Lords moderated the apparent conflict 
between the competing imperatives of substantive and formal justice. The 
House of Lords adopted a compromise in which the reference to 'profits' was 
understood to mean gross revenue less some 'working expenses' which were 
not coextensive with expenses allowed for accounting purposes. This meant 
that a wider range of deductions was allowable under Schedule A than had 
previously been available. This interpretation of 'profits' also affected the 
interpretation of the general deduction rule of Schedule D. By giving 'profits' 
the same meaning under both Schedules A and D, the House of Lords had 
rendered the general deduction provision of Schedule D119 otiose. This general 
deduction provision operated only after the profits had been ascertained120 and 
therefore only after the 'working expenses' allowed for in the calculation of 
profits had been taken into account. As the 'working expenses' had to have a 
demonstrated nexus to the derivation of business receipts to be allowable 
119 Income Tax Act I 853 s 100, Schedule D, Rules applying to Cases 1 and 2, Rule 1. For the 
text of the rule see the extract accompanying n 61 above. 
120 
'In estimating the balance of the profits of gains ... no sum shall be set against or deducted 
from ... such profits or gains ... ', Income Tax Act I 842, s 100, Schedule D, Rules applying to 
Cases 1 and 2, Rule 1. 
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deductions under this provision, the nexus requirement expressed in Rule 1121 
was redundant. 
The interpretation of 'profits' adopted in Coltness therefore neatly skirted the 
express exclusion of deductions 'from profits.i22 not allowed for under Schedule 
A of the Act. This approach therefore ameliorated the horizontal inequity 
arising from the disparate legislative treatment of expenses apparent in 
Schedules A and D. Coltness therefore represented more than 'giving effect to 
the words of the legislation', and is perhaps more properly to be characterised as 
an attempt to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies within the income tax 
legislation in arriving at what was considered to be a just result. 
4 The Coltness Compromise Begets Further Judicial Pragmatism 
Although the allowance of working expenses in the Coltness decision might be 
considered a nice compromise between the 'profits equals gross flows' approach 
and the 'profits equals accounting profits' approach, the obscurity of the 
'working expenses' category proved to be the Achilles heel of the decision. 
Subsequent case law therefore rehearsed the conflict between 'profits equals 
gross flows' and 'profits equals accounting profits'. 
Thus in Last v London Assurance Corporation123 the taxpayer was an insurance 
company which offered two categories of insurance policy. Firstly, there was 
the non-participating policy whereby the insured obtained insurance against the 
risk insured and no more. Secondly, under a participating policy, the insured 
obtained insurance against the risk insured but, in consideration for a higher 
121 Ibid. 
122 Section 159 of the Income Tax Act I 853 provided: 
'In the computation of duty to be made under this Act in any of the cases before mentioned ... it 
shall not be lawful to make any other deductions therefrom than such as are expressly 
enumerated in this Act, nor to any deduction on account of any annual interest, annuity, or other 
annual payment to be paid to any person out of any profits or gains chargeable by this Act.' 
123 (1884) 2 TC 100. 
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premium, also obtained the right to a share of the taxpayer's profits derived 
from the participating series of policies. 124 On behalf of the taxpayer, it was 
argued that this right to profit participation was no more than a conditional 
promise to return a portion of the premiums paid with respect to the 
participating policies. Viewed in this light, the 'distribution of profits' was 
merely another cost to the taxpayer's business and ought to have been deducted 
as a 'working expense' in arriving at the profit of the business, in accordance 
with the decisions of Coltness and Mersey Dock and Harbour Board v Lucas. 125 
A majority in the Court of Appeal adopted this business understanding of 
profits. A key proposition of the majority judgment was that the profits of the 
taxpayer could only mean the sum of money ultimately available for distribution 
to the corporators, as it was not open to the taxpayer to bargain away some of its 
profits to persons other than the taxpayer's corporators. 
Overruling the Court of Appeal decision, all of the Lords deciding the case 
adopted the 'gross receipts less working expenses' definition of income in 
accordance with Mersey Docks and Coltness. A majority of the House of Lords 
comprising Lords Blackbum and Fitzgerald held that it was possible for the 
taxpayer to distribute profits to non-shareholders such as the participating 
policyholders. On the basis that the distribution to participating policyholders 
was not a working expense, the majority held that it was a distribution out of 
profits which was subject to income tax in the hands of the taxpayer. 
Notwithstanding their common ground upon the exclusion of distributions to 
participating policyholders from the category of allowable working expenses, it 
is apparent that the two Lords in the majority did not share a common 
understanding of the income concept. Although at times Lord Fitzgerald 
124 The taxpayer's prospectus provided that '[t]wo thirds of the gross profits of the participating 
series of policies are allotted every five years to the assured, every policy in force at the date of 
the valuation being entitled to participate. The assured have the option of receiving their share 
of the profits in cash, or of appropriating it in increase of the sum assured, or in reduction of the 
future annual premiums'; ibid 128. 
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expressly referred to the Mersey Docks formulation of the income concept, he 
also appeared to accept a much broader concept of profits equating to gross 
flows: 
The conclusion that I have reached on the case as it comes before us, and 
not on any suppositious case, is that the premiums paid to the Company 
in respect of the participating policies form part of the annual profits of 
the Company just as much as any other portion of their revenue. 126 
If read broadly, this would suggest that any payment out of the taxpayer's 
premium income would be a distribution of profits, perhaps upon the footing 
that there were no 'working expenses' associated with the generation of 
premium income. By contrast, Lord Blackbum seemed to accept that there 
could be some working expenses incurred by the taxpayer in generating its 
premium income. Thus Lord Blackbum specifically accepted that a refund of 
premiums to policyholders, which was not conditional upon the taxpayer having 
a 'profit' in the relevant year, would not be a distribution out of profits. Lord 
Blackburn's observation is inconsistent with the definition of profits as receipts 
less working expenses incurred in generating those receipts, particularly given 
that Lord Fitzgerald had considered that all premium income would be profits. 
In his dissenting judgment, Lord Bramwell accepted the view of the Court of 
Appeal in characterising the distributions to the participating policyholders as a 
'working expense' arising out of the generation of the premium income. 
Although Coltness had rejected the general adoption of accounting practice for 
the purposes of measuring the taxpayer's profit under the income tax, the 
recognition of the category of working expenses had appeared to leave the way 
open for taxpayers to accommodate many of the accounting rules regarding 
expenses within the 'working expense' category. The decision in London 
Assurance represented a rebuff to this accommodation of accounting practice 
125 (1883) 2 TC 25. 
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within the 'working expenses' category, emphasising that 'profits' were closer 
to gross receipts than to any concept of real profits recognised for business 
purposes. 
Notwithstanding the rebuff in London Assurance, advocates of the accounting 
concept of profits continued to test the scope of the 'working expenses' 
category. It must be remembered that the more restricted understanding of the 
profit concept had only been adopted by bare majorities in both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords, and the dissentients in those courts had clearly 
embraced the rhetoric of business practice in interpreting the income tax. It is 
therefore understandable that, in Mersey Loan and Discount Company v 
Wootton, 127 the taxpayer felt emboldened enough to once again test the 
relevance of accounting concepts to the measurement of income for the 
purposes of the income tax. The taxpayer carried on the business of banking, 
receiving moneys on loan at interest and lending those moneys at interest. The 
taxpayer argued that the interest paid to its customers was a working expense 
rather than a distribution of profits for the purposes of the Act. 128 Given the 
suggestion of Lord Blackbum in London Assurance that many payments made 
out of gross receipts which were not conditional upon the taxpayer having 
'profits' comprised working expenses, the taxpayer had a credible argument that 
the interest expense was a working expense associated with its financing 
business. Pollock ~ dismissed this argument : 
Then is it a charge ... in the nature of current expenses. You would say 
house rent, taxes, salaries of clerks and others, and matters of that kind 
have to come, of course, out of the gross profits before they can make 
any income at all. It is not a charge of that kind.129 
126 Last, above n 118, 129 (Lord FitzGerald). 
127 (1887) 2 TC 316. 
128 It should also be noted that the Act precluded any deduction on account of interest, see: 
Income Tax Act 1842, s 100, Schedule D, Case 1, Rule 3. 
129 Ibid 320. 
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It was therefore held that payments of interest by the taxpayer were payments 
out of profits. 130 
The combined effect of the decisions in Coltness, London Assurance and 
Mersey Loan and Discount Co seemed to constitute a comprehensive rejection 
of the view that accounting practice was relevant to the measurement of income 
for the purposes of the income tax.131 Nevertheless, the strength of the 
conviction that the income tax ought only apply to real gains as measured by 
accountants is indicated by the fact that taxpayers continued to test the scope of 
the 'receipts less working expenses' definition of income. This persistence on 
the part of business taxpayers was ultimately rewarded. In Styles v New York 
Life Insurance Co132 the only members of a mutual insurance company were 
those who had obtained participating insurance policies with the company. At 
the end of each accounting period, any surplus over operating expenses arising 
from the insurance business of participating policyholders was effectively 
distributed to the participating policyholders. After London Assurance it might 
have been thought that there was but a forlorn hope that such distributions 
would be an allowable deduction out of the taxpayer's profits, as opposed to a 
distribution of the taxpayer's profits. However, the taxpayer had doubtless 
studied the decision of London Assurance closely, and in particular the 
suggestion by Lord Blackbum that a refund of premiums would not constitute a 
distribution of profits. 
130 See also: Stevens v Bishop (1888) 2 TC 249. 
131 See also: Russell v Aberdeen Town and Country Bank (1888) 2 TC 321; cf Alexandria Water 
Co Ltd v Musgrave (1883) 1 TC 521 (Court of Appeal). In Duke of Norfolk v Lamarque (1890) 
2 TC 579 the taxpayer sought to claim the cost of collecting manorial dues as a deduction from 
the profits brought to account under Schedule A. Pollock B considered that there was a 
difference between the expenses allowed in calculating profits for the purposes of Schedule D as 
opposed to those allowed in arriving at the profits under Schedule A. The confusion concerning 
the application of the definition of profits to particular factual scenarios is reflected in his 
comment that you cannot say that the collection of the rent is money spent for the purposes of 
earning the rent - it is simply money spent for getting in that which belongs to the owner.' (at 
582). See also: Granite Supply Association Limited v Kitton (1905) 5 TC 168. 
132 (1889) 2 TC 460. 
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In a clear rejection of the strict application of Lord Fitzgerald's view, a majority 
of the House of Lords held that the surplus did not comprise profits. The basis 
of this conclusion was that the distributions to members by New York Life 
Insurance were no more than a return of subscriptions to the members of a 
mutual fund. This recognition of a mutuality principle signalled a shift away 
from the technical meaning of profits and towards a preparedness to 
accommodate business understandings of the term. Indeed, in joining the 
majority, Lord Herschell commented upon the shortcomings of the strict 
definition of 'profits', suggesting that the undesirable consequences of this 
definition could be judicially ameliorated for pragmatic reasons in particular 
contexts: 
These definitions were, I doubt not, correct in relation to the facts of the 
Mersey Docks case, and must be accepted for the purposes of any other 
case of a similar character. But I do not think they are applicable when 
dealing with a life insurance concern. It is of the very essence of such an 
enterprise that a portion of the income should from time to time be 
invested in order to create and maintain a fund capable of meeting the 
liabilities that have been and are being created. To treat and distribute as 
profits all the income in excess of the costs and expenses of receipt and 
collection would soon land such an undertaking in hopeless 
insolvency. 133 
Lord Herschell' s observation was founded upon the view that an overemphasis 
upon the definition of income as 'receipts less working expenses' for the 
purposes of the Income Tax Act failed to take account of economic realities such 
as contingent expenditure associated with the derivation of income. Although 
he accepted that the doctrine of stare decisis precluded a reexamination of the 
issues raised in the earlier case law, Lord Herschell's observation was a 
significant indication that at least some judges were conscious of the 
commercial implications of their decisions. Further, Lord Herschell indicated 
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that there may be some room for the courts to manoeuvre within the 'receipts 
less working expenses' doctrine in order to produce more favourable outcomes 
to taxpayers. 
This commercial awareness, and the preparedness of the courts to revisit the 
vexed issue of the relevance of accounting practice in the context of the income 
tax, was tested in Gresham Life Assurance Society v Styles. 134 In that case an 
insurer sought to deduct certain annuity payments in calculating its profit for the 
purposes of the income tax, notwithstanding the apparently express exclusion of 
such a deduction in Rule 4 of Case 1, Schedule D. 135 The court was therefore 
required to determine whether this exclusion had any operation. The Court of 
Appeal cited Alexandria Waterworks Company as authority for the proposition 
that 'profits' meant gross receipts. 136 On this basis the court held that the 
exclusion of deductions for annuity payments did have an operation because the 
reference to 'profits' did not allow any deduction for the annuity expense. On 
appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the Court of Appeal was 
overturned on the basis that the reference to 'profits' was to be accorded its 
'ordinary' meaning. According to the House of Lords, this meant that in the 
case of a company trading in annuities, the cost of such annuities was properly 
taken into account in ascertaining taxable profits. 
The decision of the House of Lords in Gresham Life Assurance Society 
contributed to the confusion concerning the definition of 'profits'. If the cost of 
133 Styles, above n 117, 483. Lord Herschell failed to consider that the directors or partners were 
not obliged to distribute all of the profits, and indeed that it might be prudent to retain some 
profits in a profit reserve in the circumstances he described. 
134 (1890) 2 TC 633. 
135 Rule 4 was expressed in these terms: 'In estimating the amount of the profits and gains 
arising as aforesaid no deduction shall be made on account of any annual interest, or any annuity 
or other annual payment, payable out of such profits or gains.' 
136 
'Now the question is, what is meant here by "profits or gains?" I think that by this is meant, 
receipts, trade receipts, on credit side of the account, and I think that this view is very much 
strengthened by the different phraseology used in these different rules'; 641 (Lopes LJ); see 
also: 640 (Esher MR) and 641 (Lindley LJ). 
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annuities was to be allowed in calculating profits in all cases, the decision of the 
House of Lords rendered Rule 4 otiose, as the rule was interpreted merely as 
restating the fact that, once the taxpayer's profits had been ascertained, the 
taxpayer could not claim a deduction with respect to any payment of interest or 
an annuity not connected with his or her income earning activities. 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords appeared to accept that Rule 4 did have some 
application, although just in what circumstances Rule 4 would or would not 
apply was not discussed by their Lordships. However it seemed clear, after 
Gresham Life Assurance Society, that notwithstanding the express prohibition in 
the Act, those trading in annuities had been spared from the impact of Rule 4. 
Further, the decision of the House of Lords in Gresham signalled the 
preparedness of the Lords to extend the 'working expenses' proviso in 
developing an income concept somewhat closer to the commercial concept of 
income than had hitherto been the case, notwithstanding what were apparently 
clear legislative exclusions of particular deductions. 
According to the generally accepted account of tax interpretation, the courts 
merely discovered the literal meaning of the income tax legislation in a manner 
which stood in contrast to the discretionary administration of the income tax at 
the level of local government. However the literal meaning of 'profits and 
gains' for the purposes of the income tax of Victorian Britain is problematic. At 
no point was there a consensus upon the meaning of the income concept. 
Nowhere is this conflict between competing interpretations, and the evidence of 
judicial choice more apparent, than in the case law with respect to the meaning 
of profits or gains under Schedule D. 
Although some early decisions adopted the economic concept of profit, in 
Coltness the House of Lords rejected this broad approach, preferring a more 
limited concept of income. In Coltness the House of Lords confronted the 
apparent inequity, in terms of substantive justice, of the differential treatment of 
profits under Schedules A and D. If the references to 'profits' throughout the 
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Act were understood to mean gross receipts. The House of Lords also 
confronted the apparent injustice, in terms of formal justice, of any attempt to 
ameliorate this horizontal inequity by 'judicial legislation'. The decision in 
Coltness ultimately represented a compromise between these possibilities. By 
adapting the 'technical' meaning of 'profits' from the Rating Acts, the House of 
Lords expanded the range of deductions allowable under Schedule A, while 
effectively rendering the express deduction rule of Schedule D otiose. Although 
there is no express reference to judicial pragmatism in the judgments in the 
House of Lords, the Coltness decision reflects a judicial awareness of the 
pragmatic implications of the competing interpretations of the income tax 
legislation. 
However, rather than resolving the conflict between the accounting and 
technical understandings of 'profits', the compromise in Coltness merely 
perpetuated the conflict by incorporating them both within the 'gross receipts 
less working expenses' formula. Thereafter a line of authorities highlighted the 
judicial uncertainty regarding the relative weights to be accorded the technical 
and accounting concepts of profits when applying this compromise to particular 
circumstances. By excluding the cost of sinking pits from the category of 
working expenses, the Coltness decision had initiated a line of ad hoc judicial 
decisions influenced by a pragmatic judicial awareness of the operation of the 
legislation. Far from representing the discovery of law, the judicial 
interpretation of the income tax legislation in the 1880's is characterised by 
pragmatic choices between plausible alternative interpretations. If anything, the 
preceding review of the case law demonstrates that the judges 'discovered' the 
plethora of income concepts adopted in various contexts by the wider 
community. There was no one literal meaning of the income concept awaiting 
judicial discovery. 
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G Judicial Pragmatism and the Cloak of Formalism 
The second aspect of the mainstream account of tax interpretation is that the 
courts of the Victorian era uniformly adopted the rhetoric of strict literalism in 
construing the income tax legislation. Upon the basis of the authoritative 
declarations of the literalist method in cases such as Tennant v Smith, modem 
commentators have accepted that the judiciary uniformly adopted the literalist 
method over the closing decades of the nineteenth century. In the 1890's, it has 
been suggested, the judicial rhetoric of formalism assumed a strident tone.137 
This shift to a heightened rhetoric of formalism might also have signalled a shift 
in judicial practice. However, the creativity of the courts in this era of 'new' 
formalism is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in Tennant v Smith, 138 
one of the decisions of the House of Lords which is often cited as authority for 
the literalist approach adopted by the courts of the Victorian era,. 
It will be recalled that while Schedules A, B, C, and E brought various flows to 
account as income, Schedule D brought 'profits or gains' to account. Case VI of 
Schedule D extended the tax net to 'profits or gains' not otherwise brought to 
account under the Act, and was the troublesome provision in what was, at least 
after Coltness, otherwise perceived as a theoretically consistent Income Tax 
Act. 139 The possibility that the Act might apply to a broad range of profits 
depended upon the breadth of the interpretation adopted with respect to 'gains' 
under Schedule D, and particularly those gains falling under Case VI of that 
Schedule. In Russell (Surveyor of Taxes) v Aberdeen Town and County Bank140 
the taxpayer carried on the business of banking, and leased premises for that 
137 Blackshield, above n 84. 
138 [1892] AC 150. 
139 The potential breadth of the United Kingdom income tax, by virtue of this inclusive provision 
in Schedule D case VI, is often overlooked by commentators who are perhaps too willing to 
draw a distinction between jurisdictions such as the United States and the United Kingdom; see, 
for example, R Haig, 'The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects' in R Musgrave 
and Carl Shoup (eds), Readings in the Economics of Taxation (1959) 54, 56; Krever, above n 
56, 224 (n 23). 
140 (1888) LR 13 App Cas 418. 
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purpose. A part of the premises were used by the bank manager as his private 
residence, for which the manager was not required to pay rent. The question 
before the House of Lords was whether the taxpayer was entitled to claim a 
deduction for the rental paid for the entire premises, or just that part which was 
not devoted to the private use of the manager. In finding for the taxpayer, Lord 
Herschell suggested that the provision of premises rent free constituted a gain to 
the manager which may be assessable as an emolument under Schedule E. 
Perhaps emboldened by this obiter statement of Lord Herschell, the Surveyor 
raised the case of Tennant v Smith. 141 In that case a bank employee was allowed 
to occupy a part of the bank premises for residential purposes on the 
understanding that he would attend to the security of the building outside of 
banking hours. The employee was not allowed to vacate or sublet the premises 
without the consent of the Bank's directors. No deduction was made from the 
employee's salary in consideration for the occupation of the bank premises. The 
Surveyor maintained that the annual rental value of the accommodation 
provided to the employee ought be included in his income for the purposes of 
the Act, relying upon the alternative grounds of Schedules D and E. 
The opening words of Lord Halsbury's judgment did not bode well for the 
Surveyor: 
My Lords, to put this case very simply, the question depends upon what 
is Mr. Tennant's income. This is an Income Tax Act, and what is 
intended to be taxed is income. And when I say "what is intended to be 
taxed," I mean what is the intention of the Act as expressed in its 
provisions, because in a Taxing Act it is impossible, I believe, to assume 
any intention, any governing purpose in the Act, to do more than take 
h h . 142 sue tax as t e statute imposes. 
141 (1892) AC 150; 3 TC 158. 
142 Ibid 163. 
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His Lordship adopted the literalist canon that 'you must see whether a tax is 
expressly imposed'143 and noted that under Schedule E the subject of taxation 
was only those emoluments, perquisites and profits which were 'payable' to the 
taxpayer. On the basis that the saving of an expense could not constitute a 
payment, his Lordship held that Schedule E was inapplicable to the facts before 
him. No consideration was given to the possibility that the provision of rent 
free accommodation constituted a constructive payment. Notwithstanding the 
express reference to the literal rule by Lord Halsbury, his Lordship dismissed 
the suggestion that Case VI of Schedule D applied, on the basis that the taxpayer 
could only be assessed under Schedule E. Lord Watson offered the rationale for 
this exclusion of Case VI: 
It appears to me that everything in the shape of profit or gain arising 
from a public office or employment, which the Legislature intended to 
be chargeable with duty, is ascertainable and assessable under the rules 
of Schedule E, and under these rules only. 144 
No statutory foundation for this conclusion was recorded by Lord Watson. In 
particular, he did not reconcile his conclusion with the existence of Case VI of 
Schedule D, which seemed to clearly contemplate that some assessable gains 
would fall outside of the other Schedules. 
The decision of the House of Lords ultimately rested upon the question of which 
of two inconsistent provisions to apply. On the one hand, by taxing 
remuneration, perquisites and other benefits payable to an employee, Schedule E 
could have been categorised as the more specific provision which detailed a 
comprehensive code for the taxation of employees. By implication, any other 
benefits provided in association with the employment would not be included in 
the taxpayer's income for tax purposes. On the other hand, Schedule E could 
have been interpreted as applying specific rules to amounts payable to 
143 Ibid. 
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employees, leaving the taxation of other benefits provided to employees to the 
general rules of Case VI of Schedule D. A plausible 'literal' reading of the 
legislation might therefore have, at the least, accepted that Case VI of Schedule 
D could apply to the provision of rent free accommodation to an employee. Had 
this been the case, Lord Herschell's comment in Aberdeen and Town and 
Country Bank and also Lord Halsbury's observation in Styles v New York 
Assurance that the participating policyholders had benefited from a more 
valuable contract might have lead to the conclusion that Smith had actually 
derived a gain which was liable to income tax. 
The House of Lords was therefore confronted with at least two plausible 
approaches to the interpretation of the income tax. Although Lord Halsbury 
referred to the rule of strict construction, he opted for an interpretation of the 
Act which was founded upon the perceived 'scheme' of the legislation. Lord 
McNaghten expressed the rationale underlying the decision of the House of 
Lords when he abandoned any pretensions to a literal analysis of Schedules D 
and E, and referred to an underlying concept of income which his Lordship 
discerned in the legislation: 
In my opinion the answer to the claim of the Crown does not depend on 
any minute criticism of the language of the different schedules. The real 
answer is that the thing which the Crown seeks to charge is not income, 
nor is it required to be taken into account as income. 145 
It is difficult to see how this statement can be reconciled with a literalist 
interpretative methodology purportedly adopted by the Court, as Case VI of 
Schedule D was apparently ignored on the basis that it did not fit within the 
judicial construct of 'income'. Nowhere in Tennant v Smith is there any 
convincing explanation for why Case VI of Schedule D, interpreted regardless 
of any underlying concept of income, would not apply to the circumstances of 
144 Ibid 168. 
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the taxpayer. If Tennant v Smith stands for the proposition that tax legislation 
ought be construed literally, as many commentators suggest, the actual decision 
of the case seems to support the conclusion that it is a peculiarly creative form 
of literalism which was embraced by the courts. This pragmatic judicial 
interpretation of one of the core concepts of the Victorian income tax suggests 
that the courts were doing anything but applying the literal meaning of the 
legislation in an era when literalism was purportedly at its zenith. The creation 
of the statutory right of appeal had purportedly heralded a new age of tax 
administration according to law, as opposed to the discretion of the local 
administration, but had merely served to create a new forum for the pragmatic 
application of the income tax. 
G The Diversity of Interpretative Method in Victorian Income Tax Cases 
Indeed, this pragmatism of the courts is also evident in the diversity of 
interpretative rhetoric adopted by the courts. A review of the case law suggests 
that the judiciary adopted a wide range of interpretative rhetoric over the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
1 The Plurality of the Literalist Concept 
Although a number of judges had adopted the axiom that the interpretation of 
tax legislation required nothing more than the identification of the determinate 
literal meaning of the legislation, there was no elaboration upon what was meant 
by the literal meaning of the statutory words. It is clear from the preceding 
discussion of the early income tax case law that there was any number of 
standpoints from which the meaning of particular statutory words could be 
construed, and that often several quite disparate meanings were plausible. Thus 
even if a judge was prepared to accept the literalist rhetoric, the 'literal meaning 
of the statutory words' was itself a much more ambiguous concept than was 
145 Ibid 170. 
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recognised within such statements of the interpretative principle. The courts 
implicitly acknowledged the plurality of the concept of 'literal meaning' by 
adopting the alternative standpoints of the technical meaning, 146 the ordinary 
. 141 h · 148 d th · · 1 meanmg, t e commonsense meanmg, an e accountmg or commercia 
meaning149 of the statutory words. This plurality was recognised throughout the 
period when the courts were purportedly adopting the one literal meaning of the 
statutory words. 
2 The Recognition of Alternative Interpretative Methods 
(a) Substantive Justice 
In addition to the plurality of the concept of 'literal meaning', in some 
judgments of this period the courts expressly accepted that the interpretation of 
tax legislation should be undertaken with the object of identifying the 'just' or 
'fair' result. The concept of justice was itself open to alternative interpretations. 
This acknowledgement of a role for considerations of substantive justice 
therefore represented an implicit acceptance of the 'golden rule' of statutory 
interpretation in the context of tax interpretation. 15° From the standpoint of 
substantive justice, many judges indicated that statutory interpretation entailed 
the evaluation of alternative interpretations from the perspective of principles 
founded upon communal morality. For example, Kelly LCB in Calcutta Jute 
146 Coltness Iron Co v Black (1881) 1TC287. 
147 Knowles v McAdam (1877) 1 TC 161, 166; Re Young (1875) 1 TC 57; Brown v Watt (1886) 
2 TC 143 at 146 (the 'popular' meaning); Holborn Viaduct Land Co v The Queen (1887) 2 TC 
228 at 235 (the 'plain' meaning); Partridge v Mallandaine (1886) 2 TC 179, 181 (the 
'commonsense' and 'ordinary' meaning). 
148 Octavius Jepson v Frederick Gribble 1 TC 78 at 80; Partington v The Attorney General 
(1869) LR (HL) 100, where Lord Cairns did not refer expressly to 'commonsense' meanings but 
rather to 'the words'; Partridge v Mallandaine (1886) 2 TC 179, 181 (the 'commonsense' and 
'ordinary' meaning'. 
149 In Re Robert Addie & Sons 1 TC 1, 3; Forder v Handyside 1 TC 65, 70; Knowles v McAdam 
(1877) 1TC161, 175. 
150 In Holborn Viaduct Co v The Queen (1887) 2 TC 228, 234; Sulley v Attorney-General 
(1860) 2 TC 149, 149. 
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Mills Co Ltd v H. Nicholson and Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd stated that the 'great 
principle of the Law of England in relation to taxation is that taxation shall only 
be imposed upon persons or things actually within this country.' 151 In the 
context of tax legislation of general application, Lord Ardmillan suggested that 
such principles overrode the literal rule of statutory construction: 
There is no doubt that an Act which taxes is to be strictly construed. 
Where there is an Act taxing a particular body, or laying a tax upon a 
particular article, of course that Act is to be strictly construed, but where 
there is an Act taxing the whole of Her Majesty's subjects, and the 
question is, whether it is to be construed so as to sustain the equality of 
the incidence of the tax, I think there is no presumption in favour of that 
exemption and against the equality of the incidence of the taxation. It is 
the next and soundest principle of taxation· to be as equal as possible, 
and I cannot recognize, as a presumption against that equality, what has 
been urged today. 152 
Even in the closing years of the nineteenth century, at a time which is commonly 
portrayed as the zenith of the literalist methodology in the English courts, the 
House of Lords accepted that the literal interpretation of a particular statutory 
provision would produce an 'unreasonable' result and therefore sought an 
alternative interpretation which would better achieve 'justice'. One example of 
this preparedness to embrace notions of substantive justice in rejecting what was 
understood to be the literal interpretation may be seen in Colquhoun v 
Brooks. 153 In that case the taxpayer was assessed under Schedule D as a 
151 1 TC 83, 92. 
152 Re Young (1875) 1 TC 57, 62. Also see the judgment of Lord Deas: '[w]e are here dealing 
with a statute which lays a tax on a whole population who are in the particular position to which 
it refers, a war tax ... That is the sort of tax I take it to be, and, although a taxing Act upon 
particular classes of individuals has to be very strictly construed, we must keep in mind in 
administering an Act of this kind that the great principle comes in that there is to be equality of 
liability among all the parties for whose benefit it is laid on. Therefore, although this is a taxing 
Act, I think there is no more inference to be drawn from that in favour than against liability.' 
Also see the judgment of Lord Ardmillan in Re Scottish Widows Fund and Life Assurance 
Society (1875) 1 TC 7, 10. This was a case involving the inhabited house duty, but Lord 
Ardmillan considered that the principle of equality overrode the principle of strict construction. 
153 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 493. 
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resident who had derived profits from carrying on a trade in Australia. The 
taxpayer was a partner in an Australian partnership which had generated 
substantial profits, but only a portion of the taxpayer's share in those profits had 
been remitted to him whilst he resided in the United Kingdom. The issue was 
therefore whether the terms of Schedule D applied to just that portion of profits 
remitted to the taxpayer, or whether they applied to the taxpayer's entire share 
of the partnership profits. 
Although he concluded that the relevant provision did not make the entire share 
of the profits liable to the tax, Lord Herschell conceded that: 
It must be admitted that the words of the statute do prima facie support 
his contention. For, notwithstanding the ingenious criticisms to which 
they have been subjected by the learned counsel for the Respondent in 
their able argument, I think that, giving to the language of the enactment 
its natural meaning, the facts stated do apparently bring this case within 
it.154 
A similar concession was made by Lord Lindley in the case of Attorney General 
v London County Council, 155 while in Gresham Life Assurance Co v Styles156 a 
similar concession might quite easily have been made. In both cases the House 
of Lords ultimately decided in favour of the taxpayer upon the basis that 
adoption of the 'natural' or 'literal' meaning of the statute would produce an 
'unjust' or 'unreasonable' result. This conclusion was supported by the view 
that the natural meaning of the relevant provision conflicted with the natural 
meaning of other provisions in the Act which, it was thought, could not have 
been the legislative intention. 157 In these cases the courts clearly acknowledged 
154 Ibid 498. 
155 (1900) 4 TC 265, 303. 
156 (1892) 3 TC 185. 
157 For a discussion of the mechanistic rhetoric adopted by the English courts while they 
nevertheless engaged in pragmatic lawmaking in the late Victorian and the Edwardian eras, see: 
B Abel-Smith and R Stevens, above n 84, 121-5. 
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that it would have been open for the court to adhere to the literal meaning, but 
chose not to do so on grounds of substantive justice. 
Other judges were less willing to countenance such a clear juxtaposition of 
formal and substantive justice, preferring instead to explore the possibilities for 
accommodating substantive and formal interpretative methodologies within the 
one theory of interpretation. Thus in Forder v Handyside and Co Ltd158 Pollock 
B observed: 
Strictly speaking, there is no difference between what is called an 
equitable construction of an Act and any other construction. It appears 
to me that upon the most favourable and just construction of this Act of 
Parliament for the Respondents ... 159 
An alternative compromise between the formalist and substantive conceptions 
of justice was to give greater emphasis to formalist notions of justice by 
acknowledging that the function of the courts was to identify the principle of the 
legislation as a whole. Thus, in Coltness the Lord President in the Scottish 
Court of Exchequer stated that: 
The general principle of the property and income tax to which effect is 
given by the statutes is, that everything of the nature of income shall be 
assessed, from that source soever it may be derived, whether from 
invested capital, or from skill and labour, or from a combination of both 
and whether temporary or permanent, steady or fluctuating, precarious or 
secure. Nor does it make any difference on the incidence of the tax that 
the income has been created by the sinking of capital, as in the case of 
the purchase of annuities, instead of being merely the natural annual 
product of an invested sum which remains unconsumed and 
undiminished by the consumption of the income which it yields.160 
Aside from this quest for the principle of the legislation as a whole, the Lord 
President also appealed to a literalist methodology by noting that the specific 
158 (1876) 1 TC 63. 
159 Forder v Handyside and Co Ltd (1876) 1 TC 63, 69 per Pollock, B. 
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exclusions from deductions in Schedule D indicated that the 'balance of profits' 
in Rule 1 of Schedule D did not mean accounting profits, but rather a species of 
profits unique to the income tax: 
Any other construction of the statute would not only be inconsistent with 
the leading principle on which it is based and with its express words, but 
would lead to very embarrassing consequences. 161 
Although the decision in Coltness acknowledged that the meaning of the 
legislation was discernible in the statutory document itself, it is nevertheless 
indicative of the ambivalence of the courts towards the literalist methodology. 
The recognition of three interpretative methodologies in this last extract; the 
quest for the principle of the legislation, the identification of the meaning of the 
express words and the consideration of pragmatic consequences, suggests that 
even those judges willing to embrace a formalist interpretative rhetoric often 
only tentatively endorsed the rhetoric of literalism in the sense of the 
straightforward application of the acontextual meaning of the statutory words. 
Throughout the judgments of the Victorian era, the British courts frequently 
adopted the rhetoric of substantive justice to varying degrees, in apparent 
contravention of the literalist methodology commonly attributed to the courts of 
this era. 
(b) Judicial Reference to the Legislative Intention 
Further, in another contravention of what is commonly portrayed as the axiom 
of literal interpretation, in a number of cases the courts also expressly referred to 
the legislative intention as a basis for their decisions, although there was little 
elaboration upon the nature of this intention or how the legislative intention was 
16° Coltness Iron Co v Black (1881) 1TC287, 306. 
161 Ibid 308. 
136 
to be ascertained.162 Thus there was passing reference to the spirit of the 
legislation 163 and to the intention of the statutory words.164 
H Conclusion - Reconciling the Rhetoric of Legal Determinacy with the 
Reality of Legal Indeterminacy 
The generally accepted depiction of the interpretation of the income tax in the 
late nineteenth century maintains that the courts adopted a strict literalism in 
interpreting the legislation. These commentaries are founded upon two related 
propositions. Firstly, that there was one determinate 'literal' meaning of the 
legislation. Secondly, that the rule of strict or literal construction was uniformly 
applied to the interpretation of income tax legislation in Victorian Britain. 
These propositions appear to be justified by those cases where the strict 
construction rule was expressly referred to, such as Tennant165 and 
Partington,166 and also by the wealth of contemporary secondary literature 
supporting the view that the courts applied the literal meaning of tax legislation. 
However, the preceding discussion of the income tax case law of the period 
1875 to 1900 suggests that the interpretation of the income tax was founded 
upon anything but a mechanical application of the literal meaning of the 
legislation. With respect to the substantive meaning of the income tax 
legislation, it is clear that there were several differing conceptions of income 
used in differing contexts in the Victorian era. Further, it seems that the 
legislature had incorporated these differing conceptions of income into the 
legislation itself. Having chosen the view that the legislation imposed a tax 
162 Blake v Mayor of London (1887) 2 TC 209 cf St. Andrews Hospital v Shearsmith (1887) 2 
TC 219. 
163 Mersey Loan and Discount Co v Wootton (1887) 2 TC 316, 319 (Pollock B). 
164 Coltness Iron Co v Black, 317; Attorney General v London County Council (1899) 4 TC 265, 
302-303 (Lord Lindley). 
165 See, for example, Jeffrey Waincymer, Australian Income Tax Principles and Policy (2nd 
edn, 1993) 86. 
166 Above n 1. 
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liability upon 'income' rather than a disparate array of receipts which need not 
necessarily share any common characteristics, the courts were placed in the 
difficult position of attempting to reconcile the competing concepts of income 
reflectec;l in the income tax legislation. At times the courts adopted the 
standpoint which maintained that income was synonymous with the technical 
meaning of profits, at other times the courts adopted the commercial and 
accounting standpoint in framing an alternative concept of profit, and 
occasionally some judges even adopted an economist's standpoint in adopting a 
concept of 'real' gain. A review of the case law suggests that, rather than 
identifying the one determinate concept of income according to its literal 
meaning, the courts wrestled with the contradictions inherent within the ad hoc 
legislative scheme in their efforts to construct a coherent concept of income. 
Even if there were determinate literal meanings of key elements of the tax such 
as the income concept, it is apparent that the courts did not uniformly apply the 
literal meaning of the legislation. In various cases judges referred to 
literalism, 167 ordinary meanings, 168 commercial understandings, legislative 
intention, 169 'just' outcomes, the 'equitable construction' of legislation and 
'great principles of taxation.' It is clear that these alternative standpoints gave 
rise to a wide range of possible outcomes. Rather than resolving any doubts 
about the meaning of legislative terms, the 'methods' of statutory construction 
adopted by the courts merely emphasised the legislative polysemicity. Indeed, 
167 Gresham Life Assurance Society v Styles (1890) 2 TC 633, 639-40 (Esher MR); Aikin v The 
Trusteees of the late C.M. MacDonald (1894) 3 TC 306, 308 (Lord Adam). 
168 Lord Mostyn v London (1894) 3 TC 294, 296; Grainger v Gough (1896) 3 TC 462, 472 
(Lord Morris); Gresham Life Society v Bishop (1902) 4 TC 464, 476 (Lord Lindley); Crookston 
Bros v Furtado (1910) 5 TC 602, 620 (Lord Salvesen). 
169 Crookston Bros v Furtado (1910) 5 TC 602; Attorney General v London County Council 
(1899) 4 TC 265, 302-303 (Lord Lindley): 'Section 24, clause 3, must be read with them, and, 
so far as its language permits it must be so construed as to accomplish its special object, and 
produce with them results which are in conformity with the principles on which they are framed, 
and with the scheme of taxation contained in their provisions. The construction to which I have 
alluded appears to me to be quite inconsistent with those principles and with such a scheme. It 
introduces anomalies which are startling and irrational, and which there is no reason to suppose 
that the Legislature ever contemplated.' 
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the case law of this period suggests that judges consciously or subconsciously 
chose between these alternative standpoints in what was perceived to be a 
search for a 'just' result. Whilst the Victorian era is perhaps rightly identified as 
the watershed of the modem rhetoric of legal determinacy, the interpretative 
practice of the period was anything but consistent with the rhetoric. 170 
Given that the courts were adopting any number of interpretative rhetorics and 
that there was considerable uncertainty surrounding such core concepts as that 
of 'income', the question arises as to how the judicial statements of the strict 
construction rule were promoted above all others such that they were accepted 
as accurate depictions of the interpretative methodology adopted in tax cases. In 
response to this problem, some suggest that the courts were cynically engaging 
in a hard fought public relations exercise in which the legitimacy of 'the legal 
institution' was threatened by, for example, the utilitarian critique of the legal 
system. 171 Alternatively, it is suggested that the courts were merely captives of 
the dominant ruling class 'superstructure' and therefore oracles for the ideology 
of the middle class. 172 Both of these accounts, however, lack an explanation of 
why it was that the judicial rhetoric of legal determinacy was apparently 
accepted by a significant number of contemporary commentators. In other 
words, if the courts were under attack from a number of critics, why did people 
not see through the rhetorical web of legal formalism woven by the courts? 
Rather than explaining this phenomenon by a social theory founded upon the 
ignorance of the masses and the cynicism of an elite, it might be suggested that 
170 cf Morton Horwitz, 'The Rule of law! An Unqualified Good?' (1977) 86 Yale Law Journal 
561. 
171 For discussion of the Benthamite critique of the English legal system see: HLA Hart, 
'Bentham and the Demystification of the Law' (1973) 36 Modern Law Review 2; RB Ferguson, 
'Legal Ideology and Commercial Interests: the Social Origins of the Commercial Law Codes' 
(1977) 4 British Journal of Law and Society 18, 34-8. 
172 For discussion of the application of Morton Horwitz's work in the English context see: RB 
Ferguson, 'The Horwitz Thesis and Common Law Discourse in England' (1983) 3 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 34. For a theorisation of law in terms of an ideological instrument for 
the maintenance of hegemony see: E Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 
(1974) 25-49. 
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the shift in rhetoric to the construction of tax legislation according to legislative 
intent and literal meaning should be understood as an account of interpretative 
method which appeared plausible to a wide cross section of the nineteenth 
century British community. Such an account does not have to accept that the 
objectivist rhetoric of the courts was 'right' - all that needs to be explained is 
why this objectivist account was plausible at the time. 
For some time the courts and lawyers had developed the objectivist theory of 
law in analogising law to science - the law was 'out there' awaiting discovery by 
the application of the appropriate legal scientific method. 173 Perhaps this 
assimilation of law with science was a cynical appeal by lawyers for legitimacy, 
or perhaps it merely reflects the significance to the Victorian mind of modern 
science as the source of solutions to all sorts of social and physical problems. 
Whether or not this analogy of law to science represented an accommodation of 
utilitarian criticisms of the law, and hence just one more phase in the struggle 
for legitimacy of the legal institution, it is clear that the characterisation of law 
as a science affected the way in which the law was perceived in the late 
173 The rhetoric of legal science had been adopted in a variety of ways over the preceding two 
centuries; see: Wilfrid Prest, 'The Dialectical Origins of Finch's Law' (1977) Cambridge Law 
Journal 326, 327; BJ Shapiro, 'Law and Science in Seventeenth Century England' (1969) 21 
Stanford Law Review 727. For discussion of the polysemicity of 'legal science' in the judicial 
mind see: Robert Gordon, (Book Review), (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 903, 908-10. The 
influence of this rhetoric of science upon tax judgments in the Victorian era is apparent in a 
number of cases. For example, Lord McNaughten in The Commissioners for Special Purposes 
of the Income Tax v Pemsel 1891 3 TC 53 at 94 referred to a 'well known letter' from Lord 
Hardwicke to a Scottish judge dealing with statutory interpretation in which Hardwicke 
analogised legal reasoning to scientific reasoning by analogy. Also note that in The 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Forrest (Institution of Civil Engineers) (1890) 3 TC 117 
Lord Watson referred to the 'science of law' (at 129). For contemporaneous secondary 
literature incorporating the rhetoric of law and science see: AV Dicey, 'The Science of Case 
Law in Frederick Pollock (ed), Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (1882); Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, 'Law in Science and Science in Law' (1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 443; Roscoe 
Pound, 'Common Law and Legislation' (1908) 21 Harvard Law Review 383. In the United 
States there was a similar fascination with the science of law, for discussion of which see: TC 
Grey, 'Langdell's Orthodoxy' (1983) 45 University of Pittsburgh Law Review l; MH Hoeflich, 
'Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell' (1986) 30 American Journal of 
Legal History 95. For discussion of the implications of this rhetoric of legal science upon the 
legitimacy of the legal system see: David Sugarman, 'The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey, 
Liberalism and Legal Science' (1983) 46 Modern Law Review 102. 
140 
Victorian era. The 'science of law' enabled the portrayal of legal problem 
solving in terms of an objective process of discovering the objective facts, 
distinct from ethical and moral considerations. Accordingly, lawyers were 
understood to focus upon objectively observing what the one right answer was. 
The prevailing, referential theory of language combined powerfully with this 
characterisation of law as science. Statutory interpretation could be 
characterised as a process of discovery of meaning rather than the creation of 
meaning. Although there was an undercurrent of pragmatic dissent, 174 in the 
latter stages of the nineteenth century the existence of legal determinacy was 
rationalised upon the basis that language afforded an objective means of naming 
objects in an objectively discernible world. 175 The referential theory of 
language was therefore a key component of the 'slot machine' jurisprudence 
characterised by epithets such as 'think things not words' .176 
The rhetoric of objectivism was also bolstered by the rhetoric of individual 
rights which was so fundamental to the English psyche. 177 In the new era of 
broader parliamentary franchises and the 'creeping socialism' of the incipient 
welfare state, this rights discourse assumed a new significance to the propertied 
classes. People of property felt increasingly alienated from what had been 
174 See, for example, CS Pierce, 'How to make our ideas clear' (1878) 12 The Popular Science 
Monthly 276. 
175 See, for example, JS Mill, A System of Logic (1947) pp 48-9. As Kelly has noted, the naming 
theory of language had generated a form of literalism in Roman times; John Kelly, A Short 
History of Western Legal Theory (1992) 51. 
176 OW Holmes, above n 173, 460. Note the relevance of Bentham's theory of legislation as a 
detailed codebook minimising judicial discretion based upon a theory of language comprising a 
system of 'neutral appellatives'; Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Fictions (1932). For a 
discussion of Bentham's theory of language see: K Burke, A rhetoric of motives (1969). For a 
critique of this referential theory of meaning see, for example, G Ryle, 'The Theory of Meaning' 
in C Mace (ed), British Philosophy in the Mid-Century; a Cambridge Symposium (2nd ed, 
1966) 239, 256. 
177 The history of English radical thought is one of appeals to rights. Tom Paine's Rights of 
Man, (first published 1791-2, 1969) is a case in point. For discussion of this see, for example, 
EP Thompson's discussion of rights in EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the 
Black Act, (1975) 258-269; EP Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (1968) 
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'their' state, and considered that they were compelled to stand in line with 'the 
masses' for any benefits provided by the state. John Stuart Mill's essay 'On 
Liberty.178 and Dieey's interpretation of its precepts179 reflects this shift to a 
'boundary theory' 180 in which the interests of individual and state were treated 
in a less organic light than earlier versions of social contract theory which had 
prevailed in the eighteenth century. 181 In the taxation context, this enhanced 
awareness of the rights of the individual is discernible in the nineteenth century 
rhetorical shift from the benefit theory of taxation to a theory founded upon 
equality of sacrifice. The benefit theory of taxation had reconciled taxation with 
social contract theory by equating taxation as the price paid under a contract for 
the purchase of state provided goods and services. When the survival of the 
new liberal political order had been tested by internal dissent and foreign 
powers over the eighteenth century, it is understandable that the benefits of 
taxation were given greater prominence by the eighteenth century 
commentators. However, by the mid nineteenth century Britain was riding the 
crest of its military and industrial wave. The self assurance fostered by this 
commercial and military power generated a greater sense of security in the 
political order, leaving scope for such indulgences as a greater emphasis upon 
the rights of the individual as against the claims of the state. 182 The shift from 
the benefit theory of taxation to the rhetoric of equal sacrifice sponsored by John 
Stuart Mill reflects this attitudinal shift. Although it was not necessarily Mill's 
intention, the rhetoric of equal sacrifice suggests that taxes were no longer seen 
80-3. For a discussion of political dissent during the Civil War period see: Christopher Hill, The 
World Turned Upside Down (1972). 
178 JS Mill, On Liberty, (first published 1859, 1992). 
179 AV Dicey 'The Legal Boundaries of Liberty' (1868) 9 Fortnightly Review 1. 
180 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) passim. 
181 For general discussion of this reconfiguration of liberal legal theory in the late nineteenth 
century see: C Harvie, The Lights of Liberalism: University Liberals and the Challenge of 
Democracy I860-I886 (1976); J Roach, 'Liberalism and the Victorian Intelligentsia' (1957) 13 
Cambridge Historical Journal 58. 
182 For discussion of the literature opposing the income tax on the basis of its confiscatory nature 
and its intrusions upon individual rights more generally see: ERA Seligman, The Income Tax: A 
Study of the History, Theory and Practice of Income Taxation (2nd ed, 1914), chaps 2 and 3. 
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in terms of a purchase of a social good (ie the survival of the liberal political 
order) but rather were perceived as confiscatory. 
The professionalisation of the tax bureaucracy and the consequent diminution of 
the power of the local income tax administration, the recognised permanence of 
the income tax and the emergence of the graduated tax agenda183 were 
phenomena which only served to reinforce the conservative depiction of a more 
effective state apparatus which had turned upon the property rights which, to 
. d 184 many, 1t was create to protect. To social conservatives there was an 
alarming trend towards the use of the income tax to redistribute wealth from the 
wealthy to the poorer members within the community. In 1899 the then 
Chancellor captured the growing alarm of the wealthier classes towards this 
emergence of the rhetoric of 'state socialism' when he commented: 
I daresay I am old fashioned in my ideas but I look with alarm on the 
tendency of the present day quite irrespective of political opinion ... to 
look to the Exchequer and the Central Government in all kinds of 
departments of life, in all kinds of relations between individuals in 
which, in the old days, the Government of the country was never deemed 
capable of acting at all.' 185 
183 For discussion of the development of calls for a graduated income tax see: F Shehab, 
Progressive Taxation (1953). 
184 For discussion of this point see chapter 1 under the heading 'Taxation and the Liberal State'. 
The proposition that the state was created to protect property underpinned the mid nineteenth 
century calls for reform of the income tax so that it imposed liability upon the capitalised wealth 
of the individual. The nexus between the ownership of property and the liability to tax was 
therefore the linchpin of such calls; see, for example, the evidence presented by Mr Farr, Second 
Report from the Select Committee on the Income and Property Tax, above n 26, 236-7. 
185 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansard, 13 April 1899, 1006 (Sir Michael Hicks-
Beach, Chancellor). Indeed, in 1799 it had been generally understood that the government was 
incapable of imposing a graduated income tax, on the basis that it could only tax incomes rather 
than regulate them; Anon, Review of the Arguments Advanced in the house of Commons in 
Support of the Bill Granting an Aid and Contribution ... by Imposing Certain Duties upon 
Income (1799) 14. 
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It is clear that this perceived dichotomy of the interests of the individual and the 
state was not unanimously accepted in the nineteenth century. 186 However, for 
present purposes, it was significant that the discourse of rights deployed by 
social conservatives, and property rights in particular, was considered to require 
a reconfiguration of the judicial role in terms of the protection of individual 
rights from encroachment by the executive arm of government. 
The rights discourse, however, was not solely the discourse of social 
conservatives. The discourse of rights had also been adopted by those 
advocating the extension of the franchise and the development of the welfare 
state. The bipartisan character of the rhetoric of rights invested it with 
substantial rhetorical power in the late nineteenth century English community, 
and it is for this reason that the rhetoric of rights played a vital role in the 
legitimation of the strict construction rhetoric. The legalist rights discourse was 
perceived as a powerful bulwark in the protection of individuals from 
administrative discretion. The 'rule of law' served to emphasise the importance 
of the courts in protecting the rights of individuals to retain private property 
from the grasp of the state, presumably on the assumption that private property 
was more productive than public expenditure. 
Finally, the nineteenth century had seen the gradual extension of the franchise 
under the Reform Acts,187 lending some weight to the view that a representative 
Parliament was properly the only lawmaker under the English constitution. The 
rhetoric of respect for the democratically based sovereign power of parliament 
was therefore another vital element in contemporary portrayals of the law 
applying, as opposed to law creating, function of the courts. 
186 Note the developing ideology of the welfare state, which placed greater emphasis upon the 
characterisation of the state as the servant of the people rather than an oppressive alternative 
power; see: Eric Evans, Social Policy 1830-1914: Individualism, Collectivism and the Origins 
of the Welfare State (1978). 
144 
The rhetoric of objectivism, when combined with the rhetorical discourses of 
legal science, legal rights and the separation of powers under a parliamentary 
democracy was partially engendered by, and also engendered, a powerful vision 
of statutory interpretation which stifled suggestions that the courts were merely 
another political forum. Just as the objectivity of science was widely assumed 
in the late Victorian era, so the separation of law from politics under an 
objectivist theory of law was the 'natural' understanding of 'the law' and the 
legal process. The strongest version of this determinacy thesis was the rule of 
strict literal construction, and so it is not surprising that at times judges would 
refer to it. It is also perhaps understandable that contemporary commentators, in 
search of the 'one true principle' of statutory construction in tax cases, 
overlooked the intricate web of interpretative rhetorics adopted by the courts, 
and instead focused upon the strongest version of what, in the context of the 
day, appeared the most plausible theory of interpretation. 
187 Reforms to the franchise and system of political representation were undertaken in 1832, 
1867 and 1884-1885; women would have to wait until the Representation of the People Act 
1918 and its amendment in 1928 before winning the same franchise as men. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH INCOME TAX - COMPETING DISCOURSES AND THE 
RHETORIC OF LEGITIMACY 
A Introduction 
In chapter three it was argued that the judicial interpretation of tax legislation in 
Victorian England has been inappropriately characterised as strictly literalist, 
notwithstanding the judicial pronouncements which appeared to justify the 
depiction of a judiciary preoccupied with strict literalism. According to the 
generally accepted account of tax interpretation, the British courts continued to 
adopt this literalism until undergoing a sea change in the 1970s. Similarly, the 
Australian courts are generally understood to have followed the English 
jurisprudence in adopting a literalist approach to the interpretation of tax 
legislation. 1 For present purposes it is significant that the foundation of this 
portrayal of the interpretation of the Commonwealth income tax prior to 1980 is 
that the judicial rhetoric regarding statutory interpretation is taken at face value. 
Once again, then, it is assumed that there was a literal meaning and that the 
literal meaning was discovered by the courts. The interpretation of tax 
legislation in the first seven decades of the twentieth century is therefore 
portrayed in formal terms, a depiction which excludes any role for the context in 
which the legislation was interpreted. The purpose of this chapter is to continue 
1 See material referred to in n 29, chapter 1. This incorporation of the British jurisprudence 
upon statutory interpretation is understandable for two reasons. Firstly, the reception of English 
law into Australia upon settlement of each colony under the doctrine of terra nullius was 
generally understood to mean that English legal doctrines held a special place within Australian 
law; see: State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617, 625-6 
(Gibbs J). It was only in Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610 that Dixon CJ expressly 
challenged the High Court's subservience to English authority. Secondly, the Privy Council 
retained its appellate jurisdiction with respect to Australian federal taxation matters until 1968; 
Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth). Given that the Privy Council considered 
itself bound by House of Lords decisions (see, for example, Robins v National Trust Company 
[1927) AC 515, 519), it understandably preferred British principles of statutory interpretation 
when called upon to interpret Australian taxation legislation. In this context, it is also 
understandable that the Australian courts adopted the prevailing British theory of statutory 
construction. 
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the critical appraisal of this depiction of literalist tax interpretation in the 
context of the judicial interpretation of Australian tax legislation prior to 1980. 
B The Introduction of the Commonwealth Income Tax 
The introduction of the income tax in Australia was heralded by a tax upon 
dividends imposed by the Tasmanian Parliament in 1880.2 Over the next 
quarter of a century financial necessity drove the respective State Parliaments to 
introduce various forms of an income tax.3 South Australia was the first state to 
introduce an income tax with a relatively broad tax base, the tax being imposed 
upon 'all incomes arising or accruing in, or derived from, South Australia' .4 
Subsequent income tax legislation introduced in the respective states adopted a 
similar tax base, the tax being imposed upon 'all incomes' arising in the 
particular state. 5 
Just as wartime exigencies had precipitated the income tax in England during 
the Napoleonic wars, so the first world war compelled the Commonwealth 
government to raise additional revenue, and a number of considerations lead the 
Commonwealth government to impose an income tax.6 Many of the 
2 Real and Personal Estates Duties Act 1880 (Tas) - the Act only imposed tax upon dividends 
distributed by public companies, annuities and rentcharges. 
3 See: Taxation Act 1884 (SA); Income Tax Act 1894 (Tas); Land and Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1895 (NSW); Income Tax Act 1895 (Vic); Dividend Duties Act 1890 (Qld); Income Tax Act 
1902 (Qld); Companies Duty Act 1899 (WA); Income Tax Act 1907 (WA). For historical 
accounts of the introduction of the income tax in each of the respective Australian states see: S 
Mills, Taxation in Australia (1925); Julie Smith; Taxing Popularity: The Story of Taxation in 
Australia (1993); R Fayle, and I van den Driesen, 'History of Income Tax in Australia' in 
Richard Krever (ed) Taxation in Australia (1987) ch 2. 
4 Taxation Act 1884 (SA) s 9. 
5 Income Tax Act 1894 (Tas) s 14; Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1895 (NSW) s 15; 
Income Tax Act 1895 (Vic) s 5; Income Tax Act 1902 (Qld); Income Tax Act 1907 (WA) s 16; 
cf Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 (NZ), which adopted a schedular system of income 
taxation. 
6 Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth). Note that there were a number of options available to 
the government for raising the additional revenue, such as the imposition of a land tax or a 
wealth tax. For a discussion of the reasons for wqy the government settled upon an income tax, 
see: Smith, above note 3; see also the Attorney-General's Second Reading Speech to the Bill 
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fundamental features of the state income tax legislation were adopted in the 
Commonwealth income tax. Some of these features included the general taxing 
provision which imposed taxation upon income derived from sources within 
Australia,7 provisions exempting similar types of income or categories of 
taxpayers from the tax, 8 the specific statutory additions to the income tax base9 
and the general deduction provision. 10 However there were significant 
differences between the Commonwealth income tax and the state income taxes. 
The most notable of these differences was the attempt to combat what was 
perceived to be illegitimate tax avoidance by a number of measures including 
the grant of administrative discretions to the Commissioner of Taxation, 11 the 
enactment of a general anti-avoidance provision12 and the progressive income 
tax rate structure which had been framed with an eye to preventing income tax 
avoidance. 13 Whilst the Commonwealth income tax legislation was to some 
introducing the income tax: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
18 August 1915, 5844 (Hon WM Hughes, Attorney-General). 
7 Income Tax Assessment Act I9I5 (Cth) ss 10, 14. 
8 For discussion of which see: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 1 September 1915, 6547-51 (Mr Watt and Mr Hughes, Attorney General). 
9 Income Tax Assessment Act I9I 5 (Cth) s 14. 
10 For a more detailed comparison of the Commonwealth and State income taxes see: Robert 
Ewing, Taxes and Their Incidence (1926). 
11 Examples of such administrative discretions within the Income Tax Assessment Act I9I 5 (Cth) 
included: 
1. under s 14(e) the taxpayer was to include 5% of the capital value of land and improvements 
thereon used as the taxpayer's residence or enjoyment 'less the interest paid on a mortgage of 
that land, if the taxpayer satisfies the Commissioner that the mortgage was entered into in good 
faith;' 
2. under s 16 companies were required to distribute what the Commissioner considered to be a 
reasonable proportion of their profits to their shareholders; for discussion of this discretion by 
the Attorney-General see: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 
September 1915, 6593; 
3. s 18(a)(e)(h)G); and 
4. s 20(g)(i). 
12 Income Tax Assessment Act I9I5 s 53. For brief discussion of this prov1s10n see: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 9 September 1915, 6757-8 (Senators Russell 
and Keating). 
13 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 September 1915, 6614-
5 (Mr W Hughes, Attorney-General). 
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extent modelled upon the income tax legislation of other jurisdictions, the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 represented a unique income tax tailored to 
suit the demands of the Commonwealth polity of 1915. 
1 Conflicting Discourses and the Income Tax 
Perhaps the most striking difference between the Commonwealth income tax 
and the British income tax was that the Commonwealth legislation adopted a 
'global' concept of income, rather than dealing with differing categories of 
receipts under a schedular system. In chapter three it was argued that the 
schedular scheme of the British income tax legislation had incorporated 
irreconcilable concepts of income which had rendered the interpretation of that 
legislation particularly problematic. It might be thought that, by adopting a 
global concept of income, the Commonwealth government had overcome this 
problem. However, beneath the veneer of a coherent concept of income 
apparently reflected in the global approach, the same polysemicity of the income 
concept may be discerned. 
In chapter three it was noted that by the closing stages of the nineteenth century, 
there was a substantial body of literature in the United Kingdom addressing a 
vast array of income tax reforms, including the differentiation of permanent and 
precarious incomes and the graduation of income tax rates.14 Such debates 
played a significant role in the introduction of the Commonwealth income tax. 
In framing the income tax the Commonwealth government necessarily made a 
host of political decisions upon matters such as the rules governing the 
measurement of income for the purposes of the legislation, whether the tax 
would be imposed at a flat rate or upon a progressive scale, the rate(s) of tax 
imposed, the scope of specific exemptions, the powers granted to the tax 
administration and the rights of taxpayers to a review of administrative 
14 See: BEV Sabine, A History of Income Tax (1966) passim. 
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decisions. In resolving these matters the government was compelled to take 
account of numerous competing discourses in producing a Bill which both 
achieved the desired fiscal objectives and was also politically acceptable. The 
perceived need to foster economic growth, appeals to the developing political 
philosophy underpinning the nascent welfare state, the formalist faith in 'rule 
book' legislation and the capabilities of a relatively small tax administration 
were perhaps the more significant of these discourses which not only attended 
the birth of the Australian income tax, but continued to influence the shape of 
the income tax over the first half of the twentieth century. A study of the 
influence of any one of these discourses upon the development of the income 
tax legislation would be a major task in itself, but for present purposes it is 
sufficient to briefly outline the nature of these influences and note some 
examples of their impact upon the income tax legislation over the first seventy 
years of its operation. 
(a) Promoting Economic Growth and the Income Tax 
Whether the state is portrayed from laissez faire or interventionist standpoints, it 
is generally accepted that one of the key functions of the state is to facilitate 
economic growth. One major influence upon the Commonwealth income tax 
has therefore been the perceived need to create a tax system which is sensitive 
to the imperatives of capital within a capitalist system. This concern to tailor 
the tax system to the needs of business people is apparent in the elimination of 
perceived anomalies and injustices affecting business people, and also in the 
creation of tax concessions for particular categories of business taxpayers. 
Several examples will serve to illustrate the significant role that this discourse 
has played in shaping the Australian income tax. 
John Stuart Mill had noted that the taxation of a business person's capital was 
anathema to the concept of an income tax, as the diminution of a person's 
capital would only lead to a reduction in that person's ability to generate income 
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and, therefore, operate to reduce the income of the nation. 15 Mill's exclusion of 
capital from the income tax base resonated with the exclusion of capital profits 
from the income concept for accounting purposes. 16 The desire to encourage 
business investment by adopting this accounting concept of income is reflected 
in the exclusion of accretions to capital from the income tax base in 1915, an 
exclusion which effectively survived until 1985.17 In introducing the Income 
Tax Assessment Bill in 1915 the Attorney-General linked this exclusion of 
capital from the income tax base with the rhetoric of economic growth when he 
observed: 
As the productivity of a country and its development depend mainly on 
the amount of capital invested in it, and the employment of that capital, 
it follows that income taxation must distinguish between that portion of 
wealth which is destined for the production of more wealth, namely, 
capital, and that portion over and above that destined for consumption, 
and in excess of the amount necessary to maintain the community, which 
may be called surplus consumption wealth ... One of the basic principles 
of this Bill, then, is the taxation of surplus wealth as distinguished from 
capital. 18 
It has been argued that this statement does not support the proposition that 
capital profits were excluded from the income tax base. 19 However, given the 
exclusion of capital profits under the judicial interpretation of the United 
15 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, WJ Ashley (ed), (1923) 604 (bk 5, chap 2, 
sec 2). This concern is also apparent in the work of Sir Josiah Stamp, where he noted that one of 
the key imperatives of any tax system ought be a concern to ensure that the tax does not 'dry up' 
the tax base; Sir Josiah Stamp, The fundamental principles of taxation in the light of modern 
developments (1921). Stamp's work was quoted with approval in Commonwealth, Second 
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, Parl Paper No 1 (1922) 106. 
16 For a discussion of which see: W Strachan 'The Differentiation of Capital and Income' (1902) 
18 Law Quarterly Review 274. 
17 At which time the capital gains provisions of Part IIIA were introduced into the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). 
18 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 August 1915, 5844-5 
(Mr Hughes, Attorney-General). 
19 See: Jeffery Waincymer, Australian Income Tax Principles and Policy (2nd ed, 1993) 104. 
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Kingdom and Australian colonial and state income taxes,20 and given the 
absence of any clearly stated statutory provision including such profits within 
the tax base, it may be concluded that capital profits were intentionally excluded 
from the tax base. 21 
In other provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 the legislature also 
indicated its preparedness to incorporate accounting concepts of income within 
the statutory framework. The grant of deductions with respect to amortisation 
expenses, 22 depreciation23 and the grouping of a taxpayer's losses in certain 
circumstances24 are all indicative of a legislative preparedness to modify the 
'gross flows' concept of income in accordance with business understandings of 
an appropriate income tax base. 
Aside from this definition of the income tax base which accorded, in some 
respects, with the business concept of income, the legislature also granted a 
number of significant tax concessions to business taxpayers. Over the eighty 
years since the introduction of the Commonwealth income tax, the rhetoric of 
fostering capitalism is reflected in the provision of tax expenditures25 to 
20 For the suggestion that even in 1900 'income' had acquired a technical legal meaning, see: 
Harding v Federal Commissioner of Taxation ( 1917) 23 CLR 119, 130. The restricted nature of 
the judicial definition of income was alluded to by Rich Jin Bohemians Club v Acting Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 24 CLR 334, 338-9. For contemporary secondary 
consideration upon the technical meaning of income see: W Strachan 'The Differentiation of 
Capital and Income' (1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 274; W Strachan, 'Economic and Legal 
Differentiation of Capital and Income' (1910) 26 Law Quarterly Review 40; W Strachan, 
'Capital and Income (Lifeowner and Remainderman)' (1912) 28 Law Quarterly Review 175; W 
Strachan, 'Capital and Income Under the Income Tax Acts' (1913) 29 Law Quarterly Review 
163. 
21 R Fayle and I van den Driesen, above n 3. 
22 Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 s 20(i). 
23 Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 s 18(e). For discussion of this provision, and its perceived 
shortcomings from the standpoint of the business community, see: Commonwealth, Third Report 
of the Royal Commission on Taxation, Parl Paper No 35 (1922) 157-9. For discussion of the 
question whether an allowance ought be made for wasting assets more generally, see ibid, 159-
61. 
24 Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 s 21. 
25 A tax expenditure is an amount of tax revenue foregone by the government. The government 
might otherwise have raised more tax revenue, but chooses to exclude the revenue from the tax 
base upon policy grounds; for a general discussion of the tax expenditure concept and the 
153 
business taxpayers. Such tax expenditures included the exclusion of foreign 
source income from the income tax base,26 the exemption of profits from 
various activities such as gold mining,27 the allowance of generous deduction 
provisions to farmers28 and miners, 29 the allowance of income averaging to 
primary producers30 and the provision of accelerated depreciation of business 
plant and equipment. 31 Indeed, by 1950 the provision of such 'tax expenditures' 
was considered by the Commonwealth Committee on Taxation to have reached 
such proportions that it called for a moratorium upon them, recommending that 
industry assistance be provided by direct subsidies rather than through the 
income tax system.32 In a tacit recognition of the power of the discourse of 
promoting private investment, this call was not heeded, and despite some 
appraisal of tax expenditures in the Australian context see Richard Krever, above n 3, ch 1; for a 
discussion of the problematic nature of the tax expenditure concept see Boris Bittker, 'A 
"Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform' (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 
925; Richard Musgrave, 'In Defense of an Income Concept' (1967) 81 Harvard Law Review 
925; Charles Galvin, 'More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The 
Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR' (1968) 81 Harvard Law Review 1016; 
Stanley Surrey and Hellmuth, 'The Tax Expenditure Budget - Response to Professor Bittker' 
(1969) 22 National Tax Journal 528; Boris Bittker, 'The Tax Expenditure Budget - A Reply to 
Professors Surrey and Hellmuth' (1969) 22 National Tax Journal 538. 
26 This concern was also raised both in favour of and against taxing foreign source income, 
thereby preventing the exodus of Australian capital to tax havens or encouraging the import of 
foreign capital respectively; see: Commonwealth, Second Report of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation, above n 15, 107-108. 
27 Section 23(0). In 1925 income from gold mining was made exempt, an exemption which 
survived for 60 years despite the abolition of the gold standard and intermittent criticism of this 
tax expenditure; see:, for example, Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Mining Industries, 
Par! Paper No 88 (1952) 6. 
28 For a review of the measures in 1950 see: Commonwealth, Report on Assessment or 
Exemption of Incomes Derived from Primary Production, Par! Paper No 139 (1952). 
29 Sections 17 and 18 of the original Act allowed for deductions for calls paid upon mining 
shares and the deduction of capital expenditure over the life of the mine. For a review of the 
concessions allowed to mining industries in 1950 see: Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of 
Mining Industries (Reference No 5), Par! Paper No 88 (1951). 
3° For discussion of which see: Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation, Par! Paper No 147 (1921) 9. The report illustrates the preparedness of the 
Commissioners, and subsequently the legislature, to depart from commercial practice in 
adopting a system of income averaging for primary producers. 
31 Now provided by Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Division 42. 
32 Commonwealth, Report on Income Tax - Concessions to Industry, Par! Paper No 51 (1950). 
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pruning in more recent years, numerous tax expenditures survive to the present 
33 day. 
It is therefore apparent that the perceived need to create an environment 
favourable to private investment has influenced the substantive elements of the 
Australian income tax. However, it cannot be said that the definition of the 
income tax base was undertaken in accordance with a one-eyed protection of the 
perceived interests of capital. Although the legislature had constructed an 
income tax base which, in many respects, adopted the concept of income for 
accounting purposes, there are many examples of a legislative departure from 
the accounting concept of income.34 Further, after the 1930's, the developing 
'science' of economics propounded an alternative concept of income framed in 
terms of the taxpayer's change in net wealth plus consumption over the relevant 
accounting period. 35 From the perspective of this alternative concept of income, 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 incorporated numerous inequitable 
features. For example, although capital gains were not included in the income 
tax base, it was also clear that no deduction was allowed for capital losses 
incurred by a taxpayer in the course of carrying on a business. 36 Even after the 
insertion of the capital gains provisions into the income tax legislation,37 capital 
losses incurred by taxpayers are at best quarantined to be set off against capital 
33 At the time of writing the business tax reform process was under way, and the status of many 
tax expenditures such as accelerated depreciation was not clear. 
34 For consideration of the exclusion of allowances with respect to wasting assets, for example, 
see: Commonwealth, Third Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 23, 159-61. 
35 Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938); for earlier elaboration of a similar concept 
of income which emphasised market power rather than psychic concepts of income see: Robert 
Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects in The Federal Income Tax (1921) 
7. The preference for concepts of income framed in terms of market power is explained by the 
desire to identify a quantifiable measure of income, a keystone to any 'science' of economics. 
For discussion of psychic concepts of income as opposed to market based concepts of income 
see: Victor Thuronyi, 'The Concept of Income' (1990) 46 Tax Law Review 45, 53; T 
Chancellor, 'Imputed Income and the Concept of Income' (1988) 67 Oregon Law Review 561, 
580. 
36 Richard Krever, 'Capital or Current: The Tax Treatment of Expenditures to Preserve a 
Taxpayer's Title or Interest in Assets' (1986) 12 Monash University Law Review 49. 
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gains,38 and at worst ignored for tax purposes.39 From the standpoint of a 
business taxpayer,40 this disparity of treatment of capital gains and losses 
produces an injustice in that a taxpayer may have negative economic income, 
but have a significant income tax liability.41 Another example of the failure of 
the legislature to respond to what many business people perceived to be an 
inequitable income tax system is the perseverance with what was widely 
considered to be the double taxation of corporate profits after 1940,42 one 
consequence being that equity financing was widely considered to be severely 
disadvantaged until the introduction of the dividend imputation system in 
1987.43 Other examples of perceived inequity with respect to the treatment of 
37 The capital gains provisions now comprise Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Part 3-1, 
and took effect with respect to certain assets disposed of after 19 September 1985. 
38 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 102-15. 
39 It being necessary for the taxpayer to derive a capital gain before any capital loss can be set 
off against the gain. 
40 This is not to say that the treatment of capital losses is problematic only for business 
taxpayers. However, as many assets held by non business taxpayers are effectively excluded 
from the capital gains provisions (ie a taxpayer's principal residence, many personal use assets 
and motor vehicles), it is fair to assume that the inequity of quarantining capital losses is more 
keenly felt in the business community. 
41 For a somewhat dated, but nevertheless insightful, discussion of the perceived injustices of the 
Australian income tax from the perspective of the economic definition of income, see: Ross 
Parsons, 'Income Tax - An Institution in Decay?' (1986) 12 Monash University Law Review 77. 
42 For recognition of the view that taxation of corporate profits at the corporate and shareholder 
levels constituted double taxation see: Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission 
on Taxation, Parl Paper No 199 (1933) 11; Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Income of 
Companies - Private and Non-Private - and of Shareholders, Parl Paper No 143 (1952) 14 
(Appendix A); Commonwealth, Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Australian 
Financial System, Parl Paper No 208 (1981) ch 14. For criticism of the view that this double 
taxation was necessarily inequitable see: Ross Parsons, 'An Australian View of Corporation 
Tax' [1967] British Tax Review 14 (arguing that the effective rate of tax upon corporate profits 
is the appropriate measure to be considered in assessing the equity of a tax). While Parsons is 
right to point out that taxpayers paying tax at the top marginal rate of tax were favourably treated 
under the corporate tax system, it should be noted that lower income earners were disadvantaged 
by the double taxation of corporate profits. 
43 Commonwealth, Taxation Review Committee - Full Report, Parl Paper No 136 (1975) 227. 
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corporate distributions are the treatment of dividends in some cases44 and the 
treatment of distributions upon the winding up of a company.45 
While at times successive governments have relied upon the rhetoric of 
promoting business in introducing various tax measures or maintaining the 
status quo, it is also clear that the Commonwealth income tax legislation over 
the years reflects a considerable degree of ambivalence with respect to the 
favourable treatment of business investment. Many provisions may be 
understood in terms of the perceived need to foster business investment, but 
equally many other provisions are motivated by other imperatives. 
(b) The Nascent Welfare State 
The development of the Australian welfare state has been traced to the latter 
stages of the nineteenth century.46 One key aspect of this construction of the 
concept of the state, the philosophy of wealth redistribution, was apparent in the 
Commonwealth income tax legislation from the outset. The differential 
treatment of property and personal exertion income,47 and the imposition of tax 
under a progressive tax rate scale,48 demonstrate the significance of welfarist 
44 The inequity of including dividends may be illustrated by an example. Assume that a 
shareholder who is not a share trader paid $10 for a share with a face value of $1, and that the 
company held accumulated profits from which it shortly afterwards declared a $7 dividend. It 
might be argued that the shareholder's economic position has not changed and yet the 
shareholder is liable to income tax upon the $7 dividend per share with no rebate for the tax 
already paid by the company. If the shareholder then sold the share for $3, the shareholder 
incurs a capital loss which is not capable of being set off against the dividend receipt. Even after 
the introduction of the capital gains provisions in 1985, the capital loss is quarantined such that 
it may only be set off against a capital gain if and when such a gain is derived by the taxpayer. 
45 See: Income Tax Assessment Act I936 (Cth) s 47(1A). 
46 MA Jones, The Australian Welfare State (3rd edn, 1983) chs 2-3. 
47 For a discussion of which see: Commonwealth, Second Report of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation, above n 15, 89-94. This measure was repealed in 1953; Income Tax and Social 
Services Contribution Act I953 (Cth). 
48 The then Attorney-General, Mr W Hughes, stated that: 'The tax falls on the shoulders of the 
community in such a way as to bear most heavily on those who have an ample margin over and 
above that which is necessary to maintain themselves according to the station in which they live. 
[The Bill] calls on those who have the means, to pay according to their means.' Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 August 1915, 5845. For further 
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philosophy in the framing of the income tax. The redistribution of wealth 
through the welfare state depended upon an accurate measure of wealth, and so 
it is understandable that there are repeated references throughout the official 
record to the perceived need to create an 'equitable' income tax base.49 As 
those advocating an income tax base which was closer to the concept of 
economic income gathered voice over the course of the twentieth century, 
advocates of the welfare state incorporated the economic concept of income 
within their calls for an equitable, broadly based income tax. 50 
But the history of the income tax legislation suggests that this rhetoric of tax 
fairness was by no means a dominant discourse in the structuring of the income 
tax base, as at times the ideal of equity was clearly rejected or compromised by 
other ideals. One example of this ambivalent treatment of the concept of tax 
fairness may be seen in the treatment of cash prizes in the first years of the 
income tax. In 1915 Parliament had included cash prizes within the income tax 
net,51 but in 1919 such prizes were excluded from an individual's income but 
taxed under the Income Tax Act 1919 at the source at a flat rate.52 The effect of 
this provision was to take such winnings outside of the graduated income tax 
contemporary consideration of this measure see: Commonwealth, Second Report of the Royal 
Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 95-104. 
49 See, for example, Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above 
n 30, 7-8. 
50 These calls for root and branch reform are reflected in: Commonwealth, above n 43, ch 7; 
Commonwealth, Reform of the Australian Taxation System, Parl Paper No 315 (1985); RI 
Downing, HW Arndt Boxer AH and Mathews RL, Taxation in Australia - Agenda for Reform 
(1964). As already noted, business advocates also relied upon economic concepts of income, on 
occasion, when promoting various tax reform options, but were often less concerned with the 
broadening of the income tax base in accordance with the precepts of economic income. The 
concept of economic income was therefore selectively applied in accordance with the agenda of 
the advocate. Further, it should be noted that the concept of economic income is itself 
problematic, as there is no unanimity upon the application of the concept to such mundane 
matters as human capital; Jennifer Brooks, 'Taxation and Human Capital' (1996) 13 The 
American Journal of Tax Policy 189. 
51 Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) s14(h). 
52 Income Tax Act 1919 (Cth) s 7. 
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scale, thereby reducing the tax burden upon wealthier prize winners and 
increasing the tax burden on those with low incomes. Such a measure therefore 
clearly compromised the ideal of vertical equity embodied in the progressive 
system of tax rates. However, in speaking for the same Bill, the Treasurer 
rejected a proposal that corporate profits ought be taxed at a flat rate upon the 
basis that the concept of vertical equity was a keystone of the income tax 
system: 
The proposal to tax a company's profits in the hands of the company 
would penalize shareholders with small incomes, and, at the same time, 
greatly benefit shareholders with large incomes by allowing them to 
escape tax by paying at greatly reduced rates through the companies.53 
Aside from this ambivalence with respect to the discourse of tax fairness, it is 
also apparent that the legislature often compromised the fairness ideal for other 
policy reasons, including the imperative of framing an administrable tax and the 
perceived need to enhance the revenue. The taxation of foreign shipping 
companies according to a fixed percentage of their gross revenue,54 the 
exclusion of foreign source income until the introduction of a raft of reforms in 
the late 1980's and early 1990's,55 the taxation of non residents carrying on 
business in Australia without regard to any tax burden imposed in their country 
of residence56 and the double taxation of corporate income over the period 
1940-1987 all represented breaches of the fairness ideal but were justified on 
other policy grounds. 
53 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 May 1918, 4262-3 
(Acting Prime Minister and Treasurer, Mr Watt). 
54 Income Tax Assessment Act I9I5 s 22; see: The Ocean Steamship Coy Ltd v FCT (1918) 25 
CLR 412; Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1924) 
35 CLR 209. 
55 See, for example, the controlled foreign company provisions contained in Income Tax 
Assessment Act I936 (Cth) Part X. 
56 Film producers and foreign insurers being rendered liable to income tax in 1930, Income Tax 
Assessment Act I930 (Cth) ss 13-14. 
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( c) Raising Revenue 
The income tax was introduced and survived in part because it was considered a 
relatively efficient means of raising substantial sums of revenue. The perceived 
need to raise revenue was therefore central to the structuring of the income tax, 
often to the detriment of other considerations.57 Thus the first two Royal 
Commissions into taxation regularly weighed the need to protect the revenue 
along with other considerations in assessing various proposals for tax law 
reform.58 With respect to the Spooner Committee on Taxation, the Treasurer 
had expressed his view that the Committee should restrict itself to 
recommendations which were revenue neutral.59 The terms of reference to the 
Ligertwood Committee also emphasised this imperative by requiring the 
Committee to cost its recommendations.60 Even in 1965 it was accepted that 
various measures which breached the ideal of tax fairness, such as aspects of 
corporate taxation, were necessary on the basis of the revenue derived.61 More 
recently, the current government's business tax reform is being considered upon 
the basis that it must be revenue neutral.62 
But from the preceding discussion regarding the discourses of fostering private 
investment and tax fairness, it is also clear that the rhetoric of raising revenue 
has not been dominant in all instances. 
57 For a brief discussion of this see: J Kesselman, 'Assessing Australian Tax Reform Proposals' 
(1985) 4 Economic Papers 18, 21-2. 
58 See, for example, Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above 
n 30, 8, 21, 29, 32, 35. 
59 The letter is referred to in Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Income of Companies -
Private and Non-Private - and of Shareholders, Parl Paper No 143 (1952) 6. 
6° Commonwealth, Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Taxation, Parl Paper No 100 
(1961) ix. 
61 Commonwealth, Reform of the Australian Tax System Draft White Paper (1985) 2, 195. 
62 See: Commonwealth, A Strong Foundation (1998); Commonwealth, Press Release Number 81 
of the Commonwealth Treasurer, 13 August 1998. 
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(d) Limitations imposed by a Relatively Small Tax Administration and Demands 
for an Unobtrusive Tax Administration 
A further consideration taken into account by those framing the income tax was 
the capacity of the tax administration to administer a tax which required direct 
assessment of large numbers of people in a wide range of circumstances. At the 
inception of the Commonwealth income tax there were signs of a developing 
welfare state, and the concomitant acceptance of a much larger role for the 
executive branch of government. However, by modem standards the executive 
branch of Australian government in the first decades of the twentieth century 
was relatively small. Further, under the prevailing theory of government the 
imposition of administrative tasks upon the general population was generally 
considered undesirable. 63 
In his Second Reading Speech introducing what was to become the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1922, the Treasurer alluded to the compromises between 
administrative expedience and other ideals necessarily embodied in the 
legislation: 
We have done a substantial amount towards giving greater equity, but 
we have not done a great deal towards giving greater simplification. The 
Commonwealth system of taxation is new; it has been built up with a 
very great and almost alarming regard for equity; but the trouble is that 
we cannot secure great equity and at the same time maintain great 
simplicity. The more we attempt to be just the more complicated the 
administrative machinery becomes.64 
63 In part, this rejection of any form of self assessment may have been founded upon concerns 
that the taxpayers would confuse the disparate rules applicable under the Commonwealth and 
state income taxes. Uniformity of the Commonwealth and state income taxes was a topic of 
much concern in the first decades of the Commonwealth income tax. Only after two Royal 
Commission reports upon the harmonisation of the respective Acts of the Commonwealth and 
State parliaments was uniform income tax legislation introduced in 1936; Second Report of the 
Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 67-123; Commonwealth, Second Report of the 
Royal Commission on Taxation, Command Paper 7 (1934) 50-64. 
64 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 October 1922, 2972 
(Mr Bruce). 
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The early administration of the Commonwealth income tax was marked by a 
poorly resourced bureaucracy which could not hope to effectively administer an 
income tax which satisfied even the mainstream conceptions of tax equity. In 
1922 the first Royal Commission report noted: 
At the Commissioner's request, we inspected the offices occupied by the 
Deputy Federal Commissioner and his staff, both in Melbourne and 
Sydney, and could form no other opinion than that in each case the staff 
was working under extremely bad conditions, due chiefly to 
overcrowding. In our opinion, such conditions militate against 
efficiency. 65 
Given that the income tax often incorporated complex measures designed to 
achieve some degree of equity,66 and given that the lack of modem data 
processing technology meant that the 300,000 taxpayers had to be individually 
assessed67 in the absence of a self assessment regime,68 it is little wonder that a 
small tax bureaucracy housed in inadequate office accommodation represented a 
considerable constraint upon the formulation of the income tax base in the early 
decades of the tax. 
The significance of practical limitations upon the substantive provisions of the 
income tax may be gleaned from the first Royal Commission into the operation 
of the income tax, convened in 1921. For the purposes of the Royal 
Commission, the criteria applied in assessing various options for reform of the 
income tax system were founded upon the 'principles of taxation' formulated by 
65 Commonwealth, Third Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 23, 169. 
66 The difficulties of administering the requirement that companies distribute a 'sufficient' 
proportion of their profits are considered in the First Royal Commission: Commonwealth, 
Second Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 80-8. 
67 In the 1950's the Taxation Office began implementing 'computor' technology as a means of 
coping with the increasing administrative workload prompted by population growth, economic 
growth, and the additional tasks assigned to it by the legislature; Commonwealth, Fortieth 
Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, Parl Paper No 31 (1961) 8. 
68 Although the introduction of self assessment had been recommended in 1952, full self 
assessment was only introduced in the 1986/1987 year of income. See: Commonwealth, Report 
on Self Assessment, Parl Paper No 134 (1952). 
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Adam Smith: equity, administrative expedience, certainty, that the tax be levied 
at a time convenient to the taxpayer69 and the impact upon the revenue of 
proposed measures. 70 In many of the findings of the Royal Commission the 
capacity of the Commissioner of Taxation to administer proposed taxing 
measures was a crucial consideration in determining whether such measures 
ought be adopted. Thus, for example, the taxation of casual profits was 
excluded upon the basis that it would not be administratively practicable to 
enforce such that 'any revenue derived would be to a great extent a voluntary 
contribution from conscientious taxpayers' ,71 and also that the concomitant 
allowance of 'casual losses' would open the way to evasion and result in a net 
loss to the Revenue.72 Administrative expedience was also a significant factor 
in leading to the majority of the Commissioners concluding that the taxation of 
foreign source income ought not be implemented.73 In 1934, despite the 
expansion of the tax office establishment, the first report of the Second Royal 
Commission appointed to inquire into the operation of the income tax 
recommended reform of the taxation of corporate profits, principally for the 
reason that an administrable system of corporate taxation ought take priority 
over considerations of tax equity.74 Further, in the first years of the 
69 First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 30, 7-8. 
70 Ibid 8. 
71 Second Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 116. 
72 Ibid 117. It is ironic that the refusal to include the taxation of capital gains was founded, in 
part, upon the view that taxation upon such 'income' would be purely voluntary, when the 
absence of the taxation of capital gains from the income tax base subsequently made the 
payment of income tax voluntary for those in a position to adopt tax minimisation measures. 
Nevertheless, it would appear inaccurate to assert that the limitation of the income tax base to 
the judicial conception of income, with some relatively minor exceptions, was borne of 
ignorance of the wider conception of income. Such a limitation was a conscious decision of the 
legislature made, at least ostensibly, on the basis of the inability to implement a broad income 
tax base and also upon the basis that the inclusion of 'casual gains' in the tax base would also 
suggest that casual losses ought be taken into account. The net revenue gain was therefore 
considered to be slight, and only achieved by a substantial addition to administrative complexity; 
contra Richard Krever, 'Avoidance Evasion and Reform: Who Dismantled and Who's 
Rebuilding the Australian Income Tax System' (1987) 10 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 215, 225. 
73 Second Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 108. 
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Commonwealth income tax, the time period for the calculation of income was 
arbitrarily determined at one year, with tax payable at the appropriate rate of tax. 
In 1922 this system had been modified by an averaging system whereby 
taxpayers paid tax upon the net income of the preceding year, but at a rate 
determined having regard to the taxpayer's average income over a maximum of 
the preceding five years.75 Although this measure was rationalised upon equity 
grounds, a more pragmatic view, which took account of the administrative costs 
of the averaging system, lead to a recommendation that it be restricted to 
primary producers. 76 
Over more recent decades the expansion of the tax office establishment, 
computerised data management and the imposition of administrative tasks upon 
members of the public77 have played a significant role in expanding the capacity 
of the tax administration to oversee the operation of a mass income tax system. 
Nevertheless, the inability of the tax administration to effectively implement 
many taxation measures means that legislated measures may be poorly 
enforced,78 subject to concessionary exemptions aimed at overcoming such 
74 Note the 1934 Royal Commission First Report which rejected the existing system of dividend 
taxation which sought to allow shareholders to obtain the benefit of income streaming through 
the company - this necessitated complex administration in an era when technology was not 
adequate to the task of administering an equitable tax - as a result the Commission Report 
recommended that companies be taxed at a flat rate and that shareholders receiving dividends be 
taxed at their marginal rate, with allowance for a standard rebate; Commonwealth, First Report 
of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 42, 15. 
75 First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 30, 16; Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1922 (Cth) s 13. 
76 Commonwealth, Third Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, Parl Paper No 8 (1934) 
109-111. 
77 See, for example, the PA YE (Pay As Your Earn) provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936 (Cth) Division 2, Part VI; the Prescribed Payment System contained in the Income Tax 
Assessment Act I936 (Cth) Division 3, Part VI and the dividend imputation system which 
imposes substantial administrative burdens upon corporate entities, found in Income Tax 
Assessment Act I936 (Cth) Part IIIAA. 
78 There is substantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that at least some parts of the capital gains 
provisions are often quite innocently ignored by taxpayers; for example the provisions dealing 
with 'collectables' and non income producing real property such as holiday houses. 
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administrative incapacity79 or simply not passed into law.80 In 1984 the then 
Commissioner of Taxation accepted that the capability of the tax administration 
to effectively administer proposed measures will perhaps always play a 
significant role in shaping the income tax base: 
Even in the best times, tax administration is not a perfect art. The ideal, 
the desirable, may have to give way to what it is that is practicable. And 
the judgement about what is practicable must be made, in prevailing 
circumstances, on the basis of the always-limited resources (be they 
human, material or legal) that are available to deal with the whole range 
of matters demanding attention. 81 
The size and powers of the tax administration therefore often figured 
prominently in the structuring of the Commonwealth income tax. 
CAd Hoc Tax Policy and the Interpretive Approach of the Courts 
The preceding discussion suggests that, from the outset, the income tax was 
founded upon numerous ad hoc political compromises between these (and other) 
concepts of the ideal income tax. 82 The legislation does not embody the 
coherent scheme of any one ideal conception of an income tax, but instead 
comprises a range of provisions which implicitly deny any coherent scheme or 
purpose underlying the legislation as a whole: 
The opinion of informed witnesses is that the Act is too scientific, and 
that it strives to attain theoretical equity as between all classes of 
taxpayers and all individual taxpayers. That ideal is unattainable, and 
the attempt involves a sacrifice of simplicity and convenience out of all 
79 Thus, for example, under the capital gains provisions there are exemptions for many personal 
use assets: Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s118-10(3). 
80 See: Simons, above n 35, ch 2 for a consideration of some problematical components of an 
'ideal' income tax. 
81 Commonwealth, Sixty-Third Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, Parl Paper No 77 
(1984) 6. 
82 For discussion of the difficulties confronting wide ranging tax reform see: David Kemp, 
'Taxation: The Politics of Change' in J Wilkes, The Politics of Taxation (1980). 
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proportion to the value of the results achieved. There are of necessity 
many arbitrary elements in the taxation system. The rate of tax is 
arbitrary, the scale of progression is arbitrary, the exemptions and 
deductions are arbitrary, and it is idle to hope that a system based upon 
such a foundation can be theoretically consistent in all its parts. 83 
For the purpose of illustrating the influence of the various discourses upon the 
income tax, they have been described as if they were discrete discourses adopted 
by particular groups within the community. However, this portrayal is 
somewhat artificial in that it ignores the fact that these discourses were the 
components of a tax reform debate which was but a part of a wider 
philosophical debate with respect to the extent to which the modem Australian 
state ought embrace political philosophies ranging from 'state socialism' to a 
'laissez faire' or neoclassical economic agenda. To those who maintained that 
government ought merely enable a free enterprise economy to function by 
imposing a minimum of regulatory restraint in order to ensure that capitalists 
were justly rewarded for their efforts, an ideal tax system might comprise a 
'simple' tax imposed at a flat rate which neglected 'complex' tax base 
broadening measures and excluded wealth redistribution. An alternative, 
neoclassical vision, broadly founded upon a similar concern to reward 
enterprise, might seek maximal economic efficiency by introducing a 
conceptually 'simple', broad based tax upon income with few exemptions and 
no tax expenditures. To either of these groups an income tax was not 
necessarily the tax of choice - a consumption tax perhaps being attractive for its 
perceived simplicity. For those more receptive to the expansion of the welfare 
83 Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 42, 6; for more 
recent recognition of the eclectic nature of the income tax, but the proposition that it can be 
reformed in accordance with a theoretical ideal, see: Ian Manning, 'Income Tax - An Institution 
to Reform?' (1987) 4 Australian Tax Forum 313; Richard Krever, above n 72; Jeffery 
Waincymer, 'If at first you don't succeed ... Reconceptualising the Income Concept in the Tax 
Arena' (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 977. For a sceptical review of the 
prospects of such coherentism in the context of the United States Internal Revenue Code see: 
Ralph Rice, 'Tax Reform and Tax Incentives' (1969) 34 Law and Contemporary Problems 782, 
803-4; cf Julie Smith, Taxing Popularity: The Story of Taxation in Australia (1993) 97. For a 
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state, the redistribution of wealth by the introduction of a broadly based income 
tax founded upon some understanding of economic gain and the imposition of 
tax according to a progressive tax scale would perhaps be ideal, regardless of 
any administrative complexities which might arise in the implementation of 
such a tax. Accordingly, not only the selection of the income tax as an 
appropriate subject of taxation, but also the framing of the elements of the 
income tax, were the subject of considerable debate between what were 
ultimately alternative formulations of the state/society compact. 
According to the prevailing understanding of statutory interpretation prior to 
1980, the crystallisation of this legislative eclecticism in the form of the income 
tax legislation was of no consequence, because the primary focus of the courts 
was upon the literal, or acontextual, meaning of the statute. The legal formality 
of literalism insulated the courts from any political controversy regarding the 
framing of the income tax which might rage outside the portals of the courts. 
For the purpose of assessing this depiction of legal formalism in the 
interpretation of the Commonwealth income tax it is not possible, within the 
constraints of this thesis, and nor is it necessary, to comprehensively review the 
vast number of judicial decisions regarding the tax. A case study of the 
interpretation of the sufficient distribution requirement imposed upon 
companies will adequately illustrate the judicial methodology applied in 
interpreting the income tax legislation. 
The sufficient distribution requirement was imposed upon certain categories of 
companies, requiring them to distribute a minimum percentage of their 
distributable profits to their respective shareholders. In the event that a 
discussion of the influence of a range of discourses upon the income tax systems of the world 
see: LeifMuten, On the Development of Income Taxation since World War I (1967) passim. 
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company failed to make a sufficient distribution of profits, the Commissioner 
was authorised to include a deemed distribution of profits in the assessable 
income of the shareholders of the company according to their respective shares 
in the company or, subsequently, the Commissioner was authorised to impose 
additional tax, payable by the company, upon the profits which ought to have 
been distributed. 
The principal reason for selecting the judicial interpretation of the sufficient 
distribution requirement is that it played a central role in the taxation of 
corporate profits throughout the period 1915 to 1987.84 Over this period the 
taxation of corporate profits proved to be problematic for a number of 
theoretical and practical reasons which will be considered below. This debate 
upon the proper method of taxing corporate profits necessarily included a debate 
upon the role of the sufficient distribution requirement. Given this debate about 
the existence and proper scope of the requirement, a study of the judicial 
interpretation of the sufficient distribution requirement represents an ideal 
opportunity to examine the extent to which the purported adherence to the literal 
meaning of the legislation sheltered the courts from the political debate 
regarding the requirement. 85 Another, more pragmatic, reason for selecting the 
sufficient distribution requirement for a case study is the fact that the 
requirement was the focus of considerable critical attention, reflected in the 
repeated legislative and judicial consideration given to its terms.86 As such, the 
sufficient distribution requirement offers a relatively large sample of case law 
spanning the entire period under review. 
84 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 104(3). 
85 This debate was only in a sense resolved when the sufficient distribution requirement was 
effectively repealed with the introduction of the dividend imputation system in 1987. However, 
the debate remains relevant to this day, as there are strong arguments for the reintroduction of 
the requirement whenever the rate of tax with respect to corporate profits is lower than the top 
personal marginal rate of tax: Commonwealth, above n 43, 234. 
86 Indeed, in 1934 Mr Scullin quipped 'Our old friend section 21 has been discussed in every 
session since we have had an income tax': Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 13 July 1934, 550. 
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D Corporate Taxation and the Sufficient Distribution Requirement 
1 How Ought Companies be Taxed? 
The contentious character of the sufficient distribution requirement, and indeed 
the contentious character of the taxation of companies under the income tax law, 
may be illustrated by briefly reviewing the debate concerning the most 
appropriate means of taxing corporate profits. 87 Discussion of the most 
appropriate model of corporate taxation has produced a substantial body of 
literature, the debate focusing upon the extent to which the corporate form ought 
be ignored for the purposes of taxation. 
One option is to treat the corporate entity as a taxable entity which is entirely 
independent of its shareholders. The consequence of this approach is that 
income tax upon corporate profits might be imposed twice - once in the hands 
of the company and secondly if the after tax profits are distributed to the 
shareholders in a taxable form (ie dividends which attract no tax rebate).88 This 
system of taxing corporate profits twice was introduced in Australia in 1940, 
and was only completely repealed with respect to resident shareholders upon the 
introduction of the dividend imputation system in 1987. 89 Despite the protests 
87 For official consideration of this matter see, for example, Commonwealth, Second Report of 
the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 80-8; Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal 
Commission on Taxation, above n 42, 7-18; Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Income of 
Companies - Private and Non-Private - and of Shareholders, Parl Paper No 143 (1952); 
Commonwealth, above n 61, ch 17. 
88 This has been considered by some commentators as a form of double taxation since before the 
introduction of the Commonwealth income tax; see: ERA Seligman, Essays in Taxation (5th ed, 
1905) 256; H Gibbs, The Incidence of Income Tax on Wasting Securities (1904). As noted in 
the Asprey Committee Report, it is not so much the fact of double taxation which is inequitable, 
as the rates of tax imposed upon shareholders which may produce inequity here. As detailed in 
that report, in 1975 the double taxation of corporate profits operated to impose rates of tax 
higher than the applicable marginal rate of tax with respect to low income shareholders, while 
imposing rates of tax lower than the applicable marginal rate of tax with respect to high income 
earners - an inversion of the progressivity ideal: Commonwealth, above n 43, 226-7; see also: 
Parsons, above n 42. 
89 The extent to which non resident shareholders avoid double taxation upon corporate profits 
depends upon the extent to which the tax system in their country of residence allows a credit for 
the tax paid by the company in Australia, and also upon the terms of any tax treaty between 
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expressed in a number of submissions regarding the perceived inequity of this 
system, the Spooner and Ligertwood Committees recommended that it be 
retained.90 Only in 1975 did the Asprey Committee report recommend to the 
contrary.91 
At what might be described as the opposite end of the corporate tax policy 
spectrum is a model which completely ignores the corporate form for tax 
purposes. This model 'looks through' the corporate entity and treats each 
shareholder as if they received their aliquot share of the corporate profits. One 
perceived problem with this approach is the very fact that it imputes income to 
the shareholder and imposes taxation regardless of whether the taxpayer has 
actually received the money from which the tax may be paid.92 This could be 
overcome by the company making a sufficient gross dividend distribution in 
Australia and the foreign country. A worst case scenario would be the double taxation of 
corporate profits; once at the corporate level which would produce an imputation credit which, 
while not available to the non-resident shareholder, effectively exempts the dividend from 
dividend withholding tax to the extent to which it carries such a credit (see: Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 128B(3)(ga)), and once upon distribution of the corporate profits to 
the shareholder under the foreign taxation system. 
90 The Spooner Committee referred to a number of submissions made to it arguing that the 
double taxation of corporate profits was justifiable as a war measure, but not to be countenanced 
during peacetime. These submissions were rejected primarily on the basis that the removal of a 
rebate system produced simpler administration, such that the equity markets had factored the 
double taxation of corporate profits into share prices and that the removal of double taxation 
would therefore merely bring windfall gains to those who had acquired shares since 1940; 
Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Income of Companies - Private and Non-Private - and 
of Shareholders, Par! Paper No 143 (1952) 7. The Ligertwood Committee endorsed the taxation 
of companies according to the classical system as this accorded with the separate entity status of 
the company under the Australian legal system; Commonwealth, Report of the Commonwealth 
Committee on Taxation, Par! Paper No 100 (1961) 1-2. In its submission to the Asprey 
Committee in 1975 Treasury defended the double taxation of corporate profits on the basis that a 
flat company tax rate would generate tax avoidance. For a discussion of the Treasury 
submission see: CAS, 'Revenue Note' (1975) 49 Australian Law Journal 244. Only with the 
Asprey Committee did the calls for relief of double taxation of corporate profits receive some 
official approval, although no legislative action was taken upon this matter for another 12 years. 
91 Commonwealth, above n 43, ch 16; see also: Reform of the Australian Taxation System, Par! 
Paper No 315 (1985) 69-71; Commonwealth, Reform of the Australian Taxation System - Draft 
White Paper (1985) ch 17. 
92 Commonwealth, above n 43. 
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order to produce an acceptable return to the shareholder net of tax. Even if the 
corporate profits are not distributed to the shareholder, the share value should, at 
least theoretically, increase to reflect the increased value of the company arising 
from the retention of profits. The shareholder therefore might be perceived to 
have made a realisable gain from which the tax may be paid.93 However the 
imposition of tax liability prior to the crystallisation of the gain is generally 
contrary to other income tax provisions,94 and also encounters considerable 
administrative hurdles where the capital of a company comprises different 
classes of shares with differing rights to participation in profits.95 Further, 
ignoring the corporate entity for tax purposes could have a deleterious impact 
upon the revenue. As Australia is a capital importing country and foreign 
shareholders would escape some or all Australian income tax upon their 
dividends,96 corporate tax revenue would therefore decline.97 
Another option for the taxation of corporate profits is to seek some combination 
of the two corporate tax systems noted above, while as far as possible 
eliminating the respective disadvantages of those options. The current dividend 
imputation system is one such model which imposes tax at the corporate level 
while allowing resident shareholders a credit for the tax paid by the company.98 
The imputation system therefore adopts the first model by generally imposing 
93 Although this may be problematic in the case of shares which are less liquid, such as shares in 
some closely held companies. 
94 Note the report of the Taxation Review Committee, above, n 92. However it should also be 
noted that the accruals basis of taxing particular amounts has been adopted in particular 
contexts: interest income for financiers is treated upon an accruals basis (Alliance Holdings v 
FCT 81 ATC 4637; FCT v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd 84 ATC 4642. Under some 
provisions of the income tax legislation an accruals basis of accounting is also adopted. See, for 
example, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Div 16E. 
95 Commonwealth, above n 43, 228. 
96 Assuming that the dividend withholding tax rate is less than the personal tax rates imposed 
with respect to the income of residents, which it generally will be if the non-resident resides in a 
country with which Australia has entered into a double tax treaty. For further discussion of the 
taxation of non residents with respect to dividend income see: Geoffrey Lehmann and Cynthia 
Coleman, Taxation Law in Australia (1998) 1118-19. 
97 Commonwealth, above n 43, 230; Commonwealth, Reform of the Australian Tax System -
Draft White Paper, above n 61, 195. 
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tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels, but also seeks the perceived 
equity of the second model by effectively only imposing tax once upon 
corporate profits. 99 
The competing models of corporate taxation therefore give differing weights to 
the discourses influencing the framing of the income tax. The first model might 
be more easily administered but rates poorly from the perspective of equity. 
The second model may be fairer, but may be more difficult to administer and 
may also cause a loss of revenue for capital importing countries such as 
Australia.100 The third model is more complex to administer than the other 
models, achieves greater equity than the first model, is less than ideally 
equitable and the revenue implications are difficult to assess, although it was 
commonly acknowledged that there would be a decline in corporate tax 
revenue. 
101 
2 The Taxation of Corporate Profits under the Commonwealth Income Tax 
The Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) to some extent ignored the 
corporate form for the purposes of taxing corporate profits by allowing a 
deduction for any distributions to shareholders qua shareholders, but at the same 
time recognised the existence of the corporate form with respect to any 
98 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IIIAA. 
99 But note that the imputation system may operate disadvantageously for some shareholders 
such as non residents who may receive no tax credit under their domestic tax system for the 
Australian tax imposed at the corporate level, and who also lose much of the benefit of the 
imputation credit as it only entitles them to an exemption from the dividend withholding tax 
which is imposed at the rate of 10% as opposed to the corporate tax rate of 36%. Further, those 
who would not otherwise pay tax (for example, natural persons with an income below the 
applicable tax free threshold) are also susceptible to this wastage of imputation credits. 
100 It is consistent with the argument developed in chapter six that the rational resolution of such 
conflicts is not possible, as it is not possible for unanimity to be reached upon the standpoint 
from which conflicting theories of corporate taxation may be assessed. 
101 Commonwealth, above n 43, 234; Commonwealth, Reform of the Australian Tax System, Parl 
Pap No 315 (1985) 71. 
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undistributed profits by taxing those profits at a relatively low rate.102 Given the 
absence of any rebate for the tax paid by the company upon undistributed 
profits, such profits might have been subject to double taxation when distributed 
to shareholders had it not been for a concessional practice by the 
Commissioner. 103 In 1918 the legislature shifted towards a full integration 
model, under which companies were allowed a deduction for dividends paid, 
while with respect to undistributed profits taxed in the company's hands, a 
rebate of tax equal to the lesser of the respective shareholder's marginal rate of 
tax on the dividends or the rate of tax paid by the company on the shareholder's 
share of the profits was allowed to the shareholder.104 However, this full 
integration system proved to be unworkable, given the relatively limited 
resources of the tax administration. 105 From 1 July 1922 a revised system was 
introduced whereby companies were taxed at a low rate upon all of their profits, 
and shareholders were assessed upon their dividend income at their marginal 
rate of tax subject to a rebate for the company tax already paid. 106 The quantum 
of the rebate was the lesser of the shareholder's proportionate share of the 
amount of tax paid by the company, determined according to the shareholders 
proportionate share in the capital of the company, or the proportion of the 
shareholder's tax liability with respect to income from property determined by 
establishing the ratio of dividend income to income from property overalI.107 
102 Income Tax Assessment Act I9I5 (Cth) s 14; Income Tax Act I9I5 (Cth) s 4(3). This 
retention allowance was varied over time, until it was ultimately set at a level which did not 
achieve equity between private companies and other tax entities (Commonwealth, Reform of the 
Australian Taxation System -Draft White Paper, above n 61, para 17.5). 
103 Parsons, above n 42, 18. 
104 Income Tax Assessment Act 1918 (Cth) s 16 (2A). Note that only shareholders whose total 
incomes exceeded the taxable threshold were eligible for this rebate. The inequity of this system 
was noted in: Commonwealth, Second Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 
15, 86. 
105 Commonwealth, Sixth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, Parliamentary Paper 
No 124, 32; Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 42, 9. 
106 Income Tax Assessment Act 1923 (Cth) s 6(a) repealed the deduction with respect to 
dividends paid by a company. 
107 Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth) s 20(4). As the corporate tax rate had fluctuated over 
the life of the income tax, the calculation of the company tax paid upon the profits from which 
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This system also proved unworkable and was modified in the new uniform 
legislation of 1936 by allowing the shareholder a rebate which was the lesser of 
his or her marginal tax rate or the rate of tax paid by the company.108 However, 
in 1940 this rebate was repealed,109 and until 1987 corporate profits were 
generally subject to tax at both the corporate and the shareholder levels. 110 
The taxation of corporate income under the Commonwealth income tax 
therefore by no means reflected the dogmatic application of one theory of 
corporate taxation. Initially, there was an accommodation of the two competing 
theories of corporate taxation - the corporate form was both ignored and 
recognised in certain circumstances. Even with the shift to the 'classical' 
system of corporate taxation after 1940, elements of the integrated approach to 
corporate taxation remained, for example in the form of the intercorporate 
dividend rebate and the allowance of a deduction to a company for tax paid 
upon corporate profits. The important point for present purposes is that the 
taxation of corporate profits under the Commonwealth income tax was neither 
framed in terms of the consistent application of one principle, nor was it capable 
of being framed according to one principle which held universal support.111 
the dividend was sourced was often a major undertaking. This attempt at an equitable treatment 
of corporate profits ran aground upon the shoal of administrative difficulties. The failure of the 
Commissioner to recalculate tax rebates after adjusting the assessments of corporate taxpayers 
was the subject of some criticism: Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation, above n 42, 11-15. To overcome this problem the Royal Commission recommended 
that the rebate be allowed either at a fixed rate or at the shareholder's marginal rate of tax; ibid, 
15. 
108 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 46. 
109 Income Tax Assessment Act 1940 (No 2) (Cth) s 4. 
no Except with respect to intercorporate dividend payments made to a public company, which 
continued to attract a tax rebate, the effect of which was that the first company was generally 
ignored for tax purposes; Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 46. In 1987 the dividend 
imputation system was introduced, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IIIAA. 
Ill For the plethora of approaches adopted under the various state income taxes see: 
Commonwealth, Second Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 82-3; 
Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 42, 7-9. 
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3 The Sufficient Distribution Requirement 
Throughout all of the legislative changes to the taxation of corporate profits it 
was advantageous to shareholders with high incomes to have corporate profits 
retained by the company, and therefore subjected to a lower rate of tax in the 
hands of the company only.112 Initially this advantage existed because the 
undistributed profits of the company were taxed at a rate which was lower than 
the marginal rate of tax upon income from property paid by a high income 
shareholder.113 This differential between the rate of tax upon corporate profits 
and the rate of tax upon personal income persisted in varying degrees until the 
introduction of the dividend imputation system in 1987 .114 But a much more 
significant reason for the retention of profits within the corporate form arose 
after the restriction of the shareholder dividend rebate to intercorporate dividend 
payments in 1940, 115 as after that amendment the same corporate profits would 
be taxed twice if distributed to natural persons in the form of dividends. After 
1940 then, the effective rate of tax upon corporate profits distributed to 
shareholders could be much higher than the personal marginal rate of tax 
112 Of course, companies pay tax at a flat rate with no tax free threshold, as opposed to the 
progressive tax rate scale applicable to individuals. However, at the margin it would be 
advantageous to high income taxpayers if profits could be sheltered in the company and thereby 
subjected to the lower, corporate tax rate. This perceived shortcoming was acknowledged in the 
First Royal Commission; Commonwealth, Second Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 
above n 15, 85. In his evidence before the Royal Commission, the Commissioner of Taxation 
stated that in the 1919-20 income year 225,364 shareholders with dividend income either paid 
no tax because their total income was less than the taxable threshold, or paid tax at a marginal 
rate lower than the applicable corporate tax rate. The number of shareholders with income tax 
rates in excess of the corporate tax rate, the Commissioner stated, was 2,636; Commonwealth, 
Second Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 82. 
113 In an attempt to maintain neutrality between partnerships and companies, the legislature 
briefly allowed a rebate of tax to partnerships and sole traders upon a portion of their profits; 
see: Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth) s 30. However, this provision required the 
Commissioner to exercise a discretion in determining that the partnership or sole trader carried 
on a business in which it was necessary to retain some portion of profits for capital investment, a 
discretion which the Commissioner only rarely exercised; Commonwealth of Australia, Tenth 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, Parl Paper 96 ( 1927) 16-17. This provision 
was repealed in 1934. For discussion of this measure see Parsons, above n 42, 19-20. 
114 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Part IIIAA. 
115 Income Tax Assessment Act 1940 (No 2) (Cth) s 54. 
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imposed with respect to other sources of income, depending upon the marginal 
rate of tax paid by the individual shareholder. 
In the absence of any mechanism to control such behaviour, the possible 
retention of corporate profits within the corporate form would have presented a 
tax minimisation opportunity to those taxpayers who were paying tax at higher 
marginal rates. 116 To many, to allow such tax minimisation was contrary to the 
ideal of tax fairness, according to which individuals ought pay tax according to 
their means. 117 Of course, one means of preventing such taxpayers from 
exploiting this opportunity would have been to require companies to distribute 
all of their profits to their shareholders. However, while recognising the 
importance of such tax equity considerations, successive governments also 
heeded the discourse of private investment. This discourse maintained that the 
retention of corporate profits was an important means of fostering business 
investment in a developing nation. Even in the face of mounting evidence of 
tax minimisation by the retention of corporate profits, one Prime Minister 
rejected what he considered to be overly strict controls upon the exploitation of 
this tax minimisation opportunity, because of the perceived benefit to the nation 
flowing from the investment of capital: 
The harm to the community would be greater than the advantage gained 
from catching a few persons who were endeavouring to avoid their 
taxation obligations. In a country such as Australia, our one aim should 
be to build up industries and to encourage those who are controlling 
industry through the agency of a joint-stock company not to distribute 
too great a part of their profits, but, on the contrary, to retain as much as 
possible for the expansion and stabilization of their business. 118 
116 For discussion of the planning opportunities available with respect to private companies see 
NHB, 'Taxation of Private Companies' (1947) 21 Australian Law Journal 46. 
117 See, for example, Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above 
n 42, 28-9; Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Income of Companies, Parl paper No 143 
(1952) 1. 
118 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 1924, 
4894,(Mr Bruce, Prime Minister). 
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Of course, another response to the question of the retention of corporate profits 
and the perceived loss of revenue and inequity was to follow this business 
investment rhetoric to its ultimate conclusion, and allow companies to retain all 
of their profits at their absolute discretion. However, the countervailing force of 
the tax equity discourse weighed against this course of action. In the end, the 
legislature adopted a compromise between the competing discourses of equity, 
administrative expedience and the imperatives of capital accumulation. This 
compromise was embodied within a sufficient distribution requirement. 
4 The Manifestation of Competing Discourses in the Sufficient Distribution 
Requirement 
Under the first version of the sufficient distribution requirement, companies 
were obliged to distribute what the Commissioner considered to be a reasonable 
proportion of their distributable profits. 119 Companies were therefore authorised 
to retain a reasonable proportion of their profits for reinvestment, and so shelter 
that portion of their profits from what would often be the higher marginal rates 
of tax that applied at the shareholder level. If a company overstepped the 
authorised level of profit retention, the Commissioner made a notional 
distribution of profits to the shareholders and assessed them accordingly, and 
also imposed tax upon the company with respect to all of the undistributed 
profits. 120 Subsequently, this broad administrative discretion was limited when 
Parliament established a numerical threshold by requiring companies to 
119 Although the legislation originally applied to all companies, it seems that it was 
administratively impossible, or undesirable, to apply the sufficient distribution requirement to 
public companies. In his Twenty-Third Report the Commissioner of Taxation noted that '[a]s a 
matter of practice, the additional tax on undistributed income for all years 1915-16 to 193 3-1934 
was not assessed in the case of large public companies. It was uneconomic, administratively, to 
do so.' Commonwealth, Twenty-Third Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, Parl Paper No 
94 (1943) 23. 
120 The result was that the sufficient distribution requirement effectively imposed double 
taxation. For a discussion of this and the amending legislation overturning such double taxation, 
see: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 May 1918, 4256 (Mr 
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distribute at least two thirds of their profits or face the prospect of showing the 
Commissioner good cause for retaining more than a third of their profits.121 If a 
company did not distribute the minimum percentage of profits, and the 
Commissioner was not satisfied as to the legitimate need for the company to 
retain those additional profits, the Commissioner could calculate the personal 
income tax that would have been paid by the shareholders had the profits been 
distributed, and impose additional tax upon the company.122 If the improperly 
retained profits were subsequently distributed to the shareholders, each 
shareholder was entitled to a rebate for the tax paid on undistributed profits at 
the corporate level.123 
Prior to 1934 the sufficient distribution requirement had been framed in such a 
way that it appeared to apply to both public and private companies,124 but the 
scale of the administrative task in applying the requirement to public companies 
meant that it was never applied to public companies.125 The Royal Commission 
Watt, Acting Prime Minister and Treasurer). See Income Tax Assessment Act I9I8 (Cth), s 
lO(b). 
121 Income Tax Assessment Act I922 (Cth) s 21. For criticism of the former position, and the 
recommendation that a provision in the nature of s 21 be adopted, see: Commonwealth, Second 
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 15, 88. 
122 Income Tax Assessment Act I922 (Cth) s 21. 
123 Income Tax Assessment Act I922 (Cth) s 20(4). This produced an anomalous result. It was 
accepted practice in Australia that a company would distribute the gross dividend without 
reduction for any tax payable. When the company paid a dividend out of profits which had been 
subjected to the retained profits tax, the shareholder received the gross dividend and the tax 
rebate, the loss being borne either by the holders of other classes of shares or being deferred 
until a later year. For discussion of this point see: Commonwealth, Second Report of the Royal 
Commission on Taxation above n 15, 86-7. A further anomaly was that while the company paid 
the tax which would have been paid by the shareholders as a whole, the tax payable by wealthier 
shareholders upon the notional dividend distribution was effectively subsidised by those with 
lower incomes: Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission into Taxation, above n 
42, 35. 
124 Income Tax Assessment Act I922 (Cth) s 21 was expressed to apply to 'a company'. 
125 The effective exclusion of public companies had been officially noted; Commonwealth, 
Eleventh Annual Report of the Commissioner of Taxation (1928) 15; Commonwealth, First 
Report of the Royal Commission into Taxation, above n 42, 30. Other reasons for the exclusion 
of public companies from the requirement were the belief that little or no additional tax would 
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into Taxation therefore recommended that the terms of the sufficient 
distribution requirement be restricted to private companies, a recommendation 
that was adopted by the legislature. 126 However, with the outbreak of the 
Second World War, Parliament once again imposed the sufficient distribution 
requirement upon public companies, albeit in a separate Part of the IT AA. 127 In 
1951 this requirement was repealed, but the sufficient distribution requirement 
with respect to private companies was retained. 128 
The restriction of the sufficient distribution requirement to private companies 
was apparently justified upon the basis that it was closely held companies which 
would exploit the lower corporate tax rates by retaining an excessive portion of 
their respective profits. This assumption was founded upon the belief that 
closely held companies were in a better position to cater for the specific needs 
of a limited number of shareholders, whereas public companies would generally 
be more likely to distribute a considerable portion of their profits in order to 
maintain shareholder support. 129 However, bearing in mind that the rationale of 
the sufficient distribution requirement was to overcome the perceived inequity 
of the preferred model of corporate taxation, the restriction of the sufficient 
distribution requirement to 'private' companies, as defined, was rather clumsy. 
Many large private companies managing substantial asset portfolios would have 
legitimate reasons for retaining profits, but could only do so knowing that such 
be raised by the application of the sufficient distribution requirement to public companies (ibid, 
30), and also the administrative difficulties experienced in applying the requirement to public 
companies; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 July 1934, 
276 (Mr Casey). 
126 Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission into Taxation, above n 42, 30; 
Income Tax Assessment Act I934 (Cth) s 10, inserting new s 31A into the Income Tax 
Assessment Act I922 (Cth). 
127 Income Tax Assessment Act I940 (Cth), s 11 which inserted Part IIIA into the Income Tax 
Assessment Act I936 (Cth); this Part effectively imposed additional tax on 75% of the 
undistributed profits of public companies. 
128 Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1951 (Cth) s 24. 
129 Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission into Taxation, above n 42, 30. 
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retention was susceptible to attack by the Commissioner.13° Furthermore, it is 
possible that some public companies would foster shareholder support by 
retaining profits and thereby enhancing the capital value of shares which could 
be sold tax free by many shareholders. 131 
Once the decision had been made to tax actual distributions of profits and 
restrict the ability of companies to retain profits to those with 'legitimate' 
reasons for doing so, it became necessary to differentiate between a retention of 
profits for tax minimisation purposes and a retention of profits for legitimate 
purposes. The only means of effectively monitoring this differential treatment 
of corporate profits would have been to conduct detailed investigations into the 
financial position of each corporate taxpayer retaining profits - a task beyond the 
capabilities of the tax administration system. It was therefore necessary to 
exclude a large range of companies by reference to 'objective' criteria, the 
existence of which could be ascertained upon a brief examination of the 
circumstances of each corporate entity. Such objective criteria were always 
going to appear imperfect and arbitrary when compared with the detailed 
investigation into the taxpayer's subjective purpose required for perfect 
implementation of the conception of tax equity. As such, the identification of 
the rationale behind these objective criteria was problematic because they 
embodied a Delphic attempt to reconcile the competing ends of administrative 
expedience, equity and commercial practicality. 
The identification of the legislative intention with respect to the sufficient 
distribution requirement was also complicated by the interaction of the 
130 True, such large private companies could rearrange their structures in order to become 
'public' companies, but there might well be commercial reasons for not wishing to do so, such as 
the desire to retain control within a small group of shareholders. 
J3l It was accepted that some public companies adopted this course; Commonwealth, First 
Report of the Royal Commission into Taxation, above n 42, 30; Commonwealth, above n 43, 
244. The capitalisation of profits was most advantageous given the absence of any effective 
taxation of capital gains, only introduced with effect from 20 September 1985; Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IIIA, now Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Part 3-1. 
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sufficient distribution requirement with the corporate tax provisions. It has been 
suggested that the obligation to distribute corporate profits was rationalised 
upon fairness grounds, while the provision for a retention allowance was 
justified by the perceived need to foster corporate investment.132 However, 
these respective principles were apparently contradicted by the combined 
operation of the sufficient distribution requirement and the double taxation of 
corporate profits.133 If it is accepted that the discourse of tax equity suggests 
that corporate profits ought only be taxed once, 134 the imposition of double 
taxation upon corporate profits was clearly inequitable. By compelling a 
distribution of corporate profits in the context of a tax system which imposed 
taxation at both corporate and shareholder levels, the sufficient distribution 
requirement was the mechanism by which shareholders were forced to pay tax 
upon company profits at rates which were often higher than the shareholder's 
personal marginal rate of tax. Had the double taxation of corporate profits and 
the escalation of corporate tax rates after 1940 been complemented by the repeal 
of the sufficient distribution requirement, some semblance of tax fairness might 
have remained while the promotion of corporate investment might have been 
enhanced by creating a shelter from double taxation. But by introducing double 
taxation of corporate profits, raising corporate tax rates and retaining the 
sufficient distribution requirement, the Parliament had created a system of 
corporate taxation which was inexplicable from the perspectives of equity or 
promoting corporate investment, and could only be rationalised as a penal 
revenue measure which singled out corporate profits. As if in recognition of the 
perceived inequity of such double taxation, but whilst refusing to adopt a system 
of taxation whereby corporate profits were taxed just once, the retention 
132 See above, p 184. 
133 Although note that the sufficient distribution requirement was restricted to private companies 
after 1951; seen 128 above. 
134 This was the view adopted by the Royal Commission in 1933; Commonwealth, First Report 
of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 42, 11. 
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allowance was varied - at times apparently with the object of ameliorating the 
impact of the sufficient distribution requirement upon private companies. 135 
The sufficient distribution requirement was therefore framed in response to 
several often competing discourses upon what the income tax should and could 
achieve. The sufficient distribution provisions initially reflected a legislative 
attempt to reconcile the discourses of equity and private investment, but as the 
inability of the tax administration to cope with a corporate tax system which met 
these ideals became apparent, the legislation was amended to the point that it 
proved inexplicable upon either of these grounds. The differentiation between 
public and private companies for the purposes of the requirement, while 
compelled by the inability of the tax administration to cope with a broadly 
framed requirement, only heightened the apparently arbitrary operation of the 
requirement. 
But whether the sufficient distribution requirement was framed upon an 
arbitrary reconciliation of the competing discourses influencing taxation policy, 
and whether the purpose of the provisions was clear, were questions which were 
irrelevant to the judicial interpretation of the provisions if the interpretative 
methodology was such that the courts objectively determined the literal meaning 
of the statutory words. If the courts merely applied the acontextual meaning of 
the statutory words regardless of any political storms that might rage outside the 
portals of the courts, the consequences of any judicial decision were a political 
problem and not a legal one. At this point it is therefore appropriate to examine 
whether or not the interpretative methodology adopted by the Australian courts 
135 The percentage allowed to be retained varied over time, during the early phase it was 33%, 
while during the 1950's and 1960's it ranged up to 50%. In more recent times it was reduced 
and different categories of income were treated differently. Under the most recent legislation, 
the most income that could be retained was 80% of the personal exertion income component of 
'reduced distributable income' and 10% of the property income component of the reduced 
distributable income; Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 105B(l). 
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was consistent with the depiction of literalism commonly accepted in the 
historical account of tax interpretation. 
E The Early Judicial Decisions - A Literalist or an Intentionalist Rhetoric? 
In deciding the first case with respect to the sufficient distribution requirement, 
the High Court apparently rejected any contemplation of legislative purpose in 
favour of the rhetoric of literalism.136 In that case the relevant company's profit 
and loss account showed a profit of £12,663 for the 1917-1918 year. After 
taking into account various tax accounting items, the assessable income of the 
company was considered by the Commissioner to total £15,007. For that year 
no dividend was paid by the company. The Commissioner therefore decided 
that the relevant company had not satisfied the sufficient distribution 
requirement, and sought to impose tax upon £12,663 of the undistributed profits 
in accordance withs 16(2). Section 16(2) provided that: 
Where, in the opinion of the Commissioner, a company has not in any 
year distributed to its members or shareholders a reasonable proportion 
of its taxable income, the taxable income of the company shall be 
deemed to have been distributed to the members or shareholders in 
proportion to their interests in the paid up capital of the company, if the 
Commissioner is satisfied that the total tax payable on it as distributed 
income is greater than the tax payable on it by the company. 
The Commissioner issued an assessment to the taxpayer upon the basis of the 
notional distribution of £4,534, being the taxpayer's share of the corporate 
profits. The taxpayer objected to the assessment principally upon constitutional 
grounds, but one aspect of his case raised a perceived difficulty with the 
operation of s 16(2). The taxpayer argued that the taxable income of the 
company was not determined until the end of the relevant year, and submitted 
that it was impossible for the company to make any distribution of its taxable 
136 Cornell v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1920) 29 CLR 39. 
183 
income until after the end of the relevant year. Accordingly, the taxpayer 
submitted that s 16(2) was inoperative. The taxpayer also argued that the 
assessment was invalid in that the Commissioner had only made a notional 
distribution of a portion of the taxable income, rather than the entire taxable 
income. 
The High Court adopted the rhetoric of literalism in considering the operation of 
s 16(2): 
On this question it is unnecessary to say more than that in our opinion it 
is clear on the words of the sub-section construed literally that, when the 
Commissioner is of opinion that less than a fair proportion of the profits 
have been distributed, the whole amount of profit which would 
otherwise have been taxable income of the company is to be deemed to 
have been distributed to the shareholders. 137 
The Court therefore upheld the Commissioner's assessment, accepting that it 
was within the Commissioner's discretion to assess the taxpayer upon the 
assumption that the company had distributed less than its taxable income. But 
while the High Court used the rhetoric of literalism, it is doubtful whether there 
was necessarily only one literal meaning of the provision in the manner that the 
High Court suggested. Section 16(2) operated in conjunction with s 16(1), 
which provided that: 
For the purpose of ascertaining the taxable income of a company there 
shall be deducted from the total assessable income, in addition to any 
other deductions allowed by this Act, so much of the assessable income 
as is available for distribution and is distributed to the members or 
shareholders of the company. 
On one interpretation of the provision, the taxable income of the company was 
therefore the amount remaining after any distribution of profits to members 
and/or shareholders. On this view, s 16(2) required companies to distribute a 
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'reasonable proportion' of any 'taxable income', which by definition was 
assessable income less all allowable deductions including the deduction allowed 
under s 16(1). This meant that a taxpayer could never make a 'reasonable 
distribution' out of its taxable income, because the distribution of profits was 
considered for the purposes of s 16(1) to be made out of gross income. The 
result would have been that the requirement to distribute a reasonable 
proportion of taxable income would have applied ad infinitum to the decreasing 
pool of profits which had not yet been distributed. On the basis that s 16(2) was 
presumably intended to apply to the company's taxable income before the 
deduction allowed under s 16(1), it is arguable that s 16(2) was nonsensical 
because it would apply to any company which failed to distribute 100% of its 
taxable income to its shareholders (a distribution which might have been in 
breach of the relevant Articles of Association, because taxable income could be 
greater than the accounting profits of the company). 
On an alternative reading of s 16(2), by deeming a distribution to have been 
made, the legislature had not excluded the operation of s 16(1), which allowed a 
deduction for any distribution of profits to the shareholders. By not excluding 
the operation of s 16(1), s 16(2) therefore created a closed logical loop 
according to which s 16(2) could never apply because all companies which 
failed to distribute a reasonable proportion of their taxable income would be 
deemed to have distributed 'the taxable income' and therefore, by virtue of s 
16(1), would have no taxable income. This shortcoming of s 16(2) was 
implicitly acknowledged and overcome by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 
(Cth), in which s 21(4) defined 'taxable income' for the purposes of the new s 
21 in terms which excluded the deduction of any deemed distribution of profits. 
137 Cornell, above n 136, 48. 
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A further difficulty with s 16(2) was that it deemed a distribution to have been 
made without specifying the time for such distribution. In the absence of a 
specified time for the deemed distribution, it would be impossible for the 
Commissioner to calculate the additional tax paid by the shareholders, as the 
identity and income of the shareholders could change over time. 138 
Although it purported to apply the literal meaning of the legislation, the High 
Court overcame these difficulties by treating s 16(2) on the footing that it 
applied to 'the profits' 139 of the company, as opposed to the company's taxable 
income. Whether or not it is accepted that a 'literal meaning' of 'taxable 
income' existed, the vast disparity between accounting profits and taxable 
income meant that, by the time of Cornell, it was at least recognised that taxable 
income was not necessarily synonymous with 'profits' .140 The High Court 
decision may be understood as any of a misconceived application of the law, an 
application of what was perceived to be the legislative purpose or an act of 
judicial lawmaking. This decision could not have been an application of the 
'literal meaning' of the legislation in the sense of an understanding of the 
statutory terms founded upon acontextual meanings not reasonably open to 
dispute - the recognised difference of 'profits' from 'taxable income' belied the 
semblance of literalism endorsed by the High Court in this case. 
Despite the literalist rhetoric adopted by the High Court in Cornell, in other 
early cases the courts were more prepared to expressly consider matters of 
policy in interpreting the sufficient distribution requirement. One example of 
this approach may be seen in the Supreme Court decision of Kellow-Falkiner 
138 Note that under a progressive tax rate system the amount of a shareholder's taxable income is 
crucial in determining the applicable marginal rate of tax. 
139 Cornell, above n 136, 48. 
14° For the purposes of the Act taxable income was defined as assessable income less allowable 
deductions, which begs the question as to the meaning of those terms. As may be seen from 
chapter 3, the meaning of 'income' was problematic long before the introduction of the 
Commonwealth income tax. 
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Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation. 141 In Kellow-Falkiner the issue 
was the time by which a company was required to make a distribution of profits 
in order to comply with the sufficient distribution requirement. Section 21 of 
the ITAA merely referred to this issue in passing, stating that 'where, in any 
year a company has not distributed to its members or shareholders at least two-
thirds of its taxable income' the Commissioner was authorised to make a 
notional distribution of profits unless special circumstances existed. The phrase 
'in any year' had several possible meanings in this context. It might have meant 
the financial year (ie 1 July to 30 June) in which the profits were derived or the 
year immediately following upon the year in which the profits were derived. 
From a practical perspective, allowing companies to make a distribution within 
a reasonable time after the year in which the profits were derived had some 
merit. Companies would rarely be in a position to determine their profits for a 
relevant accounting period prior to the termination of that period, simply 
because of the practical difficulty of accurately determining profits before the 
end of the financial period. Of course, one option was for companies to adopt a 
conservative approach to tax compliance by making a substantial distribution in 
anticipation of their profits before year end, thereby ensuring that they exceeded 
the two-thirds threshold of s 21. But to suggest that companies ought err on the 
side of compliance by retaining less than one third of their profits would seem 
contrary to the policy underlying the retention allowance and the imperative of 
determinate law. 
Once again from a practical perspective, there was also merit in taking the view 
that s 21 required a distribution within the company's income year. This was 
because many companies had obtained approval from the Commissioner to 
adopt a substituted accounting period under s 32(3) of the Act, whereby their tax 
return was prepared for a different period to the usual 1 July to 30 June financial 
141 (1928) 49 ALT 276. 
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year. In such cases, if the year referred to in s 21 was the financial year rather 
than the company's income year, the application of the sufficient distribution 
requirement to such companies would require the Commissioner to construct an 
account of a company's profits for the financial year in order to determine 
whether a sufficient distribution of those profits had been made. Given the 
Commissioner's limited resources, such a time consuming undertaking was out 
of the question and the sufficient distribution requirement would therefore 
effectively be inapplicable with respect to those companies with substituted 
accounting periods. 
The third possible interpretation was that s 21 required a distribution of profits 
within the income or financial year of derivation, as opposed to allowing a 
reasonable time after the expiration of such period for the making of 
distributions. This interpretation could be rationalised on the grounds that the 
purpose of s 21 was to ensure that the corporate form was transparent for tax 
purposes, aside from the express provision for the retention allowance.142 
According to this view, shareholders ought be taxed upon their share of 
corporate profits in the year that those profits were derived by the company, 
rather than obtaining a tax deferral (and hence the time value of the additional 
tax liability) merely by virtue of the fact that their income was derived in a 
corporate form. 
Whether or not the words 'in any year' had an acontextual, literal meaning at the 
time of Kellow-Falkiner, it is apparent that in the context of the ITAA there 
were several inconsistent, yet seemingly plausible, interpretations of the phrase 
which produced widely differing results for the parties to the dispute. However, 
in this case Lowe J clearly opted for the rhetoric of a purposive construction of 
the legislation in appraising the merits of the competing interpretations. His 
142 For discussion of the possible purposes of the sufficient distribution requirement see: 
Parsons, above n 42. 
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Honour concluded that the purpose of the provision was to achieve an equitable 
tax system: 
Sections 16(b), 20 and 21 are a group of sections which deal with the 
taxable income of a company and bring it within the net of taxation, 
whether in the hands of shareholders or of the company. To effect this 
result it seems to me to be necessary that the same period should be 
contemplated, and it seems reasonably clear, under secs.16(b) and 20, 
that it is the year of the earning of the income that is referred to. 143 
With respect to companies with substituted accounting periods, Lowe J held that 
the substituted period did not apply for the purposes of s 21. As a result of this 
decision, it was virtually impossible for the Commissioner to apply s 21. 
Further, this interpretation of the provision presented considerable problems to 
the business community, which confronted a provision with which it would be 
exceptionally difficult to comply whilst simultaneously retaining the full benefit 
of the retention allowance. 
Although Lowe J cast his decision in terms of a purposive construction, it is 
difficult to understand how an interpretation which satisfied one perception of 
tax equity, but was administratively unworkable, was necessarily within the 
legislative intention. Indeed, the proposition that the legislature intended to 
achieve tax equity by requiring a distribution of corporate profits within the year 
of derivation necessitated a considerable leap of faith, given the apparent 
inequity of some aspects of the income tax legislation and the fact that the 
sufficient distribution requirement itself reflected the influence of several 
competing discourses. In this context it has already been noted that the 
identification of any one predominant purpose is implausible. Further, even if 
the imperative of tax equity was recognised as predominant in the context of the 
sufficient distribution requirement, it is difficult to see how this imperative was 
met by the construction of s 21 in Kellow-Falkiner. By championing tax equity, 
143 Kellow Falkiner v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 141, 280. 
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Lowe J adopted an interpretation of the requirement which made it inoperative 
in a substantial number of cases. How this self contradiction could be 
considered to be the necessary outcome of a purposive construction of the 
sufficient distribution requirement was not considered by Lowe J. Indeed, 
within weeks of the decision in Kellow-Falkiner, the Commonwealth 
government introduced amending legislation with the object of remedying the 
perceived shortcomings of the Act arising out of this decision.144 
The revised s 21 was reconsidered by the High Court in Neal's Motors Pty Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation. 145 In that case the Commissioner had 
determined that 10 July 1930 was the relevant date for distribution of corporate 
profits for the year ending 30 June 1929. The taxpayer company had not 
distributed any of its profits for that income year by the date specified. The 
Commissioner therefore made a determination that £32,397 could reasonably 
have been distributed to the shareholders. Accordingly, he calculated the 
respective shareholder's additional income tax liability (which was payable by 
the company in accordance with the terms of section 21) by including their 
respective portions of that sum in their income for the 1929-1930 income year. 
The taxpayer company disputed this additional liability on the basis that the 
Commissioner had selected the wrong income year for ascertaining the 
shareholders' additional liability. The taxpayer argued that as the distribution 
could have been made after the end of the 1929-1930 financial year, the 
144 The Kellow-Falkiner decision was handed down on 8 August 1928, the Income Tax 
Assessment Bill 1928 was introduced into Parliament on 11 September 1928; Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 September 1928, 6569 (Dr Earle Page, 
Treasurer). In the Committee stage of consideration of the Bill in the House of Representatives 
the Attorney-General, Mr Latham, noted that 'the court [in Kellow-Falkiner] has held that the 
Commissioner must apply his mind only to such distribution of income as could reasonably have 
been made in the twelve months in which the profits have been derived. This again is an entirely 
new point. There is no meritorious substance in it at all. It arises out of the technical wording of 
the section. If now an alteration were made in the law, a large number of assessments would be 
declared to be invalid. The object of the first sub-clause now before the committee is to put this 
matter right'; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 September 
1928, 6807 (Mr Latham, Attorney-General). 
145 (1932) 48 CLR 233. 
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calculation of tax liability should have been made on the assumption that the 
profits had been distributed in the 1930-1931 year. If this approach had been 
adopted, the Commissioner would have had to wait until the end of the 1930-
1931 financial year in order to determine each shareholder's taxable income and 
the appropriate amount of tax that would be payable upon the notional 
distribution of profits. As was the case in Kellow-Falkiner, the advantage to the 
taxpayer company under its interpretation of s 21 was a deferral of tax liability 
(the time value of money), an outcome contrary to the discourse of tax equity 
which would suggest that the notional distribution ought be assumed to have 
been made in the year that the profits were derived by the company. 
Perhaps with the legislative response to the decision of Lowe J in Kellow-
F alkiner in mind, and perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of ascertaining the 
legislative intention, the majority of the High Court eschewed a 'purposive' 
rhetoric in favour of a close reading of the legislative text, and therefore 
purported to adopt a literalist methodology. In doing so, Dixon J (in the 
majority) acknowledged that the history of the provision was relevant, but 
stopped short of a discussion of the purpose of the provision. 146 The reasoning 
of the majority justices was based upon the proposition that there must be a 
temporal link between the deadline for sufficient distributions determined by the 
Commissioner under s 21(1), and the time at which the Commissioner 
ascertained the liability of the respective shareholders in companies which had 
failed to meet that deadline. The majority accordingly held that the 
Commissioner ought determine the additional tax liability based upon the 
assumption that the notional distribution of profits to shareholders took place in 
the year after the profits were derived by the company. The reasoning of Dixon 
J for this conclusion was perhaps the most forthright: 
146 Ibid 247. 
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Once the conclusion is reached that the reasonable capacity of the 
company to distribute is to be determined in reference to a period 
expiring on the fixed day, it seems an inevitable consequence that, in the 
complete absence of any indication of any other date as at which the 
distribution should be supposed, the latest date must be taken of the 
period within which a distribution might reasonably have been made.147 
Why this was the 'inevitable' meaning of the provision is not clear. As Dixon J 
observed, the case concerned an apparent lacuna in the legislation which could 
only be resolved by adopting the 'better' interpretation of s 21 overall, rather 
than the identification of the one acontextual meaning of the legislation. 
Certainly, the interpretation ultimately adopted by the majority of the High 
Court was plausible in that it was founded upon a justifiable assumption that the 
date of the deadline could be taken as identical to the date of the notional 
distribution. But there were other plausible interpretations founded, for 
example, upon the discourse of tax equity, which would suggest that the better 
interpretation required that the notional distribution ought be assumed to have 
been made in the same year as the year in which the profits were derived by the 
particular company. 148 On this reading, s 21 would have allowed a company to 
distribute a percentage of its taxable income after the expiration of the year of 
derivation, but in accordance with the discourse of tax equity identified by Lowe 
J in Kellow-Falkiner and Starke J in his minority judgment in Neal's Motors, 
the time of this notional distribution might have been deemed to fall within the 
year of derivation. It is therefore arguable that the foundation of Dixon J's 
judgment is not necessarily as secure as he suggested, in that there was not 
necessarily a 'complete absence of any indication of the timing of the notional 
147 Ibid 248 (Dixon J). 
148 On the basis that the taxation of companies and partnerships was intended to be treated in a 
similar fashion: see: above n 113. 
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distribution. The appearance of literalism therefore belied the existence of 
'hard' judicial discretion in this case. 149 
The significance of Cornell, Kellow-Falkiner and Neats Motors is that they 
neatly illustrate the ease with which the courts moved between a literalist 
rhetoric and a purposive rhetoric at a time in which, by many accounts, the 
courts uniformly adopted a literalist or strict construction of tax legislation. 
Further, the cases also illustrate the argument that the courts were confronted 
with competing interpretations of the tax legislation arising out of standpoints 
founded upon the rhetorical discourses woven into the legislative framework. 
Notwithstanding the objectivist rhetoric adopted by the courts in these cases, 
there was no one 'right' or 'obvious' interpretation discovered by the courts. A 
plausible interpretation of these cases suggests that, in the absence of any 
rational path to reconciling such conflicting standpoints, the courts exercised a 
hard discretion in selecting one interpretation. 
F The Differentiation of Public and Private Companies and Judicial 
Pragmatism 
The restriction of the sufficient distribution requirement to private companies, 
and the theoretical difficulties that this posed, have already been noted. 150 
Clearly, public companies were in a privileged position in comparison to private 
companies. By differentiating between private and public companies, the 
legislature created a window of opportunity for small companies clothed in 
149 In 1934 the Royal Commission on Taxation reported that, as a result of Neal's Motors, the 
Commissioner was only able to issue assessments for additional tax payable under s 21 some 
two years after the close of the relevant accounting period; Commonwealth, First Report of the 
Royal Commission into Taxation, above n 42, 36. The Royal Commission therefore 
recommended that the Income Tax Assessment Act be amended to provide that any notional 
distribution to shareholders pursuant to s 21 be deemed to occur at the end of the relevant 
accounting period; ibid. This recommendation was adopted by the Parliament by the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1934 (Cth) s 13. The wheel had therefore turned a full circle, and the 
decision of Lowe Jin Kellow-Falkiner was embodied in the legislation. 
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public garb to exclude themselves from the sufficient distribution requirement. 
The definition of 'private company' was therefore drafted in light of the 
multifarious schemes created by taxpayers for the purpose of escaping the 
sufficient distribution requirement. 151 The new s 3 lA accordingly incorporated 
a number of sub-sections deeming a company to be a private company in a 
range of circumstances.152 Notably, the legislation looked to the control of the 
relevant company, whether by reference to the shareholding of the relevant 
person or otherwise.153 Curiously, though, one of the provisions of the United 
Kingdom income tax legislation upon which the Australian provisions were 
modelled had already been criticised as 'unintelligible and ridiculous' before the 
introduction of the Australian legislation, 154 a fact which did not escape the 
attention of the High Court. 155 The difficulty which had been identified with the 
United Kingdom legislation was that it was expressed in such broad terms that, 
when one interpretation of the provision was applied to particular 
circumstances, it could produce ridiculous results. 156 
150 See discussion above under the heading 'The Manifestation of Competing Discourses in the 
Sufficient Distribution Requirement'. 
151 Commonwealth, Third Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 76, 112-121. 
152 Income Tax Assessment Act I934 (Cth) s 31A. In 1936 a similar provision was incorporated 
in the revised Act; Income Tax Assessment Act I936 (Cth) s 103. For discussion of s 103 see: N 
H B, 'What is a Private Company?' (1947) 21 Australian La.w Journal 15; NH B, 'What is a 
Private Company?' (1949) 23 Australian Law Journal 89. 
153 Thus, for example, Income Tax Assessment Act I934 (Cth) s 31A(2)(c) provided that 'a 
company shall be deemed to be under the control of any persons where the major portion of the 
voting power or the majority of the shares is held by those persons or is held by those persons 
and nominees of those persons or where the control is, by any other means whatever, in the 
hands of those persons'. 
154 Himley Estates Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1933) 1 KB 472, 486 (Lawrence LJ), 
487 (Romer LJ). 
155 Adelaide Motors Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1942) 66 CLR 436, 444 (Latham 
CJ), 449 (Rich J) and 450 (Starke J). 
156 Himley Estates, above n 154, 487 (Romer LJ). 
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In Adelaide Motors Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation157 the taxpayer 
company had issued 41,700 fully paid shares and 20,000 preference shares. The 
company was listed on the Adelaide Stock Exchange, there being thirty ordinary 
shareholders and sixty-eight preference shareholders. Of the shareholders, the 
three directors and their associates controlled 61 % of the ordinary shares and a 
majority of the shares overall. In applying the sufficient distribution provisions 
in this case, the Commissioner relied upon s 103(1), which defined a private 
company as 'a company which is under the control of not more than seven 
persons, and which is not a company in which the public are substantially 
interested or a subsidiary of a public company'. A company in which the 
'public was substantially interested' was also a defined term, essentially being a 
company in which at least 25% of the voting shares were held by 'the public' 
and which were quoted on the Stock Exchange. For the purposes of applying 
this definition of 'private company' in the present case, the Commissioner 
selected the three directors and four otherwise unrelated shareholders, who 
between them controlled 36,850 ordinary shares (representing approximately 
88% of the ordinary shares). The Commissioner did not claim that all seven of 
the selected shareholders actually controlled the relevant company in the sense 
that they wielded their voting power in a bloc, or participated in the day to day 
management of the company, but argued that as there were just seven 
shareholders who between them controlled more than 75% of the ordinary 
shares, both elements of the definition of 'private company' were satisfied. 
In the leading judgment of the High Court, Latham CJ noted that there were 
9,086 possible combinations of the thirty shareholders which could be 
considered to hold a controlling interest in the company. Having accepted that 
the first limb of the definition of a private company was satisfied, Latham CJ 
therefore turned to the second limb of the definition, and in particular the 
meaning of the reference to 'the public'. Noting that in one sense everybody is 
157 Above n 155. 
195 
a member of the public, Latham CJ observed that s 103 assumed that at least 
some shareholders were not members of the public for the purposes of the 
section. In yet another significant departure from any purported application of 
the literal rule of interpretation, his Honour continued by considering the 
perceived purpose of Division 7, suggesting that its object was to treat certain 
closely held companies as if they were a partnership: 
Certain shareholders may correspond to partners, the others being 
"outsiders" - and therefore members of the public. But in a case such as 
the present, where it is not shown that the artificially created "control 
group" is actually a controlling group, it is not easy to apply the rough 
general conception upon which the statutory provisions are based.158 
His Honour observed that if the Commissioner's approach was adopted, it 
would be tantamount to accepting that the definition of a private company might 
have been expressed in an alternative fashion, by merely stating that a private 
company is a company in which no more than seven shareholders control more 
than 75% of the voting shares of the company. Discounting this approach, 
Latham CJ observed that: 
It would have been easy for the legislature to make such a provision if 
this is what was intended, as the Commissioner contends. But 
Parliament has not made this simple provision. On the contrary, it has 
deliberately introduced a reference to the holding of shares by the public. 
The Court should not ignore this feature of the legislation.159 
His Honour therefore noted that it was necessary to determine whether there was 
any characteristic shared by the four shareholders who were not directors which 
differentiated them from 'the public', such as the fact that they shared in the 
actual control of the company. Finding that no such characteristic existed, he 
158 Ibid 446; for a discussion of the original policy considerations supporting the restriction of 
the sufficient distribution requirement to private companies, see: First Report of the Royal 
Commission on Taxation, above n 42, 30. 
159 Adelaide Motors, above n 155, 447. 
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held that the company did not fall within the definition of a private company for 
the purposes of s 103. 
Rich and Starke JJ decided against the Commissioner, but on grounds which 
were at least in part different to those underlying the judgment of Latham CJ. In 
particular, Rich and Starke JJ considered that the first element of the definition 
of a private company (ie control of the company vested in less than eight 
persons) was not satisfied. Starke J gave the clearer exposition of the reasoning 
underlying this conclusion: 
In terms the section only refers to a company which is under the control 
of not more than seven persons; it contemplates and provides for a single 
group of not more than seven persons of whom it can be established that 
they, and no other, control the company. Those persons may control the 
company because they have the major portion of the voting power, the 
majority of the shares may be held by them or their nominees, or the 
control is by any other means whatever in their hands. The section 
becomes unintelligible if, according to the Act, the control of the 
company may be deemed to be in any of a number of groups of 
shareholders not exceeding seven persons, and as in this case, in several 
thousands of such groups. 160 
The High Court therefore took the view that Division 7 was only intended to 
apply to those closely held companies which were actually controlled by no 
more than seven shareholders who held more than 75% of the voting shares in 
the company. Both of these judgments seem to have expressly or implicitly 
relied upon the proposition that the legislature intended the sufficient 
distribution provisions to apply only to those companies in which actual control 
of corporate affairs could be identified in the hands of a small group, on the 
basis that such companies could be equated with a small partnership. Latham 
CJ expressly referred to this proposition while Starke J's reference to the control 
of the company being in the hands of the identified control group, and no other, 
would seem to have been similarly founded. 
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Why this restriction upon the sufficient distribution requirement ought, of 
necessity, have been imputed to Parliament is not apparent from the judgments. 
It is difficult to identify anything in the legislation to this effect. Certainly, in 
1940 the legislature had effectively abolished the retention allowance by 
requiring private companies to distribute 100% of their net profits each year, 
and so private companies were in some respects being treated in the same way 
as partnerships. But it was also clear that private companies were not being 
treated in the same way as partnerships under the income tax legislation. The 
double taxation of corporate profits, the imposition of company tax without the 
benefit of a tax free threshold and the imposition of tax upon dividends at the 
higher rate applicable to income from property were in stark contrast to the 
imposition of tax upon a partner's share of partnership profits in the hands of 
the respective partner only. 161 Indeed, there was no avenue by which the High 
Court could achieve equal treatment of corporate and partnership profits for tax 
purposes in this case. If the application of the sufficient distribution 
requirement was upheld, the corporate profits were subject to double taxation. 
On the other hand, if the application of the sufficient distribution requirement 
was rejected, the corporate profits would be subject to tax at the flat corporate 
rate applicable to private companies without regard to the personal marginal 
rates of tax applicable to each shareholder (whereas partners would pay tax at 
their personal marginal rate of tax upon their share of partnership profits). 
The proposition that the legislature intended that closely held companies should 
be treated in the same fashion as partnerships is therefore open to question. 
Once the disparity of treatment under the income tax legislation of closely held 
companies and partnerships is acknowledged, much of the force of the view that 
160 Ibid 450-1. 
161 For discussion of the differential treatment of private companies and partnerships see: 
Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission into Taxation, above n 42, 31. 
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the references to 'private companies' in Division 7 were intended to mean small 
'incorporated partnerships' loses its force. Further, given that small 
partnerships and 'private companies' for the purposes of Division 7 may be 
quite dissimilar, there is additional justification for questioning whether the 
purpose of Division 7 was as clear cut as Latham CJ seemed to suggest. 
One alternative construction of s 103 might have held that it applied to a much 
broader range of companies, because the definition of a 'private company' 
included all of those companies in which less than eight shareholders controlled 
more than 75% of the voting shares in the company. According to this view, it 
was irrelevant whether or not the definition of 'private company' was satisfied 
in cases where the company was not actually controlled by the seven nominated 
shareholders. As noted above, Latham CJ implicitly acknowledged that this 
interpretation was open on the terms of s 103, before dismissing it on the basis 
that it overreached the perceived legislative intention. However, it was not 
necessarily the case that this broad operation of s 103 overreached the legislative 
intention. Even if it had been conceded that in some way the sufficient 
distribution requirement was intended to effect a degree of tax neutrality 
between partnerships and private companies, the argument might continue, it 
was not clear that this purpose ought prevail over other purposes of the rule. If 
an alternative purpose of Division 7 had been given a higher priority than the 
purpose emphasised by the High Court, such as the prevention of closely held 
companies being used for the purposes of tax minimisation, it might have been 
accepted that the broader interpretation of s 103 was quite consistent with 'the' 
legislative purpose. The broader interpretation of s 103 would quite possibly 
have included many companies which were not being used for the purposes of 
tax minimisation, and so it might seem inequitable that they would have been 
required to distribute all of their profits in the context of the double taxation of 
corporate profits. However, it might have been accepted that another purpose of 
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the provision was to produce an administratively workable rule, as to assume 
that the legislature intends to produce an unworkable rule seems nonsensical. 162 
To achieve this purpose the legislature often identifies 'objective' criteria, such 
as the measurable control interests in a company, as an administratively 
practicable means of delimiting the operation of a provision. Such 'objective' 
criteria are much more readily applied to the circumstances of particular 
taxpayers than a test which requires a finding that a group of taxpayers actually 
control a company. At times such criteria may seem to apply in a manner 
contrary to one perceived purpose of a legislative provision or to one conception 
of tax equity. The desire to minimise such apparent overreaching of a rule must 
therefore be weighed against the imperative of identifying an administratively 
workable rule. Thus if it was accepted that the legislature intended to restrict 
the retention of corporate profits on the basis that such conduct is inequitable, 
and if the legislature was taken to have intended to produce a rule which 
achieved this objective despite some perceived collateral inequity, s 103 could 
quite validly have been interpreted to apply to all of those cases in which less 
than eight shareholders controlled more than 75% of the shares.163 
The prevailing account of tax interpretation suggests that the literal approach 
was the basis for reading down the income tax legislation. However, if the 
rhetoric of the High Court in Adelaide Motors is taken at face value, it is clear 
that a purposive rhetoric was applied in concluding that the sufficient 
distribution requirement was not applicable in that case. Further, even if the 
purposive interpretation adopted by the High Court is considered to be 
162 Of course, it is possible that an unworkable rule is introduced as a face saving measure - a 
means of indicating that something is being done about an issue when in fact nothing will 
change. But to suggest that such rules are a common feature of legislative activity is perhaps to 
adopt an unduly cynical theory of legislation. 
163 Commonwealth, Twenty-Eighth Report of the Commissioner of Taxation, Parl Paper No 21 
(1950) 11; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v West Australian Tanners and Fellmongers Ltd 
(1945) 70 CLR 623. 
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plausible, it is arguable that there was another plausible interpretation founded 
upon a differing standpoint of tax equity and administrative expedience. 
The Adelaide Motors and West Australian Tanners decisions provoked a repeal 
of s 103 in 1948 and its replacement with a modified definitional provision. 164 
The definition of a private company was expanded and renumbered as s 103A in 
1951.165 The new definitional provision defined a private company by stating 
several tests, only one of which needed to be satisfied. The new tests included 
'objective' criteria, such as the voting power of the company being controlled by 
a limited number of persons (whether or not the identified persons actually 
exercised such control), and also a broad de facto control provision. The time 
for the application of these tests was 30 June of the relevant income year. 
Despite this reworking of the provision, it became clear that taxpayers were still 
manipulating their circumstances with the object of ensuring that Division 7 did 
not apply, so that they were able to retain profits within a company in excess of 
the amount allowed under Division 7, and not be subject to additional tax upon 
the undistributed profits. 
164 It had also been noted that '[d]uring recent years a number of companies, have been able to 
establish public company status, and thereby secure the advantage of being taxed on 
undistributed profits at the lower rate applying under the Income Tax Act for public companies. 
In addition, it has been brought to the notice of the Committee that, with the introduction of a 
lower primary rate for company taxable incomes up to £5,000, and the establishing of minimum 
permitted retentions out of the undistributed incomes of private companies, a number of private 
companies are subdividing their operations and conducting them by several companies, each of 
which obtains the advantage of these concessions intended only for one taxpaying concern'; 
Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Income of Companies - Private and Non-Private - and 
of Shareholders, Parl Paper No 143 (1952) 5. The Committee also noted that '[t]he Committee 
has had placed before it many methods by which companies, in essence private companies, have 
succeeded in placing themselves outside the present definition of "private company"'; ibid 9. 
See also the Second Reading speech to the Income Tax Assessment Bill 194; Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 September 1948, 271 (Mr Dedman, 
Minister for Defence, Minister for Post-War Reconstruction and Minister in charge of the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research). 
165 Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1951 (Cth) s 15. 
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The first case dealing with the revised legislation, and in many respects the most 
significant, was WP. Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation. 166 
In that case the taxpayer was incorporated on 20 June 1952. Mr Keighery and 
his wife were the only two subscribers to the memorandum, taking four ordinary 
shares between them. The two shareholders appointed themselves directors. 
On 27 June 1952 an extraordinary general meeting was held at which it was 
resolved to issue one redeemable preference share to twenty persons 
respectively, the redeemable preference shareholders being friends of the 
Keighery's and also staff members of the Keighery's accountant. According to 
the special resolution, the directors could redeem any of these redeemable 
preference shares at any time, provided that: no redemptions could occur 
between 24 June and 7 July in any year; at least seven days notice of any 
intended redemption had been given; the redemption payment was made out of 
profits of the company; and that the company had complied with various 
restraints imposed under the relevant companies legislation. According to the 
company's Articles of Association, an extraordinary general meeting could only 
be held after 21 days notice, but the Keighery' s had the ability to redeem the 
preference shares after just 7 days notice. Thus, if notice of a general meeting of 
the company was given on 30 June, there was a strong likelihood that the 
Keighery' s could control the composition of the shareholders and thereby 
control the company in general meeting. 
The Commissioner treated the company as a private company for the purposes 
of Division 7 and accordingly assessed it to additional tax upon its undistributed 
profits. This categorisation of the taxpayer as a private company was founded 
upon the de facto control provision in s 105(1)(f) of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936, which provided that a company was a private company if it was 
'capable of being controlled by any means whatever by one person or by persons 
not more than seven in number.' The Commissioner relied upon two notions of 
166 (1957) 100 CLR 66. 
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control. The first concept of control focused upon the fact that the Keighery' s 
could wield the threat of redeeming a recalcitrant shareholder's preference share 
in order to ensure that that shareholder would vote 'appropriately' at any general 
meeting. The second concept of control focused upon the fact that, even if the 
Keighery' s did not exercise the first form of control, they were nevertheless 
capable, as at 30 June 1952, of obtaining control of the company in general 
meeting by virtue of their ability to redeem the preference shares after notice of 
the meeting had been given but before the meeting was held. 
In the High Court a majority comprising Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and 
McTiernan JJ upheld the taxpayer's appeal. Dealing with the Commissioner's 
first argument, the joint judgment of Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ held that: 
It is of course, nothing to the point that the existence of the power of 
future redemption might conceivably have made the holders of the 
redeemable preference shares more willing than otherwise they would 
have been to comply with the wishes of Mr. and Mrs. Keighery. Clearly 
enough, the description of a company as "capable of being controlled" is 
not satisfied by the mere fact that a majority of shareholders, while not 
under any legal or equitable obligation to obey the directions of other 
persons, may possibly prove so anxious to retain shares which those 
other persons are able to eliminate that they will obey those directions 
against their own desires. A power in a person to provide shareholders 
with an incentive or inducement to exercise their voting power as that 
person may wish is not aptly described as making the company capable 
of being controlled by that person. The person must be able to dictate 
the decisions of the general meeting, through a preponderance of voting 
power which either is vested in him or is subject to his command.167 
The joint judgment therefore adopted what was taken to be the 'technical' 
meaning of control, being the ability to carry a resolution at general meeting. 168 
One alternative interpretation, which might be characterised as the 'practical,i69 
167 Ibid 85. 
168 Ibid 84. 
169 FCT v Sidney Williams (Holdings) Ltd (1957) 100 CLR 95, 115 (Webb J). 
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understanding of s 105(1 )(f), was summarily dismissed in the companion case to 
Keighery: 
But to give effect to this argument would be to construe the expression 
"capable of being controlled" as referring, not to a capability existing in 
law - that is to say a liability to a lawful control by the exercise of legal 
or equitable rights or powers which persons are shown to possess. 170 
Whilst it must be conceded that the formalistic adherence to the technical 
meaning of control was a plausible interpretation of s 105(1), it is not 
necessarily the case that this was the only plausible interpretation of the 
provision. Although the High Court denied the relevance of the practical 
meaning of s 105(1)(f) with considerable rhetorical force, neither of the 
decisions in Keighery nor Sidney Williams offered any reasons for this 
conclusion and, indeed, omitted to expressly address arguments for such 
al temati ve interpretations. 
For example, the High Court ignored the (rebuttable) presumption that statutory 
words are intended to have some effect which, it will be recalled, Latham CJ 
referred to in his decision in Adelaide Motors. By interpreting s 105(1)(f) in 
terms of actual control of the company general meeting, the High Court 
rendered s 105(1)(f) coextensive with s 105(1)(b) which provided that a 
company which fell outside the exclusionary limbs of s 105(1) would be a 
private company if it was 'a company in which more than half of the voting 
power is capable ... of being exercised by one person or by persons not more 
than seven in number'. According to the High Court, there was only one means 
that control could be exercised - by voting at general meeting. But the reference 
to 'any means whatsoever' in s 105(1)(f) suggested that the control might be 
exercised in a number of ways, all of which were intended to be caught by the 
revised provision. By interpreting control in a one dimensional way, the High 
170 Ibid 112 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ). 
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Court effectively ignored the statutory words 'any means whatsoever', and in 
doing so seemingly contradicted the rhetoric adopted by Latham CJ in Adelaide 
Motors that the legislative words must be assumed to have some operation. The 
legislative reference to 'any means whatsoever' could quite plausibly have 
constituted the foundation of an interpretation of s 105(1) which accepted that a 
private company included those companies which could potentially be 
controlled by a small group of shareholders by mechanisms such as those 
created for the Keigherys. Although the High Court dismissed the practical 
meaning of control with a conviction which makes the judgment rhetorically 
appealing, this certainty as to the meaning of control belies the existence of 
choices open to the court in applying s 105(l)(f). 
Further, even if a 'practical' test had been adopted, it is clear that the High Court 
would have imposed a stringent requirement for the test to be satisfied, nothing 
less than an absolute ability of the nominated shareholders to control the general 
meeting being considered sufficient for the purposes of the hypothetical 
'practical' test. In this regard, it was noted by their Honours in the joint 
judgment that there were contingencies surrounding the ability of the Keighery' s 
to redeem the preference shares which mitigated against any conclusion as to 
their ability to exercise practical control of the company. For example, it was 
noted that the directors might die before the general meeting, or that the 
company might not have sufficient profits to redeem the shares in accordance 
with the Articles of Association: 
Even if they continued to be the directors, there was no certainty, 
however great the probability may have seemed, that at the expiration of 
the period specified in the requisite notice the company would still be in 
a position to satisfy the conditions laid down by s.149 of the Companies 
Act... Mr and Mrs Keighery therefore had no absolute power to 
eliminate the votes of the preference shareholders. The company was 
capable of being made controllable by them in certain eventualities; but 
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that is not to say, that the company was then capable of being controlled 
by them. 171 
Had a practical test of control been adopted, the joint judgment concluded, some 
hypothetical ability of the Keighery' s to remove the other shareholders at some 
time after 30 June 1952 was considered to be irrelevant in applying the 
definition of a private company. 'Capability' was therefore treated as 
synonymous with certainty, a conclusion which is evident from the extract from 
the judgment dealing with this matter. But 'capable' need not necessarily have 
been interpreted in this way. For example, 'capable' could have been 
interpreted to include a reasonable likelihood that the nominated shareholders 
would control a general meeting at some future time. Had this construction 
been adopted, the contingencies identified by the High Court could have been 
dismissed as too improbable to justify the conclusion that the Keigherys were 
not in a position to control the company at a hypothetical general meeting: the 
requirement as to redemption of the shares from profits could have been 
satisfied by making an appropriate cash gift to the company to put it into a profit 
position and the technical requirements of s 149 could not really be considered 
to represent any significant barrier to redemption of any shares. The possibility 
of the death of the Keighery' s must also be conceded but may be discounted on 
grounds of remoteness. 
With respect to the second contention on behalf of the Commissioner, the issue 
was whether 'capability of control' extended to the possibility of control being 
obtained at some future time, or whether the phrase ought be restricted to the 
existence of a formal ability to control the company in general meeting as at 30 
June. The joint judgment opted for the latter approach upon the basis that 'the 
natural sense of the expression is that of possessing, as a present attribute, a 
liability to be controlled.' This conclusion was stated with a similar certitude 
later in the judgment: 
171 Keighery, above n 166, 89. 
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The truth is that "capable of being controlled" connotes the existence of 
either one person whose enforceable and immediately exercisable rights 
enable him to control, or a number of persons whose enforceable and 
immediately exercisable rights enable them, if they act in concert, to 
control. 172 
On the basis that the legislative purpose of s 105(1)(f) was to respond to the 
decision in Adelaide Motors by extending the definition of a private company to 
cases where no more than seven persons were in a position of controlling a 
company, the justices in their joint judgment noted that their interpretation of s 
105(1)(f) would apply to the facts of Adelaide Motors. Therefore, they 
maintained, their interpretation of the provision was in accordance with the 
legislative purpose. Given that on 30 June 1952 there were 22 shareholders 
with one vote each (Mr Keighery with three votes), the majority of the High 
Court considered that no grouping of seven shareholders could possibly control 
the company at general meeting if a meeting had been held at that time. The 
High Court also referred to what it considered to be the legislative purpose of s 
105(1), which was stated to be the broadening of the category of private 
companies from those actually controlled by a small number of shareholders to 
include those companies which could be controlled by a small number of 
shareholders. This discussion of the legislative purpose was curiously bereft of 
any consideration of the wider purpose of the sufficient distribution requirement 
- a discussion of which might (but need not necessarily) have lead the High 
Court to the view that a broader scope for s 105(1) was appropriate. Had the 
High Court considered the wider purpose of the sufficient distribution 
requirement, as it had done in Adelaide Motors, the court might have 
constructed an interpretation more favourable to the Commissioner on the basis 
of the rhetoric of tax equity and the perceived purpose of restricting the use of 
companies for tax minimisation purposes. On this basis it might have been 
172 Ibid 87. 
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concluded that s 105(1) meant that the Keigherys' company was a private 
company and therefore fell within the sufficient distribution requirement. 
The decision in Keighery therefore construed s 105(1) to mean that a company 
was a private company only if less than eight shareholders held the legal ability 
to control the company in either an actual or hypothetical general meeting on 30 
June in any year. This interpretation was founded upon what was described as 
the 'technical legal' meaning of control and the 'natural' meaning of 'capable of 
being controlled'. Whereas previous decisions such as Adelaide Motors had 
restricted the operation of the sufficient distribution requirement by relying upon 
the rhetoric of a purposive construction, in this case the High Court expressly 
relied upon both literalist and purposive rhetorics in limiting the operation of the 
provision. 
At the same time as the decision of Keighery, the High Court adopted a similar 
approach to a different scheme, with the same purpose of circumventing 
Division 7 of the Act, in the decision of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v 
Sidney Williams (Holdings) Limited.113 Compounding the loss of revenue 
arising from these decisions, no legislative action in response to these 
decisions174 was taken for almost seven years after they were handed down,175 
despite the concerns expressed by the 1961 Ligertwood Committee on Taxation 
at the loss of revenue suffered as a result of such arrangements. 176 In this seven 
year period the legislative delay, in the context of the frequent amendments to 
173 Above n 169. 
174 Minor amendments were made to s 105B by the Income Tax and Social Services 
Contribution Assessment Act (No 2) 1959 (Cth) s 10 ands 105AA (a procedural provision) was 
inserted by the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act (No 2) 1963 (Cth) 
s 39. 
175 The decisions in Keighery and Sidney Williams were both handed down on 19 December 
1957; the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Bill (No 3) 1964, in which 
the provisions relating to private companies were substantially rewritten, was introduced into 
Parliament on 22 October 1964; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 22 October 1964, 2219 (Harold Holt, Treasurer). 
176 Commonwealth, Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Taxation, Parl Paper No 100 
( 1961) chapter 1, passim. 
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the sufficient distribution requirement since the inception of the Commonwealth 
income tax in 1915, might perhaps justifiably have been perceived as no less 
than legislative sanction of the decisions of the High Court. Further, the 
legislative delay constituted tacit acceptance of the rhetoric of the need to foster 
capital investment by ameliorating the impact of the double taxation of 
corporate profits (at least in the case of private companies), by enabling 
corporators to shelter income from taxation within the corporate form. 177 
When they were finally introduced in 1964, the amendments to the sufficient 
distribution provisions adopted a fresh approach to the distinction between 
private and public companies. Instead of defining private companies, and 
stating that all other companies were public companies, the new provision 
adopted the opposite approach by defining public companies and providing that 
all other companies were private companies. Safeguard provisions, whereby 
companies which otherwise satisfied the definition of a public company but 
were so closely held as to warrant being deemed to be private companies, were 
included to deal with circumstances such as the facts of Adelaide Motors. 
Significantly, subsidiaries of public companies were generally deemed to be 
public companies, and the safeguard provisions mentioned above did not apply 
to such subsidiaries. 
While these amendments overcame the specific minimisation arrangements 
considered in Keighery and Sidney Williams, there were opportunities to exploit 
the exclusion of subsidiaries of public companies by issuing the requisite 
amount of shares to a public company while, in many respects akin to Keighery 
and Sidney Williams, ensuring that those shares were subject to the ultimate 
control of the real controllers of the subsidiary. Indeed, the possibility of such 
arrangements was reasonably clear in the light of decisions of the High Court 
177 It is significant that at this time the legislature was encouraging the retention of profits within 
the corporate form by allowing a relatively high retention allowance of up to 50%. 
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handed down before the introduction of the 1964 amendments. 178 Of course, 
such arrangements required the complicity of a public company, but to 
taxpayers prepared to enter into such arrangements, the identification of such 
public companies was achievable. That such arrangements were available to 
well-advised taxpayers shortly after the 1964 amendments is evident from the 
case of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Casuarina Pty Ltd. 179 
In Casuarina a taxpayer and his wife controlled private companies which had 
derived substantial profits. If the portion of those profits above the permitted 
retention allowance was not distributed, it would have been subject to the 
undistributed profits tax under Division 7. To escape Division 7, the taxpayer 
entered into an arrangement developed by a firm of accountants for the purpose 
of circumventing the Division. The taxpayer's accountants had incorporated a 
company (Forum Holdings Ltd ('Forum')), the majority of the shares being 
beneficially held by at least two public companies. As a result, Forum was a 
public company for the purposes of Division 7. The taxpayer and his wife 
acquired all of the 49 ordinary shares in a shelf company (Casuarina Pty Ltd 
('Casuarina')), and 51 redeemable preference shares were issued by Casuarina 
to Forum. These redeemable preference shares were issued under conditions 
similar to those outlined in Keighery. That is, the redeemable shares could not 
be redeemed between 24 June and 7 July in any year. Again in a manner similar 
to the facts of Keighery, as a result of the conditions upon the calling of general 
meetings established in the Articles of Association of Casuarina, the preference 
shareholders were the de jure controllers of the company but, in practice, the 
taxpayer and his wife could reasonably be expected to control the company at 
178 Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 309, 
where it was held that the relevant definition of a subsidiary of a public company focused upon 
formal control irrespective of who actually exercised control over the subsidiary. This decision, 
when combined with the opportunities for manipulation of share rights along Keighery and 
Sidney Williams lines, opened the door for tax minimisation arrangements using public company 
subsidiaries. 
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any general meeting of which notice was given on 30 June in any year. In fact, 
Forum played no role in any decision made by Casuarina, being content to 
receive its small dividend from the preference shares each year. 
Similar arguments to those raised in Keighery were raised by the Commissioner 
in this case, as the issues were whether Forum, by virtue of its preference 
shareholding, was the majority shareholder in Casuarina and also whether it 
held the preponderance of voting rights. 180 As the arrangements had been 
entered into with the intention of ensuring that these requirements were 
satisfied, and given the factual similarity in many respects to the matters which 
were considered in Keighery, all members of the High Court held that the 
taxpayer had succeeded in cloaking Casuarina with public company status. 
Both Keighery and Casuarina are striking for the clear purpose of the taxpayer 
in creating the circumstances to circumvent Division 7, and the High Court's 
insistence that, as the taxpayer did not fall within the express terms of the 
relevant provisions, those provisions did not apply. Why the technical meaning 
179 (1971) 127 CLR 62. For discussion of this case see: R B, 'Revenue Note' (1971) 45 
Australian Law Journal 377; RB, 'Revenue Note' (1970) 44 Australian Law Journal 567. 
180 To establish the public company status of Casuarina, it was necessary to determine whether 
Casuarina was a subsidiary of a public company. A subsidiary of a public company was defined 
ins 103A(4) in the following terms: '[f]or the purposes of this section, a company is a subsidiary 
of a public company in relation to the year of income if, at the end of the year of income, one or 
more companies that are public companies for the purposes of sub-section ( 1) of this section in 
relation to the year of income but none of which is a company referred to in paragraph (c) of 
sub-section (2) of this section-
( a) beneficially owns or own shares representing more than one-half of the paid-up capital of the 
first-mentioned company; 
(b) is or are, by reason of its or their beneficial ownership of shares in the first-mentioned 
company, capable of controlling or of obtaining control of more than one-half of the voting 
power in that company; 
(c) would be beneficially entitled to receive more than one-half of any dividends paid by the 
first-mentioned company; and 
(d) would be beneficially entitled to receive more than one-half of any distribution of capital of 
the first-mentioned company in the event of the winding up, or of a reduction in the capital, of 
that company.' 
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of control was the most appropriate interpretation of the relevant provision was 
not considered by the court. Once again, there were plausible alternative 
interpretations. For example, the High Court might have adopted the view that, 
if Division 7 was going to have some scope for operation, it ought to apply in 
the case of taxpayers who structure their affairs in order to escape the technical 
meaning of the Division. After all, to ignore the prospect of effective control of 
other shareholders was arguably contrary to an 'ordinary' understanding of the 
term 'control'. Once again, then, the operation of Division 7 had been restricted 
by the exercise of 'hard' judicial discretion which was cloaked by a rhetoric of 
literalism. 
One year later, the legislature moved to close the loophole exposed by 
Casuarina, principally by the means of vesting a discretion in the Commissioner 
to treat what would otherwise be a public company as a private company if, in 
his or her opinion, the subsidiary company was managed without proper regard 
to the interest of the relevant holding company.181 Thereafter a number of 
taxpayers sought to cloak their companies in public garb, but such attempts were 
repelled by the High Court. 182 However by this stage tax minimisation advisers 
had moved on to greener pastures offered in the form of trust structures, which 
made a host of tax avoidance and evasion arrangements possible. 183 
Furthermore, the retention allowance under the sufficient distribution 
181 Income Tax Assessment Act (No 3) I972 (Cth) s 6. In 1973 the sufficient distribution 
provisions were again amended, this time with respect to avoidance schemes which achieved 
compliance with the distribution requirement by ensuring that distributions were a part of a 
dividend stripping operation; Income Tax Assessment Act I 973 (Cth) ss 16-17. 
182 See the discussion of the relevant case law in: CAS, 'Revenue Note' (1975) 49 Australian 
Law Journal 590. 
183 For a review of various methods of income splitting, and recognition of the impact of the 
revised s 103A upon the retention of profits within the corporate form, see: C Cullinan, 'Latest 
Developments in Tax Planning' (1975) 49 Australian Law Journal 353, 357. The increasing 
use of trusts is recorded in Commonwealth, Reform of the Australian Taxation System (Draft 
White Paper), above n 61, 52-3. The number of trusts increased from 117,616 in 1972-3 to 
258,846 in 1982-3. 
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requirement had been increased to 50%. 184 Given that the rate of tax imposed 
upon private companies remained significantly below the top marginal rate of 
tax, high income taxpayers retaining profits in their companies obtained a 
significant tax advantage even if the sufficient distribution provisions were 
applied to the profits in excess of the 50% retention allowance. The belated 
success of the Commissioner in the High Court with respect to the sufficient 
distribution provisions was of minimal consequence in the overall scheme of 
things - the government had ultimately conceded ground to the discourse of 
fostering private enterprise by forsaking the discourse of equity which mandated 
equal treatment for all taxpayers. Further, taxpayers had moved on to more 
fertile fields of tax minimisation. 
F Conclusion 
From the outset, the sufficient distribution requirement represented an 
ambivalent compromise between the competing discourses of tax equity, 
fostering corporate investment, administrative expedience, maintaining the rule 
of law and raising revenue. The preceding discussion of the case law 
concerning the sufficient distribution requirement suggests that the legislative 
ambivalence was duplicated in the legal realm - taxpayers and the 
Commissioner offered alternative interpretations drawn from competing 
standpoints. It has been argued that in all of the cases brought before the courts 
choices, subconscious or overt, were made by the judges deciding them. 
Although the existence of choice between competing interpretations in itself is 
uncontroversial, the preceding discussion of the case law supports the more 
controversial proposition that there was nothing in the legislation itself which 
necessarily dictated the respective outcomes ultimately adopted by the court in 
these cases. Certainly, there was nothing in the judgments which offered a 
184 In 1973 the Income Tax Assessment Act (No 5) 1973 (Cth) s 24 amended the retention 
allowance with respect to most private income to 50% of the distributable income of the relevant 
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convincing account of how the result was achieved by the application of the 
'literal' meaning of the statutory words. It may be accepted that, in most or all 
of the cases, the respective interpretation of the legislation adopted by the court 
was plausible. However, in each case the interpretation ultimately adopted by 
the court was merely one of several quite plausible interpretations, rather than 
the one 'right' interpretation. The suggestion that the Australian courts of 
yesteryear discovered the literal meaning of the legislation is therefore 
unconvincing, notwithstanding the repeated judicial references to the 
methodology of literalism. 
The account of judicial literalism is also flawed for a second reason. Even if it 
is accepted that judges accurately describe what they do, there is a wealth of 
evidence to suggest that at no time did the courts consistently purport to adhere 
to the literalist method. The existence of judicial discretion with respect to 
methodological rhetoric is reflected in the fact that the courts variously 
purported to adopt a literal interpretation, 185 a purposive construction, 186 a 
business or commercial understanding of the statutory terms 187 and at other 
times a technical reading of the relevant provision. 188 In this regard the 
sufficient distribution case law is not atypical. A review of the income tax case 
law more generally indicates that the courts, for no apparent reason, oscillated 
between the various rhetorical poles of literalism (variously understood), 189 a 
purposive construction190 and even occasionally the odd express recognition of 
company. 
185 See, for example, Cornell, above n 136. 
186 See, for example, Kellow-Falkiner, above n 141; Adelaide Motors, above n 155. 
187 Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932) 47 CLR 222, 226 
(Starke J), 227 (Dixon J); FCTv St. Huberts Island Pty Ltd 78 ATC 4104, 4112. 
188 Keighery, above n 166; Sidney Williams, above n 169; Casuarina, above n 179. 
189 Swinburne v FCT (1920) 27 CLR 377, 383, 386; Premier Automatic Ticket Issuers Ltd v 
FCT (1933) 50 CLR 269, 298 (Dixon J); National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v 
FCT (1970) 122 CLR 13; FCTv IC/ Australia Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 529, 542, 564. 
190 MP Metals Pty Ltd v FCT(l967) 117 CLR 631, 633 (Windeyer J). 
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judicial pragmatism, 191 although there were widely divergent views upon the 
respective meanings of these methodologies. 
The courts therefore exercised discretion at two levels: firstly, at the level of 
methodological rhetoric; and secondly in choosing between competing 
substantive interpretations of the relevant provision. Given the existence of 
these choices it might be considered odd that the judges did not expressly 
address themselves to the exercise of these discretions. Indeed, one striking 
aspect of the sufficient distribution case law is the rhetoric of certainty with 
which the existence of judicial choice is apparently erased from the judicial 
determination of statutory meaning. The reliance of Dixon J upon the 
'inevitable consequence' of his premise in Neal's Motors, 192 the view of the 
High Court in Adelaide Motors that the purpose of the sufficient distribution 
requirement was to treat some companies in the same way as partnerships193 and 
the point blank exclusion of the 'practical' meaning of control in favour of the 
'legal' meaning in Sidney Williams and Keighery194 are just some examples of 
the rhetoric of judicial certainty erasing the existence of judicial discretion. 
The judicial methodology and rhetoric in the Australian income tax case law 
prior to 1980 therefore evidences a substantial similarity to that employed by the 
British courts of the Victorian era. The Australian case law indicates that the 
judges exercised substantial discretion in the interpretation of the income tax 
legislation, while simultaneously purporting to merely 'discover' the meaning of 
191 At various times Dixon CJ conceded that judicial pragmatism was a necessary facet of the 
adjudication of cases: '[t]he resource of ingenious minds to avoid revenue laws has always 
proved inexhaustible and for that reason it is neither possible nor safe to say in advance what 
must be found, after a scheme is struck down under s 260, before a consequential assessment can 
be justified'; FCT v Hancock (1961) 8 AITR 328, 333; see also: Hallstroms Pty Ltd v FCT 
(1946) 72 CLR 634, 648 (Dixon J). The so called personal exertion rule may be another 
example of judicial pragmatism - the personal exertion rule has been recognised as an example 
of the preparedness of the courts to effectively legislate against once form of tax minimisation in 
the absence of any legislative basis for the rule: FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440, 453. 
192 See above n 147. 
193 See above n 155. 
194 See above n 166. 
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the legislation. Once again, then, the question of why the judiciary said one 
thing whilst doing another must be addressed. The reasons for why the 
judiciary' s portrayal of its method was generally accepted both by the judiciary 
and by 'outsiders' are the same as the reasons for the rationalisation of the 
judicial method in Victorian Britain.195 Legal formalism offered a compelling, 
sweet nectar drawn from the rhetorical sources of scientific method, prevailing 
language theory and the rhetoric of individual rights under a constitutional 
democracy. Indeed, the commentators embellished the judicial concern 
regarding the subject's property rights by suggesting that the instances of 
literalist rhetoric in the tax cases aptly described all tax decisions, in that the 
courts purportedly adopted the strict meaning of the legislation. Of course, 
there are some judicial statements which supported this proposition. However, 
the preceding discussion of the case law indicates that this account could not be 
reconciled with a large number of judicial descriptions of interpretative practice, 
as the courts often expressly referred to alternative interpretative methodologies 
including the legislative purpose and judicial pragmatism. Nevertheless, as the 
twentieth century progressed, the threads of this depiction of judicial method 
began to unravel, particularly in the context of taxation law. 
195 See the conclusion to chapter three, above. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE INTERPRETATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN INCOME TAX 
FROM 1980 TO THE PRESENT 
A Introduction 
In chapters three and four it was argued that adherence to a literalist 
methodology in tax matters was perceived to be the keystone of the legitimacy 
of the courts in both the United Kingdom and Australia until the late 1970' s. 
However as the 1980' s dawned there was a marked shift in the interpretative 
rhetoric adopted by the Australian courts. Literalism was spumed and displaced 
by a renewed emphasis upon intentionalism or purposive interpretation of 
legislation. This fundamental shift was broadly portrayed as a necessary 
corrective to the excessive literalism adopted by the courts, particularly in the 
era of Sir Garfield Barwick' s tenure as Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia. The literalism of the courts, it is generally accepted, jeopardised the 
legitimacy of the courts and the tax system, and thereby threatened the 
foundations of the modem democratic state. The issue which I want to address 
in this chapter is whether this shift in judicial rhetoric has been matched by a 
shift in the judicial practice of tax interpretation. 
B The Reorientation of Interpretative Rhetoric 
The 1970's were marked by high income tax rates on a progressive scale, a 
relatively narrow income tax base and high inflation rates.1 High inflation rates, 
and the refusal of the Commonwealth government to index the income tax rate 
thresholds to inflation, meant that many taxpayers were caught by 'bracket 
creep', the phenomenon of rising nominal incomes triggering higher tax rates 
despite the fact that the taxpayer's 'real' income (in terms of market power) had 
not increased. 2 As a result, taxpayers earning average weekly earnings were 
1 Commonwealth, Taxation Review Committee - Full Report, Parl Paper No 136 (1975) 1-2. 
2 Ibid, 49-53. 
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paying tax at rates which had hitherto been the preserve of the wealthy.3 
Meanwhile wealthier taxpayers in a position to alter the legal form of their 
income, or the channels through which it was derived, were in a good position 
to take advantage of the many lacuna in the income tax base.4 Provided that 
they were well advised, such taxpayers could minimise their tax liability or 
escape paying tax altogether. Indeed, with careful planning, the wealthy could 
not only minimise their income tax, but also receive an attractive slice of the 
fruit distributed by the burgeoning welfare state. The works of the late Peter 
Clyne capture this mood of aggressive tax planning which infected the 
Australian tax scene from the 1960's.5 Whether or not the wealthy had always 
had access to tax minimisation arrangements, 6 the Australian income tax system 
was increasingly portrayed as riddled with loopholes and wracked with crisis.7 
The extent of the problem confronting the Australian tax system was apparent to 
policy advisers and academics,8 who drew upon the literature of public finance9 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid, passim. 
5 Peter Clyne, Adventures in Tax Avoidance (1969); Peter Clyne, New Horizons in Tax 
Avoidance (1977). 
6 The development of the sufficient distribution requirement, discussed in chapter four, and 
judicial decisions such as DFCT v Purcell (1921) 29 CLR 464, suggests that there was a 
considerable amount of tax minimisation undertaken in the pre war period, although at this stage 
little research has been undertaken with respect to early tax avoidance in Australia. After 
Purcell the Commissioner noted that such arrangements had become 'a widespread practice 
throughout Australia amongst persons who have been liable to assessment of income tax in the 
higher grades of income ... with the result that, although the same financial benefit accrues 
annually to the family as a whole and is enjoyed by the family, the total amount of income tax 
payable on the total financial benefit is greatly reduced.' Commonwealth, Tenth Report of the 
Commissioner of Taxation, Parl Paper No 96 (1926-1927) 14. 
7 The difficulty of quantifying the extent of the tax avoidance 'problem' was commonly 
acknowledged at this time, most commentators relying upon substantive analysis of the law 
rather than quantitative analysis. For discussion of the difficulty of quantifying tax avoidance 
see: Michael O'Higgins, 'Aggregate Measures of Tax Evasion: An Assessment' [1981] British 
Tax Review 286; Michael O'Higgins, 'Tax Evasion and the Self-Employed: An Examination of 
the Evidence' [1981] British Tax Review 367. 
8 In the 1960's a tax reform booklet had been commissioned by the Social Science Research 
Council in response to the limited terms of reference conferred upon the Ligertwood Committee. 
The report that emerged depicted a tax system riddled with loopholes: RI Downing, HW Arndt, 
AH Boxer and RL Mathews, Taxation in Australia: Agenda for Reform (1964). For another 
early discussion of the problems confronting the income tax systems of Australia and New 
Zealand, see: I Richardson, Attitudes to Income Tax Avoidance (1967) 13. For recognition of 
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and also looked abroad to the substantial changes wrought to the tax systems in 
other countries. However, the depiction of the perceived threat to the welfare 
state was not restricted to the corridors of academia or the odd fleeting official 
reference to the problem. Over the course of the 1970's and the early 1980's, 
the media repeatedly highlighted the perceived inequity of the well advised 
wealthy failing to contribute their fair share to the commonweal. 10 
Parliamentary references to tax avoidance reflected the growing public concern, 
while in the High Court Murphy J occasionally expressed his concerns for the 
survival of the Australian welfare state. 11 
The depiction of the Australian tax system in crisis, and the responses to the 
crisis, were influenced by the various discourses outlined at the beginning of 
chapter four. 12 From the standpoint of those advocating the merits of the 
expanding welfare state, the tenet of wealth redistribution was jeopardised by 
the tax dysfunction of the 1970' s. 13 On the other hand, some of those that 
the shortcomings of the tax system in the 1970's see, for example, Yuri Grbich, 'The Duke of 
Westminster's Graven Idol on Extending Property Authorities into Tax and Back Again' (1978) 
9 Federal Law Review 185, 210-11. 
9 In the latter years of the 1960s there had been a number of major reviews of taxation in 
countries with similar political systems to Australia: Canada, Report of the Royal Commission 
on Taxation (1966); New Zealand, Report of the Taxation Review Committee (1967); JE Meade 
(chairman), The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (1978); South Africa, Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into Fiscal and Monetary Policy (1969-70); United States of America, 
Congressional Hearings on tax reform in the United states (1969 and 1973). 
10 Vincent Smith, 'How the rich avoid tax', National Times, 12-17 June 1972, 1, 4; Richard 
Ackland 'Court's Tax Shock', Australian Financial Review, 7 March 1974, 1, 10; Glenys Bell, 
'Moonlighting tax cheats lose a good "lurk"', National Times, 9-14 February 1976; Joe Farthing, 
'A small honest raid on federal treasury', Nation Review, 23-29 July 1976, 993; Christopher 
Webb, 'How to outwit the taxman with the charity man', National Times, 8-13 August 1977, 3; 
Pete Freeman, 'Trusts: How a tax loophole was closed', The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 August 
1977, 3; Geoffrey Sawer, 'The ancient art of dodging tax lawfully', Canberra Times, 17 May 
1978, 2; Editorial, 'Crackdown on $20 million tax cheats', The Sunday Telegraph, 25 February 
1979, 26; G McGregor, 'The High Court: Backwards into the Future', National Times, 17-23 
February 1980, 14; Paul Chadwick and others, 'Tax Avoidance Report', The Age, 27 May 1982, 
1-4; Editorial, Australian Financial Review, 2 April 1982, 13. 
11 FCTv Westraders 80 ATC 4357, 4370. 
12 See chapter four, under the heading 'Conflicting Discourses and the Income Tax'. 
13 Speaking after the passing of the perceived crisis, Lionel Murphy observed: 'The Court no 
longer encourages the tax avoidance industry - it is no longer regarded as the tax avoider's 
temple. The Court used to read Acts of Parliament absolutely literally - the words were all 
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attached a high priority to the rule of law denied that there was a crisis at all, 
suggesting that the existence of 'tax avoidance' was evidence that the rule of 
law was functioning in accordance with the standards of a society which valued 
individual freedom and property rights. 14 The 1970's and early 1980's were 
therefore an era in which the competing discourses of the welfare state and 
economic liberalism clashed most spectacularly. 15 This struggle between 
competing discourses focused critical attention upon the role of the courts in the 
tax crisis. 
Those concerned at the widespread minimisation of tax focused upon what was 
perceived to be the preparedness of the courts to adopt a 'literal' reading of tax 
legislation in upholding tax avoidance schemes.16 Although the Barwick High 
Court of the late 1970' s purported to be doing no more than complying with 
entrenched common law doctrines by enforcing the strict literal meaning of the 
legislation, 17 the critique of this interpretative standpoint gathered considerable 
momentum over the late 1970's and early 1980's.18 The interpretation of 
important - the spirit was often ignored. This made it easy for any competent lawyer or 
accountant to devise schemes to turn profits into tax losses. Because of this many of the rich 
ceased to pay tax and the burden fell on the workers and the scrupulous. This literal approach 
has been abandoned by the Court, which now adopts the correct judicial approach that Acts of 
Parliament should not be interpreted in a way which Parliament could never have intended.' 
Lionel Murphy, National Press Club Speech, 17 August 1983, quoted in Richard Krever, 
'Murphy on Taxation' in Jocelynne Scutt, Lionel Murphy: A Radical Judge (1987) 128, 142. 
14 A Shenfield, The Political Economy of Tax Avoidance ( 1968) 35. 
15 For the view that this clash is an emanation of the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, 
see: John Passant, 'Tax Avoidance in Australia: Results and Prospects' (1994) 22 Federal Law 
Review 493; John Passant, 'Tax Avoidance and the Judiciary' (1990) 7 Law in Context 24; Yuri 
Grbich, 'The Duke of Westminster's Graven Idol: on Extending Property Authorities into Tax 
and Back Again' (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 185, 189. 
16 Lionel Murphy, 'The Responsibility of Judges' in Gareth Evans (ed) Law, Politics and the 
Labor Movement (1983) 5; Geoffrey Lehmann, 'Tax Reform in the Land of the Bunyip' [1986] 
British Tax Review 288, 291; FCT v South Australian Battery Makers 78 ATC 4412, 4427 
(Murphy J); FCT v Westraders, above n 11, 4370 (Murphy J). 
17 FCT v Westraders, above n 11, 4358 (Barwick CJ). In the context of the doctrine of 
precedent, Sir Garfield Barwick stressed the function of the court in finding 'the law'; Sir 
Garfield Barwick, 'Precedent in the Southern Hemisphere' (1970) 5 Israel Law Review l, 21-2. 
18 See, for example, Yuri Grbich, 'Section 260 Reexamined: Posing Critical Questions about 
Tax Avoidance' (1975) 1 University of New South Wales Law Journal 211; Yuri Grbich, 'The 
Duke of Westminster's Graven Idol on Extending Property Authority into Tax and Back Again' 
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statutes in the period of the Barwick High Court was characterised as 'pedantic', 
motivated by policy considerations and marked by the failure of the courts to 
find the true law. 19 Desperate situations call for desperate measures, some 
critics suggested. These critics proposed an abandonment of the rule of law 
discourse underpinning the formalism of a literalist approach, and called for a 
substantial expansion of the Commissioner's discretionary powers to combat 
'tax avoidance'. 20 
However, not all were prepared to abandon the discourse of the rule of law to 
the winds of administrative discretion in this way. If respect for the rule of law 
collapsed, it was suggested, then the very foundations of the Australian political 
system would be threatened.21 Many of those who accepted that the tax system 
was in crisis therefore remained faithful to the rule of law discourse. Some of 
these commentators suggested that the crisis had arisen because of the tardy and 
ad hoc piecemeal reform of the preceding seventy years, a problem which could 
be resolved by root and branch surgery upon the income tax base. 22 According 
to these commentators, once the legislature clearly expressed what was subject 
to tax, the literalism of the courts would be an effective tool in the repair of the 
(1978) 9 Federal Law Review 185; Geoffrey Lehmann, 'The Income Tax Judgments of Sir 
Garfield Barwick: A Study in the Failure of the New Legalism' (1983) 9 Monash University 
Law Review 115. For parallel criticisms of the perceived pedantry of the courts in the United 
Kingdom see, for example, HH Monroe, 'Fiscal Statutes: A Drafting Disaster' [1979] British 
Tax Review 265; Louis Blom-Cooper, 'The Legal Effect of Transactions infected by "An 
Understanding"' [1979] British Tax Review 301. 
19 Lehmann, above note 18, passim. 
2
° Commonwealth, Taxation Review Committee - Full Report, Parl Paper No 136 (1975) 382. 
As we saw in the context of the sufficient distribution requirement. The consequence of such an 
expansion of administrative discretion being that the role of the courts in tax administration 
would be largely eliminated. 
21 FCT v Westraders, above n 11, 4370 (Murphy J); Richard Krever, (Book Review) (1984) 10 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 4, 6; Michael Binetter, 'The Interpretation of Part 
IVA after Gulland, Watson and Pincus' (1986) 21 Taxation in Australia 404, 414-15; Robin 
Speed, 'The High Court and Part IVA' [1986] Australian Tax Review 156, 156. 
22 Richard Krever, 'Avoidance, Evasion and Reform: Who Dismantled and Who's Rebuilding 
the Australian Income Tax System?' (1987) 10 University of New South Wales Law Journal 
215. For the view that legislative tardiness to act in response to the tax avoidance crisis was a 
major cause of the crisis, see: SEK Hulme, 'Tax Avoidance' in J Wilkes (ed), The Politics of 
Taxation (1980). 
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income tax system. 23 However those endorsing literalism in this way struggled 
to overcome the negativity towards 'literalism' which was associated with 
judicial complicity with anti-social behaviour.24 The greater weight of opinion 
therefore accepted that the tax system was in crisis, and that the literalist method 
purportedly adopted by the courts was largely responsible for this problem. 
Pressure mounted for a reconsideration of the judicial role, and in particular a 
revision of the judicial approach to the interpretation of legislation in general 
and tax legislation in particular. 25 
At the core of this critique was a reexamination of the assumptions regarding 
the referential capacity of language which had sustained the rhetoric of 
literalism, a reexamination in part attributable to the resurgence of interest in 
intentionalist theory over the 1960s and 1970' s. 26 Language was often 
portrayed as an imperfect medium for conveying the author's intended meaning. 
The referential certainty of Mill's era and the apparent rigidity of the 
connotation/denotation dichotomy of the Dixon court had by now been 
displaced by a distrust of language. Even liberal lawyers such as Hart 
recognised that the 'slot machine jurisprudence' consistent with a referential 
theory of language was no more than a 'noble dream'.27 Once the 'science' of 
interpretation was considered to stand on shaky foundations, the two discourses 
critical to the perceived legitimacy of literalism unravelled. This was a 
23 Ibid. 
24 A view propagated by Murphy Jin cases such as Westraders v FCT above n 11, 4370 and 
FCT v South Australian Battery Makers above n 16, 4427-8. See also: Razeen Sappideen, 
'Judicial Legislation and the Rationalisation of Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936' (1977) 8 Federai Law Review 319, 345; Sir Anthony Mason, 'Where Now?' (1975) 49 
Australian Law Journal 570, 574. 
25 MJ Walsh, 'The Role of Professional Advisors and Others in Relation to Tax Avoidance' 
(1981) Papers presented at the Taxation Convention of the Victorian Division of the Taxation 
Institute of Australia 2-4 October 1981 1, 1; Symposium on Statutory Interpretation (1983) 82 
(Sir Anthony Mason). 
26 For further discussion of this point see below, chapter 6, under the heading 'Intentionalist 
Theories of Determinacy'. 
27 HLA Hart, 'American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream' (1983) 11 Georgia Law Review 969. 
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watershed moment in legal language theory, as the Australian community stood 
at the crossroads. Behind lay the reassuring interpretative rhetoric of the 
Victorian era, ahead lay uncertainty. It was apparent to many that there was a 
choice between the perceived anarchy of legal realism or, alternatively, a new 
theory of interpretation consistent with the certainty depicted in the rule of law 
maxim.28 
In chapters three and four it was noted that, over the preceding century, the 
British and Australian courts had frequently expressly referred to a purposive 
interpretative rhetoric when interpreting tax legislation.29 In the early 1980's 
there was a marked rhetorical shift towards this purposive rhetoric. Although 
there had been some earlier indications of this shift in the context of 'tax 
avoidance' cases,30 the common law rules of statutory construction were 
reconsidered in globo by Mason and Wilson JJ in the decision of Cooper 
Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v FCT.31 The joint judgment of Mason and 
Wilson JJ was seized upon by the commentators as the most direct statement of 
this reorientation towards a rhetoric of purposive interpretation: 
[W]hen the judge labels the operation of the statute as "absurd", 
"extraordinary", "capricious", "irrational", or "obscure" he assigns a 
ground for concluding that the Legislature could not have intended such 
an operation and that an alternative interpretation must be preferred. But 
the propriety of departing from the literal interpretation is not confined 
to situations described by these labels. It extends to any situation in 
which for good reason the operation of the statute on a literal reading 
does not conform to the legislative intent as ascertained from the 
provisions of the statute, including the policy which may be discerned 
from those provisions. Quite obviously questions of degree arise. If the 
28 That this perception pervaded legal consciousness is reflected in the title of Hart's paper: ibid. 
29 Jocelynne Scutt, 'Statutory Interpretation and Recourse to Extrinsic Aids' (1984) 58 
Australian Law Journal 483, 484-5. 
3° FCT v Students World (Australia) Pty Ltd 78 ATC 4040, 4048 (Mason J). For discussion of 
the application of this decision in the case of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Lutovi 
Investments Pty Ltd 78 ATC 4708 see: AJ Myers, 'Dividends and Redeemable Shares' (1979) 8 
Australian Tax Review 83, 88-9. 
31 81ATC4292. 
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choice is between two strongly competing interpretations, as we have 
said, the advantage may lie with that which produces the fairer and more 
convenient operation so long as it conforms to the legislative intention. 
If, however, one interpretation has a powerful advantage in ordinary 
meaning and grammatical sense, it will only be displaced if its operation 
is perceived to be unintended.32 
This statement reflects an attempt to synthesise three rival theories of language 
in its accommodation of literalism, intentionalism and pragmatism, but for 
present purposes it is sufficient to note that at the time of the judgment it was 
widely contrasted with what had been perceived as the consistent application of 
the literal meaning of tax legislation by the Barwick High Court. 33 
Whilst with the benefit of hindsight Cooper Brookes may be depicted as a 
revolutionary decision marking a new era of cooperation between the courts and 
the legislature in achieving the legislative intention, at the time there was less 
confidence in the commitment of the High Court to combat tax avoidance. The 
Parliament therefore sought to entrench this shift to a purposive methodology by 
inserting sections 15AA and 15AB into the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.34 
Although some had perceived a shift to this purposive rhetoric slightly earlier,35 
the decision in Cooper Brookes and the legislative amendments have been 
widely interpreted as having ushered in a new era of purposive construction of 
32 Ibid 4306. For further discussion of this case see: ICF Spry, 'The Cooper Brookes Case and 
Statutory Construction' (1981) 10 Australian Tax Review 208; Robert Allerdice, 'The Swinging 
Penduluum: Judicial Trends in the Interpretation of Revenue Statutes' (1996) 19 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 162; Jeffrey Barnes, 'Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and 
Sampford's Theory of the Disorder of Law' (Pt 1) (1994) 22 Federal Law Review 116, 163-8. 
33 Although it should be noted that even Sir Garfield Barwick did not adhere rigorously to a 
rhetoric of literalism. See, for example, his reliance upon a purposive rhetoric in Mullens v FCT 
76 ATC 4288, 4292. 
34 Section 15AA was inserted into the Acts Interpretation Act by the Statute Law Revision Act 
1981 (Cth), to take effect from 12 June 1981. Section 15AB was inserted in 1984 by the Acts 
Interpretation Act Amendment Act 1984 (Cth). 
35 Douglas Brown, 'The Canons of Construction of Taxation and Revenue Legislation' [1976) 
Australian Tax Review 81, 103. 
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tax legislation according to which the courts take account of policy 
considerations and the legislative intention.36 
The perceived crisis of tax avoidance had therefore precipitated a reexamination 
of the common law and statutory rules governing statutory interpretation, 
culminating in the rhetorical shift to a discourse of purposive interpretation. 
Whilst this shift is often depicted as a significant revolution in Australian 
jurisprudence, in a sense there was little change in the underlying theory of 
statutory interpretation. As with the literal theory of statutory interpretation, a 
purposive theory remained faithful to the tenets of judicial discovery of law 
made by Parliament without recourse to underlying moral norms, was consistent 
with the liberal fear of excessive administrative power embodied in 
administrative discretions and also accorded with the belief that tax law ought 
be clear such that taxpayers might readily ascertain their tax liability. The 
discourses of individual rights and the science of objective legal discovery were 
therefore reconfigured within a purposive rhetoric which signalled the rejection 
of any acknowledgement of legal realism. Nevertheless, in one fell swoop this 
relatively minor rhetorical shift, which preserved the norms of legal formalism, 
was portrayed as the answer to the perceived evils of tax avoidance and the 
threat to the legitimacy of the courts. 37 Whether or not this approach is applied 
to all tax legislation, it is generally accepted that the courts adopt a purposive 
36 For a detailed discussion of the purpose rule, and the argument that it introduced a heightened 
degree of disorder within the law, see: Jeffrey Barnes, 'Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and 
Sampford's Theory of the Disorder of Law' (Pt 1) (1994) 22 Federal Law Review 116; Jeffrey 
Barnes, 'Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory of the Disorder of Law' 
(Pt 2) (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 77. See also Jocelynne Scutt, above n 29; Patrick Brazil, 
'Reform of Statutory Interpretation - the Australian Experience of Use of Extrinsic Materials: 
With a Postscript on Simpler Drafting' (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 503; JM MacRossan, 
'Judicial Interpretation' (1984) 58 Australian Law Journal 547; Robin Woellner, et al, 1998 
Australian Taxation Law (8th ed 1998) 62. 
37 See: Woellner, above n 36, 62; Yuri Grbich, 'The Duke of Westminster's Graven Idol on 
Extending Property Authorities into Tax and Back Again' (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 183, 
214; Patrick Brazil 'Reform of Statutory Interpretation - the Australian Experience of Use of 
Extrinsic Materials: With a Postscript on Simpler Drafting' (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 
503, 506-507. 
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interpretation of tax avoidance provisions. 38 If there was one part of the income 
tax legislation which might be expected to demonstrate a purposive 
interpretative rhetoric in this new era, then, it is in the interpretation of the 
general anti-avoidance provisions of the income tax legislation. 39 It is therefore 
to the purpose of the general anti-avoidance provisions that we must now tum 
before examining the judicial interpretation of those provisions in the era of 
purposiveness. 
C The Function of General Anti-Avoidance Provisions in the Era of 
Purposive Statutory Interpretation 
There is widespread agreement that the concept of tax avoidance defies 
definition40 - one commentator analogising any such attempt to nailing jelly to 
38 FCT v Students World (Aust) Pty Ltd 78 ATC 4040, 4047 (Mason J). For a similar rhetoric 
adopted slightly earlier in the United Kingdom see: Greenberg v !RC (1972) AC 109, 137 (Lord 
Reid) and /RC v Joiner (1975) 1 WLR 1701, 1706 (Lord Wilberforce). For recognition of this 
approach in the secondary commentaries see: Woellner above n 36, 62; DG Hill, 'Great 
Expectations: What do we expect from judges in tax cases?' (1995) 30 Taxation in Australia 21, 
26-7; HH Monroe, above n 18 (criticising the doctrine on the basis of the uncertainty that it 
brings to taxation law). For discussion of the earlier view see Brown, above n 35, 106-7. 
39 Now found in Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IV A. It should be noted that not 
every jurisdiction incorporates a general anti avoidance provision within its income tax 
legislation. For discussion of the approach of the courts in such jurisdictions see: John Tiley, 
'Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives' (Pt 1) [1987] British Tax Review 190; 
John Tiley, 'Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives' (Pt 2) [1987] British Tax 
Review 220. 
4° Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 
1981, 2683 (John Howard, Treasurer); DG Hill, 'Weapons Against Tax Avoidance' (1984) 
Papers Presented at the Taxation Convention of the Western Australian Division of the 
Taxation Institute of Australia 17-18 August 1984 1, 1; M Walsh, 'The Role of Professional 
Advisors and Others in Relation to Tax Avoidance' (1981) Papers presented at the Taxation 
Convention of the Victorian Division of the Taxation Institute of Australia, 2-4 October 1981 1, 
1; JA Kay, 'The Economics of Tax Avoidance' [1979] British Tax Review 354. For the view 
that tax avoidance is the under measurement of economic income, on the assumption that 
'economic income' is determinate, see Joshua Rosenberg, 'Tax Avoidance and Income 
Measurement' (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 365, 445. For discussion of the problematic 
nature of the income concept, see: Boris Bittker, 'A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of 
Income Tax Reform' (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 925; Richard Musgrave, 'In Defense of an 
Income Concept' (1967) 81 Harvard Law Review 925; Charles Galvin, 'More on Boris Bittker 
and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR' 
(1968) 81 Harvard Law Review 1016; Stanley Surrey and I Hellmuth, 'The Tax Expenditure 
Budget - Response to Professor Bittker' (1969) 22 National Tax Journal 528; Boris Bittker, 
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the wall.41 However, one commonly accepted understanding of tax avoidance is 
framed in terms of the intentional minimisation of tax by means which are 
consistent with the letter of the tax law but are contrary to the legislative 
intention or purpose.42 The purpose of the general anti-avoidance provisions is 
therefore widely understood to be that of supplementing the specific taxing 
provisions by ensuring that taxpayers who ought be assessed under those taxing 
provisions are liable to tax. However this understanding of tax avoidance raises 
a question regarding the function of the general anti- avoidance provisions in an 
era of purposive statutory interpretation. If a purposive interpretation of the 
specific taxing provisions in the legislation is adopted,43 then logically there is 
no scope for a general anti-avoidance provision if the only function of the 
general anti-avoidance provisions is to ensure that the specific provisions apply 
to all receipts and transactions that the legislature intended to tax. On this 
basis, the legislative insertion of new general anti-avoidance provisions into the 
income tax legislation and of provisions promoting the purposive interpretation 
of legislation into the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), seems inexplicable. 
One solution to this conundrum is to accept that the anti-avoidance provisions 
are yet another example of statutory provisions inserted out of an abundance of 
caution, superfluous provisions which will never have any practical operation 
provided that the courts continue to adopt a purposive interpretation of the 
substantive provisions of the legislation. On this view, the general anti-
'The Tax Expenditure Budget - A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth' (1969) 22 National 
Tax Journal 538. 
41 Passant, 'Tax Avoidance in Australia: Results and Prospects', above n 15, 493. 
42 See, for example, United Kingdom, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits 
and Income (Cmd 9474, 1955-6); Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (1966); 
Commonwealth, Taxation Review Committee - Full Report, Parl Paper No 136 (1975) 143. For 
a more restrictive definition of tax avoidance see G Cooper, 'The Taming of the Shrewd: 
Identifying and Controlling Tax Avoidance' (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 657. 
43 Note the general acceptance that the courts are paying closer attention to the legislative 
purpose of the specific provisions, and particularly so in cases where 'tax avoidance' is 
concerned; see, for example, the interpretation of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 51(1) 
in John v FCT(l989) 166 CLR 417; Coles Myer Finance v FCT93 ATC 4214, 4222-3. 
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avoidance provisions are a backstop measure, lying dormant until the courts 
stray from the true legislative purpose of the substantive provisions of the 
legislation, whence they spring into effect to catch certain benefits derived by 
taxpayers. However this approach is inconsistent with the legislative, judicial 
and secondary opinion which accepts that the general anti-avoidance provisions 
continue to have some practical effect, even where there is a purposive 
interpretation of the remaining provisions of the Act. In the context of the 
current provisions embodied in Part IV A of the Act, when introducing the 
amending Bill into Parliament the Treasurer clearly expected that Part IV A 
would have a practical impact upon tax avoidance arrangements, rather than 
Part IV A being intended as a merely precautionary measure.44 Further, there has 
now been a number of Federal Court and High Court decisions which have 
accepted that Part IV A has an effective operation,45 while the practical operation 
of Part IV A has never seriously been questioned in the substantial body of 
secondary commentary upon the provisions.46 It is generally accepted that the 
general anti-avoidance provisions simultaneously fulfil the intention of the 
specific taxing provisions and also have a practical operation. It is therefore 
clear that, in what is purportedly the new age of purposive construction, there 
must be an alternative theorisation of the function of the general anti-avoidance 
provisions which accounts for the practical scope that is commonly attributed to 
them. 
The second understanding of the general anti-avoidance provisions, which gives 
them some practical scope, accepts a bifurcation within the concept of 'the 
legislative intention' between the legislative intention of the specific taxing 
44 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 
1981, 2683-4 (John Howard, Treasurer). 
45 In particular see: Davis v FCT 89 ATC 4377, 4400 (Hill J); FCT v Jackson 90 ATC 4990; 
FCTv Peabody 94 ATC 4663; FCTv Spotless 96 ATC 5201. 
46 Aside from the secondary material with respect to Part IV A referred to elsewhere in this 
chapter, see the discussion of Part IVA with references to further material in Woellner, et al, 
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provisions and an overarching legislative intention of the statute overall. 
According to this model of the income tax legislation, 'the legislative intention' 
is more than the sum of the 'legislative intentions' with respect to the specific 
taxing provisions - there is an overarching legislative purpose which the general 
anti-avoidance provisions are intended to fulfill. For this bifurcation of the 
legislative purpose to be sustained, it must be accepted that each specific taxing 
provision should be interpreted upon its own terms without regard to any 
consideration of the overarching legislative purpose. To interpret a particular 
provision in light of its statutory context would collapse the dichotomy between 
the intention of the provision and the intention of the Act upon which the 
bifurcation depends. Only after adopting this approach to the specific 
provisions of the legislation and finding that the taxpayer remains free of tax, 
should the general anti-avoidance provisions be considered.47 However the 
identification of an overarching legislative purpose, which this theorisation of 
the function of general anti-avoidance provisions suggests Part IV A is intended 
to fulfil, is most problematic. 
From the overview of the often competing discourses influencing the Australian 
income tax legislation in chapter four, it may be seen that the balancing of the 
competing discourses of administrative expediency, fiscal demand, tax equity, 
the rule of law and the perceived need to foster capital investment has 
influenced the creation of an income tax base embodying ad hoc political 
compromises. As a result, it was often considered impossible to identify an 
overarching concept of income from this sea of political compromises.48 While 
above n 36 ch 24; Geoffrey Lehmann and Cynthia Coleman, Taxation Law in Australia (1998) 
ch20. 
47 Support for this view may be found in some judicial statements suggesting that it is the 
purpose of the specific provision as revealed by the legislative text within those provisions 
which is the appropriate subject of inquiry: Keighery (WP) Pty Ltd v FCT (1957) 100 CLR 66, 
87 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ); Mullens v FCT (1976) 135 CLR 290, 300 (Barwick CJ); 
Shell v FCT (1949) 78 CLR 382, 461 (Dixon J). 
48 For a critique of the income tax on these grounds see, for example, Ross Parsons, 'Income 
Tax - An Institution in Decay?' (1986) 12 Monash University Law Review 77; Krever, above n 
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some see the absence of a cohesive statutory income tax base as cause for 
reform,49 the conceptualisation and implementation of a cohesive normative 
income concept is problematic.50 Thus it is not possible to reform the income 
tax in accordance with one discourse, because the structuring of the Act will 
always be undertaken in an environment of political compromise. Further, some · 
express, and even some implicit, exclusions from the tax base are clearly 
deliberately intended to encourage investment in particular activities or have 
deliberately been excluded from the tax net for administrative or other reasons.51 
It is therefore accepted that many forms of receipt are deliberately not assessed 
to income tax, or are concessionally taxed, by the express provisions of the 
legislation with the purpose of encouraging the taxpayer to 'avoid' tax.52 
Perhaps because of the difficulties of identifying an overarching legislative 
purpose in the Income Tax Assessment Act which the general anti-avoidance 
provision was purportedly intended to fulfil, prior to 1980 the Australian courts 
had restricted the scope of s 260. The courts had often given priority to the 
specific provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act, on the basis that the 
interpretation of s 260 was governed by the common law principle of statutory 
construction which maintained that, in the absence of any contrary intention, a 
specific provision should take priority over any general provision. Accordingly, 
the courts had developed the choice principle, which accepted that a taxpayer 
taking advantage of a tax minimisation opportunity expressly contemplated by 
the legislation ought be allowed to do so without the general anti-avoidance 
22; M Walsh, 'The Role of Professional Advisors and Others in Relation to Tax Avoidance', 
Papers presented at the Taxation Convention of the Victorian Division of the Taxation Institute 
of Australia, 2-4 October 1981, 1, 4-5 
49 Krever above n 22; Ian Manning, 'Income Tax - An Institution to Reform?' (1987) 4 
Australian Tax Forum 313. 
50 See the material cited at n 40 above. 
51 Charles Gustafson, 'The Politics and Practicalities of Checking Tax Avoidance in the United 
States: Shifting Concepts, Revised Strategies and Jurisprudential Reengineering', Australian Tax 
Research Foundation Colloquium: Tax Avoidance and the Law, Sydney, 5 May 1995. 
52 Ibid. 
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provision being applied.53 This choice principle had subsequently been 
extended in the Barwick era to include any choice implicitly allowed to the 
taxpayer.54 As a result, the general anti-avoidance provisions were generally 
allowed to wither on the legislative vine as the courts gave priority to the 
perceived meaning of the specific provisions of the legislation.55 Section 260 
was therefore generally only allowed a residual effect - effectively only applying 
to poorly advised taxpayers who sought to construct their existing affairs in 
order to minimise tax, as opposed to taxpayers who sought to minimise their tax 
from the beginning of a transaction.56 With the introduction of the new general 
anti-avoidance provisions of Part IV A in 1981, the common law presumption 
was overturned unless the legislature expressly allowed the taxpayer a choice 
under the specific provisions of the Act. 57 By thus elevating the status of the 
general anti-avoidance provisions to place them on an equal footing with the 
other provisions of the legislation, Parliament prompted considerable debate 
concerning the legislative intention with respect to their scope.58 
The third alternative interpretation of the purpose of the general anti-avoidance 
provisions rejects the bifurcation of legislative intention postulated by the 
second alternative, and instead depicts the general anti-avoidance provisions as 
another specific addition to the tax base which ought be interpreted in the same 
way as any other provision in the Act. This approach therefore rejects the 
53 Keighery above n 47; Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v FCT (1964) 111 CLR 430; for a more recent 
recognition of this principle see John v FCT 89 ATC 4101, 4109 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
54 Mullens v FCT76 ATC 4288; Slutzkin v FCT77 ATC 4076; Cridland v FCT77 ATC 4538. 
55 For an overview of the limitations of s 260 see: ICF Spry, Section 260 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act (1978); H Reicher, 'Tax Avoidance in 1977 - The Decline and Fall of Section 
260' (1978) 12 Taxation in Australia 680; Passant, 'Tax Avoidance in Australia: Results and 
Prospects', above n 15; Krever, above n 22, 233-4. 
56 See, for example, Bell v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 87 CLR 548. This 
approach was known as the annihilation principle. 
57 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 177B(l). 
58 For a discussion of which, with reference to the relevant case law, see Richard Vann and 
Robert Allerdice, 'Australian High Court Renders Final Decision in Spotless' (1996) 13 Tax 
Notes International 2063, 2065. 
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generally accepted definition of the scope of anti-avoidance provisions, being 
the fulfilment of the purpose of the specific provisions of the Act. Instead this 
approach accepts that the purpose of the general anti-avoidance provisions is to 
catch receipts which are not intended to be caught by the other specific 
provisions in the Act and without regard to any overarching legislative 
purpose.59 
In many instances the legislature deliberately intends that particular receipts or 
transactions should be free from tax, or should be concessionally taxed. Many 
prudent taxpayers deliberately structure their affairs so as to fall within the 
express or implied legislative exclusions from the tax base in order to minimise 
their tax liability, and therefore fall within the generally accepted understanding 
of tax avoidance. General anti-avoidance provisions such as Part IV A, which 
are interpreted independently of the remaining provisions of the income tax 
legislation, catch such transactions. Under this third approach to the 
interpretation of the general anti-avoidance provisions, the legislature must 
therefore exclude from the operation of Part IV A those receipts which the 
legislature is taken to have deliberately excluded from the tax base regardless of 
such deliberate planning on the part of the taxpayer. In the case of Part IV A, 
the definition of tax benefit in s 177C seeks to achieve this result by excluding 
the operation of Part IV A from the exercise of any choice by the taxpayer 
expressly allowed under the Act. This third theorisation of the purpose of the 
general anti-avoidance provision can therefore allow the general anti-avoidance 
provisions of Part IV A some scope in an era of purposive interpretation, and is 
59 The former Commissioner of Taxation adopted this view: Trevor Boucher, 'Section 260/Part 
IVA - The Doctor's Cases', (1986) Papers Presented at the State Convention of The 
Queensland Division of the Taxation Institute of Australia 9-1 I May I 986 6, 10. However one 
unsatisfactory aspect of this third approach to the interpretation of Part IV A is that it does not 
explain why this extension to the income tax base attracts penalty tax and other administrative 
sanctions, which indicate that the anti avoidance provisions are intended to have a punitive 
effect, as opposed to being merely one more addition to the income tax base. 
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consistent with the terms of s 177B(l) and the express exclusion of tax 
concessions from the operation of Part IV A. 
The preceding discussion of alternative theorisations of the scope of the anti-
avoidance provisions suggests that the purpose of the general anti-avoidance 
provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act must be reconsidered. Whereas 
the generally accepted understanding of the purpose of general anti-avoidance 
provisions is that they merely bolster the specific provisions of the Act and 
ensure that the legislative purpose of those provisions is fulfilled, this 
understanding appears inadequate in an era when the courts are purportedly 
already identifying the legislative intention of the specific provisions of the Act. 
On the basis that the general avoidance provisions are not superfluous, and 
acknowledging that there is no cohesive income concept underpinning the Act, 
it must be accepted that the general anti-avoidance provisions have an 
independent operation. Under this model, the legislature must include measures 
designed to prevent the anti-avoidance provisions from catching receipts not 
otherwise subject to tax which the legislature deliberately intended should be 
exempt or treated concessionally.60 Having thus identified the perceived 
function of Part IV A in what is purportedly an era of purposive statutory 
interpretation, the subject of debate in the contemporary literature is the scope of 
the general anti-avoidance provisions under this 'independent operation' model. 
D The Elements of Part IVA 
Part IV A of the Act was introduced in 1981 with the object of overcoming the 
perceived shortcomings of s 260 of the Act.61 Section 177F grants the 
Commissioner a discretion to reconstruct a taxpayer's affairs in order to increase 
60 To some extent, the legislature has done this by the definition of 'tax benefit' in s 177C and 
also by granting priority to certain deduction provisions in the Act (Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936 s 177B(3)(4)). 
61 The shortcomings of s 260 had been dealt with at considerable length, for a selection of the 
literature see the material cited at n 55 above. 
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the taxpayer's tax liability, provided that the taxpayer has entered into a scheme 
which produced a tax benefit and a person, who need not necessarily be the 
taxpayer, had the dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit for the relevant 
taxpayer. Although the application of these provisions had arisen in a number 
of Administrative Appeal Tribunal decisions and tax rulings, it was not until the 
cases of FCT v Peabody62 and FCT v Spotless63 that the High Court considered 
the application of Part IV A. Before turning to the High Court's approach to the 
application of Part IV A in these cases, the facts of Peabody and Spotless will be 
briefly outlined. 
1 The Facts of FCTv Peabody 
Peabody's case involved the restructuring of a privately controlled corporate 
group prior to a public issue of shares representing 50% of the group's value. 
Prior to the relevant transactions in October 1985, the Peabody family trust held 
approximately 62 % of the share capital of a corporate structure, for all practical 
purposes the remaining 38% being held by a Mr Kleinschmidt. On 14 October 
1985 Mr Kleinschmidt agreed to dispose of his shares to interests associated 
with the Peabody family trust on the understanding that the price paid for the 
shares would be confidential. 
For the public issue to proceed, it was decided to transfer the Peabody interests 
into a company, of which one half of the share capital was to be issued to the 
public. The consideration paid by the Peabody interests for the Kleinschmidt 
shares was calculated upon the basis that the corporate group had a net value of 
approximately $24 million. Importantly, the Peabody interests agreed with the 
public issue vehicle to transfer 50% of its interests in the corporate group (after 
acquiring the Kleinschmidt shares) for approximately $15 million (ie valuing 
the corporate group at $30 million). The Peabody interests were therefore to 
62 94 ATC 4663. 
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derive a gain of approximately $2 million upon the purchase and sale of the 
Kleinschmidt shares. On 17 October 1985 Mr Peabody, the defacto controller 
of the Peabody trust, met with stockbrokers who advised that the difference 
between the purchase price of the Kleinschmidt shares and the stated value of 
the publicly issued shares would cause problems if disclosed to the public. The 
question was whether the corporate regulatory framework then in force required 
the prospectus to give details of the acquisition of the Kleinschmidt shares. 
Having sought the advice of counsel, Mr Peabody and certain advisers decided 
that, if the Peabody trust were to purchase the Kleinschmidt shares and dispose 
of them to the public issue vehicle, there was a real prospect that disclosure of 
the acquisition price (from Mr Kleinschmidt) would be required. 
As the problem was therefore the purchase and resale of the Kleinschmidt 
shares, the Peabody's advisers settled upon an arrangement whereby the 
Peabody interests would purchase the Kleinschmidt shares, convert them to a 
class of shares which was virtually worthless, and then transfer 50% of the 
Peabody shares to the public issue vehicle. In the end, a shelf company 
(Loftway Pty Ltd) which was wholly owned by the Peabody trust, acquired the 
Kleinschmidt shares on 13 December 1985. On 20 December 1985, the 
companies within the corporate group converted the Kleinschmidt shares, with 
the consent of Loftway, to virtually valueless "Z" class shares. As a result, the 
shares held by the Peabody interests, which formerly represented 62% of the 
share capital (by value) of the corporate group, represented almost 100% of the 
share capital by value. In short, the value of the Kleinschmidt shares had been 
shifted to the Peabody trust without any change in the number of shares directly 
held by the trust. This shift in share value resolved the disclosure issue, but also 
fortuitously meant that the two million dollar gain derived by the Peabody group 
from the acquisition and disposal of the Kleinschmidt shares was free of tax. At 
the time, s 26(a) provided that any profit arising from the acquisition and 
63 96 ATC 5201. 
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disposal of an asset within 12 months was to be included in the taxpayer's 
assessable income. Had the Peabodys acquired the Kleinschmidt shares and 
disposed of them to the public issue vehicle, as was originally mooted, they 
would have been liable for tax upon the profit. An adjunct to this arrangement 
was the fact that the purchase of the shares by Loftway was financed by the 
issue of redeemable preference shares to the financier, the dividends being 
calculated in light of the 100% rebate to which the financier would be entitled 
under s 46. Although at the time such redeemable preference share financing 
was considered to be consistent with the taxation law, it was subsequently 
branded as tax avoidance and effectively negated by the insertion of an express 
provision into the Act. 64 
2 The Facts of FCT v Spotless 
In Spotless the taxpayer had undergone a successful public float, as a result of 
which it had received a sum of forty million dollars which was available for 
short term investment. The facts provided in all of the judgments in the Federal 
Court and the High Court do not indicate why the taxpayer only intended to 
invest this sum for the short term, but this seems to have been accepted by all of 
the judges. After canvassing several investment houses, the taxpayer entered 
into an arrangement sponsored by Bankers Trust Australia. Under this 
arrangement, funds were invested with the Cook Islands registered bank 
European Pacific Banking Company Limited. Security for this borrowing was 
given to the taxpayer in the form of a letter of Credit issued by Midland Bank 
plc. At all times the taxpayer was careful to ensure that the source of the 
income from this investment would be outside of Australia for taxation 
purposes. The advantage of the transaction to the taxpayer was that the interest 
would be exempt from Australian tax pursuant to s 23( q) of the IT AA, while the 
Cook Islands government only required payment of 5% withholding tax. 
64 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 46D. 
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Although the rate of interest on the lending was several percentage points lower 
than that obtainable with investments of similar security in Australia, the result 
was that the taxpayer derived approximately $2.3 million free from Australian 
tax, which was a greater after tax return to the taxpayer than that available from 
similar investments in Australia. 
3 The Definition of 'Scheme' 
A 'scheme' is broadly defined in s 177 A as meaning any form of agreement or 
understanding, presumably between two parties, and also as any 'scheme, plan, 
proposal, action, course of action or course of conduct'. Subsection 177 A(3) 
merely provides that the second limb of the definition is also to apply to 
unilateral schemes, actions, and so forth. 
Prior to the High Court decisions in Peabody and Spotless, there had been 
considerable speculation as to how Part IV A would apply in particular cases. 
This speculation had been fuelled by a number of AAT decisions.65 One key 
element of this speculation was how the definition of 'scheme' ought be 
interpreted. On the one hand, some commentators favoured a broad definition 
of 'scheme' in s 177 A, relying upon the fact that scheme was defined as 
meaning, inter alia, 'any act'. This approach also seemed to be supported bys 
177D, which applied where a person with the requisite dominant purpose had 
entered into or carried out just part of a scheme. Section 177D therefore 
implied that it was sufficient for the purposes of Part IV A to focus upon part of 
a scheme in considering whether the threshold requirements of s 177F were 
satisfied. On the other hand, to those concerned about the expansion of the 
65 One of the more significant decisions was Case W58 89 ATC 524. For a discussion of this 
case see: Julie Cassidy, 'Case W58: Death Knell for Family Companies and Trusts?' (1992) 26 
Taxation in Australia 479; Mark Burton and Justin Dabner, 'Part IVA - Walking the Dog' 
(1992) 26 Taxation in Australia 607, 609-10. 
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Commissioner's discretionary powers under the Act,66 the broad definition of 
scheme raised concerns that Part IV A had invested the Commissioner with an 
'ultimate' discretion.67 According to this view, many 'prudent' business people 
characterise tax as just one among many business expenses. In structuring their 
affairs it is therefore sensible for them to minimise that expense, without 
necessarily entering into arrangements which are blatantly contrived for the 
purposes of tax avoidance. The broad definition of 'scheme' contained in s 
177 A(5), and in particular the fact that a scheme can apparently mean any one 
act, poses a threat to this commercial understanding of Part IV A. This is 
because it suggested that any step in a complex business transaction could be 
identified as a scheme. If the Commissioner could scrutinise every business 
transaction and isolate one step from among what may be hundreds of steps, it 
was suggested, the Commissioner would effectively have a power to apply Part 
IV A to any business transaction entered into by prudent business people.68 
Indeed, it was even possible that obtaining advice upon the taxation 
implications of any proposed business arrangement would be fraught with 
danger, unless the taxpayer opted for the arrangement which generated the 
greatest tax liability. To do otherwise, by implementing parts of a broader 
66 Since the 1960's there had been a growing body of literature regarding the expansion of the 
Commissioner's discretionary powers: see: DC Wilkins, 'The Commissioner's Power to Form 
Opinions and Make Determinations', Papers Presented at the Convention of the Taxation 
Institute of Australia, April 1961; RF Hughes, 'Elections, Options and Discretions under the 
Income Tax Assessment Act', Papers presented at the Victorian Convention of the Taxation 
Institute of Australia (1964); DL Canavan, 'Income Tax: The Commissioner's Discretion' 
Papers presented at the Victorian Convention of the Taxation Institute of Australia (1965); TR 
Sappideen, 'The Control of the Commissioners Discretionary Powers under the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (1977) 13 University of Western Australia Law Review 135; KW Ryan, 
'Curbing the Commissioner's Discretionary Powers' in RE O'Neill, Tax Essays (1979) 1; TW 
Murphy, 'The Tax Commissioner's Discretion under the Tax Act' (1989) 24 Taxation in 
Australia 302. 
67 Terry Murphy, 'Part IVA: The Broadest Ambit' (1991) 25 Taxation in Australia 531; Not all 
commentators viewed the prospect of an ultimate administrative discretion with alarm; see Yuri 
Grbich, 'Anti-Avoidance Discretions: The Continuing Battle to Control Tax Avoidance' (1981) 
4 University of New South Wales Law Journal 17. 
68 See, for example, Michael Binetter, 'The Interpretation of Part IV A after Gulland, Watson 
and Pincus' above n 21; DG Hill, 'A New Interpretation of s.260 and its implications for Part 
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arrangement which lowered the tax burden, might have been considered to be 
the implementation of a 'scheme' with the requisite purpose of obtaining a tax 
benefit. It was argued that penalising taxpayers who obtained tax advice and 
prudently opted for the arrangement which achieved the desired business 
objective and the lowest tax liability would be a nonsensical interpretation of 
Part IV A. After all, in introducing Part IV A, the Treasurer the Hon John 
Howard had suggested that Part IV A was only intended to catch blatant, 
artificial and contrived tax avoidance arrangements.69 Further, there seemed to 
be some support for this limitation upon the scope of 'scheme' in the terms of 
Part IV A itself. Firstly, whilst acknowledging the breadth of the definition of 
'scheme' in s 177A, it was arguable that the reference to 'scheme' implicitly 
meant all logically connected actions.70 The second argument noted the 
reference to 'parts of a scheme' in s 177D, but queried why it was necessary to 
specifically refer to a part of a scheme if a 'part' of a scheme could be a scheme 
in itself.71 The arguments for a more limited administrative discretion were 
appealing from the standpoints of the rule of law and business taxpayer 
discourses - there is clearly a concern to constrain the Commissioner's 
discretion within the confines of determinate law in order to engender certainty 
for business taxpayers making investment decisions.72 From the perspective of 
these discourses there were therefore compelling pragmatic arguments for 
IV A', Papers presented to the Seventh National Convention of the Tax Institute of Australia, 9-
12 April 1986, Hobart, 6. 
69 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 
1981, 2683-4 (John Howard, Treasurer); for affirmation of this view from the perspective of the 
Australian Taxation Office see Trevor Boucher, 'Business, Investment, the Family and Tax 
Avoidance - The Difficult Decision' (1983) Papers presented at Taxation Convention of the 
South Australian Division of the Taxation Institute of Australia 2-4 June 1983 1, 4-5. 
70 DG Hill, 'Weapons Against Tax Avoidance' (1984) Papers Presented at the Taxation 
Convention of the Western Australian Division of the Taxation Institute of Australia, 17-18 
August 1984, 1, 25; Mark Burton, 'Part IVA and Distributions from Discretionary Trusts' 
(1992) 4(5) The CCH Journal of Australian Taxation 18, 20-22. 
71 Burton, above n 70. 
72 A humorous review of this approach may be found in Neil Forsyth, 'The Bank Manager and 
the Big Black Dog' (1991) 20 Australian Tax Review 107. 
239 
limiting the Commissioner's power to dissect a scheme into component 
'schemes'. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of those concerned to eliminate the 
'scourge' of tax avoidance, there were compelling pragmatic arguments for 
adopting a broad interpretation of the Commissioner's powers under Part IV A. 73 
This view was founded upon the fear that if the definition of 'scheme' did not 
grant the Commissioner a broad discretion, well advised taxpayers would once 
again be successful in slipping the tax net, compromising the integrity of the 
income tax and undermining the welfare state.74 Those wanting an 'effective' 
general anti-avoidance provision therefore worried about the potential 
limitations of the interpretation of 'scheme' in accordance with the approach 
outlined in the preceding paragraph. In particular, they recognised that if a 
scheme could only comprise all of those elements which were logically 
connected, the consequent broadening of the meaning of 'scheme' might make 
it difficult to identify the requisite tax benefit and dominant purpose.75 The 
more actions that a scheme included, the more likely that the taxpayer would be 
successful in arguing that, in the absence of the scheme, there would not have 
been a greater tax liability.76 The broader a scheme became, the more likely that 
the taxpayer would be able to point to a multitude of purposes in arguing that 
the tax minimisation purpose was relatively insignificant. 77 
4 The Approach of the High Court to the Definition of 'Scheme' 
From the preceding discussion it may be seen that there were plausible 
alternative interpretations of 'scheme', with substantial implications for the 
potential scope of Part IV A. Given that Peabody was the first decision dealing 
73 Passant, 'Tax Avoidance in Australia: Results and Prospects', above note 15, 514. 
74 Ibid; Grbich above n 67. 
75 Burton and Dabner, above n 65, 609. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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with the meaning of Part IV A to be handed down by the High Court, and given 
the existence of these competing interpretations, it might have been expected 
that the High Court would give a detailed elaboration of its reasons for 
preferring one interpretation of 'scheme' over another. However, the High 
Court purported to discover the one true meaning of 'scheme' without 
considering the competing interpretations to any significant degree. 
The High Court initially indicated that it was not prepared to accept that a 
scheme necessarily comprised all logically or temporally related conduct in 
accordance with the concerns of business taxpayers noted above: 
If, within a wider scheme which has been identified, the Commissioner 
seeks also to rely upon a narrower scheme as meeting the requirements 
of Pt IV A, then in our view there is no reason why the Commissioner 
should not be permitted to do so.78 
However, the High Court appeared to make some concession to the concerns of 
business taxpayers when it observed that: 
Pt IV A does not provide that a scheme includes part of a scheme and it 
is possible, despite the very wide definition of a scheme, to conceive of a 
set of circumstances which constitutes only part of a scheme and not a 
scheme in itself. That will occur where the circumstances are incapable 
of standing on their own without being "robbed of all practical 
meaning". In that event it is not possible in our view to say that those 
circumstances constitute a scheme rather than part of a scheme merely 
because of the provision made by ss 177D and 177 A. 79 
Shortly after making this statement, the High Court once again suggested that its 
reading of s 177D 'does not mean that if part of a scheme may be identified as a 
scheme in itself the Commissioner is precluded from relying upon it as well as 
the wider scheme.' Reading these three statements with respect to the definition 
of 'scheme' together, they might be understood to suggest that, although a part 
78 94 ATC 4663, 4670. 
241 
of a scheme can be a scheme in itself, the criterion for differentiating between 
schemes and parts of schemes is that a scheme must be capable of having some, 
however slight, 'practical meaning'. On this interpretation it is open to the 
Commissioner to define any number of schemes with more or less actions of the 
taxpayer, provided that all of those schemes have some 'practical meaning'. 
This 'practical meaning' test therefore appears to constitute a compromise 
between the broad and narrow interpretations of the definition of scheme which 
had been proposed by various commentators and judges prior to the High Court 
decision in Peabody. It seems to offer a balance between the two extremes by 
allowing considerable flexibility to the Commissioner, whilst preventing the 
Commissioner from adopting the 'extreme' stance of breaking any transaction 
into its component parts and treating each part as a scheme. 
Although the High Court did not offer a detailed consideration of the competing 
interpretations of the definition of scheme in its judgment, the High Court 
suggested that its conclusion was justified by reference to a House of Lords 
decision with respect to the income tax of the United Kingdom.80 In Brebner, 
the House of Lords was called upon to interpret s 28 of the Finance Act 1960 
(UK).81 In this case the taxpayers acquired control of a coal supplier in which 
they had previously held shares. The reason for taking control of the company 
was to preserve the favourable terms upon which coal was supplied to the 
taxpayer, terms which would be renegotiated to the detriment of the taxpayer 
had the coal supplier been acquired by a third party. After the takeover, some of 
the capital reserves of the coal supplying company were paid to the taxpayers in 
79 Ibid. 
80 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Brebner [1967] 2 AC 18, 27 (Lord Pearce). 
81 Section 28 provided that 'Where ... (b) in consequence of a transaction in securities or of the 
combined effect of two or more such transactions, a person is in a position to obtain, or has 
obtained, a tax advantage, then unless he shows that the transaction or transactions were carried 
out either for bona fide commercial reasons or in the ordinary course of making or managing 
investments, and that none of them had as their main object, or one of their main objects, to 
enable tax advantages to be obtained, this section shall apply to him in respect of that transaction 
or those transactions'. 
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a tax free form, these distributions of capital being used to repay some of the 
debt incurred in acquiring control of the company. The Inland Revenue 
Commissioner conceded that the acquisition of the coal supplier was undertaken 
for commercial purposes, but argued that the subsequent distribution of capital 
to the taxpayer was not a part of the acquisition transaction and ought be viewed 
in isolation. When viewed in isolation, the Commissioner contended, the only 
reason for the distribution of capital was one of tax avoidance, and accordingly 
the Commissioner sought to apply s 28 of the Finance Act. The House of Lords 
held that the Special Commissioner of Taxes had rightly considered the 
acquisition and subsequent capital distribution together, but offered little 
guidance for delimiting a particular arrangement. 
The most perplexing aspect of the High Court's reliance upon Brebner is that 
the High Court did not expressly reconcile the test adopted by the House of 
Lords with the apparent breadth of the definition of 'scheme' in s 177 A, which 
expressly includes 'any action'. This oversight is all the more striking, in the 
context of the High Court's rejection of one of the Commissioner's submissions 
with respect to the meaning of scheme, by its reliance upon the literalist 
proposition that 'Pt IV A does not provide that a scheme includes part of a 
scheme' .82 If the High Court is understood to have required express statutory 
authorisation for the Commissioner's contention, the same argument could have 
been applied in rejecting the 'practical meaning' test, given the absence of any 
express statutory foundation for it. The effect of the High Court's reference to 
Brebner was that the High Court portrayed itself as constrained from 
considering alternative interpretations of 'scheme' in the context of Part IV A. 
Yet the High Court did not explain why, in what was its first decision upon Part 
IV A, it considered itself constrained by a merely persuasive decision of the 
House of Lords. 83 The reliance upon the decision in Brebner therefore obscures 
82 94 ATC 4663, 4670. 
83 /RC v Brebner [1967] 2 AC 18, 27. 
243 
a number of matters which the High Court failed to consider - the presentation 
of the result in Brebner as determinative of the meaning of scheme is a 
rhetorical device which erases the plethora of choices confronting the High 
Court in the interpretation of 'scheme'. 
This erasure is all the more profound when the problematic nature of the High 
Court's interpretation of the definition of 'scheme' is considered in the light of 
the circumstances of Peabody itself. Most importantly, the High Court 
overlooked the alternative interpretations of the 'practical meaning' test that 
were open on the facts of Peabody. The 'practical meaning' of any set of 
circumstances could be dependent upon a full appreciation of the means adopted 
in creating those circumstances, the contemporaneous setting (however broadly 
defined) of those circumstances and also the practical consequences of those 
circumstances. Thus, for example, it might be suggested that the devaluation of 
the Kleinschmidt shares, and their subsequent sale are incapable of having any 
practical meaning without taking into consideration such matters as the long 
association between the Peabody and the Kleinschmidt interests, the transfer of 
the shares from Kleinschmidt to Loftway, the financing of this acquisition, the 
concerns regarding the perceived need to disclose the acquisition price of the 
Kleinschmidt shares in the course of the public issue and the tax consequences 
arising from the dealings. It might even be suggested that the 'practical 
meaning' of the share devaluation could only be ascertained after taking into 
account the social context of the scheme. A plausible interpretation of the 
'practical meaning' test might therefore suggest that the relevant scheme in 
Peabody embraced all of those elements which were originally identified by the 
Commissioner in defining the scheme for the purposes of the first instance 
hearing of the case. 84 Indeed, in the latter part of its judgment, the High Court 
84 Peabody v FCT 92 ATC 4585. For consideration of the decision of O'Loughlin J see: Mark 
Burton, 'Peabody v FCT -The Province of Part IVA Determined?' (1993) 4 The CCH Journal 
of Australian Taxation 12. 
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apparently proceeded upon the assumption that the wider definition of scheme 
originally identified by the Commissioner was the appropriate definition of the 
scheme in this case. 85 However, in the earlier part of its judgment, when 
specifically addressing the application of 'scheme' to the circumstances of the 
Peabody case, the High Court accepted that just the share devaluation and 
subsequent share disposal could be a scheme for the purposes of Part IV A. 86 
This conclusion was reached without any consideration as to why the isolation 
of the share devaluation and subsequent sale of the devalued shares did not rob 
those circumstances of all practical meaning. 
Given that the practical meaning test might be interpreted in a variety of ways, 
what was the basis for the scheme identified by the High Court on the facts of 
Peabody? The High Court did not expressly consider alternative applications of 
the practical meaning test to the circumstances in choosing the one which it 
considered to be most appropriate. Instead, the High Court ignored the 
possibility of alternative interpretations, and accepted the narrow definition of 
'scheme' identified by O'Loughlin J at first instance. In reaching this 
conclusion, the High Court on three occasions in less than one page of its 
judgment prefaced its conclusion with the phrase 'in our view'. No reasons 
were given for the formation of their view - all that was presented was an 
erasure of the plurality of competing interpretations in what was portrayed as a 
statement of monosemic law. From the foregoing discussion, it may be seen 
that this apparent monosemicity belies the plurality latent within the concepts of 
'practical meaning' and 'scheme' applied by the High Court. In Spotless the 
High Court did not elaborate upon the application of the practical meaning test 
85 The High Court considered why a company such as Loftway was a necessary part of the 
taxpayer's arrangements, although this issue was irrelevant to ascertaining the existence of a tax 
benefit if just the share devaluation by Loftway (rather than the creation of Loftway, the 
acquisition of the Kleinschmidt shares by Loftway, the redeemable preference share financing of 
this acquisition, the subsequent share devaluation and public issue) was taken to be the relevant 
scheme. 
86 94 ATC 4663, 4670. 
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to the facts of the particular case, being prepared to accept the definition of 
'scheme' adopted by the majority in the Full Federal Court.87 In tum, the 
consideration of the practical meaning test by the majority of the Full Federal 
Court comprised merely a passing reference to the issue, rather than any critical 
discussion of the problematic nature of the test in its application to particular 
facts. 88 
Having regard to the cursory statements of the High Court upon the 
interpretation of the definition of 'scheme' in Peabody and the dearth of critical 
consideration of this issue in the Spotless decision, it is difficult to assess how 
the definition of 'scheme' will be applied in the future. However, the approach 
of the High Court would seem to be founded upon an understanding of the 
practical meaning test which emphasises the 'all' in 'robbed of all practical 
meaning'. This approach to the definition of scheme suggests that the 
Commissioner may isolate those parts of any business transaction as a scheme 
which have some 'practical meaning'. On this view, it might be argued that 
virtually any part of a scheme can be attributed with some meaning, and 
therefore the apparent limitation upon the Commissioner's power to define a 
scheme embodied in the requirement of 'practical meaning' belies the breadth of 
the Commissioner's actual power. Given that the share devaluation had little 
practical meaning on its own, the Peabody decision therefore suggests that the 
Commissioner will be able to isolate any part of a scheme as a scheme in itself 
in almost all circumstances. 
5 The Requirement of a Tax Benefit 
Section 177C(l) provides a definition of 'tax benefit', requiring either that an 
amount would have been included in the taxpayer's assessable income, or that a 
87 FCT v Spotless 96 ATC 5201, 5205(High Court); FCT v Spotless 95 ATC 4775, 4805 
(Cooper J, Northrop J concurring). 
88 FCT v Spotless 95 ATC 4775, 4805 (Cooper J, Northrop J concurring). 
246 
taxpayer would reasonably be expected to have included an amount in their 
assessable income, had the scheme not been entered into. Section 177C(2) 
excludes any tax reduction attributable to the exercise of any choice or election 
expressly allowed to the taxpayer under the provisions of the Act outside Part 
NA. Since the introduction of Part NA, there had been considerable 
uncertainty as to how the definition of 'tax benefit' in s 177C was to be 
interpreted in relation to two matters: the degree of probability required by the 
words 'would be reasonably likely' and also the interaction of Part NA with the 
remainder of the Act. 
The first issue regarding the potential scope of s 177C was the meaning to be 
attributed to the requirement that an assessable receipt would, or 'would 
reasonably be expected' to have been received by the taxpayer in the absence of 
the relevant scheme. 89 One interpretation of this definition suggested that the 
Commissioner could only annihilate the relevant scheme and then, on the basis 
of the taxpayer's affairs which remained, examine whether the taxpayer would 
almost definitely have received an assessable amount or not. Such a narrow 
reading would have been consistent with, for example, the approach to the 
meaning of 'control' adopted in Keighery, where the High Court interpreted the 
term in a restrictive fashion. If adopted, this approach would have gone a long 
way towards resurrecting the annihilation doctrine, which had been perceived as 
one of the major shortcomings of s 260.90 
However, an alternative interpretation of s 177C suggested that the words 
'reasonably likely' were to be interpreted as merely requiring that the benefit be 
89 It should also be noted that arrangements which generated deductions and also those which 
were designed to minimise withholding tax liability are also specifically included within the 
concept of tax benefit: Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 177C(l)(b), 177CA. 
90 DG Hill, 'A New Interpretation of s.260 and its Implications for Part IVA' above n 68, 7. A 
broad annihilation doctrine had posed particular problems in the case of 'first time' schemes 
where no antecedent transaction existed, as it would not be possible to establish whether the 
taxpayer would have received an assessable amount. For further discussion of the annihilation 
doctrine see the material cited at n 55 above. 
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a 'remote possibility'. On this view, the Commissioner would have had a broad 
discretion to reconstruct the taxpayer's affairs in determining whether a tax 
benefit existed, as the Commissioner could consider numerous remote 
possibilities after identifying and annihilating the relevant scheme. This 
interpretation of the provision raised the spectre of a wide ranging 
administrative discretion which enabled the Commissioner to reconstruct the 
taxpayer's affairs such that no taxpayer could seek respite in a harbour safe from 
the scrutiny of the Commissioner.91 To many this was anathema to the rule of 
law and contrary to the interests of business taxpayers making well informed 
business decisions.92 By contrast to the concerns of many tax advisers and some 
parts of the business community, to those concerned about the integrity of the 
tax system and the need to eliminate 'tax avoidance', a broad meaning of the 
definition of tax benefit was the only course if the income tax was to survive in 
a viable form.93 
With respect to the second issue regarding the meaning of s 177C, that provision 
provided that the only tax concessions free from the potential operation of Part 
IV A were those under which the taxpayer was expressly allowed a choice or 
election. The limited nature of this exemption from Part IV A implicitly 
included within the definition of 'tax benefit' any choices which were only 
implicitly allowed to the taxpayer under the legislation. At the time of its 
introduction, the definition of tax benefit was understood to be directed towards 
the elimination of the broad choice principle adopted in the cases of the Barwick 
era. Notwithstanding the apparent legislative endeavour to restrict what were 
portrayed as the excesses of the Barwick court, it was not clear how 'express' a 
tax concession had to be before it would be excluded from Part IV A. It has 
already been noted that Part IV A is generally accepted to operate as a parallel 
91 DG Hill, 'A New Interpretation of s.260 and its Implications for Part IVA' above n 68, 7. 
92 Ross Parsons, Income Taxation in Australia (1985) 840. 
93 
'Tax Avoidance in Australia: Results and Prospects', above n 15. 
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provision in cognisance of the fact that s 177B(l) states that nothing in the 
provisions of the Act outside Part IV A was to be understood to limit the 
operation of Part IV A. On this basis it was possible that a broad reading of the 
definition of tax benefit in s 177C would overreach a 'sensible' general anti-
avoidance rule which paid greater attention to the legislative context of Part 
IV A. In particular, it would be illogical for the Act to offer certain incentives to 
taxpayers as a means of encouraging them to make particular business 
decisions, only to have those investment decisions and the relevant tax 
incentives overridden by Part IV A.94 The Treasurer's discussion of the 
definition of 'tax benefit' in his Second Reading Speech did nothing to allay 
such concerns on the part of taxpayers. At one point he accepted that arranging 
one's affairs to attract specific tax concessions would not fall within the ambit 
of Part IV A, but carried on to observe that Part IV A would apply where the 
taxpayer 'blatantly misused' such concessions: 
I do assert that taxpayers who simply take advantage of concessions for 
the purposes for which they were put in the law cannot and will not be 
affected by the new provisions. Specifically, for example, Part IV A will 
not deny to people who simply respond to our concessions for 
investment in Australian films the benefit of the tax advantages that are 
part of those concessions. But I think it incontrovertible that blatant 
misuse of those and other 'incentive' concessions ought to be within the 
scope of Part IV A. A general anti-avoidance provision would be of little 
worth if it could not be used to prevent unintended exploitation of such 
concessions in the law, or to operate as a backup to a specific anti-
avoidance provision in circumstances where a taxpayer has tailored 
arrangements so that the provision is circumvented in form, but not in 
substance.95 
Given that taxpayers will commonly arrange their affairs in order to attract a tax 
benefit, and given the Treasurer's acknowledgement that Part IV A would apply 
to some such endeavours on the part of taxpayers to maximise tax concessions, 
94 Gustafson, above n 94. 
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there was legitimate concern that Part IV A would override what a taxpayer had 
considered to be a legitimate investment decision.96 Thus, for example, a 
taxpayer choosing to invest in research and development in order to attract the 
advantageous tax deduction for such expenditure, rather than making non 
deductible capital expenditure, would worry that Part IV A could be applied to 
override this choice of investment. While in most cases the taxpayer might have 
a good case for maintaining that the dominant purpose of the investment 
decision was not to obtain the tax benefit, being subjected to the seemingly 
arbitrary inquiry as to the dominant purpose of the taxpayer was an additional 
concern which many business taxpayers and their advisers felt that they could 
do wlthout.97 By limiting the scope of s 177C, it was felt that the prospect of 
Part IV A being applied to everyday commercial transactions would be rendered 
more remote, freeing legitimate business decisions from the spectre of Part IV A. 
On the other hand, to those concerned to eliminate tax avoidance, the definition 
of 'tax benefit' was open to judicial restriction in the same way that s 260 had 
been limited. After all, the case of Mullens Investments Pty Ltd v FC'f98 was 
widely criticised on the basis that it sanctioned blatant tax avoidance, but in his 
judgment Barwick CJ had stressed that his interpretation was quite consistent 
with the purpose of the provisions granting the particular tax concession. 
6 The Interpretation of s 177C in the High Court 
In dealing with the definition of tax benefit, the High Court referred to the 
decision of one Supreme Court judge upon a matter of company law,99 before 
once again appearing to reach an uneasy compromise between the rival 
interpretations of s 177C: 
95 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 
1981, 2685 (John Howard, Treasurer). 
96 Parsons, above n 92, 839. 
97 Murphy above n 67, 537. 
98 76 ATC 4288. 
99 Dunn v Shapowloff[l978] 2 NSWLR 235, 249 (Mahoney J). 
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A 'reasonable expectation' requires more than a possibility. It involves 
a prediction as to events which would have taken place if the relevant 
scheme had not been entered into or carried out and the prediction must 
be sufficiently reliable for it to be regarded as reasonable. 100 
The High Court therefore apparently rejected an approach which would have 
given the Commissioner a broad power to reconstruct the taxpayer's affairs, 
while simultaneously rejecting the annihilation doctrine by allowing the 
Commissioner to reconstruct the taxpayer's affairs in accordance with what was 
'reasonably' expected to happen, as opposed to a certainty, in the absence of the 
scheme. 
It is not apparent from the decision why the decision of a Supreme Court judge 
upon a criminal prosecution under the Companies Code was considered relevant 
to the interpretation of a tax avoidance provision, notwithstanding that the anti-
avoidance provisions of Part IV A apply with penal effect. There was ample 
scope to ignore and/or distinguish Dunn v Shapowloff on any number of bases, 
and yet the High Court clutched at this statement of a single judge of a lower 
court. Even if it is conceded that the definition of 'reasonably expected' offered 
by Mahoney J in Dunn v Shapowloff was relevant to the High Court's 
deliberations upon this issue, it is axiomatic that the High Court was not bound 
by his Honour's definition. The absence of any critical consideration of the 
relevance of Dunn v Shapowloff, any consideration of alternative interpretations 
and of alternative interpretative methodologies is striking in a context where 
there were such widely differing interpretations of s 177C prior to the High 
Court decision. 
Furthermore, contrary to the generally accepted view that the High Court is now 
more willing to adopt a substance approach in applying the law to the facts of 
100 94 ATC 4663, 4671. 
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tax cases, 101 the decision in Peabody exposes the formalism of the High Court. 
Noting that it was not sufficiently predictable that Mrs Peabody would have 
received the relevant income in the relevant year, the High Court held that she 
had not received a tax benefit and therefore concluded that Part IV A could not 
apply. The finding that there was no reasonable expectation that the profits 
would flow to Mrs Peabody in the relevant year was apparently based upon the 
view that, in the absence of the devaluation of the Kleinschmidt shares in the 
hands of Loftway, the timing of the distribution of the profits from the sale of 
the Kleinschmidt shares was not a matter of reasonable prediction, because any 
such distribution of profits was at the discretion of the directors of Loftway. 
Further, the High Court apparently relied upon the fact that the discretion 
exercised by the trustees of the Peabody trust with respect to the distribution of 
trust income added an additional level of uncertainty as to the timing and 
direction of those profits. The clear suggestion is that taxpayers in a position to 
add additional formal levels between themselves and the ultimate source of 
income thereby enhance their prospects of escaping the operation of Part IV A. 
At a time when the High Court is purportedly concerned with the substance of 
the case, 102 this reluctance to look beyond the formal veil of the taxpayers 
affairs is remarkable. 
The interpretation of s 177C in Peabody therefore reflected the ambivalence of 
the provision. On the one hand, the High Court accepted that the provision 
invested the Commissioner with some power to reconstruct the taxpayer's 
affairs. On the other hand, it restricted this reconstructive power by accepting 
without question the legal form of the taxpayer's arrangement which pre-existed 
the scheme. Notwithstanding this ambivalence and the choices which it creates, 
101 Lehmann and Coleman, above n 46, 26; for a similar proposition in the context of decisions 
in the United Kingdom, see: Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan, 'The Elusive Spirit of 
the law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control' (1991) 54 Modern Law Review 848. 
102 Lehmann and Coleman, above n 46, 26. 
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the High Court presented its interpretation of s 177C as the outcome of an 
inexorable process - as the one true outcome of the case. 
This erasure of plurality is also evident in the second High Court decision upon 
Part IV A. In Spotless, it will be recalled, the taxpayer had moneys from a public 
share issue which it had invested on short term loan. The taxpayer considered 
making tax advantaged investments in either the Cook Islands or in Hong Kong, 
but opted for the Cook Islands arrangement on the basis that it produced the 
higher after tax return. The High Court accepted that in this case there was a tax 
benefit on two grounds. Firstly, that it was reasonably likely that, in the absence 
of the Cook Islands scheme, the taxpayer would have kept the moneys on short 
term loan within Australia and thereby derived assessable income. 103 Secondly, 
on the basis that the taxpayer's reliance upon the specific concessionary 
provision of s 23(q) did not preclude the application of Part IV A. 
With respect to the second issue regarding the interpretation of s 177C, the 
taxpayer had argued that it would not have derived the same return in Australia 
as it did from the Cook Islands investment, and therefore that the taxpayer could 
not reasonably be expected to have included 'that amount' in its assessable 
income. This argument therefore hinged upon the proposition thats 177C could 
only apply where the taxpayer chose to derive the identical amount in a way 
which produced a tax free receipt. On this point the High Court conceded some 
latitude to the Commissioner, accepting that: 
It is sufficient that at least the amount in question might reasonably have 
been included in the assessable income had the scheme not been entered 
into or carried out.104 
In reaching this conclusion, the High Court did not expressly refer to the 
'legislative intention' or to the 'literal meaning' of s 177C, preferring instead to 
103 96 ATC 5201, 5211. 
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present its decision in axiomatic fashion. Further, the assumption that the 
taxpayer would have kept its monies on short term loan if the tax exempt 
arrangement had not proceeded, necessitated a considerable leap of faith which 
was not justified by recourse to 'the legislative meaning'. If the taxpayer had 
been advised that Part IV A would apply to the Cook Islands arrangement, it 
could quite reasonably have considered alternative forms of 'legitimate' short 
term investment which could have produced a higher after tax rate of return in 
the taxpayer's hands whilst generating a lower level of income. For example, 
the taxpayer might have considered share investments with a view to taking 
advantage of the intercorporate dividend rebate - the taxpayer might even have 
acquired redeemable preference shares under a redeemable preference share 
financing arrangement similar to the one entered into in the Peabody case and 
which the High Court was prepared to accept was a 'rational commercial' 
arrangement.105 Under such arrangements the after tax rate of return on the 
dividend income might have exceeded the after tax rate of return derived from 
the short term money market because the dividend income would effectively be 
free of tax. The High Court in Peabody had apparently accepted that the 
existence of discretion as to the timing and flow of money to the taxpayer 
precluded the conclusion that the profits would flow to the taxpayer in the 
relevant year. However in Spotless the High Court implicitly rejected the 
proposition that the existence of discretion in the hands of the taxpayer's board 
precluded the finding that the tax benefit would not have been derived. 
Although the facts of the cases are quite different, it is not clear from the 
Spotless decision why the High Court was prepared to acknowledge the 
significance of discretion in the Peabody case and not in the Spotless case. 
Strangely, had Spotless Services created a subsidiary in the Cook Islands for the 
purposes of the transaction, the decision in Peabody would suggest that the 
High Court would have adopted a formalist stance by acknowledging the 
104 Ibid. 
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significance of the subsidiary's discretion with respect to the profit distribution, 
and accordingly found that Part IV A could not apply because it was not clear 
when the profits would be repatriated to Australia (in the absence of any firm 
evidence of an intended repatriation of profits at a particular time). 
The preparedness of the High Court to reach conclusions without expressly 
assessing the competing interpretations from alternative interpretative 
standpoints is also evident in its decision with respect to the interaction of Part 
IV A with the specific provisions of the Act, including s 23(q). In the Full 
Federal Court it was apparent that Cooper J was mindful of this issue. Having 
noted thats 23(q) was not the only exempting provision in the Act, he implicitly 
acknowledged that Part IV A would have to be read down if such exempting 
provisions were to effectively channel investment into government preferred 
alternatives. The exemption of foreign source income was attributable to the 
perceived need to avoid double taxation upon foreign source income and a range 
of other considerations. 106 No matter what the policy justification for the 
exemption under s 23(q), there was a plausible argument that the taxpayer was 
quite entitled to take advantage of this incentive expressly allowed for by the 
Act by investing its surplus funds in the Cook Islands. Of course a broad 
reading of this choice doctrine might have rendered Part IV A largely ineffective 
in much the same way that s 260 had been restricted by judicial interpretation. 
It was precisely for this reason that s l 77B(l) provided that the provisions of 
Part IV A were not to be construed as limited by the other provisions of the Act. 
The decision of the Full Federal Court in Spotless therefore threatened the 
viability of Part IV A as an effective check upon tax avoidance. 
In concluding that Spotless Services had derived a tax benefit, the High Court 
did not expressly consider the perceived purpose of Part IV A in the context of 
105 94 ATC 4663, 4671. 
106 For a discussion of the exemption of foreign source income see: Commonwealth, Taxation 
Review Committee - Full Report, above n 42, 256-62. 
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the legislative scheme of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), but it 
clearly left the way open for the Commissioner to attack taxpayers who 
structured their affairs in order to fall within an express provision of the Act. 
The failure of the High Court in this case to explain the interaction of s 177C 
with the remaining provisions of the Act once again highlights its erasure of 
interpretative complexity in favour of an appearance of legal determinacy. 
7 The Requirement of Dominant Purpose 
Section 177D lists the matters to be taken into account in ascertaining the 
existence of a dominant purpose to obtain a tax benefit for the relevant taxpayer. 
Adopting the approach suggested in Newton v FCT, 107 the legislature had 
developed an 'objective purpose' test in s 177D which required a host of 
'objective' factors to be considered in determining whether 'it would be 
concluded' that any person carried out any part of the scheme for the purpose of 
obtaining a tax benefit for the taxpayer. It was not necessary to establish the 
actual subjective purpose of the relevant person, it was enough to conclude from 
the objective evidence that such a purpose could reasonably have existed. 108 
The ascertainment of the 'dominant purpose' of the taxpayer under s 177D had 
also generated considerable debate after the introduction of Part IV A. Perhaps 
the most significant issue raised in this debate was whether the minimisation of 
tax by prudent business planning in ordinary business transactions could be 
characterised as a purpose to obtain a tax benefit, or whether it should merely be 
characterised as prudent commercial practice.109 It had been suggested that if 
107 (1958) 98 CLR 1. 
108 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives 27 May 
1981, 2683-4 (John Howard, Treasurer). 
109 There had been considerable discussion of this issue in other tax jurisdictions: see, for 
example, P Faber, 'Business Purpose and Section 355' (1990) 43 The Tax Lawyer 855; J van 
Kempen, 'The Business Purpose Test: The Dutch Approach' (1985) 6 Fiscal Studies 66; Spear, 
Corporate Business Purpose" in Reorganisation (1947) 3 Tax Law Review 225; Michaelson, 
"'Business Purpose Test" and Tax Free Reorganization' (1952) 61 Yale Law Journal 14; 
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the taxpayer entered into a transaction which included some degree of tax 
minimisation, while nevertheless carrying on a legitimate business activity, s 
177D would not be satisfied because the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit 
would be overwhelmed by the broad business purpose of the legitimate 
enterprise. On this view, the scope of Part IV A would be restricted to a handful 
of cases in which taxpayers had engineered one off arrangements which had no 
commercial justification whatsoever. 
In the Full Federal Court decision in Peabody, it was held that the dominant 
purpose of the scheme as defined by the Commissioner was to allow for the 
public issue of shares in the Pozzolanic group and the consequent raising of 
capital. 110 This was considered to be a purely commercial purpose to which s 
177D could not apply.11 1 The silent hand of the business taxpayer rhetoric may 
be discerned in the Full Federal Court decision, relegating taxation to 'just 
another business expense' which prudent business people would minimise as far 
as possible. The High Court decision in Peabody did not expressly consider the 
interpretation of s 177D, as the High Court held that Mrs Peabody had not 
obtained a tax benefit. Nevertheless, in accepting that the creation of Loftway 
to take advantage of the preference share financing arrangement was a 'rational 
commercial decision', 112 the High Court appeared to lend some credence to the 
view that it was prepared to accept that the creation of transactions which had 
one aspect of tax minimisation would not be characterised as tax avoidance. 113 
This business taxpayer rhetoric figured prominently in the Full Federal Court 
judgment of Cooper and Northrop JJ in the Spotless litigation. In deciding that 
the taxpayer did not have the requisite purpose for Part IV A to apply, Cooper J 
(with whom Northrop J concurred) appeared to rely upon a number of factors. 
110 93 ATC 4104, 4117-8 (Hill J, Ryan and Cooper JJ agreeing). 
111 Ibid. 
112 94 ATC 4663, 4671. 
113 Passant, 'Tax Avoidance in Australia: Results and Prospects', above note 15, 518-19. 
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A critical facet of the judgment was the proposition that the taxpayer's purpose 
in entering into the offshore lending arrangement was merely a rational 
commercial decision to maximise its after tax profits by minimising its 'costs': 
When investing outside Australia, the incidence of tax and the operation 
of any relevant double taxation rate between Australia and the countries 
in which investment is being considered will be relevant to a decision to 
invest overseas or not. Where by the operation of the foreign taxation 
laws and the existing Australian taxation laws the net return after the 
payment of all applicable tax and other costs of the investment is higher 
investing offshore than within Australia, it cannot be said that, 
objectively, the dominant purpose of the investor investing offshore is to 
get a tax benefit; the purpose is to obtain the maximum return on the 
money invested after the payment of all applicable costs, including 
tax. 114 
From this passage it may be seen that Cooper J accepted that tax was just 
another business cost which all prudent business people would minimise. 
Accordingly, he concluded that the arrangement was founded upon a perfectly 
legitimate commercial purpose, as distinct from a purpose of obtaining a tax 
benefit. His Honour therefore accepted that s 177D did not apply in the 
circumstances. Although Cooper J appeared to suggest that the pursuit of such a 
purpose by artificial or contrived means would fall foul of Part IV A, he stressed 
that in this case the taxpayer's transaction involved both in form and substance 
'real' money and a 'real' transaction. 115 
In the High Court, this business taxpayer rhetoric was rejected on the basis that 
the juxtaposition of a rational commercial decision and a scheme entered into 
with the dominant purpose of tax avoidance was a false dichotomy. 116 The High 
Court reasoned that the only reason for investing funds in the Cook Islands at a 
similar level of security but a lower rate of interest than available in Australia 
114 95 ATC 4775, 4812. 
115 95 ATC 4775, 4810. 
116 96 ATC 5201, 5206. 
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was to obtain a tax advantage, concluding that this was a scheme to which Part 
IV A applied. While the majority of the High Court did not expressly refer to 
any legal authority or legal argument in support of its approach to the 
interpretation of s 177D, at one point in the majority judgment it is clear that the 
High Court was swayed by the rhetoric of tax equity and the perceived need to 
bolster the welfare state from the threat of tax avoidance. Having noted that the 
US Supreme Court had accepted that tax minimisation was to be expected in the 
conduct of business, the majority of the High Court carried on to reject the 
proposition that this meant that tax avoidance by business taxpayers ought to be 
legitimised: 
In Australia, State and Territory stamp duty laws have been a particularly 
significant factor in the shaping of business transactions. However, the 
tax laws are one part of the legal order within which commerce is 
fostered and protected. Another part is Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), which regulates or proscribes certain restrictive trade 
practices. In this broad sense, "[t]axes are what we pay for civilized 
society", including the conduct of commerce as an important element of 
that society.117 
In this rather Delphic comment, which was not necessary for the High Court's 
subsequent elaboration upon the meaning of dominant purpose, the High Court 
seems to be suggesting that taxpayer's must learn to accept that if they want the 
protection of the state and the other benefits that the existence of the state 
brings, they must be prepared to pay their 'fair share'. 
However, even from the perspective of fairness, it is arguable that the decision 
of the High Court in Spotless was unjustified. Members of the public had 
subscribed for Spotless shares at a time of high interest rates, and also at a time 
when corporate profits were subject to what the Asprey and RATS Reports had 
characterised as an inequitable system of corporate taxation under which 
117 Ibid. 
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corporate profits were subject to tax twice. 118 Had the subscribers to the shares 
invested their funds with a bank, they would have received a similar rate of 
return to that achieved by Spotless with its Cook Islands investment (which 
attracted a rate of interest 4.5% lower than the bank bill buying rate in 
Australia). However, the direct investment of the subscribers in the form of 
bank deposits would have generated interest which was only taxed upon receipt 
by the depositors, at worst at a top marginal rate of 57 .08%. II9 By contrast, if 
the investment profit derived by Spotless was distributed to its shareholders, 
that profit would be taxed twice, and could be subject to an effective rate of tax 
of 70%. 120 In this context, it was a perfectly rational decision on the part of the 
Spotless directors to seek tax exempt investments in order to retain the 
confidence and support of their shareholders. Further, by applying Part IV A in 
these circumstances, the Commissioner bolstered what was officially recognised 
to be an unfair taxation system and contradicted the rhetoric of tax equity upon 
which Part IV A was purportedly founded. 121 If taxes are what we pay for a 
civilised society, it might have been suggested, then the imposition of a liability 
under what was acknowledged to be an inequitable taxation system, and the 
imposition of tax avoidance penalties to boot, could hardly be considered to be 
'civilised' . 
118 Commonwealth, First Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, Par! Paper No 199 
(1933) 11; Commonwealth, Report on Taxation of Income of Companies - Private and Non-
Private - and of Shareholders, Par! Paper No 143 (1952) 14 (Appendix A). 
119 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) s 7(1), Sch 1. 
120 Note also that even if the profit was not distributed to shareholders but retained by the 
company, such retained profits would theoretically have inflated the share value which would 
have been taxed when shareholders (share traders or those that had acquired shares after 20 
September 1985) disposed of their shares. For a discussion of the inequity of Part IVA when 
applied to enforce the double taxation of corporate profits, see: Parsons, above n 48, 100-103. 
121 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives 27 May 
1981, 2683 (John Howard, Treasurer). 
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E Conclusion 
At the beginning of the 1980's it was commonly accepted that there had been a 
fundamental shift in the methodology of statutory interpretation in favour of the 
discovery and application of the legislative intention. To this day there is 
considerable support for the intentionalist rhetoric. On the basis of this 
rhetorical shift, it might have been expected that recourse to the legislative 
intention would have become a necessary step in confirming or departing from 
the perceived literal meaning in every case. Further, it might have been 
expected that such recourse to the legislative intention would have been all the 
more apparent given what is generally considered to be a greater willingness on 
the part of the courts to overcome tax avoidance. Given that it is generally 
accepted that tax avoidance defies definition, and given the wide array of 
plausible alternative interpretations of the terms of Part IV A published by 
numerous commentators prior to the Peabody and Spotless litigation, one 
striking feature of the High Court decisions is the brevity with which the 
appropriate interpretative methodology was considered. Moreover, it is 
remarkable in this era of purposive interpretation that in the Peabody and 
Spotless matters, no judicial decision has expressly relied upon the legislative 
purpose in supporting an interpretation of the legislation. When recourse to the 
legislative. purpose was raised as a potential aid to the interpretation of the 
statute, it was apparently dismissed in favour of a literalist rhetoric. Thus only 
O'Loughlin J at first instance in the Federal Court referred to the possibility that 
Part IV A might be interpreted by having regard to the legislative purpose 
evidenced in extrinsic materials, but discounted this approach on the basis that 
the literal meaning of the words was plain. 122 In Peabody the High Court briefly 
referred to one understanding of an intentionalist methodology when it 
commented that Part IV A 'replaced s 260 which had proved to be somewhat 
122 Peabody v FCT (1992) 92 ATC 4585, 4593 (O'Loughlin). See also: Marsh v FCT 85 ATC 
4345, 4363; FCT v Bill Wissler (Agencies) Pty Ltd 85 ATC 4626, 4631; Case W58 89 ATC 524; 
Gray v FCT89 ATC 4640; Trevisan v FCT9l ATC 4416, 4422; 
261 
ineffective as a measure to counter tax avoidance arrangements'. 123 This 
passing reference to the perceived need to fashion an 'effective' general anti-
avoidance provision did not, however, overtly figure in the resolution of any of 
the substantive issues which the Court was called upon to resolve. By contrast 
to this faint reference to an intentionalist approach, in Spotless the High Court 
appeared to adopt a literalist rhetoric, commenting that Part IV A was to be 
'construed and applied according to its terms' .124 However, when drawing 
conclusions upon the application of Part IV A to the particular facts of the 
Spotless matter, the High Court did not expressly rely upon what it considered 
to be the literal meaning of the provisions. 
A review of all tax cases since 1980 suggests that express reliance upon ss 
15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), or the principles 
enunciated in Cooper Brookes, is the exception rather than the norm in income 
tax cases. 125 More commonly, judges have made some passing reference to the 
perceived intention of a provision, without offering any detailed examination of 
underlying policy objectives which may be discerned in the legislation and 
123 (1994) 94 ATC 4663, 4665. 
124 (1996) 96 ATC 5201, 5205 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron Gummow and Kirby 
JJ). 
125 A point made by several authors over the past 20 years: W Leitch, 'Interpretation and the 
Interpretation Act 1978' [1980] Statute Law Review 5; Allerdice, above n 32. In FCT v 
MacFarlane (1986) 86 ATC 4477, in the Full Federal Court Beaumont J (Fisher J concurring) 
apparently relied upon the common law mischief rule rather than the Acts Interpretation Act 
1901 (see 4492), while in the first instance decision of Cooling v FCT extrinsic material was 
also relied upon without recourse to those provisions (89 ATC 4731, 4743). See also Grant v 
DFCT (1986) 66 ALR 690, where the Federal Court referred to the relevant explanatory 
memorandum to ascertain the legislative purpose. In Hilton v FCT 92 ATC 4534, 4539 Hill J 
apparently considered that ss 15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 were 
coextensive with the principles set out in Cooper Brookes; for other decisions purporting to 
apply s 15AA see: Healey v FCT89 ATC 4152, 4156; Richardson v FCT91ATC5098, 5112-3 
(Merkel J); FCT v Ryan 98 ATC 4428, 4439 (Merkel J). For decisions purporting to apply or be 
consistent with the application of s 15AB see: CTC Resources NL v FCT 94 ATC 4072, 4076 
(Gummow J); ANZ Banking Group v FCT 93 ATC 4238, 4278 (Lockhart J); Hepp/es v FCT 90 
ATC 4497, 4518 (Gummow J); Morris v FCT 89 ATC 5303, 5309 (Hartigan J). For decisions 
where the judge has preferred a rhetoric of literalism see: FCT v Faywin Investments Pty Ltd 90 
ATC 4361, 4379 (Hill J, dissenting); FCT v Knight 83 ATC 4789, 4795 (Sheppard J); FCT v de 
Vonk 95 ATC 4820, 4822 (Foster J); Shells Self Service v FCT 89 ATC 4233, 4244 (Ryan J). 
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extrinsic material. Thus, some judgments in the Peabody and Spotless litigation 
referred to the legislative purpose of Part IV A in a cursory manner, usually in 
introducing the terms of Part IV A, but made no further reference to this 
purpose. 126 In such cases it is difficult to ascertain whether the perceived policy 
of a particular provision was taken into account by the court, although it must be 
considered that this is unlikely, given the omission of any express reliance upon 
the legislative purpose by the respective judges in reaching their conclusions. 
Furthermore, such references to the legislative intention are little different to the 
references to legislative intention occasionally made by the courts over the past 
century. Such references are more of a rhetorical flourish than a detailed 
discussion of competing policies and the perceived import of the legislative 
compromise embodied in the legislation. 
There has therefore been a pervasive reluctance on the part of the judiciary to 
overtly contemplate the legislative purpose m weighing competing 
interpretations of a particular provision of the income tax legislation. This 
reluctance would be understandable if the legislation had been transformed 
during the 1980's, such that the literal meaning was unquestionably clear and 
mirrored the legislative intent. But it has been argued that the legislation 
remained open to competing interpretations, and that the legislative intention 
was anything but clear. The one thing that was clear was that there was 
considerable debate regarding the scope of the provisions comprising Part IV A 
prior to the litigation in Peabody and Spotless. 
This judicial intransigence with respect to the adoption of a purposive 
interpretative methodology might also be explained by the fact that Cooper 
Brookes and the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA and 15AB 
overrode what was considered to be a longstanding common law principle 
126 See, for example, Peabody v FCT 93 ATC 4104, 4110 (Hill J); FCT v Peabody 94 ATC 
4663, 4665 (High Court). 
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requiring the literal interpretation of tax legislation. It might therefore be 
expected that there would be some judicial reluctance to accept the new 
purposive approach, as the judges came to terms with the new interpretative 
methodology. However, this explanation is also unconvincing. Given the 
outcry against 'pedantic literalism' during the early 1980's, and the strength of 
the intentionalist rhetoric adopted by several prominent figures in the Australian 
judiciary, it might have been expected that any such intransigence would have 
dissipated relatively quickly. 
Although the conservatism of the judiciary is not an adequate explanation, in 
itself, of the failure of the courts to expressly embrace the intentionalist rhetoric, 
it is part of a more plausible explanation. This explanation focuses upon the 
proposition that express recourse to the legislative intention is perceived to be 
an admission of legal pluralism which is anathema to the determinacy thesis. 
While various intentionalist theories are quite consistent with the determinacy 
thesis and modem liberal legal theory, the earlier discussion of the ad hoc 
compromises embodied in the Commonwealth income tax 127 indicates the 
problematic nature of 'the legislative intention' in the context of the 
Commonwealth income tax. To embark upon a broad examination of 
legislative policy is therefore considered to offer little benefit in the context of 
the income tax legislation, where there is only ad hoc compromise upon ad hoc 
compromise, apparently defying any attempt to identify a consistent underlying 
policy of any practical use in ascertaining the determinate legislative meaning. 
A close examination of legislative intention would require participation in open 
ended debate which defies the closure which is commonly taken to be the 
hallmark of 'the law'. Indeed, some have suggested that such legislative 
ambivalence evidences a legislative intention to effectively delegate the 
127 See chapter 4 above. 
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formulation of underlying principles of taxation to the courts. 128 While some 
judges have embraced the concept of judicial lawmaking in their extra curial 
observations, the 'lawmaking' that they envisage is constrained by what is 
assumed to be a moral consensus within the community. From the discussion of 
the conflicting discourses influencing the Income Tax Assessment Act in chapter 
four and at the beginning of this chapter, there are good reasons for doubting 
that there will ever be the moral consensus upon matters of taxation which 
underpins the judicial theorisation of judicial activism. In practice, then, any 
overt consideration of the legislative intention of the tax legislation is perceived 
to be a little too close to the 'dangerous' path of judicial lawmaking. 
By contrast, what is often portrayed by both courts and commentators alike as a 
close reading of the legislation offers the courts the apparent safety of a harbour 
of certainty, insulating the judges from the perceived vagaries of speculation as 
to legislative purpose. However, the preceding case studies suggest that the 
apparent certainty of key legislative terms such as 'scheme', 'tax benefit' and 
'purpose' is a mirage. The context in which those terms are to be applied is 
fundamental to the attribution of meaning in any particular case. The traces of 
the discourses of the welfare state, business taxpayers and the rule of law may 
be discerned in any judgment. Although this recognition of the plurality of 
discourses influencing modern Australian tax interpretation suggests that 
meaning is dependent upon the context of the text, there is no overt recognition 
of such a role for the statutory context in the judgments. In both Peabody and 
Spotless the High Court handed down its judgments with the certainty of 
conviction noted in earlier decisions of the High Court. There is, in other 
words, an erasure of semantic plurality as the courts appear to reason towards 
the one right answer in accordance with the homogenising discourse of liberal 
legalism. 
128 See, for example, Brian Arnold, Timing and Income Taxation: the principles of income 
measurement (1983) 7-8. 
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CHAPTER 6 - DETERMINACY, INDETERMINACY AND RHETORIC IN A 
PLURALIST WORLD 
A Introduction 
A central aspect of any liberal legal theory is the proposition that the meaning of 
a legal rule is determinate from its inception or, at the least, determinate 
immediately before its application to a particular case.1 For the purposes of 
liberal legal theory, determinacy may mean that there is always one right 
interpretation of a rule; or, at the least, that law consists of a vast bulk of 
interpretive decisions made 'automatically', supplemented by a small residue of 
uncertain cases where courts must 'make' law which accords with communal 
morality. Without such determinacy, liberal legalists maintain, the separation of 
the judicial from the legislative power under the rule of law would collapse. 
Judges would presumably apply rules in accordance with some preferred 
outcome, politically speaking, rather than merely applying the law in the vast 
majority of cases. 2 The linchpin of the liberal determinacy thesis is therefore 
that there is some standpoint from which true propositions of law may be 
determined. Whilst not assuring a democratic society, the apparent exclusion of 
arbitrarily exercised power under the liberal rule of law is understood to be an 
important step away from the perceived tyranny of the 'Dark Ages' .3 
1 For a generic theory of liberal legalism see Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal 
Critique (1990) 27. For references to a theory of determinacy in the context of particular liberal 
legal theories see: HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, Raz and Bulloch (eds) (1994), where Hart 
argues that meaning is generally conventionally determined from the outset, penumbral cases 
aside; Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev edn, 1969) ch 2; Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 
(1986) viii-ix, 76-86, where Dworkin argues that the proper interpretation of legal doctrine 
provides one right answer which can only be determined at the time of judgment. For a similar 
argument, devoid of the right answers thesis, see: Neil MacCormick, 'Reconstruction after 
Deconstruction' (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 539. 
2 Altman, above n 1, 27. 
3 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (first published 
1885, 5th ed, 1897); Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944) 78; Geoffrey de Q Walker, 
The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (1988) ch 1. 
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Perhaps the surest path to the determinacy thesis would be a literal theory of 
meaning which offers the comforting certainty of a 'slot machine 
jurisprudence' .4 Alternatively, the interpretation of legislation according to the 
legislative intention also seems to offer an attractive theory of legal determinacy 
- some versions of intentionalism even allowing the meaning of the legislation 
to be adapted to changing social circumstances.5 However, from the preceding 
review of the interpretation of tax legislation over the past three centuries, it 
must be said that the literalist or intentionalist theories of determinacy are less 
than convincing. Leaving to one side the interpretation of tax legislation during 
the eighteenth century, even when the courts purported to adopt a literal and/or 
purposive interpretation of tax legislation, there are good grounds for arguing 
that the context in which the legislation was created and applied played a far 
greater role in the interpretative methodology of the courts than either of these 
objectivist theories would allow. The meaning of income, profits and gains in 
Victorian Britain, the meaning of the sufficient distribution requirement in 
Australia over the period 1915 -1980 and the meaning of Part IV A were all 
much more elusive than the literalist theory of interpretation would suggest. 
The existence of competing interpretations of all of these provisions meant that 
it was not possible to identify any one literal meaning of the legislative terms. 
Further, the eclectic nature of the British and Australian income taxes meant 
that it was impossible to identify one coherent legislative scheme in the search 
for the legislative intention. Discussion regarding the 'literal' meaning and the 
legislative intention was therefore inevitably subjectivised by the standpoint of 
the discussant. Notwithstanding the objectivist rhetoric of the courts and the 
commentators, the interpretation of tax legislation over the past three centuries 
4 For a formalist theory of language see: Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 
C Bally and A Sechehaye (eds), (1966); for a critique of which see: Peter Goodrich, Legal 
Discourse - Studies in linguistics, rhetoric and legal analysis (1987) 17-31. 
5 See the text in chapter 1 under the heading 'A purposive construction of tax legislation'. 
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has been influenced significantly by the context in which that legislation was 
applied. 
As noted in chapter one, the mainstream account of tax interpretation suggests 
that the literalist interpretation of tax legislation has prevailed for some 
considerable time. It was also noted that liberal legalists have taken 
considerable comfort from this account, being reassured that the law had indeed 
risen above the arbitrary exercises of power characteristic of the Dark Ages. If 
such liberal legalists were to accept that this literalist theory failed as a 
descriptive account of tax interpretation over the past three centuries, it would 
remain open to them to suggest that literalism remains the preferred normative 
theory of statutory interpretation. Although intentionalist theory is considered 
to have been consistently applied only since the 1980' s, it was suggested in 
chapters three, four and five that this account also failed descriptively. Once 
again, those that subscribe to an intentionalist theory of interpretation might be 
expected to suggest that, even though it fails as a descriptive theory, it should 
nevertheless be adopted as a normative theory of statutory interpretation. The 
purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. Firstly, to consider the merits of 
alternative normative theories of legal determinacy. Drawing upon the literature 
regarding the shortcomings of the various theories of language underpinning 
alternative theorisations of the determinacy thesis, it will be argued that such 
normative theories are unconvincing.6 The second purpose of this chapter is to 
develop a theory of legal indeterminacy which explains the phenomena noted in 
the preceding chapters. In doing so, it is acknowledged that any theory of legal 
interpretation must explain why judges have purported to comply with the 
determinacy theory while in fact exercising considerable discretion in every 
case. 
6 It should be noted that a detailed analysis of all of the theories of legal determinacy is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Accordingly, the shortcomings of some theories of determinacy will be 
outlined and the relevant literature referred to, before turning to a more detailed account of the 
stronger, hermeneutic and critical theories oflegal determinacy. 
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B Objectivist Foundations of the Determinacy Thesis 
1 Literalist Theories of Legal Determinacy 
As noted in chapter one, literalist theories maintain that there is one determinate 
meaning of any word. This determinate meaning may be determined 
referentially, formally or conventionally. 
(a) Referential and Truth Conditional Theories of Literal Meaning 
Prior to the twentieth century, the existence of legal determinacy was 
rationalised by the assumption that language was an objective means of 
describing the objective world.7 There was no question of polysemicity because 
language conveyed what was 'there'. Earlier forms of liberal legalism took this 
referential theory and maintained that law consisted of an autonomous body of 
rules which could be objectively applied to a determinate range of factual 
circumstances.8 Although there was the pragmatic undercurrent of dissent,9 in 
the main this referential theory of language spawned the slot machine 
jurisprudence characterised by epithets such as 'think things not words' .10 
7 See, for example: JS Mill, A System of Logic (1947) 48-9. 
8 For one expression of rule formalism in the legal context see the work of C Langdell, first 
Dean at Harvard Law School. For commentary upon Langdell's work see: TC Grey, 
"Langdell's Orthodoxy" (1983) 45 University of Pittsburgh Law Review l; MH Hoeflich, "Law 
and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell" 30 American Journal of Legal History 
95. The discussion of Hart's work below will show that at times Hart also appeared to embrace 
rule formalism, although note MacCormick's attempt to downplay the significance of rules in 
Hart's theory - N MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, (1981) ch 10. For a rebuttal of formalist language 
theory in the context of law see: M Moore, "The Semantics of Judging" (1981) 54 Southern 
California Law Review 151, 202-26. 
9 See, for example: CS Pierce, "How to make our ideas clear" (1878) 12 The Popular Science 
Monthly 276. 
10 OW Holmes, "Law in Science and Science in Law" (1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 443, 460. 
Note the relevance of Bentham's theory of legislation as a detailed codebook minimising 
judicial discretion based upon a theory of language comprising a system of "neutral 
appellatives"; Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Fictions (1932). For a discussion of Bentham's 
theory of language see: K Burke, A rhetoric of motives (1969). For a critique of this referential 
theory of meaning see, for example: Gilbert Ryle, "The Theory of Meaning" in C Mace (ed), 
British Philosophy in the Mid-Century; a Cambridge Symposium (2nd ed, 1966) 239, 256. 
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For the first decades of the twentieth century, logical atomists and logical 
positivists modified this referential theory by arguing that ordinary language 
offered but a partial description of the world because it was recognised that 
there is not necessarily a sign for every referent. Logical atomists and their 
positivist descendants therefore set about breaking the code of language by 
defining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement to be true. 11 
This search for the truth conditions of an utterance was founded upon the 
separation of the denotation of the utterance from its connotation, or in Frege's 
terminology of the reference from the sense of the utterance. However it is now 
generally accepted that this project can never reach the closure of a complete 
statement of the truth conditions of an utterance. 12 In particular, such theories 
have been discredited13 on the basis that there is not a strict demarcation 
between the denotation and connotation, or the reference and the sense of an 
utterance.14 Once the dualism of sense and reference is collapsed, the meaning 
of an utterance depends upon its context. 15 As Macintyre observes, the 
geographical placenames of 'Londonderry' and 'Coire Columcille' refer to the 
same place, but the sense of the two names is different given the historical and 
political sense of using either the English or the Irish name. 16 While it might be 
argued that both names for the same place have the same meaning because they 
name the same place, this proposition is only true if it is accepted that the 
11 For the classic statement of logical atomism see: L Wittgenstein, (transl CK Ogden), Tractatus 
Logico-philosophicus (1990); this was subsequently adapted by logical positivists such as AJ 
Ayers, Language Truth and Logic (1971). 
12 For a critique of logical atomism and logical positivism see: H Putnam, 2 Mind, Language 
and Reality, Cambridge University Press, (1975) pp 1-33. For general histories of language 
theory see: John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (1968); John Passmore, Recent 
Philosophers (1990); Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory (1983); J Thompson, Critical 
Hermeneutics (1981) ch 1. 
13 For a discussion of formal theories of meaning in the context of his attempt to assimilate them 
with some pragmatic elements, see: J Habermas, 'A Reply' in Communicative Action, A 
Honneth and H Joas (eds) (1991) 234ff. 
14 Gottlob Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', in Max Black and PT Geach (eds) Translations 
from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (1952), 56-78; for discussion of this see: 
Christopher Norris, 'Sense, Reference and Logic' in The Contest of Faculties (1985) 47-68. 
15 Derrida, Of Grammatology, G Spivak (transl) (1976) 89. 
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function of language is to name objects in the world. It is because this 'naming' 
concept of language is considered under-inclusive of the function and effect of 
language that it has largely been rejected. Accordingly, theories of literal 
meaning founded upon referentialism or truth conditional theories have 
therefore generally fallen out of vogue in favour of alternative theories of 
meaning. 
(b) Fonnalist Theories of Literal Meaning 
An alternative foundation for a literal theory of interpretation is formalism. 
Ferdinand de Saussure17 is generally attributed with developing this alternative 
source of interpretive determinacy by focusing upon langue rather than parole, 18 
thereby emphasising the formal aspects of language as a system of signifiers.19 
Saussure argued that the meaning of a sign does not depend upon it referring to 
any aspect of the material world. Rather, he argued, the meaning of each 
signifier is formally determined by its relationship to all other signifiers within 
the particular language.20 Thus, the signifier 'cat' is differentiated from 'cap', 
'cad', 'dog' and so forth, and 'cat' is arbitrarily assigned the function of 
conveying the idea of a fluffy thing which commonly purrs and meows. A 
message consisting of signifiers could be sent and be decoded by the recipient, 
provided that the appropriate communicative methods were adopted. 
The height of twentieth century formalism was reached when structuralists 
adapted Saussure's work by locating humanity within a complex array of 
contingent social structures, not all of which are necessarily apparent to the 
social actors. 21 Born into a particular lifeworld organised by such structures, 
they argued, our perceptions of the world are determined by those structures. 
16 Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) 378. 
17 F de Saussure, C Bally and A Sechehaye (eds), Course in General Linguistics (1966) 67ff. 
18 
'Langue' being the system of signs as distinct from parole which is the usage of the signs. 
19 Saussure, above n 17, 9. 
20 Ibid, 114ff. 
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On this view, determinacy was assured because the language system was a self 
maintaining system in which the meaning of each signifier was capable of 
objective analysis,22 at the least by an appropriately qualified person.23 But this 
structuralist perception that language determines our understanding of the world 
was criticised for several reasons.24 One problem was the apparent assumption 
that language systems came into existence with a 'big bang' - structuralists 
simply seemed to be willing to assume the existence of some timeless 
underlying system of signifiers. Objection was also taken to the assumption by 
structuralists that systemic response to social change in the use of signifiers 
would quickly achieve a new equilibrium within the one communal language -
there was simply no room for a theory of multiculturalism which acknowledged 
the prospect of multiple discourses. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
structuralism fails to explain the perceived slippage of meaning in daily 
discourse. Just as Saussure had excluded consideration of parole in favour of 
langue, structuralists excluded consideration of context and the response of the 
recipient in order to 'scientise' the study of language as an objectifiable 
system.25 
(c) A Conventionalist Theory of Literal Meaning 
But at least since the later work of Wittgenstein,26 it has been widely accepted 
that meaning is pragmatically created rather than being formally determined. 27 
21 See, for example: C Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (1966). 
22 Ibid, 75. 
23 For a discussion of this aspect of structuralist theory, see: Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: 
Theory and Practice (revised edn, 1993) 5-6. 
24 Eagleton, above n 12, 113. 
25 S Clarke, The Foundations of Structuralism (1981) 173ff. 
26 For the pragmatic theory of language propounded by Wittgenstein see: Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, trans by GEM Anscombe, (3rd edn, 1968); Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Remarks, R Rees (ed), trans by R Hargreaves and R White, (1975) 110. 
27 Although, of course, predominantly formal theories of language such as structuralism have, 
and retain, some prominence in literary theory. For general discussion of literary theory, see the 
material referred to above at n 12. For an overview of the transition from formalism to 
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It is therefore understandable that contemporary liberal theories of law develop 
theories of legal determinacy which accommodate this sea change towards 
pragmatic theories of language.28 This recognition of the pragmatic aspects of 
language use, accelerated by Wittgenstein29 and the contribution of speech act 
theorists such as JL Austin,30 has been developed in various ways. One path has 
lead to the potentially nihilistic theory of deconstruction.31 However, the 
reception of pragmatism into theories of meaning need not necessarily lead to a 
theory of indeterminacy. Indeed, the thrust of ordinary language philosophy was 
to find the source of meaning in the general agreement of a community upon the 
meaning of terms. 32 
In the legal context, ordinary language theory was applied most notably by HLA 
Hart. 33 In an attempt to overcome the contingency of pragmatically determined 
meaning depicted by rule sceptics such as Karl Llewellyn,34 Hart argued that the 
application of words to factual circumstances was generally determined by 
pragmatism in the legal context see: Peter Goodrich 'The Role of Linguistics in Legal Analysis' 
(1984) 47 Modern Law Review 523. 
28 Thus, for example, Unger was seemingly compelled by this recasting of liberal theory to 
recast a definition of legal formalism which accommodated this admission of some versions of 
pragmatic language theory; see: Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986) 1. 
29 
'For a large class of cases - though not for all in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can 
be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.' Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, above n 26, sec 43. Note JL Austin's criticism of 'use' as hopelessly ambiguous; 
JL Austin, How To Do Things with Words, JO Urmsen and M Sbisa (eds), (2nd edn, 1976) 100. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Note the debate as to just what deconstruction means. To Christopher Norris deconstruction 
is a powerful tool in revealing often subtle rhetorical devices - see, for example: Deconstruction: 
Theory and Practice, (revised edn, 1993) ch 1. On the other hand, Richard Rorty considers that 
deconstruction authorises the textual solipsism which Derrida has gone some way towards 
rebutting, at least in his more recent work; see: Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism 
(1982) ch 6; Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, Peggy Kamuf (trans), Routledge, (1994) 59. 
For a scathing attack upon Derrida's duplicity in positing deconstruction while at the same time 
offering the 'right' reading of Paul de Mann's wartime writings sympathetic to Nazism see: R 
Wolin, Labyrinths (l995) 1-12. 
32 L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, above n 26, vol 1, para 242. For discussion of 
this aspect of Wittgenstein's pragmatics see: Garth Hallett, A Companion to Wittgenstein's 
"Philosophical Investigations" (1977) 304-6. 
33 Although note that it was a modified ordinary language theory which incorporated the 
permanence of core meanings with the pragmatism of Wittgenstein's agreements upon language. 
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.al . 35 soc1 convent10n. According to Hart, by a unidirectional process of 
incremental growth which excluded the regression of meaning,36 a 'dictionary' 
of core meanings had been generated. Incorporating the intentionalism of 
speech act theory, Hart accepted that such core meanings were the primary 
resource to which a legislator referred in framing legislation. Indeed, at one 
point Hart suggested that legislative omniscience, combined with this complex 
of conventionally determined meanings, would mean that legislation might only 
apply to those circumstances specifically contemplated by the legislature. 37 
Hart's work can be interpreted in a number of ways,38 but perhaps the most 
commonly accepted is the view that for any legal rule there is a large core of 
determinate meaning supplemented by a penumbra! zone of uncertainty where 
judges must legislate.39 Under this theory of meaning, the function of the judge 
is merely to create a list of conventionally determined 'meanings', and 
determine whether the circumstances of the instant case fall within those 
meanings. Thus, Hart observed, for the purposes of the rule 'No vehicles in the 
Park', the paradigm cases of 'vehicle' will be conventionally determined and at 
present include 'the motor-car, the bus, the motor-cycle.' 40 When such 
34 K Llewellyn, The bramble bush: or our law and its study (1951); K Llewellyn, 
Jurisprudence: realism in theory and practice (1962). 
35 Hart, above n 1, 126. 
36 Ibid, 135; see also 129; but cf Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (1994) 65. 
37 Hart, above n 1, 127-8; he carried on to note that we are merely human and must therefore 
accept that there will always be a penumbra of doubt beyond the core of meaning, at 128. 
38 For a discussion of this see: M Burton, 'The Song Remains the Same - The Search for 
Interpretive Constraint and the Rhetoric of Legal Theory in Hart and Hutchinson' (1997) 20 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 407. 
39 See, for example: Allan Hutchinson, 'A Postmodern's Hart: Taking Rules Sceptically' (1995) 
58 Modern Law Review 788, 792; but note the emphasis upon formalist aspects of Hart's work 
in Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society (1993) 301; Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of 
Modern Law, (1992) 207. 
40 Hart, above n 1, 129. 
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conventional meaning 'runs out', he suggested that judges either adopt a 
purposive41 interpretation or reach an 'acceptable' decision.42 
Whilst many critics have attempted to rebut Hart's theory of core meanings by 
citing such exceptional cases as Fuller's query of whether a book might be a 
vehicle (of ideas) or Hutchinson's Ford carpark,43 these attempted rebuttals have 
merely reinforced Hart's depiction of incremental growth from a determinate 
core. That is, these exceptional cases can always be rationalised on the basis 
that they are merely another example of a penumbra! case. There is therefore 
little rhetorical benefit to be gained by challenging Hart's theory of core 
meanings by pointing to an unusual case. No matter how many reported 
decisions are cited in support of the indeterminacy thesis, Hart's supporters 
could always say 'Ah, that is just another penumbra! decision which is at the tip 
of the iceberg - what about the millions of easy decisions made everyday which 
are not reported simply because there is no argument about the meaning of the 
terms?' 
A more substantial criticism of Hart's conventionalism is that, notwithstanding 
his view to the contrary,44 an existing conventional meaning cannot be directly 
applied to a new case. Even if one accepts the conventional accretion to 
meaning, no two situations will be identical in every respect. It is therefore 
necessary to decide whether the instant case falls within the conventionally 
determined scope of a particular rule, no matter how many cases have 
previously been considered to fall under the rule.45 Given the singularity of any 
case, the application of language in any case must therefore always be what Hart 
called a 'hard' or 'penumbra!' decision requiring the exercise of judicial 
41 Hart, above n 1, 127, 129. Note that Hart is indecisive as to whether it is the purpose of the 
legislature (127) or the purpose of the interpretive community (129). 
42 Ibid, 204-5. 
43 Hutchinson, above n 39, 811. 
44 For a discussion of this aspect see: Burton, above n 38. 
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discretion.46 What is portrayed as the 'automatic' application of literal meaning 
therefore belies the existence of choice in every case. 
A second more compelling criticism of conventionalist theories of literal 
meaning is that they assume that a statutory word cannot have two inconsistent 
meanings at any one point in time. Inconsistent conventional meanings may 
arise where different sub-communities attribute a particular meaning to a word 
which is not generally adopted. The legal subcommunity might, for example, 
give a word a technical legal meaning different from the ordinary meaning of 
the term. Such a case causes no concern to a positivist such as Hart, who would 
have merely accepted that the courts had created a rule that the legislature 
intended the technical legal meaning to prevail. However, where there are other 
sub-communities, such as the accounting profession, which develop their own 
meanings for particular terms, the courts have not adopted any hard and fast 
tiebreaker rule for determining which meaning ought prevail. Thus, in the case 
of the income tax in Victorian England it was shown in chapter four that there 
were a multiplicity of conventional meanings of the terms 'profits and gains', 
and the courts were compelled to choose between the competing meanings. 
Regardless of what may be considered the functionalist appeal of 
conventionalist theories of meaning,47 they are therefore unconvincing. 
Referential, formal and conventionalist literalist theories of legal determinacy 
therefore fail on both descriptive and normative grounds because the 'literal' 
meaning of any statutory text does not, and cannot, exist. A literal meaning 
45 For a discussion of which see: Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'The Self Destruction of Legal 
Positivism' (1990) IO Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 449, 467; Dworkin, above n I, ch 4. 
46 Hart, above n I, 135; see also 129; but cf Waluchow, above n 36, 65. For further 
consideration of the polysemicity of language and its impact upon Hart's core meanings see: M 
Wood, 'Rule, Rules and Law', in The Jurisprudence of Orthodoxy: Queen's University Essays 
on H.L.A. Hart, Leith and Ingram (eds), (1988) 27. 
47 NE Simmonds, 'Why Conventionalism does not Collapse into Pragmatism' (1990) 49 
Cambridge Law Journal 63. 
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cannot exist because the context in which an utterance is made and interpreted 
inevitably influences the attribution of meaning. 
2 Intentionalist Theories of Legal Determinacy 
In the quest for determinacy some language theorists suggested that authorial 
intention was another aspect, and 'not just one among others' ,48 of the context 
of a particular utterance.49 Thus, under Austin's speech act theory,50 authorial 
intention was fundamental to determining the 'sense'51 in which a particular 
speech act was to be understood. A 'valid' or, to use Austin's terminology, 
'felicitous' or 'happy' 52 performative utterance required the author to intend the 
act, use appropriate forms and make the speech act in the appropriate context. 
The assumption in this theory of speech acts is that the author has an intention 
which he or she frames in terms of language and sends the encoded message to 
the recipient who deciphers it to produce what is hopefully the same concept to 
that originally thought of by the author. 53 In any particular context, the meaning 
will be determined by the author's intention even if the mode of expression is 
'unhappy'. Although Austin ultimately recognised that his categorisation of 
speech acts into performatives and constatives was flawed,54 the importance of 
authorial intention in determining the meaning of speech acts became a 
48 J Derrida, 'Signature Event Context' (1977) 1 Glyph 172, 187. 
49 This inclusion of authorial intention under the pragmatic domain contrasts with Moore's 
suggestion that authorial intention is just another brand of formalism because it purportedly 
produces one answer; Moore, above n 8. 
5° For a discussion of speech act theory see: V Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, L Matejka and I Titunik (transl), (1973); Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the 
Evolution of Society (1979) ch 1; Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, above n 12, ch 18; 
Goodrich, above n 4, 48ff; J Derrida, 'Signature Event Context', above n 48; for a response to 
Derrida see: J Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences' (1977) 1 Glyph 198. For Derrida's rejoinder 
see: Jacques Derrida, 'Limited Inc abc' (1977) 2 Glyph 162. 
51 Austin, above n 29, 99. 
52 Ibid, 14ff. 
53 Oliver Wendell Holmes had posited the centrality of authorial intention in 'The Theory of 
Legal Interpretation' (1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 417, 418. Glanville Williams had also 
adopted this theory of language: G Williams, 'Language and the Law' (1945) 61 Law Quarterly 
Review 71, 73; see also: HP Grice, 'Meaning' (1957) 66 Philosophical Review 377. 
54 Austin, above n 29, 149. 
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significant aspect of theories of meaning, and was subsequently developed by 
Hirsch.55 
Indeed, much of the rhetorical force of Hart's theory of meaning is arguably 
attributable to his incorporation of literalism and intentionalism within his 
theory of meaning.56 In chapter five the general acceptance by lawyers of this 
accommodation of literalism and intentionalism within the one theory of 
meaning was noted. Perhaps the most obvious example of this point may be 
seen in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v FCT,57 where Mason and 
Wilson JJ accepted that the literal meaning of statutory terms may be overridden 
after consideration of the legislative intention. At the core of this 
reconsideration of interpretative theory by the courts is the proposition that the 
author's intention can differ from the conventionally determined meaning(s) of 
the words used.58 This proposition is generally justified on the basis that 
language is an imperfect medium for communicating our intention. This 
highlights a critical assumption of intentionalists - they assume that it is possible 
to intend something in prelinguistic form such that there can be a difference 
between the author's intention and their words.59 There is, as Derrida suggests, 
a myth of prelinguistic origins in the intentionalist approach which is 
unsustainable.60 On the basis of this assumption, intentionalists embark upon an 
ss ED Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (1967). 
s6 It has been argued elsewhere that this attempted reconciliation of two quite different theories 
of meaning enhanced the rhetorical appeal of Hart's work but simultaneously comprised a fatal 
internal contradiction; Burton, above n 38. 
s7 (1981) 147 CLR 144. 
ss See, for example: R Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975) 93. For a similar shortcoming in 
literary theory see the intentionalist approach of ED Hirsch, above n 55, 82. Hirsch's approach 
to literary interpretation was criticised by Stanley Fish in Is there a text in this class? (1980) ch 
14-15. 
s9 Hirsch, for example, suggests that verbal meaning should be defined as 'whatever someone 
has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs and which can be conveyed 
(shared) by means of those linguistic signs.' above n 55, 31. 
60 See particularly, Derrida, above n 15: 'I would wish rather to suggest that the alleged 
derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, was possible only on one condition: that the 
'original', 'natural', etc. language had never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, 
that it had itself always been a writing.' 56. 
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inquiry to determine what the legislature 'really meant'. However, the 
assumption of prelinguistic origins precludes the identification of a 
methodology by which we can test the accuracy of a particular reading against 
the author's prelinguistic intention.61 No amount of extrinsic writing will be 
determinative of the authorial intention because all such material is necessarily 
only an imperfect reflection of the prelinguistic intention. Moreover, whilst it is 
true that communication cannot take place without the 'formal necessity' of the 
author's intentional act, in itself this does not justify the assumption that the 
author must be the specifier of meaning in the domain of literature generally.62 
If it is accepted that authorial intention can be pre-lingual, it is not clear how an 
interpreter can access such an intention in any manner which produces the 
determinate result sought by liberals. On the other hand, if it is accepted that 
authorial intention cannot be pre-lingual, an intentionalist must offer a theory of 
how the terms in which the intention is expressed are to be understood if the 
intentionalist theory is to be of any assistance. An intentionalist theory by itself 
is therefore of no assistance in applying a rule to each unique case - it can only 
exist as part of a broader theory of meaning. 
In the legal domain, it might be suggested that there are good reasons, grounded 
upon modern democratic institutions, for bowing to the assumption of 
61 Hirsch acknowledges that such a test is impossible: Hirsch, above n 55, 173. 
62 Hirsch, above n 55, 225-6. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, above n 26, para 33; 
argued for a dialectical interaction between subject and the object language which envisages 
language as a diachronic social process; see also the structuralist approach beginning with 
Saussure who emphasised the all enveloping nature of the system of language which depicts 
language as a synchronic social system. For a discussion of these aspects of language theory 
see: Goodrich, above n 4, ch 2; the assumption that meaning can pre-exist language is 
inconsistent with the widely accepted view that it is language which pre-exists and shapes our 
experience see: Eagleton, above n 12, 60, 67-71; R Rorty, 'Indeterminacy of Translation and of 
Truth' (1972) 23 Synthese 448, 461 n 20; Volosinov above n 50; Jacques Derrida, Speech and 
Phenomena (1973). For a critique of interpretation according to authorial intention on this basis 
see: H Gadamer, (eds), Truth and Method, G Barrett and J Cumming (eds) (1975) 148-9; Jurgen 
Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, T McCarthy (trans), (1984), vol 1, 275. By 
'specifier of meaning' I mean the person from whose perspective alone meaning is to be 
determined. 
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legislative omniscience m accepting that the legislative intention ought be 
determinative. The advantage of this approach is that it enables a theory of 
legislation which accepts that the legal meaning which governs us all is fixed by 
the democratically elected representatives. However, there are also good 
reasons for rejecting the proposition that the legislative intention ought be the 
specifier of statutory meaning. One key ground for adopting this view is the 
discourse of the rule of law - the subjects are entitled to have ready access to 
information regarding the scope of the legal rules governing their behaviour. To 
accept that the legislation may say one thing and mean another is anathema to 
this standpoint. The point for present purposes is that neither view is 
necessarily right - the 'answer' being determined by the weight attributed to the 
ideals of democratic representation on the one hand and the rule of law on the 
other. The proposition that the legislative intention is legitimately determinative 
of statutory meaning need not necessarily be accepted. 
Other perceived shortcomings of purposive theory in the context of legislation 
stem from the descriptive aspects of intentionalist theory. One key aspect of 
intentionalist theory is the preparedness to assume that there is one univocal 
'author' of a statute.63 Is the 'author' the government of the day? Those that 
voted for the bill? The originator of the bill? The parliamentary draftsperson? 
The person who drafted the instructions for the draftsperson? Interest groups 
who have had a substantial input into the final bill? Any of these represent a 
relatively limited pool of potential authors when compared with a bill which has 
been subjected to substantial public debate before being passed by Parliament. 
If a bill has been subjected to widespread public debate it might be argued that 
the 'authors', at the least, include those who had made public comment with 
respect to the bill. In any case, the recognition of the fact that legislation is born 
of a relatively large number of minds makes the identification of the one 
legislative purpose particularly problematic. Dworkin has noted the artificiality 
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of ascertaining the legislative 'purpose' in a Parliament of hundreds of members 
who will vote for legislation for a host of reasons. Some members might agree 
with what they believe the legislation will achieve, others might agree with the 
bill for strategic purposes, while others might disagree but vote along party 
lines?64 In this context the concept of the legislative intention is a flight of 
fancy inspired by wishful thinking. 
A further difficulty with a purposive theory is that legislation will rarely, if ever, 
be enacted to achieve just one purpose. In the discussion of the Australian 
income tax, for example, it was noted that legislation is far more likely to 
represent a compromise between competing conceptions of the good. It is in 
identifying the compromise between these often conflicting purposes that courts 
will have to weigh a range of purposes underlying the legislation. Once it is 
accepted that the legislative compromise is only imperfectly expressed in the 
legislative text, as an intentionalist suggests, it is not clear why recourse to 
further contextual material will necessarily produce a closure in legislative 
meaning. Taking the Commonwealth income tax legislation, for example, the 
structuring of such legislation is the result of a balancing of a number of broad 
imperatives. Such imperatives include the need to raise public revenue, wealth 
redistribution, fostering business investment, minimising compliance costs and 
achieving enforceable legislative outcomes. Moreover, as Radin notes, it could 
be said that a purpose underlying all legislation is to ensure the stability of the 
political system. 65 Recognising the existence of such purposes does not assist 
the interpreter in identifying just one 'meaning' of the legislative compromise. 
At best, the interpreter can consider the various discourses underlying the 
legislation in examining the various consequences of alternative interpretations, 
but this does not lead the interpreter to one determinate meaning. The point is 
63 Dworkin, above n 1, 318-20. 
64 Ibid, ch 9; see also: Moore, above n 8, 248ff. 
65 M Radin, 'Statutory Interpretation' (1930) 43 Harvard Law Review 863, 877. 
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that the examination of legislative purpose inevitably compels the interpreter to 
make a choice between more or less desirable outcomes. 
A theory of determinate legal meaning founded upon legislative purpose is 
therefore problematic.66 
C Ontology and Determinacy - The Creation of 'Community' 
Owing to the growing acceptance of the perceived shortcomings of 
conventionalist and intentionalist theories of meaning, the objectification of 
meaning has increasingly been called into question. Modem liberal legal theory 
has therefore turned, in various ways, towards a hermeneutic standpoint, which 
acknowledges the impossibility of both literal and purposive theories of 
meaning. This alternative theory of determinacy was faintly raised by Hart at 
several points in his discussion of adjudication in penumbra! cases. At some 
points he suggested that judges resolve penumbra! decisions in an 'acceptable' 
way, the concept of 'acceptability' being founded upon Wittgenstein's view that 
meaning is grounded upon communal consensus. Thus, according to Hart, 
penumbra! cases will be determined by judges who select new meanings to 
which the wider community gives their 'agreement' .67 This theorisation of what 
Hart described as 'judicial lawmaking' signalled a fundamental shift in the 
liberal conception of legal determinacy. Rather than the content of legal rules 
being fixed once and for all at the inception of the rule, in accordance with the 
dictates of prospective determinacy, this non-conventionalist theory 
acknowledges that the content of legal rules may expand and/or contract over 
66 For a discussion of the problems associated with intentionalist theories of interpretation see: 
Burton, above n 38. 
67 Hart, above n 1, 123-4. 
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time.68 This alternative form of pragmatic interpretive theory, only hinted at by 
Hart, was subsequently considered at much greater length by Dworkin.69 
Pointing to the fact that judges in hard cases speak in terms of determinacy 
rather than discretion, Dworkin noted that such statements contradicted Hart's 
theory that judges make law in every hard case. As we have no reason to 
believe that judges are simpletons or liars, Dworkin argued, we should take their 
statements at face value and accept the existence of legal determinacy.70 
Dworkin argued that if the application of the rule is to be determinate at all, the 
interpreter must link all previous cases under a coherent theory of the 
application of the rule. A critical aspect of Dworkin's theory is that he 
maintained that such a theory cannot help but be a moral theory, as it must draw 
upon the community's principles of morality, not only in determining what 
counts as a theory, but also in establishing the content of such a theory.71 
Despite the fact that interpretation entails such recourse to communal principles 
of morality found within institutionally authorised texts, Dworkin argued, there 
can only be one right interpretation of the relevant legal text at any particular 
time. This is because an interpreter is constrained to interpret the legal text in 
light of the best interpretation of a uni vocal communal morality.72 According to 
68 As opposed to Hart's conventionalism, where the content of legal rules could only expand as 
the rules were applied to new circumstances; Hart, above n I, 129, 135. 
69 Dworkin, above n 1, 41-3. 
70 Ibid, 37-44. The argument that what you see is what you get is hardly convincing. Everyday 
people act and speak in accordance with beliefs which do not necessarily make those beliefs true 
in some universal sense. As Hoy notes, Dworkin's methodological premise of accepting at face 
value what judges say may undermine his later argument - that judges must interpret earlier legal 
texts 'in their best light'. There is no widely accepted judicial support for this premise; see: 
David Hoy, 'Dworkin's Constructive Optimism vs Deconstructive Legal Nihilism' (1987) 6 Law 
and Philosophy 321. 
71 Dworkin, above n 1, 42-3. 
72 Ibid, viii-ix, 76-86; the assimilation of law and morality along with the right answers thesis 
would seem counter-intuitive, as Fish notes in Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free 
Speech and it's a good thing too (1994) 142. For an attempt to construct a pluralist hermeneutic 
theory see: David Hoy's contributions in D Couzens Hoy and T McCarthy, Critical Theory 
(1994); see also: Georgia Warnke, Justice and Interpretation (1992). Warnke even interprets 
Dworkin as rejecting the right answers thesis, at 71. 
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such a theory, for example, at one point in time it might be determined that the 
best interpretation of Hart's hypothetical 'no vehicles in the park' rule indicates 
that it is highly relevant that the vehicle is being used to rescue an injured 
person or animal. At another point in time, the best interpretation of the rule in 
light of prevailing moral norms might hold that both people and animals are 
expendable and that it therefore makes no difference whether the vehicle is 
being used to rescue a person or an animal. Under Dworkin's theory, legal 
meaning is therefore simultaneously determinate and pragmatic. Legal meaning 
is determinate because at any point in time there is just one right answer. 
However, legal meaning is also pragmatic in the sense that the substantive 
norms of communal morality are constantly being reviewed and rebalanced in 
the context of a moral scheme which is retrospectively determinate. 73 
Dworkin's legal hermeneutics therefore portrays the judge as constrained by the 
moral principle of integrity, while simultaneously contributing to the ongoing 
development of communal morality in a process of creative construction 
analogised to writing a new chapter in the legal 'chain novel'. 
In more recent times the influence of Dworkin's work upon Australian 
jurisprudence is evidenced by a number of articles published by serving and 
retired judges.74 These judges have acknowledged that judges 'make law', but 
maintain that the law is nevertheless made in accordance with the dictates of 
communal morality. In the more recent Australian tax jurisprudence implicitly 
adopting this theory of law, there has been little critical discussion of the extent 
to which communal morality offers any effective constraint upon judicial 
lawmaking. At this point it is therefore appropriate to tum to a critical appraisal 
of Dworkin's theory of legal determinacy, because his work offers a 
sophisticated theorisation of legal determinacy founded upon the dictates of 
communal morality. 
73 See the definition of this term in chapter 1 under the heading 'Taxation and the Liberal State'. 
74 See the material referred to in chapter 1, n 50. 
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The sophistication of Dworkin's unification of law with morality and of 
determinacy with pragmatism, owes much to his interpretation of Gadamer' s 
hermeneutic theory. However, in Law's Empire Dworkin merely suggests that 
Gadamer 'strikes the right note,' 75 including Gadamer's hermeneutic theory of 
meaning by reference without elaborating upon Gadamerian theory or the 
criticisms thereof.76 To embark upon a critique of Dworkin's theory therefore 
necessitates an appraisal of Gadamer's theory. As Dworkin's application of 
Gadamer's work has only rarely been considered in any detail,77 a critical 
review of Gadamer' s theory must be undertaken in developing a critique of 
Dworkin's theory oflegal determinacy. 
1 An Overview of Gadamerian Hermeneutics 
Seeking an answer to the question 'how is understanding possible?'78 Gadamer 
repositioned the knowing subject of Enlightenment epistemology by adapting 
Heidegger's phenomenology. Accordingly, Gadamer argued that the knowing 
subject was a part of Being as opposed to the dispassionate observer idealised in 
the commonly held perception of the natural sciences.79 Moreover, in adopting 
Heidegger's concept of the 'forestructure' and renaming it 'prejudice,' Gadamer 
argued that 'the fundamental prejudice of the enlightenment is the prejudice 
75 Dworkin, above n 1, 62. 
76 Curiously, although Dworkin referred to both Gadamer and Habermas, he did not consider the 
criticisms of Gadamer's theory by Habermas in the course of their exchange. It is therefore 
surprising to find that Dworkin just assumes that Gadamer is 'about right' without considering 
the merits of the criticisms of Gadamerian hermeneutics in any detail, particularly those found in 
Habermas's debate with Gadamer; see: J Habermas, 'A Review of Gadamer's Truth and 
Method' in Understanding and Social Inquiry, F Dallmayr and T McCarthy (eds) (1977). For 
Gadamer's rejoinder to Habermas see: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, D 
Linge (trans anded) (1976). 
77 Georgia Warnke, above n 72; David Couzens Hoy, above n 70, 327-32. 
78 Gadamer, above n 62, xviii; it must be stressed that Gadamer is concerned merely to explain 
the conditions for understanding and is not concerned with developing a methodology of 
interpretation by which understanding may occur, a point which he repeatedly states; see for 
example, 263. 
79 Kant aspired to the standpoint of the universal man, depicted in Immanuel Kant, The Critique 
of Judgement, James Meredith (trans), (1952) para 40. 
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against prejudice itself which deprives tradition of its power.' 80 The 
Enlightenment discourse, Gadamer continued, constrains our appreciation of the 
concept of understanding by focusing upon knowing 'the truth', when in fact 
our prejudices preclude the possibility of ever accessing such objective truth.81 
Instead of offering accounts of the conditions of possibility of such truth, 
Gadamer argued, philosophy ought to recognise that all understanding is 
hermeneutic. Hermeneutics is the study of being, and as 'being that can be 
understood is language,' 82 Gadamer's theory of understanding is founded upon 
his theory of language.83 
Acknowledging the social aspect of language84 and its material foundations,85 
Gadamer therefore rejected referential theories of language. Further, he 
observed that the process of interpretation is not the excavation of historical fact 
portrayed by Dilthey86 or Hirsch,87 the latter of whom maintained that 
interpretation entails the reconstruction of the author's subjective intention.88 
Such referential and intentionalist theories of interpretation, Gadamer argued, 
suffer from the Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice. Developing an 
understanding of a text, Gadamer continued, is rather an intersubjective process 
80 Gadamer, above n 62, 239-240. 
81 Ibid, 246. Note that Gadamer adhered to the historical specificity of the concept of reason 
when he observed that 'reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms, ie it is not its own 
master but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates.' 245; 
Gadamer, Wahrheit in den Geisteswissenschaften' in Kleine Schriften, vol l, 42 quoted in 
Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, Reason (1987) 66. 
82 Gadamer, above n 62, xxii; for further endorsement of this inheritance from German idealism 
see; 'Not only is the world "world" only in so far as it comes into language, but language, too, 
has its real being only in the fact that the world is re-presented within it. Thus the original 
humanity of language means at the same time the fundamental linguistic quality of man's being-
in-the-world.' ibid, 401. 
83 Gadamer, above n 62, 446-7; Gadamer, above n 76, 16-17. For discussion of this aspect of 
Gadamer's theory see: S Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge (1986) 95. 
84 Gadamer, above n 62, 260. 
85 Ibid, 404-5. 
86 For Dilthey's theory of understanding see: Wilhem Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (1959-
1968), vol 7, 189-200; translated in Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Writings, HP Rickman (transl 
anded) (1976) 207ff. 
87 Hirsch, above n 55, 82. 
88 See the discussion of intentionalist approaches in Gadamer, above n 62, 264. 
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where the subject encounters an utterance within the context of a social 
lifeworld which influences its meaning: 
It is not only that historical tradition and the natural order of life 
constitute the unity of the world in which we live as men; the way that 
we experience one another, the way that we experience historical 
traditions, the way that we experience the natural givenness of our 
existence and of our world, constitutes a truly hermeneutic universe, in 
which we are not imprisoned, as if behind insurmountable barriers, but 
to which we are opened. 89 
Prejudices are therefore positive phenomena, as they enable the interpreter to 
understand a text.90 Despite his apparently relativist celebration of prejudice, 
Gadamer also whiggishly heralded the advance of understanding towards the 
'right' understanding of the tradition. 
The 'true' prejudices of the tradition play an important role in influencing (but 
not determining) the world view of the subject which Gadamer called the 
'horizon'. The horizon is defined as 'the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point' .91 Different 
horizons will appear to subjects as they travel along the path of self-knowledge 
towards understanding, a journey which necessitates the continuous 
examination of their personal prejudices. A subject will be compelled to 
examine personal prejudices because there will always be a question posed by 
the text under examination.92 Understanding a text therefore entails a 
confrontation between the reader and the text which causes the reader to 
critically examine background prejudices with the object of finding a 'common 
language' with the text.93 Such a confrontation is facilitated by the making of 
two key assumptions. These assumptions are, firstly, that the relevant text is 
89 Ibid, xiv. 
90 Ibid, 261-4. 
91 Ibid, 269. 
92 Ibid, 266; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science (1981) 106, 108. 
93 Ibid, 110; see also: Gadamer, above n 62, 238, 260. 
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coherent,94 and, secondly, that the text offers, at the least, the possibility of some 
complete truth.95 Adopting these assumptions means that the interpreter is 
compelled to take the text, and more importantly, the different horizon 
represented by the otherness of the text, seriously.96 This insight is what 
Gadamer called 'effective historical consciousness' .97 
By the very process of interpretation, then, the subject will be forced to confront 
the competing horizons of the text and the tradition. The outcome of this 
confrontation, Gadamer maintains, cannot be the perpetuation of idiosyncratic 
interpretations or interpretations which merely replicate the interpreter's 
prejudices, because the conflict between text and subject horizon will engender 
a new understanding. Understanding can only be achieved when the horizons of 
the text and that of the subject are fused by virtue of the dialogue between the 
knowing subject and the text: 
Coming to an understanding in conversation presupposes that the 
partners are ready for it and that they try to allow for the validity of what 
is alien and contrary to themselves. If this happens on a reciprocal basis 
and each of the partners, while holding to his own ground 
simultaneously weighs the counter-arguments, they can ultimately 
achieve a common language and a common judgment in an 
imperceptible and non-arbitrary transfer of viewpoints.98 
The fusion of horizons on the field of the tradition99 means that there is only one 
right interpretation of a particular text for the interpreter at any particular point 
94 Gadamer, above n 62, 262; an assumption which will not be criticised in this article in any 
detail. Suffice it to say that such an assumption is at best contentious, and that Warnke's 
defence of Gadamer on this matter misses the point that the existence of contradictions within a 
text does not necessarily support the conclusion that there is one dominant meaning which is 
contradicted - there may well be several possible meanings none of which can be identified as 
the dominant meaning; see: Warnke, above n 81, 84. 
95 Gadamer, above n 62, 262. 
96 Ibid, 102. 
97 See also: Gadamer, above n 76, 27. 
98 Gadamer, above n 62, 348. 
99 Ibid, 273. 
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in time, as the fusion restores a unity between the text and the tradition in 
accordance with the reader's 'fore-conception of completion': 100 
Historical consciousness is aware of its own otherness and hence 
distinguishes the horizon of tradition from its own. On the other hand, it 
is itself, as we are trying to show, only something laid over a continuing 
tradition, and hence it immediately recombines what it has distinguished 
in order, in the unity of the historical horizon that it thus acquires, to 
become again one with itself. 101 
This fusion of alternative viewpoints is apparently predicated upon the ability of 
the interpreter to transcend and objectify those standpoints in the movement 
towards the fusion of agreement. This interaction of critical transcendence and 
prejudices is therefore central to Gadamer' s theory of understanding. 
Much of the difficulty, and perhaps also much of the rhetorical force, of 
Gadamer' s work stems from the fact that some parts of his work could be 
interpreted on the one hand as advocating a strong form of communal constraint 
which denies any prospect of critical insight, while on the other hand, other 
parts of his work are consistent with a critical pluralism. I will therefore briefly 
review the grounds for these interpretations in order to question Dworkin's 
implicit assumption that there is one Gadamerian theory when he suggested that 
Gadamer is 'about right'. 
2 Gadamer Version 1 - Communal Prejudices and the Determinacy Thesis 
At some points in his work Gadamer acknowledged that the process of 
examining one's prejudices will be an infinite task, 102 implying that the 
transcendental, objective appraisal of competing viewpoints is an impossibility. 
The consequences of this inevitability of a prejudice-laden understanding 
100 Ibid, 261. 
IOI Ibid, 273. 
102 Ibid, 265-266, 269. 
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depend upon the nature of the prejudices envisaged by Gadamer. If prejudices 
are specific to the individual, Gadamer's hermeneutic theory leads to a strong 
relativism where the number of valid interpretations may equal the number of 
interpreters, unless there is some means of critically assessing the merits of the 
various interpretations. On the other hand, if prejudices are monovalent and 
communal, it would only be possible for interpreters in any particular social 
setting to reach one right answer. 
The interpretation of Gadamer which emphasises the communal character of 
prejudices is supported by his repeated reference to prejudices as if there could 
only be one type of prejudice in any community at a particular point in time. 
Thus, whilst Gadamer rejected the Enlightenment preoccupation with objective 
truth, his preoccupation with one truth is reflected in scattered references to 
'true prejudices' and 'right understanding' constituting the tradition. 103 In a 
kind of Darwinian selection which he did not explain, Gadamer maintained that 
the tradition ensures that only those interpretations which fit the tradition will 
survive.104 The temporal distance, which is a component of the concept of 
'tradition', somehow fulfils a filtering process by which the tradition works 
itself pure. This process of purification ensures that we are only imbued with 
'true' prejudices which comprise 'a unity that is efficacious in our lives': 105 
'It [the filtering process] not only lets those prejudices that are of a 
particular and limited nature die away, but causes those that bring about 
genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such. It is only this temporal 
distance that can solve the really critical question of hermeneutics, 
103 Evident in Gadamer's definition of a person who 'has an horizon' as meaning a person who 
'knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, as near or far, great or small' 
(ibid, 269). 
104 Ibid, 266. Note that Fish also adopts a pragmatic theory in which the reader is apparently 
free to create her own meaning, but that Fish seeks to restrict the apparent anarchy which would 
flow from this approach by invoking the concept of common interpretive strategies which 
constrain the range of possible interpretation which readers might adopt - see the discussion of 
the work of Stanley Fish below, under the heading 'Accommodating Pluralism'. 
105 Gadamer, above n 92, 137. 
291 
namely of distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand, 
from the false ones by which we misunderstand.' 106 
Even in the face of the threat to the monovalence of the tradition posed by 
multiculturalism, Gadamer maintained that the tradition would offer a 
reassuring standard by which to assess competing interpretations: 107 
This is something that hermeneutical reflection teaches us: that social 
community, with all its tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again 
leads back to a common area of social understanding through which it 
exists. 108 
In the same paper Gadamer emphasised the nationalist aspect of the tradition, 
implying that there is one national tradition rather than a plurality of traditions: 
Actually, the historian even the one who treats history as a "critical 
science," is so little separated from the ongoing traditions (for example, 
those of his nation) that he is really himself engaged in contributing to 
the growth and development of the national state. He is one of the 
"nation's" historians; he belongs to the nation. And for the epoch of 
national states, one must say: the more he may have reflected on his 
hermeneutical conditionedness, the more national he knows himself to 
be.109 
Within this framework of true prejudices inevitably guiding interpretation, it is 
not surprising that Gadamer adopted a determinacy thesis founded upon a soft 
relativism, which acknowledges the existence of a communal consensus upon 
fundamental values The implication of this soft relativism for legal theory is that 
the validity of the legal order is purportedly accepted as valid by everyone: 110 
106 Gadamer, above n 62, 266. 
107 
'Since the human intellect is too weak to manage without prejudices it is at least fortunate to 
have been educated with true prejudices'; ibid, 242; and 'True prejudices must still finally be 
justified by rational knowledge, even though the task may never be able to be fully completed'; 
ibid, 242. 
108 Gadamer, above n 76, 42; see also: Gadamer, above n 62, 262. 
109 Gadamer, above n 76, 28. 
110 Gadamer, above n 62, 294. 
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It is part of the idea of a legal order that the judge's judgment does not 
proceed from an arbitrary and unpredictable decision, but from the just 
weighing-up of the whole ... This is the reason why, in a state governed 
through law, there is legal certainty, ie it is possible to know, in 
principle, what the exact situation is. 111 
Given Gadamer' s apparent endorsement of an omnipresent, monovalent, 
national tradition, it is understandable that some commentators have interpreted 
his theory as merely endorsing the status quo. It would seem impossible to 
transcend the national tradition to some critical perspective, or to even assume 
the perspective of an alternative standpoint. 112 This emphasis upon the ontology 
of the monovalent tradition comprising 'true' prejudices therefore seems to 
simultaneously exclude any prospect of a transcendental critical theory, the 
relativism of Foucault113 and the differance of Derrida. 
3 Gadamer Version II -A Critical Hermeneutics? 
But in some passages Gadamer seems to have suggested that the interpreter can 
transcend her or his prejudices 'so that the text, as another's meaning, can be 
isolated and valued on its own.' 114 Gadamer therefore suggested that, contrary 
to Habermas' assertion, 115 hermeneutics did not necessitate the surrender to 
tradition: 
Ill Ibid, 294. 
112 Ibid, 269; For a discussion of this aspect of Gadamer's work see: J Habermas, above n 76, 
335; T McCarthy in Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72, 41; Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, (trans F Lawrence, 1987) 344-7; Eagleton, above n 12, 72-4; but cf 
Warnke, above n 81, where Warnke argues for a critical hermeneutics which accepts the 
importance of prejudices without conceding that they are determinative. 
113 For a defence of Gadamer from the charge ofrelativism see: Hekman, above n 83, 115. 
114 Gadamer, above n 62, 266; see also: 'A person who has no horizon is a man who does not see 
far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest to him. Contrariwise, to have an horizon means 
not to be limited to what is nearest, but to be able to see beyond it. A person who has an horizon 
knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, as near or far, great or small. 
Similarly, the working out of the hermeneutical situation means the achievement of the right 
horizon of enquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition'; ibid, 269. See 
further, ibid, 495-6. 
115 For a discussion of the work of Habermas see below under the heading 'Theorising 
Determinacy in A Multicultural World - Habermas' Discourse Ethics' 
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But is man as a political being the mere object of the techniques of 
making public opinion? I think not: he is a member of society, and only 
in playing his role with free judgment and politically real effectiveness 
can he conserve freedom. It is the function of hermeneutical reflection, 
in this connection, to preserve us from naive surrender to the experts of 
social technology. 116 
This critical engagement with a text is fundamental to Gadamer' s discourse 
upon effective historical consciousness. Such critical engagement suggests that 
we do more than 'come home to our communal tradition' when engaging with a 
text - the interpreter is compelled to critically review her prejudices. 
4 Can the Differing Versions ofGadamer's Work be Reconciled? 
There are therefore at least two conflicting interpretations of Gadamer' s 
hermeneutic theory. On one view, Gadamer reclines in the comfort of what is 
perceived to be a conservative, stable status quo, whilst on the other view, he 
grapples with an account of critical theory in a prejudiced world. 
In one attempt to reconcile Gadamer' s apparent aspiration to a critical 
perspective with his acknowledgement of prejudice, Hoy117 drew upon the 
discourse theory of Foucault Hoy argued that a pluralist interpretation of 
Gadamer' s work is an appropriate foundation for a critical hermeneutics. This 
pluralist reading of Gadamer suggests that the tradition is not one coherent unity 
but multifaceted, 118 that there are multiple traditions, each competing for 
supremacy in a manner reminiscent of Bakhtin's dialogic theory of meaning 
which emphasised the social, diachronic construction of meaning. 119 Hoy 
argues that any member of a community is therefore exposed to any number of 
116 Gadamer, above n 76, 40. 
117 Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72, 144-200. 
118 There are also suggestions of this pluralist interpretation of Gadamer in Warnke's work; see: 
Warnke, above n 81, 103. 
119 Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the novel' in M Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: four 
essays, M Holquist (ed), C Emerson and M Holquist (trans), (1981), 259-422; Volosinov, above 
n50. 
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alternative standpoints, and that hermeneutics requires that the member take 
these standpoints seriously and, accordingly, examine his or her own prejudices 
from the alternative standpoints. But the major shortcoming with this approach 
is that neither Hoy nor Gadamer explains how it is possible for a person 
invested with prejudices to transcend those prejudices in order to examine their 
original prejudices. Surely a prerequisite of such a process would be a universal 
medium of discourse if the two standpoints were not to talk past each other. 
5 Dworkin' s Debt to Gadamer 
Regardless of whether there is a right interpretation of Gadamer, it is clear that 
Dworkin was either ignorant of the competing interpretations of Gadamer' s 
work or chose to ignore the debate. By overlooking the second, pluralist, 
interpretation of Gadamer's work, Dworkin was perhaps too hasty in arriving at 
the closure of legal determinacy. In Law's Empire Dworkin moved from the 
proposition that Gadamer 'strikes the right note' to the view that the 
interpretation of legal texts is 'instinctively' 120 governed by a principle of 
integrity which dictates that texts are interpreted in accordance with the assumed 
omnipresent and monovalent moral tradition of the 'true community' .121 The 
influence of Gadamer in this crucial aspect of Dworkin's theory is 
unmistakeable. It is because of his preparedness to construct one community 
with one coherent set of moral principles governing legal interpretation that 
Dworkin was prepared to adopt Gadamer' s conclusion that legal officials could 
120 Dworkin, above n l, 183; for a critique of Dworkin's reporting of social 'facts' such as 
common beliefs, despite a lack of empirical research to support such observations, see: Robert 
Moles, 'The Decline and Fall of Dworkin's Empire' in A Hunt (ed) Reading Dworkin Critically 
(1992) 71, 83. 
121 Here, the parallel between Dworkin and Bourdieu's concept of the 'habitus' is striking; see: 
Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Richard Nice (trans), (1977) 72-95. For a 
critique of the monological aspect of Dworkin's theory of interpretation which ignores the 
interaction of judge and community see: F Michelman, 'The Supreme Court 1985 Term, 
Foreword: Traces of Self Government' (1986) 100 Harvard Law Review 4, 76; Michelman's 
argument is adopted by Habermas in Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, trans William Rehg (1996) 222ff. 
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produce one right answer. 122 This right answers thesis remains the central 
aspect of Dworkin's theory,123 and is the basis upon which Dworkin rejects any 
suggestion of legal pluralism. It is because of his preparedness to assume the 
existence of a community with a coherent scheme of principle that Dworkin 
scoffed at suggestions that the law might be considered by some to be unfair, 
stating that 'no one really thinks the law wicked or its authors tyrants.' 124 
According to Dworkin, the 'true society' is a no go zone for disaffected 
minorities: conflict exists, but it is conflict concerning which interpretation of 
monovalent communal principles is consistent with past practices and prevailing 
social morality as interpreted by state officials - it is conflict within the 
constraints of Dworkin's paradigm of law busily 'purifying' 125 itself through the 
· actions of state officials. 126 
As with Gadamer, Dworkin's work may therefore be understood to acquiesce in 
the impossibility of transcending any given context in achieving a universal 
standpoint for critique, and therefore as negating any possibility of critical 
insight, because legal officials are inextricably a part of 'their' legal project. In 
this respect, Dworkin' s focus upon one communal morality is remarkably 
similar to Rorty's soft relativism. According to Rorty, after Gadamer it is clear 
that 'we' cannot be critical of alternative projects which differ from 'our' own 
because there is no universal critical standpoint. Dworkin is therefore 
comfortable in bringing 'internal skeptics' such as Rorty aboard his depiction of 
Neurath's boat. 127 According to both Rorty and Dworkin, there can be no 
critique of 'our' project, because we are hermeneutically chained to it and 
122 Gadamer, above n 62, 294. 
123 Dworkin, above n 1, viii-ix. 
124 Dworkin, above n 1, 111. 
125 Ibid, 407-410. 
126 Whilst Dworkin was by no means a Nazi sympathiser, there is a resemblance between 
Dworkin's subsumption of minority moralities within 'our' culture and Gadamer's comments in 
his Paris lecture delivered in 1941. See: Warnke, above n 81, 71-72; see also: Gadamer, above 
n 76, 28. 
127 Ibid, 82-83. 
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therefore cannot transcend our lifeworld in some critical moment. 128 Truth is 
what is 'right for us' - a chilling prospect for some,129 and a poor account of 
discursive practice for others. 130 
This pursuit of coherence is not unique to Gadamer and Dworkin, but shared 
with reception theorists such as Iser131 who suggested that texts ought to be read 
so as to 'normalise' any indeterminacy and thereby achieve a coherence within 
the text. Eagleton suggests that this willingness to overcome dissonant voices 
within a text is merely a result of the influence of Gestalt psychology, 132 while 
the impulse to coherence of psychoanalytic theory may also be discerned. 
Whether or not Eagleton is correct, the point is that Gadamer' s observation that 
true understanding requires texts to be interpreted as internally coherent, 133 and 
Dworkin's Neptune of integrity,134 are not naturally occurring phenomena. 
Rather, they are constructed ideals of a particular political vision. 135 Norris 
criticises such ontological theories on the basis that their version of social 
128 Dworkin's suggestion that a judge may transcend the prevailing norms of communal morality 
is strikingly weak in the context of his adherence to the right answers thesis; see: Dworkin, 
above n 1, 219. 
129 See, for example, the work of Christopher Norris, especially What's Wrong with 
Postmodernism, (1990); Christopher Norris, Uncritical Theory, postmodernism, intellectuals 
and the Gulf War, (1992). Indeed, as noted by Georgia Warnke, in a lecture delivered in 1941 
Gadamer cited the tradition of the 'volk' as superior to the claims of democracy, see: Georgia 
Warnke, above n 81, 71-2. For a critique of Dworkin's work from this standpoint see: Sandra 
Berns, 'Integrity and Justice or When is Injustice Mandated by Integrity?' (1991) 18 Melbourne 
University Law Review 258. 
130 Jurgen Habermas, 'Questions and Counterquestions' in R Bernstein (ed), Habermas and 
Modernity (1985), 192, 193-5. 
131 W Iser, The implied reader: patterns of communication in prose fiction from Bunyan to 
Beckett; (1974); W Iser, The Act of Reading (1979). 
132 Eagleton, above n 12, 81. 
133 Gadamer, above n 62, 261; see also: 259, 261-262, 262; Hoy argues that whilst a universalist 
interpretation of Gadamer is open, so also is a pluralist interpretation such that deconstruction 
and Gadamerian hermeneutics are not necessarily incompatible, see: Hoy and McCarthy, above 
n 72, 188ff. Whilst it is certainly the case that Gadamer recognises that there is no prospect of 
universal truth (Gadamer, above n 62, 270), by his approach to tradition and his emphasis upon 
achieving unity he does seem to suggest that at any particular time there is one true 
interpretation. 
134 See: Dworkin, above n 1. 
135 For further critical discussion of the assumption of coherence see: Paul de Man, Blindness 
and Insight: Essays on the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (1971). 
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relativism paralyses debate by omitting mention of the contests of power 'out 
there', in which often powerful interests seek to manipulate discourse to further 
their own interests. The lesson of the Gulf War, Norris continues, is a telling 
example of the attempt by the military and supporters of the war to manipulate 
the mass media in stifling dissent. 136 Only a critical theory of social discourse, 
Norris argues, can rationalise the existence and rationality of those who stand 
against the mass media tide in constructing an alternative discourse on such 
events as the Gulf War. Norris observes that the theorisation of social discourse 
on the Gadamerian assumption of 'our' tradition or 'our' project cloaks the 
existence of social dissent. Perhaps in an ideal world we would all loll around 
in club chairs engaging in Rorty' s 'interesting conversations' 137 without ever 
having to make a decision. In the 'real world', however, facts are interpreted, 
laws are interpreted and decisions are made. Often such interpretive decisions 
are imposed over a more or less vocal dissent. This dissent poses a threat to the 
communal monovalence underpinning Dworkin's determinacy thesis. It is 
therefore necessary to briefly consider the existence of such pluralism before 
turning to alternative theories of discourse which acknowledge such a plurality 
of views. 
6 Cultural Heterogeneity, Psychoanalysis and the Foundations of Dworkin's 
Theory 
As Taylor has noted, 138 modem social theory is heavily influenced by this 
assumption of some fundamental commonality bonding all members of any 
particular community, such that a common set of founding assumptions is 
possible. Wittgenstein suggested that meaning is founded upon agreement, 139 
apparently ignoring the conundrum that a community would initially have to 
136 See, for example, the work of Norris cited at n 129. 
137 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980) 389ff. 
138 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "the politics of recognition": an essay, A Gutman (ed), 
(1992) 44ff. 
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agree upon what such agreement comprises. Similarly, it is the belief in a 
homogeneous tradition as the foundation of interpretive constraint which 
underpins both Dworkin' s and, perhaps Gadamer' s, right answers thesis. I will 
challenge the existence of this communal homogeneity by arguing that there is 
not a common set of founding assumptions, that there is not one tradition. It 
will be argued that the assumption of one community is flawed on two counts. 
Firstly, it ignores the existence of pluralist communities. Secondly, there is the 
assumption that members of the community are coherent selves, despite the 
considerable psychoanalytic literature after Freud and Lacan to the contrary. 
That we live in a pluralist community is, in these times, a trite observation. The 
wealth of literature springing from liberal theory's requirement for tolerance of 
autonomous selves is testimony to the modem recognition of this pluralism. 140 
However, Rockefeller has questioned the assumption of multicultural theory, 
which posits the community as merely fractured into perhaps a relatively small 
number of sub-cultures. 141 Rockefeller argues that focusing upon the grouping 
of individuals into a handful of sub-cultures ignores the possibility that there 
may be numerous tiers of subcultures. Indeed, Taylor traces the breakdown of 
omnipresent, premodem moral orders and the development of the new order of 
modernity in which the fear of meaninglessness is experienced at the individual 
level.142 This ideology of the autonomous self seems to contradict the 
subsumption of the individual within any group or 'culture' .143 
139 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, above n 26, vol 1, para 242. 
14° For an early discussion of the problems of multiculturalism within a liberal social theory see: 
J Locke, 'An Essay Concerning Toleration' in J Locke, Political Writings, (D Wootton ed), 
(1993) 186-210; see also: J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 3-4; for a critical overview of the 
liberal literature dealing with pluralism see: W Kyrnlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture 
(1989); Taylor, above n 138. 
141 Steven Rockefeller, 'Comment' in Taylor, above n 138, 87-103. 
142 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (1989) 18; see also: Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: 
Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (1969). This burgeoning recognition of the 
autonomous self, Calhoun observes, is reflected in the Cartesian maxim 'I think therefore I am' 
and Fichte's idealist 'I am I'; C Calhoun, 'Social Theory and the Politics of Identity' in Craig 
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In a similar vein, in one essay which served to undermine much of his theory of 
an all-encompassing institutionalised lifeworld, Fish recognised the diversity of 
institutions which play a part in influencing the outlook of the subject. 144 While 
writing about 'the legal institution', Fish conceded that there was no such 
homogeneous totality. This is because any institution is fractured along 
numerous fault lines attributable to the singularity of each member, arising from 
their membership of any number of institutions. Indeed, in some parts of his 
work, Fish seems to accept that such institutional heterogeneity means that 
institutions will be wracked with debate about even the most fundamental of 
institutional objectives. 145 Fish later appeared to resile from this view by 
suggesting that his theory of legal practice offers as much stability and 
determinacy as anyone would need.146 It is difficult to reconcile this 
conservative shift with his earlier description of institutional practice as an 
'engine of change', 147 which evokes the image of fractured and dynamic social 
institutions which are far from being monolithic structures constraining the 
discourse of their members. 
This growing recognition of the diversity amongst individuals has coincided 
with the prominence accorded the liberal notion of the essential self, which may 
be traced back at least as far as Mill. Just as Fish's suggestion of uniquely 
socialised individuals threatens to undermine the social homogeneity which 
underpins the determinacy thesis, so the increasing awareness of the 
Calhoun (ed), Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (1994), 9-36; see also: Craig Calhoun, 
Critical Social Theory (1995). 
143 Of course, it was the individuation of the subject and the power struggles which ensued which 
comprised one focus of Foucault's work. For a discussion of this aspect of his work see: Michel 
Foucault, 'Afterword: The Subject and Power' in H Dreyfus and P Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982) 208; Michel Foucault, 'About the beginnings of 
the hermeneutics of the self (1993) 21 Political Theory 198. 
144 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies (1989) 141-160. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Fish, above n 72, 191. 
147 Fish, above n 144, 156; Fish, above n 72, 189. 
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autonomous self seeking 'self fulfilment' poses a considerable threat to the 
posited cultural homogeneity underpinning many theories of legal determinacy. 
In light of this ongoing preoccupation with the individual, in some respects it is 
understandable that much modem theory takes as given the concept of the 
coherent, autonomous self. Thus, Calhoun observes, role theorists generally 
overlooked the multiplicity of roles which any individual was required to fulfil 
in ordinary life, 148 social constructionists such as Fish generally depicted 
individuals as automatons subjected to normativization149 while other theorists 
emphasised, and continue to accept, the idea of an essential self. 
In more recent times considerable attention has been paid to the view that 
individuals are confronted with the 'predicament of rivalry and contestation' 150 
arising from the insertion of the modem subject 'into a series of separate value-
spheres each one of which tends to exclude or attempts to assert its priority over 
the rest' .151 In this regard the substantial body of writing dealing with 
psychoanalytic theory, which portrays the deep divisions within the subject, is 
particularly pertinent.152 According to such theories of the self, the individual is 
constantly engaged in an internal dialogue which never reaches the point of 
complete self knowledge. 153 Thus in feminist theory Donna Haraway has 
148 In relation to this point, Calhoun cites Merton who considered those that did not fulfil the 
prescribed functions of their roles fell within the 'deviant' category - Robert Merton, Social 
Theory and Social Structure (1968) 185ff. Although, Calhoun notes, Erving Goffman argued 
that conflict between roles could produce fragmentation of the self; E Goffman, The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) ch 5. 
149 John Hewitt, Dilemmas of the American Self(l989) 127 where Hewitt talks of the 'essence of 
community'. 
150 Taylor, above n 142, 318. 
151 Anthony Cascardi, The Subject of Modernity (1992) 3. 
152 See: Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, A Sheridan (trans) (1980); Rainer Nagele, 'Freud, 
Habermas and the dialectic of Enlightenment: on real and ideal discourses' (1981) 22 New 
German Critique 41-62 for a discussion of psychoanalysis and Habermas's attempt, in Jurgen 
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (1971) 214-245, to contain the fractious self within 
norms of coherence to the point that Habermas' interpretation of Freud is virtually 
unrecognisable. 
153 See, for example: Jacques Lacan, Jacque-Alain Miller (ed), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan 
Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, (S Tomaselli 
trans) (1988) 166. 
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argued that there is no essential characteristics of the female self, maintaining 
that each assertion of a shared characteristic which defines the concept 'woman' 
is merely 'an excuse for the matrix of womens dominations of each other.' 154 
The existence of this politics of identity suggests that individuals inhabit unique 
lifeworlds which themselves are never static but, as Bakhtin recognised, are 
characterised by the diversity envisaged within his concept of heteroglossia. 155 
D Theorising Determinacy In A Pluralist World - Habermas' Discourse 
Ethics 
The fracturing of communities, and of the self, discussed in the preceding 
section poses a fundamental threat to the liberal theory of determinacy. If 
meaning is dependent upon conventional agreement (Hart and Wittgenstein), 
upon agreement founded upon some communal morality presumably generated 
by a homogeneous community (Dworkin and Sunstein 156), or finally if meaning 
is dependent upon the existence of autonomous, homogeneous institutions 
(Fish), how can these theories of determinacy survive the recognition that 
multiculturalism and the fractured self rent asunder any postulated communal 
homogeneity?157 The only potentially plausible defence of the determinacy 
thesis in the face of this pluralism is framed in terms of a universalising rational 
discourse which transcends the plurality of our world. 'Rational' discourse, it 
might be suggested, can lead us to the one right answer despite the multiplicity 
of viewpoints which constitute our world. 
Of course, it is not only liberals who seek such a critical standpoint from which 
to assess the merits of truth claims in an interpretive, epistemological or moral 
154 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, The Reinvention of Nature (1991) 155. 
155 Bakhtin, above n 119. 
156 Cass Sunstein, 'Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State' (1989) 103 Harvard Law 
Review 407, 431-2. 
157 For a discussion of the problems that multiculturalism poses for Dworkin's theory of law, 
see: Ian Duncanson, 'Power, Interpretation and Ronald Dworkin' (1989) 9 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 278. 
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context. As many 'members' of the critical legal studies 'movement' recognise, 
the hermeneutic monism underlying Dworkin's legal theory may be rejected on 
the basis that there is no one tradition which generates the right answers, but this 
is only the first step in supplanting liberal legal theory with an alternative 
theory. To create an alternative legal theory consistent with an agenda of 
reform, either a critical pluralism or a critical standpoint must be invoked as 
warranting the truth of some alternative legal agenda such as a pragmatic 
program of reform. 158 In the absence of such an alternative framework, all that 
the 'critical' scholar could aspire to is the exposure of the perceived 
contradictions of liberal theory and an admittedly biased attempt to explain how 
a system so riddled with contradictions could survive. Thus, in attempting to 
explain the survival of the legal system, critical scholars have often argued that 
other social theories are mere ideology when viewed from what is portrayed as a 
superior standpoint. Such critical scholarship is therefore founded upon an 
external, objectifying perspective (often derived from Marxist theory), upon the 
basis that the chosen perspective is the one concrete foundation in an otherwise 
contingent world.159 Many liberal and critical scholars therefore share a 
preoccupation with theorising rational, monist discourse (albeit with different 
ends in view) in response to the perceived plurality of the lifeworld. It is 
therefore to an assessment of the merits of such critical theory that we must tum 
in order to establish whether such critical insight might ground a theory of legal 
determinacy. 
158 For discussion of the dilemma confronting CLS in this regard see: Allan Hutchinson and 
Patrick Monahan, 'Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of 
American Legal Thought' (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 199, 215. 
159 See, for example, the early Lukacs, who argued that Marxian theory was unique in that it 
recognised the universality of the class consciousness of the proletariat: see: Gyorgy Lukacs, 
History and Class Consciousness, trans R Livingstone, (1971). In the context of legal theory, 
Horwitz's historical study of American law is a classic example of this approach; see: Morton 
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1977). For a discussion of the 
problematic nature of the role for ideology within legal theory see: Alan Hunt, Explorations in 
Law and Society (1993). 
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1 How Might a Determinacy Thesis Accommodate Difference? 
A liberal legalist seeking to buttress the determinacy theory against the pluralist 
threat might be expected to turn to some standpoint theory as the means of 
transcending and overcoming the value dissent of our fractured world. Such a 
standpoint may be a universal one, for example that contemplated by Kant160 
and those falling within the critical tradition. 161 Perhaps the most significant 
contemporary social theorist falling under this broadly universalist rubric is 
Habermas.162 Habermas accepted the pluralism of modern society, 163 but sought 
to modify Kantian and Hegelian critical theory by removing the metaphysical 
emphasis upon consciousness embodied in the categorical imperative. 164 
Instead, he developed a critical theory founded upon his interpretation of the 
conditions for communication in modern lifeworlds, 165 and therefore provides 
the key to identifying the social process which underpins the perceived human 
capacity for critical insight.166 
2 An Overview of Habermas' Discourse Theory 
Reaching understanding is, according to Habermas, 'the inherent telos of human 
speech.' 167 Understanding is achieved when the recipient can say 'yes' to a 
16° Kant, above n 79, para 40. 
161 The alternative foundation for a critical standpoint may be class, gender, age, etc. As 
Calhoun notes, the shortcoming of such essentialist positions is that they fail to account for the 
marked differences within any of the nominated classes; see: Calhoun, 'The Standpoint of 
Critique? Feminist Theory, Social Structure, and Learning from Experience' in Calhoun, 
Critical Social Theory, above n 142, 163. 
162 Although Habermas is by no means a liberal social theorist. 
163 For a discussion of Habermas's treatment of pluralism see: B Walker, 'Habermas and 
pluralist political theory' (1992) 18 Philosophy and Social Criticism 81. 
164 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, above n 112, 294-327. 
165 Jurgen Habermas, 'A Reply to My Critics', in J B Thompson and D Held (eds), Habermas: 
Critical Debates (1982) 236. 
166 Hegel argued that Kant's theory of reason was deficient in that it ignored the role of material 
conditions in influencing the processes by which we learn of the posited objective world. In 
turn, Habermas argued that the Hegelian metaphysical preoccupation with the teleological 
theory of history needed to be overcome if the path to empirical social study was to be cleared; 
see: Habermas, above n 62, vol 2, 382-3. 
167 Habermas, above n 62, vol l, 8-22, 287; see also: Habermas, above n 50, 1. 
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validity claim.168 Although he recognises that there are different forms of 
rationality169 and intersubjective discourse, 170 Habermas maintains that rational 
discourse upon moral and legal norms entails a preparedness to propose validity 
claims supported by reasons which are open to criticism, with a view to 
reaching the uncoerced consensus of the populace (and all future people) acting 
rationally. 171 At the core of Habermas' theory is the assertion that there is only 
ever one right answer in the given context, because there is only one answer 
supported by reasons to which all would assent at any particular spatio-temporal 
point. Whilst accepting that those reasons may not survive indefinitely, it is the 
assertion of warranted truth supported by idealised procedural assumptions172 
which Habermas perceives to be the key to context transcendence.173 Without 
this objective of universal truth, Habermas considered that discursive practice 
168 Habermas, above n 50, 2; Habermas, above n 62, vol 1, 287-8, 392. This is somewhat 
problematical, as Couzens Hoy notes that it is possible to understand without agreeing; see: Hoy 
and McCarthy, above n 72, 182; Jurgen Habermas, above n 13, 246. 
169 Instrumental rationality, for example, does not depend upon the existence of two knowing 
subjects, while social interaction obviously does. 
170 In this regard Habermas is prepared to adopt the classification of speech acts developed by 
JL Austin; see: Habermas, above n 62, 295ff. 
171 Habermas, above n 121, 227; Jurgen Habermas, 'Geschichte und Evolution,' Zur 
Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, 217, quoted in Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72, 
161; Habermas, above n 62, vol 1, 1-22; Habermas, above n 165, 113; Jurgen Habermas, 
Legitimation Crisis (1976) 89. Habermas restricted members of the ideal community to 'all 
subjects capable of speech and action': Jurgen Habermas, 'Justice and Solidarity: On the 
Discussion Concerning Stage 6' in T Wren (ed), The Moral Domain (1990) 245. In another 
elaboration upon the concept of the ideal speech situation Habermas suggested that in such a 
situation: 'the bracketed validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings are the 
exclusive object of discussion; ... participants, themes, and contributions are not restricted 
except with reference to the goal of testing the validity claims in question; ... no force except that 
of the better argument is exercised; and ... as a result, all motives except that of the cooperative 
search for truth are excluded.' Legitimation Crisis, 107-108. 
172 Although Habermas has resiled from the 'ideal speech situation' nomenclature in his more 
recent work, his commitment to the substance of this procedural ideal remains; see generally, 
Habermas, above n 121. These procedural assumptions include: that participants ascribe 
identical meanings to expressions, connect utterances with context transcending validity claims 
and assume that addressees are accountable in the sense that they are autonomous and sincere 
with both themselves and others; Between Facts and Norms, 4. For a discussion of this aspect 
of Habermas' theory, with references to relevant untranslated material, see: Maeve Cooke, 
Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (1994) 31. For consideration of the 
developments within Habermas' discursive theory see: Stephen Knight, The Recent Work of 
Jurgen Habermas (1988). 
173 See: Habermas, above n 62, vol l, 22-42. 
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would be meaningless, because there would be no criterion for assessing the 
respective theories posited - a strong relativism would prevail in a frustrating 
world where we all spoke past each other. 
Thus, while Kant considered rationality to be predicated upon what the self-
conscious subject can will to be a universal law without self contradiction, 
Habermas adopted an intersubjective definition of rationality which focused 
upon what the subject can submit as a universal law to all others for discursive 
validation in the ideal speech situation.174 Habermas therefore presents his 
theory of rationality as a procedural ethics governing discursive practice, a 
definition which aspires to universality because it purports to contain no 
substantive norms for the good life.175 
3 Communicative Action and Legal Adjudication 
But how is this theory of communicative action relevant to the determination of 
legal disputes? Habermas recognised that not all discourse is analogous to the 
natural sciences, which he assumed to be predicated upon the identification of 
one truth about the objective world. He identified the discourses of aesthetics, 
cultural values and literary criticism as examples where there is no one right 
answer, but nevertheless the statement of reasons plays a considerable role in 
the furtherance of meaningful discourse. 176 By contrast, it would seem that the 
determination of moral and legal norms is susceptible to the rationality 
constituted by a universal consensus upon normative propositions.177 Habermas 
therefore considered that the articulation of legal norms is undertaken with the 
174 
'Discourse or argumentation is a more exacting type of communication ... [It] generalizes, 
abstracts, and stretches the presuppositions of context-bound communicative actions by 
extending their range to include competent subjects beyond the provincial limits of their own 
particular form of life.' Habermas, above n 62, 202. 
175 For a critique of Habermas on this point see: Charles Taylor, 'Language and Society' in A 
Honneth and H Joas, above n 13, 23-35. 
176 See: Habermas, above n 62, vol l, 20. 
177 Ibid, vol 1, 19. 
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belief that a rational consensus upon the law can be reached in ideal 
circumstances. 178 
4 The Transparency of Background Assumptions to Rational Discourse 
Upon closer examination of his foundational assumptions, it can be argued that 
Habermas' telos of agreement ignores several arguments which suggest that 
communicative rationality can be anything but the primary form of discursive 
practice. Firstly, it will be argued that the idealising assumptions protecting the 
integrity of rational understanding are so artificial as to threaten the descriptive 
validity of Habermas' theory. Secondly, even if we accept Habermas' idealising 
assumptions, it will be argued that it would be irrational for participants in 
discourse to ever claim to have transcended their own lifeworld in arriving at 
the universalising perspective envisaged by Habermas. It is therefore argued 
that Habermas' account is unconvincing as a normative theory. 
Before exploring these criticisms in more detail, it should be noted that both 
stem from the fact that Habermas was prepared to concede some ground to 
hermeneutic theory by accepting that the days of the Kantian universal 
perspective have passed. In seeking some foundation for critical insight, 
Habermas therefore had to draw a compromise which sought to superimpose a 
rational discourse upon a subjectivised lifeworld background. In contrast to the 
seemingly central role of the monologic tradition in Gadamer' s hermeneutics 
and Rousseau's republicanism,179 the importance of ontological presuppositions 
within Habermas' theory is that they merely restrict the number of credible 
178 Habermas, above n 121, 107. Note that Habermas certainly did not consider that such 
consensus was realistically possible as he explicitly acknowledged the need for coercion to 
protect rational discourse from those who would compel agreement by overt force; Habermas, 
above n 171, 87. 
179 See also: Cass Sunstein, 'Interest Groups in American Public Law' (1985) 38 Stanford Law 
Review 17-34; F Michelman, 'The Supreme Court 1985 Term, Foreword: Traces of Self 
Government' (1986) 100 Harvard Law Review 4; F Michelman, 'Political Truth and the Rule of 
Law' (1988) 8 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 281. 
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reasons proffered in support of a validity claim (without determining the 
outcome), and therefore enhance the prospect of consensus. 180 Thus Habermas 
accepted181 that the subject's understanding is riddled with unthematised 
knowledge which both holds out the prospect of discursive consensus and also 
is beyond critical, discursive examination.182 Habermas believed that this 
'invisible' knowledge comprises ideas which are taken for granted, the norms 
which secure social cohesion, and the competencies and skills that individuals 
have intemalised.183 Habermas therefore accepted that it would be impossible 
for participants in discourse to achieve complete transparency of the 
assumptions flowing from their lifeworld background: 
The fundamental background knowledge that must tacitly supplement 
our knowledge of the acceptability conditions of linguistically 
standardized expressions if hearers are to be able to understand their 
literal meaning, has remarkable features: It is an implicit knowledge that 
cannot be represented in a finite number of propositions; it is a 
holistically structured knowledge, the basic elements of which 
intrinsically define one another; and it is a knowledge that does not stand 
at our disposition, inasmuch as we cannot make it conscious and place it 
in doubt as we please.184 
Given that discourse is carried on within this sea of 'invisible' knowledge, any 
validity claim will necessarily carry many implicit assumptions. Participants 
180 Habermas, above n 50, 178-205; see also: Jurgen Habermas, 'The Hermeneutic Claim to 
Universality' in Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Method, Philosophy and Critique, 
(1980) 205; Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, above n 112, 298, 319-26. 
For discussion of Habermas's appropriation of hermeneutic concepts see: J Mendelson, 'The 
Habermas-Gadamer Debate' (1979) 18 New German Critique 44. 
181 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, above n 112, 298, 319-26. 
182 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, above n 62, vol l, 336-7; But cfMaeve Cooke, 
above n 172, 15-16, where she argues that the pre-reflective background would not escape the 
critical gaze of modern society. 
183 Habermas, above n 62, vol 2, 119-52; see also: Theory of Communicative Action, vol 1, 70. 
Paradoxically, whilst Habermas criticised Foucault for self contradiction in positivistically 
unveiling power whilst simultaneously rejecting the knowing subject, he maintained that the 
unthematised knowledge of the background invisible to discursive participants is nevertheless 
susceptible to his analysis; see: Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, above n 
112, 266-293. 
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would therefore never be in a position to know themselves in the sense of the 
knowing subject postulated by the Enlightenment. The problem with the 
aspiration to context transcendence embodied in Habermas' theory of 
communicative rationality is that it does not seem to sit at all well with his 
acceptance of the apparently considerable influence of the lifeworld background 
upon discourse. 
(a) Mutually Understood Terms 
Turning to the assumption of mutually understood terms, the consequences of 
this assumption for Habermas' theory are twofold. Firstly, it explains the shared 
background of understanding to which Eagleton and Altman referred, and 
thereby explains why in ordinary discourse we seem to be able to minimise the 
number of issues which need to be addressed with a view to achieving a 
consensus. Secondly, it makes the telos of agreement appear to be a logical 
keystone of rational discourse. Without knowing or assuming that they have 
proceeded from a common standpoint, participants could not rationally believe 
that consensus might ultimately be achieved. 185 As with Gadamer, for 
Habermas the existence of the lifeworld background therefore constitutes a 
positive phenomenon which facilitates discourse. 
Unlike the interpretation of Gadamer's work which suggested that he envisaged 
a monologic tradition, Habermas acknowledged the existence of a plurality 
within modem Occidental community(ies) and therefore faced the problem of 
explaining how it was possible for discursive participants from different 
backgrounds to interact with the purpose of achieving understanding. Habermas 
maintained that discursive participants must assume away the consequences of 
this potentially disruptive plurality by accepting that the terms of their discourse 
184 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, above n 62, vol I, 336. See also: vol I, 70; 
Habermas, 'A Reply' above n 13, 244-5. 
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are mutually understood. 186 However, the preceding discussion187 of 
multiculturalism and the fractured self suggests that it would be rational to 
expect that in a pluralist world there would be a real prospect (if not an 
inevitability) of discursive participants beginning from disparate backgrounds, 
and that this difference would also be reflected in disparate understandings of 
discursive terms. Further, in the absence of transparent background 
assumptions, it would be impossible for discursive participants to know that 
they all begin from a common set of assumptions.188 
It is therefore difficult to understand how Habermas can claim that it would be 
rational for participants to assume that they all commence from a common 
understanding of discursive terms. If participants do not even know that they 
are beginning from a common foundation and are rationally precluded from 
assuming it, 189 how can they be sure that they have reached the sort of 
consensus envisaged in Habermas' ideal speech situation? 
(b) The Scope and Significance of Background Knowledge 
Even if Habermas' foundational assumption as to a shared understanding of 
discursive terms is accepted, the postulate of context transcending validity 
claims is also problematic. The question here is the scope of what Habermas at 
times190 calls the 'pre-reflective' background knowledge: the broader the scope 
of such knowledge the closer Habermas moves to accepting that discursive 
participants must uncritically accept the constraint of a monologic tradition in a 
185 Habermas, above n 62, vol 1, 13. See also: Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity, above n 112, 326. 
186 See above n 172. See also: Habermas, above n 13, 219. 
187 See the discussion in Part IV 'Determinacy, Cultural Heterogeneity and Psychoanalysis' 
188 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, above n 112, 323-6. 
189 A problem acknowledged by Habermas in Justification and Application: Remarks on 
Discourse Ethics (1993). 
190 Although there are instances where Habermas appears to suggest that all knowledge will be 
subject to critical review; see: Habermas, 'A Reply' in Honneth and Joas, above n 13, 223-4. 
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way strikingly similar to that envisaged in the 'monologic' interpretation of 
Gadamer' s work. 
The term 'background' implies that such pre-reflective knowledge is relatively 
limited, but on the other hand Haberrnas apparently accepted that an 
understanding of gravity falls within the pre-reflective background 
knowledge.191 It is therefore difficult to know the limits of this pre-reflective 
knowledge and, furthermore, the basis upon which Habermas implied that such 
knowledge comprises a relatively small portion of total knowledge. Regardless 
of the scope of this unthematised background knowledge, it is difficult to 
understand how a participant can claim to be acting rationally when they tender 
what they present as universal reasons for validity, knowing all the while that 
there can be no such universality owing to the prejudices of the background 
which influence the presentation and content of those reasons. Indeed, 
Habermas concedes that the assumption of context transcending validity claims 
is rather thin when he acknowledges that an agreement will always be subject to 
revision in the light of better arguments and that discursive participants will 
embrace the ephemeral nature of validity claims.192 
5 Habermas's 'Transcendental Theory Hope' 
The fact that the assumptions underpinning the ideal speech situation are not 
achievable is not the point, according to some statements of Habermas193 and 
some of his supporters such as McCarthy. 194 What is important is our 
acceptance of the fact that the ideal at least to some extent constrains our 
191 Habermas, above n 62, vol l, 336. 
192 Habermas, above n 121, 226-7; for a discussion of this perceived shortcoming in Habermas's 
work see: Hoy, in Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72. 
193 Habermas, above n 180, 206; The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, above n 112, 322; 
Habermas, above n 165, 235. 
194 McCarthy in Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72, 217ff. See also: Cooke, above n 172, 112ff. 
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practice. 195 Thus, the argument continues, even if participants accept the 
impossibility of complete understanding of the background, they would 
nevertheless appraise what appeared to be the aspects of the background 
relevant to the particular validity claim. 
This admission of the impossibility of the truly transcendental assessment of 
validity claims, while retaining the aspiration to such a universal standpoint, 
merely strengthens the objections of pragmatists such as Rorty and Fish. Thus 
Fish disparagingly refers to much critical legal scholarship as merely 
perpetuating the 'transcendental theory hope' of the Enlightenment.196 Those, 
such as Hoy, who wish to retain some room for critical insight whilst accepting 
the artificiality of universalist aspirations, query whether the appeal to an ideal 
made by Habermas and McCarthy is pragmatically necessary in engendering 
'genuine' discourse. Indeed, Hoy suggests, an appeal to 'truth' as determined 
by an unattainable ideal is merely one more rhetorical tool which may do more 
harm to 'genuine' debate than any good arising from an appeal to an 
unattainable 'truth' .197 In contradistinction to a critical monism dependent upon 
an appeal to an empty procedural ideal, Hoy and others propose a critical 
195 Given the insistence by Habermas upon consensus and truth in such texts as Habermas, 
'What is Universal Pragmatics?', in above n 50 and Habermas, above n 62, vol l, 8-22, 26, it is 
difficult to account for McCarthy's views as a valid interpretation of Habermas rather than a 
revision of Habermasian theory. Habermas does accept that if the ideal speech situation is not 
achieved other forms of communication such as strategic communication (where the intention is 
to achieve a particular consequence rather than to reach understanding) prevail; see: 'What is 
Universal Pragmatics?', in above n 50, 3-4. But if the ideal speech situation is never achieved in 
actual practice, Habermas' theory of communicative action has nothing to say about actual 
discursive practice. See also: Norris, Uncritical Theory, above n 129, 62. 
196 Fish, above n 72, 180-199. 
197 Hoy in Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72, 249ff; for further criticism of the utopian elements of 
Habermas's discourse theory see: Y Sintomer, 'Power and Civil Society: Foucault vs. 
Habermas' (1992) 18 Philosophy and Social Criticism 357. 
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pluralism which seeks to accord mutual respect to discursive participants on the 
basis that they are rational autonomous agents. 198 
E Critical Theory And Pluralist Hermeneutics 
The perceived failure of Habermas to offer a convincing theory of critical 
monism in a pluralist world199 has led those seeking a critical theory to adopt 
alternative reconciliations of hermeneutics with critical theory, and in particular 
to explore the possibility of a critical theory born of the contests envisaged by a 
pluralist hermeneutics. If multiple lifeworlds at any point in time are a reality, 
Hoy suggests,200 might it not be enough for the critical appraisal of 
interpretations to invite consideration of a theory from the perspective of other 
lifeworlds which actually exist? Given that Habermas accepted that discourse 
can never be founded upon a transparent understanding of the background, he 
tacitly acknowledged that this appeal to other lifeworlds was what actually 
happened in everyday discursive practice. Perhaps an equally plausible 
interpretation of discursive practice would accept that what we put forward, for 
example in the human sciences, is an interpretive theory which best describes 
our perception of the facts as we understand them today. Our purpose for 
putting forward the theory is arguably to test it in the community to which it is 
disclosed in order that lacunae, inaccuracies, unsupported assumptions and so 
forth may be revealed and the theory either modified or discarded.201 
In other words, the practical application of a pluralist theorisation of critical 
discourse, such as that propounded by Hoy, differs little from the application of 
198 See, for example: Couzens Hoy in Couzens Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72, 249ff; Maeve 
Cooke, 'Habermas, Autonomy and the Identity of the Self (1992) 18 Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 18. 
199 For criticism of Habermas' commitment to an unconstrained consensus in the context of a 
pluralist lifeworld see: Selya Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia (1986); McCarthy, Ideals 
and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory (1991); 
Cooke, above n 172, 153. 
200 Hoy in: Hoy and McCarthy, above n 72, 260-2. 
201 Ibid, 262; Warnke, above n 81, 132. 
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the critical monism of Habermas. Both envisage a rational debate in which 
competing interpretations are subjected to the furnace of peer review. The key 
difference is in the concept of the purpose of such discourse. Habermas 
maintains that all discourse is premised on the search for truth, or the best 
interpretation, through a consensus reached by all rational, fully informed 
subjects participating in an ideal speech situation. On the other hand, a 
hermeneutic pluralist such as Hoy accepts that truth may be an outcome of 
discourse while refusing to make that the ultimate objective. 
1 The Problem with Critical Pluralism 
Hoy's theory, it has already been noted, rejected the discourse of 'truth', but 
argued that one interpretation would be jettisoned in favour of another because 
it was 'better' .202 But Hoy does not elaborate upon the standard applied in 
determining whether an interpretation is 'better' .203 Calhoun has similarly 
attempted some form of compromise between hermeneutic and critical theories 
by jettisoning 'truth'. After recognising the politics of identity he can only 
suggest that the best we can do is to come up with differing accounts, one of 
which may for the time being be of greater use for a particular pragmatic 
purpose.204 What we seek, Calhoun observes, 'and indeed often achieve - is not 
202 For an early discussion of this in the context of legal interpretation see: Couzens Hoy, above 
n 70, 355. 
203 For a similar approach to that of Couzens Hoy see: Warnke, n 72, 132; Warnke, above n 81; 
Desmond Manderson, 'Beyond the Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal Theory' 
(1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 1048. See also: Cooke, above n 172, 157ff where 
Cooke argues in similar vein for a procedural standard for the assessment of discourse rather 
than focusing upon consensus as the ideal. For application of this approach in developing 
theories of deliberative democracy see, for example, James Fishkin, Democracy and 
Deliberation: New Direction for Democratic Reform (1994) 4; Cass Sunstein, 'Interest Groups 
in American Public Law' (1985) 38 Stanford Law Review 29-87. 
204 Calhoun Critical Social Theory, above n 142, 7 n 14; 51, 66. 
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consensus as such, but adequate mutual understanding for the pursuit of various 
practical tasks in which we are jointly engaged. ' 205 
This merely begs the questions of what understanding can be 'adequate', and in 
relation to whose pragmatic purpose?206 By suggesting that there is, at any 
point in time, one project (whether local or general) in which the entire 
community has consensually chosen to participate, Calhoun contradicts his 
earlier acknowledgement of the politics of identity. Furthermore, Calhoun fails 
to explain how such a consensus upon one project is possible in the first place. 
If there can be consensus upon one project, however localised, why can't there 
be consensus upon everything and hence, no politics of identity? Moreover, in 
the context of legal theory, Calhoun inexplicably suggests that the attribution of 
legal meaning is a special case in which meaning will be founded upon 
consensus. 207 In contrast to Calhoun, it might be argued that the implications of 
the politics of identity must be accommodated with a theory of legal 
interpretation. This can only occur if it is accepted that the existence of some 
communal project is at best highly contextualised and contingent, only made, 
not always already there. 
The ranks of commentators embracing this pluralism born of the politics of 
identity continue to grow, all accepting that it is a 'good thing' to foster such a 
multiplicity of views. This multiplicity of views, they suggest, is for the good 
because only from such social pluralism can 'better' theories surface. 208 
However, none of these commentators is prepared to define what they mean by 
'better'. Given that critical pluralists reject any universalising standpoint from 
which to assess the respective merits of competing theories, it is difficult to 
205 Calhoun, 'Social Theory and the Politics of Identity' in Calhoun, Social Theory and the 
Politics of Identity, above n 142, 51. 
206 For example, during the Gulf War was there really only one communal purpose? For a 
critique of postmodernist theory and its uncritical implications for localised social action see: 
Christopher Norris; Uncritical Theory, above n 129. 
207 Calhoun, 'Social Theory and the Politics ofldentity', above n 142, 51, 52. 
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understand how the meaning of a 'better' theory can itself be anything other 
than controversial and beyond universal acceptance. If one accepts the politics 
of identity and the pluralism which it spawns, it is difficult to see how such 
'critical' pluralism can be truly critical and resist the slide into, at least, the soft 
relativism of Rorty, where 'hey man, what's good for us is good' is the catchcry. 
FA Pragmatic, Pluralist Theory of Interpretation 
1 Accommodating Pluralism 
From the preceding discussion it may be seen that in more recent times theories 
of determinacy have been founded upon both hermeneutic and universalist 
propositions. Gadamer, Habermas, Fish, Rorty and Calhoun all sought to 
exclude power by recourse to some shared tradition, ideal or pragmatic project 
which engendered a social consensus. Hoy and Lyotard preferred to deal with 
discourse in an abstract way, remaining silent on how a pluralist discursive 
theory would apply in practice when decisions have to be made. The principal 
critique of such theories offered by this chapter has been that, by admitting the 
pragmatism of language and by failing to offer a convincing account of language 
use in the context of the politics of identity, these theories have failed. 
If there is a multiplicity of sub-communities and hence potentially infinite 
applications of a signifier, does this mean that there is no truth, no meaning, no 
'best interpretation'? Altman is one commentator who has interpreted (in a self-
serving way) the indeterminacy thesis to suggest this.209 Or does the politics of 
208 See material cited at n 203. 
209 Altman, above n 1, 92-3. Curiously, Altman discounts 'deconstruction' without one 
reference to Derrida, just one reference to Foucault and only a few pages dealing with several 
legal theorists. The passage from Foucault quoted by Altman, when placed in the context of 
Foucault's work, does not necessarily support Altman's interpretation that indeterminacy 
equates with an absence of meaning. Foucault and other 'radical relativists', Altman's 
terminology not mine, argue that their is no essential meaning, that meaning is created in any 
given context. Indeterminacy, then, does not necessarily mean an absence of meaning. Rather, 
indeterminacy merely suggests that there is a choice between possible meanings. 
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identity mean, as some 'deconstructionists' have suggested,210 that meaning is 
what we, individually, choose to make of any speech act in some anarchic 
frenzy. There is, as HLA Hart once said in a quite different context, the need 
for a 'fresh start' in offering a theory of language which rejects both the 
determinacy thesis and also the nihilism and apathy that some deconstructionists 
apparently endorse. 
In light of the earlier discussion of pluralism, the beginning of such a fresh start 
must be the acceptance of the pluralism born of the politics of identity. As has 
been argued above, such pluralism is clearly incompatible with the universalist 
aspects of Habermas' work, the monologic discourse of the monist 
interpretation of Gadamer' s work and also Rorty' s ethnocentric community. In 
a pluralist world a multitude of interpretive communities is inescapable. In this 
regard Fish's recognition that interpretation occurs at a host of localised sites is 
an important starting point for a pluralist theory of legal interpretation. 211 
However, there must be reservations concerning Fish's depiction of a lifeworld 
mysteriously divided into autonomous, homogeneous institutions. 212 Further, as 
even Fish has acknowledged at times, the notion of institutional autonomy and 
homogeneity does not stand up to close scrutiny. Indeed, Fish acknowledged 
that individuals may come to challenge the assumptions which they have 
'inherited' and thereby discard those assumptions in favour of another set of 
assumptions.213 Further, Fish conceded that members within an institution may 
210 See, for example, J Hillis Miller, The Ethics of Reading (1987). 
211 Fish, above n 58, 97-8. 
212 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the shortcomings of Fish's theory in any 
detail. Suffice it to say that Fish at no stage offers an account of how such institutions came into 
existence other than offering vague suggestions of some social contract like allocation of 
institutional function; see, for example: Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? above n 58, 97-8. 
One critical problem which Fish does not address is how it was possible for there to be 
communal discourse and agreement upon such an allocation of institutional tasks if meaning is 
institution specific and postdates such an agreement. 
213 
'This does not mean that one is always a prisoner of his present perspective. It is always 
possible to entertain beliefs and opinions other than one's own; but that is precisely how they 
will be seen, as beliefs and opinions other than one's own, and therefore as beliefs and opinions 
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have quite different understandings of the particular institutional enterprise. 
The Vietnam War, he notes, had different effects upon participants within the 
'literary studies' institution, depending upon 'whether or not their conception of 
what they [did], their sense of the enterprise, [was] bound up in an essential way 
with political issues. ' 214 In a similar vein he argued that the change wrought by 
Chomskian linguistics was only relevant to those in the literary community who 
already considered themselves linguists.215 In the context of law, Fish observes: 
Rather than being an embarassment, the presence in contract doctrine of 
contradictory versions of the enterprise is an opportunity. It is in the 
spaces opened by the juxtaposition of apparently irreconcilable impulses 
- to be purely formal and intuitively moral - that the law is able to 
exercise its resourcefulness.216 
In the absence of the stabilising effect upon meaning flowing from the existence 
of these homogeneous, autonomous interpretive communities, we must accept 
that legal arguments may be subjected to critical review not only by members of 
the legal institution, but by a wide spectrum of the community.217 Once the 
construct of one interpretive community is rejected, the theorisation of social 
discourse must tum away from consensus by the broad community or by some 
sub-community as the foundation of discourse. 
that are false, or mistaken, or partial, or immature, or absurd. That is why a revolution in one's 
beliefs will always feel like a progress .. .'; ibid, 361. 
214 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies, above n 144, 151. 
215 Ibid, 147-8. It is because of cases such as this, where linguistics as a distinct discipline 
preceded Chomskian linguistics, that Fish argues that change can only occur where it is 
anticipated within the relevant interpretive community. 
216 Fish, above n 71, 161. 
217 Many decisions of the judicial branch of government are reported in the media, ranging from 
summaries of penalties imposed upon the latest group of drink drivers to controversial judicial 
observations to detailed analyses of particular judgments. Aside from scrutiny by the mass 
media, many decisions will be examined by a host of 'non-legal' people including the litigants in 
the instant case, people seeking their own legal advice, and members of various interest groups 
and political lobbyists. The process by which just some decisions are considered worthy of 
widespread review itself calls for further study. However, for present purposes, the point is that 
the critical audience might be a small portion of any particular community or it might be all of 
the community. 
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The absence of personal and cultural homogeneity postulated by the politics of 
identity suggests that there can be no 'right' interpretation as such, whether 
under hermeneutic or universalist models. At the individual level, the 
interpreter's interpretation of a text reflects the outcome of a balancing of the 
differing and often contradictory aspects of the self in arriving at an arbitrary 
conclusion as to what the text means.218 For any interpreter, an interpretation is 
therefore a contingent point on a continuum of personal change, as the 
competing aspects of the self are reconsidered and new compromises reached. 
At the social level,219 in a heterogeneous community there will also be a number 
of interpretations vying for supremacy. The identification of the 'best' 
interpretation ultimately constitutes an act of power founded upon a subjective 
decision regarding the acceptability of the warrants of authority220 
accompanying the competing interpretations to disparate parts of the 
community. To put this another way, in a world where there is no one 'natural', 
'rational' or hermeneutically ascertained meaning, and where power infiltrates 
every nook of social being, the attribution of meaning is inescapably an act of 
power. 
2 The Role of Power 
There are broadly three reactions to such an assertion of the inevitability and 
ubiquity of power in all social relations, including adjudication. The prospect of 
such a role for power within any theory of interpretation is anathema to liberal 
legalists, who portray the exercise of such power in a negative light. Under 
liberal theory power is legitimated either expressly or impliedly by the consent 
218 Dyson argues that we need to move away from essentialising assumptions regarding 
characteristics of members of any grouping such as those of class or race: M Dyson, Reflecting 
Black: African American Cultural Criticism (1993). See also: Diana Fuss, Essentially 
Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (1989) xii. 
219 Of course, there is no clear dichotomy between the individual and the social level, the 
differentiation only being used here as an aid to explication. 
220 The concept of warranted assertions being taken from Rorty, see: Rorty, Consequences of 
Pragmatism, above n 31, 136. 
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of autonomous rational subjects.221 If adjudication involved the illegitimate 
(non-consensual) exercise of power, they say, we must inevitably slide back into 
the anarchic morass of the Dark Ages from which we were saved by legal 
determinacy.222 No, liberal legalists continue, the determinacy thesis must 
accurately reflect social reality, because otherwise we would already have 
slipped into the war of all against all of the Dark Ages. 
The second response to the recognition of the significance of power within 
social relations is to accept its presence, but to deny that it is necessarily 
present. Thus many non-liberals depict law as already the domain of power. 
According to this critical perspective, legal doctrine merely represents 
manipulation by an empowered elite furthering its own interests under the guise 
of a rights discourse.223 To these critical theorists, the determinacy thesis serves 
the ideological purpose of masking the reality of the illegitimacy of judicial 
power. 'To study ideology', John B Thompson suggests in a different context, 
'is to study the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain 
relations of domination.' 224 According to such critiques of legal doctrine, the 
illegitimate exercise of power in adjudication must be eliminated as part of a 
more wideranging reform of the political community which seeks to reinstate 
the autonomy of the rational subject as the foundation of legitimate government. 
The third response to the recognition of a necessary role for power in 
adjudication is to embrace it, in various ways, as an inevitable part of social 
221 John Locke, 'Second Treatise of Government' in J Locke, Two Treatises of Government 
(1988) para 211, 403; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1968) 227; Dworkin rejects the notion of 
consent, but in practical terms it is difficult to differentiate the 'protestantism' of his 'true 
community' of willing subjects from one founded upon consent; see: Dworkin, above n 1, ch 6. 
For an examination of the modern theorisation of power as founded upon consent see: B 
Hindess, Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to Foucault (1996). 
222 See, for example, Altman, above n 1. 
223 In the context of taxation law, see: John Passant, 'Tax Avoidance in Australia: Results and 
Prospects' (1994) 22 Federal Law Review 493. More generally see: Horwitz, above n 159; 
Duncanson, above n 157, 298. For a discussion of this functionalist tendency within CLS 
generally, see: Robert Gordon, 'Critical Legal Histories', (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57. 
224 JB Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (1984) 4. 
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discourse. This third option is clearly anathema to proponents of the first two 
approaches to the role of power in discourse. Understandably, those who pursue 
social reform often query whether everything is an effect of power: 
What is there 'left over', so to speak, to find this situation so appalling? 
What, including one Michel Foucault could conceivably protest against 
this condition, given that all subjectivity is merely the effect of power in 
the first place? If there is nothing beyond power, then there is nothing 
that is being blocked, categorized and regimented, and therefore 
absolutely no need to worry. Foucault does indeed speak of resistances 
to power; but what exactly is doing the resisting is an enigma his work 
does not manage to dispel. 225 
Non-liberals therefore worry about the postmodern scepticism about truth and 
rights, 226 perhaps understandably seeing a rights discourse as a central plank in a 
program of furthering the interests of disadvantaged peoples: 
I worry about criticising rights and legal language just when they have 
become available to people who had previously lacked access to them. I 
worry about those who have, telling those who do not, 'you do not need 
it, you should not want it. ' 227 
There are therefore a number of significant contemporary discourses aligned 
against the postulate of the inevitability of power in adjudication. Such 
discourses either perceive power as an illegitimate component of adjudication 
where it is not founded upon the consent of autonomous, rational subjects or, 
without explicitly adopting this liberal denunciation of power, are fearful of the 
consequences of embracing power in social theory. The question therefore 
arises of how a non-liberal legal theory can simultaneously account for the 
phenomenology of determinacy, explain the fact that we have not succumbed to 
225 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: an introduction (1991) 47. 
226 See, for example, S Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Political 
Change (1974) (arguing that liberal legal theory is founded upon the myth ofrights). 
227 Martha Minow, 'Interpreting rights: an essay for Robert Cover' (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 
1860, 1910. See also: Richard Delgado, 'The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies 
Have What Minorities Want?' (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 301. 
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the Hobbesian spectre of the war of all against all, deny the validity of an ideal 
adjudication bereft of illegitimate power and still provide some hope for those 
who wish to offer a critique of the status quo without being told in 
Baudrillardian fashion, that 'we don't debate things in these here parts because 
rationalism has been run out of town.' 228 
But the depiction of power as avoidable, which underpins the first two 
responses to power, has not been the only model for the exercise of power 
within Western social theory. In a theorisation of power similar in many 
respects to antecedent critical theory and even one branch of Locke's 
deliberations upon power,229 Foucault argued that there is a need to 'cut off the 
King's head' by acknowledging the diversity and ubiquity of power within any 
community. In various degrees and forms, power is exercised by everybody 
within a community: total subjugation can therefore only rarely exist.230 Thus, 
Foucault challenged the universality of the ideal underpinning much critical 
social theory, arguing that such an ideal is merely one effect of power.231 One 
reading of Foucault would therefore suggest that social power is a much 
broader, multifaceted phenomenon than what Hindess has called the 'simple 
minded determinism' 232 of a concept of power as a mere ability to control 
others. On this view, power can not only control but be a means of creation: 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but 
to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What 
makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that 
it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses 
228 See, for example, Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault (1987). 
229 For a discussion of which see: Hindess, above n 221, 17-22, 145-6. 
23° Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', above n 143, 221; Michel Foucault, 'The ethic of care for 
the self as a practice of freedom' in J Bernauer and D Rasmussen (eds), The Final Foucault 
(1988) 1-20, 12. 
231 Michel Foucault, 'About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self (1993) 21 Political 
Theory 198. 
232 Hindess, above n 221, 141. 
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and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces 
discourse. 233 
Foucault is therefore not concerned with the legitimation of power in particular 
instances, but rather merely with describing the effects of power in localised 
discourses. 
Eagleton's concern that the recognition of a role for power in all social 
discourse eliminates any prospect for critique of alternative world views is 
founded upon a 'quantitative' 234 conception of power which assumes that social 
relations arise from confrontations of power in which the person or group with 
the most power subjugate(s) the other(s). Under this quantitative theory of 
power, the issue is whether the power is being legitimately exercised or not; 
legitimacy generally being conceived in terms of the consent of autonomous 
rational subjects. At times Foucault lent support to this quantitative conception 
of power, particularly when he wrote of power at the macro level: 
A central phenomenon in the history of societies is that they manifest in 
a massive and universalizing form, at the level of the whole social body, 
the locking together of power relations with relations of strategy and the 
results proceeding from their interaction. 235 
The theory of interpretation advanced in this chapter denies that such totalising 
power can exist, a view consistent with the former conception of Foucault's 
233 Foucault, 'Truth and Power', extracted in P Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader (1986) 61. 
See also: M Foucault, Discipline and Punish - The Birth of the Prison (1977) Pt 3, where 
Foucault develops this theme of the creative aspects of disciplinary power. For a similarly 
critical view of the functionalist depiction of law as simply furthering the interests of a ruling 
class see: E P Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1975) 258-69. As 
Calhoun notes, Foucault's formulation of power precludes any prospect of a critical perspective; 
Calhoun, Critical Social Theory, above n 142, 119; see also: Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, above n 112, ch 9 and 10. 
234 For a discussion of differing conceptions of power within Western social theory see Hindess, 
above n 221. 
235 Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', above n 230, 226. 
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work which emphasised the localised nature of power.236 This is not to suggest 
that at times the exercise of power in the quantitative sense will not be all too 
apparent - the suppression of dissenting interpretations in the political arena by 
bloody means is all too frequent. However, the point of this chapter is that the 
survival of any interpretation cannot be achieved by force alone. 
3 The Combination of Power with Rhetoric 
Some sense of the complexity introduced into any account of adjudication by 
this recognition of both a bifurcation of concepts of power and the acceptance of 
a diffusion of power throughout the community may be gleaned from Douglas 
Hay's account of the administration of the criminal law in the United Kingdom 
during the eighteenth century.237 Hay's thesis is that the successful 
administration of the criminal law in a time of great social foment was not 
solely dependent upon the crushing weight of state authority, but was largely 
attributable to what would often be called 'extra-legal factors' such as the 
paternalism of the ruling classes. The law could be brutally applied when need 
be, but it was not brute force alone which served to maintain order in a 
community with a largely ineffective criminal administration. In other words, 
order was maintained as much by the willing compliance of the 'oppressed' as 
by the imposition of state authority. 
Hay's work suggests that members of a community may often feel that an 
interpretation is determinate and even, perhaps, 'right', notwithstanding that 
such an interpretation runs contrary to the perceived interests of those members. 
But it is the contention of this chapter that the dynamism of the politics of 
identity dictates that any such conclusion can only be a tentative, contingent 
236 See, for example: Michel Foucault, 'Omnes et singulatim: towards a criticism of "Political 
Reason"' in S McMurrin (ed), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1981), 223-254, 226; 
Michel Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment' in Rabinow, above n 233, 32-50, 45. 
237 Douglas Hay, 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law' in D Hay et al, Albion's Fatal 
Tree: crime and society in eighteenth century England (1975) 1-63. 
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position founded upon the individual's interpretations of the arguments in 
favour of competing interpretations. Such a position is subject to review at any 
time in response to alternative arguments for an alternative interpretation. For 
any meaning to arise and survive in the contingent world portrayed by the 
politics of identity, there must be sufficient support for a particular 
interpretation for it to be accepted as 'right'. The task of any advocate of an 
interpretation is therefore to frame the interpretation in such a manner that it 
garners sufficient support from whatever portion of the community that may 
critically review the interpretation. In the absence of any universalising or 
hermeneutic standpoint from which truth may be assessed, the rhetorical art of 
persuasion is clearly critical to the success of any interpretation. 
In this regard Rorty's concept of warrants of authority is apposite. However, 
rather than adopting Rorty' s portrayal of warrants of authority having a standing 
accepted by all members of the community, it is proposed that the arguments in 
support of a particular interpretation will need to appeal to a diverse array of 
warrants of authority, acceptable from the perspective of differing standpoints, 
in order to muster sufficient support within a community.238 By raising 
alternative arguments in support of a particular interpretation, the interpreter 
gathers together members of the community in support of one interpretation, 
even though the supporters might agree on nothing else. 239 Beginning from 
different standpoints does not necessarily produce a different result upon a 
particular issue of interpretation. The persuasiveness of any interpretation may 
be influenced by any or all of a host of principles, including what Posner called 
238 In his discussion of ideology Eagleton suggests that it is the heterogeneity of the dominant 
ideology which enables it to survive, a view which is consistent with my theory of interpretation; 
Eagleton, above n 225, 45. 
239 Even Marx and Engels recognised the importance to the success of a revolutionary class of 
this rhetorical task of garnering support by appealing to disparate classes; Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, CJ Arthur (ed), (1974), 66; for a discussion of this 
universalising aspect of emergent ideology see: Eagleton, above n 225, 56ff. 
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the maximisation of wealth,240 consideration of past decisions, arguments from 
particular moral principles, argument by analogy and even the universalising 
rhetoric of determinacy.241 The identification of meaning must therefore be a 
rhetorical process in which an interpreter seeks to win the support of sufficient 
peers and commentators so as to minimise the risk of criticism or other adverse 
reaction. 242 Moreover, publication of alternative ideas might not be tolerated, 
compelling the decision maker to frame the grounds for a decision in terms 
acceptable to substantial elements of the reviewing community. 243 
Within such a model there can be no question that the decision maker is merely 
identifying what social morality requires, or what the interests of some 
undefined social class dictate. 244 There can therefore be no suggestion that this 
theory allows 'us' to settle back on the sofa with a self satisfied smile, relaxed in 
the knowledge that: 
Our identification with our community - our society, our political 
tradition, our intellectual heritage - is heightened when we see this 
community as ours rather than nature's, shaped rather than found, one 
among many which men have made. ' 245 
This reassurance is not available to us because there is not one society which we 
can call 'ours' .246 All that we may have is a multiplicity of coalitions of interest 
240 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (4th edn, 1992) 523. 
241 Fish, above n 72, 141-179. 
242 Peter Goodrich has written extensively upon the rhetorical character of law, and particularly 
upon the categorisation of legal rhetoric, including: Peter Goodrich, 'Rhetoric as Jurisprudence' 
(1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 88; Peter Goodrich, Reading the Law (1986); Peter 
Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (1987); Peter 
Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of memory to Nomadic Masks (1990). 
243 For which I have drawn upon Rorty's concept of warranted assertibility, see text 
accompanying n 220. For application of this concept in the domain of the philosophy of 
science, see, for example, M Jacob, 'Science and Politics in the Late Twentieth Century', in The 
Politics of Western Science 1640-1990 (1992) 1-19, 4. 
244 But cf Horwitz, above n 159. 
245 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, above n 31, 166. 
246 As Raymond Williams noted, hegemonic ideology must always be responsive to the 
dynamism of alternative ideologies; Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (1977) 112. 
326 
groups prepared to accept various premises but not others, various arguments 
but not others, various interpretations but not others, across the gamut of 
political issues. Any such coalition is liable to change in response to changes 
within such coalitions elsewhere in the wider community.247 Nowhere is there 
an equilibrium which affords anybody the opportunity to rest on their laurels.248 
A proponent of an interpretation is constantly striving to win and maintain allies 
in a dynamic world. An argument is only as good as the support which it is able 
to muster from the wider social context of which it is a part. 249 As with Hoy's 
critical pluralism, then, this theory embraces pluralism and is sceptical of the 
prospects of achieving 'the truth'. 
G Conclusion 
By accepting that all knowledge is 'grounded' in some social context, 
contemporary determinacy theorists have conceded that all knowledge is to 
some extent pragmatic. But once pragmatism is thus admitted past the portals 
of liberal legal theory, it wreaks havoc from within upon attempts to theorise 
legal determinacy. Both psychoanalytic theory and multicultural theory, which 
stress the plurality of the personal and social lifeworld respectively, offer a 
sound foundation for questioning the liberal belief in a monovalent, 
homogeneous community which serves to constrain what is accepted to be the 
247 
'Discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are 
sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude or be aware of each other.' 
Michel Foucault, 'Is it Useless to Revolt?' (1981) 8 Philosophy and Social Criticism 1. But cf 
Horwitz, above n 159; whilst a critique of Horwitz's work is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
pluralist social theory tendered here is clearly inconsistent with Horwitz's thesis. Horwitz 
argues that American law adapted mechanically to the demands of an ascendant 'commercial 
interest.' Thus he charts the demise of substantive judicial decisionmaking and the rise of legal 
formalism. The 'oppressed' may also have had an interest in the apparent objectification of the 
law, as it may have enabled them to adopt the rhetoric of rights rather than being confronted 
with the reality of judicial discretion exercised by a biased judge; see further: EP Thompson, 
above n 233. What Horwitz seems to assume is that the law successfully picked a winner in 
forming a strategic alliance with the commercial interest. But the 'commercial interest' could 
not exist without the host of legal relations which constituted it as a prominent interest. 
248 Contra Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, above n 92, 108-9. 
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pragmatic process of interpretation. Unless contemporary liberal theory can 
develop an account of legal determinacy which incorporates an 
acknowledgement of this politics of identity, it is difficult to see how the liberal 
determinacy thesis can be considered anything other than a view of law through 
rose tinted spectacles. It is in this context that Habermas' work is significant -
he was prepared to accept the pluralism of the politics of identity and sought to 
develop a theory of determinacy in a pluralist lifeworld. Habermas' work 
therefore points the way for future developments within liberal legal theory. 
But as we have seen, Habermas' unconvincing attempt to overcome the anarchic 
effects of a pluralist world suggests that present and future liberal legalists 
confront a daunting, and arguably impossible, task. 
In rejecting the various liberal and non-liberal accounts of the determinacy 
thesis, I am mindful of the 'political' implications of such a conclusion. As 
noted at the outset of this chapter, if it were convincing, the determinacy thesis 
might be a reassuring account of how a 'civilised' society can entrench the rule 
of law as a bulwark against arbitrary exercises of 'quantitative' power. For this 
reason it is not only liberals who support the determinacy thesis as a 
fundamental aspect of modem democratic society. It is therefore not surprising 
to find that a theory of interpretive determinacy is adopted by some on the 
political left, who also advance a theory of social transformation towards a 
'better' society, because such transformative theories also depend upon the 
identification of the 'right' transformative path. To those advancing such 
theories of social transformation, the indeterminacy thesis can all too easily lead 
to a fatalistic acceptance of 'what will be will be'. There is certainly some merit 
in the concern, expressed by Norris and Eagleton, that to reject accounts of legal 
determinacy without replacing them with an alternative amounts to no more 
than the adoption of what they perceive to be a conservative, stable status 
249 Such an approach is therefore incompatible with a strong relativism, which accepts that each 
argument is as good as any other. 
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quo.250 Indeed, this conservative endorsement of the status quo is all too 
apparent in the postmodernist work of Fish and Rorty. 
In the latter part of this chapter I have argued that an endorsement of an 
indeterminacy thesis need not entail the conservative depiction of a world in 
which dissenting voices are lost in 'our' 'frankly ethnocentric' worldview or in 
the prevailing interpretation of 'the' legal community. If the indeterminacy 
thesis is to be taken seriously, as I have argued, I cannot validly argue for one 
'right' theory of interpretation, one 'right' interpretation or even one 'right' 
program of social reform. Nor can I validly argue for a critical pluralism, a 
description of a theory which is oxymoronic if the pluralist aspect is taken 
seriously. In a sense the argument advanced in this chapter therefore 
fatalistically accepts that there is nothing to be done but acquiesce in the status 
quo. But whereas Norris, Eagleton, Rorty and Fish all generally perceive the 
status quo to be a static world dominated by the conservative influence of liberal 
theory, the argument of this chapter is that the lifeworld is much more dynamic, 
such that no one world view necessarily holds sway. Indeed, taking the domain 
of liberal legal theory, one purpose of this chapter has been to illustrate the fact 
that the liberal idea of legal determinacy is itself the subject of competing 
interpretations. The argument advanced in the latter part of this chapter would 
suggest that the willingness of many social and legal theorists to suppress such 
dynamism in favour of a 'stable' status quo is itself but a rhetorical device. 
To the liberal legalist worried about the breakdown of social order should the 
. determinacy thesis be jettisoned, and to the transformative theorist who believes 
thats/he is 'outside' the present legal system, I therefore say the same thing - we 
are already a fractured part of a fractured community in which we are all 
constantly seeking to gather supporters to our respective views. This account of 
250 See, for example: C Norris, Reclaiming Truth: contribution to a critique of cultural 
relativism (1996). 
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the rhetoric of legal theory and legal interpretation is therefore neither a 
normative theory nor a conservative theory. 
This theory of law as rhetoric is also significant for legal history. According to 
contemporary liberal legal theory, the analysis of earlier legal interpretations 
would entail an account of how judges and administrators had generally 
reflected the morality of their community in making an interpretation, and 
would perhaps also identify those interpretations which were 'wrong' according 
to the prevailing standards of the community at the time of the decision. By 
contrast, the theory of law as rhetoric in a pluralist world asks 'how was it that 
this legal doctrine came to be accepted as right - what rhetorical devices 
enhanced the appeal of this doctrine in a multifarious community?' In 
answering this question, the diversity within our pluralist world must be 
embraced in offering a wideranging interpretation of the operation of the 
plurality that is law within a pluralist society.251 At this point it is therefore 
appropriate to return to the accounts of the interpretation of tax legislation in the 
preceding chapters, and consider the relevance of this theory to those accounts, 
and also to consider the implications of this theory for the modem tax 
administration. 
251 This conclusion is therefore consistent with the critique of American historiography by 
Horwitz; Morton Horwitz, 'The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal 
History' (1973) 17 American Journal of Legal History 275. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that the determinacy of law constitutes a major discourse 
within modem Anglo-Australian jurisprudence, and for good reason. The 
certainty of the law portrayed by various liberal legal theories is an alluring 
prospect to liberals and many non liberals alike. To liberals, a legal system in 
which subjects prospectively know how the law will apply to their affairs, or at 
least a system in which subjects know that they can seek an impartial and non 
arbitrary adjudication upon their legal rights, is a quantum leap from the 
arbitrary administration of government during the 'Dark Ages' .1 To many 
legalists, the certainty of law is fundamental to both the centrality of law in 
modem society and the professionalisation of legal service providers. To adapt 
Stanley Fish's phrase, many of us want the law to have a formal existence 
because such formalism also offers both a reassuring account of the operation of 
a fundamental social institution and offers hope to those seeking social reform. 
However, it is clear from the preceding chapters that this most appealing 
account of determinate law fails both descriptively and normatively. 
Although the generally accepted account of tax interpretation since 1689 
portrays the application of determinate law in accordance with the literal 
meaning or legislative intention, the preceding chapters suggest that the 
interpretation of taxation law is indelibly stamped with judicial pragmatism. 
Whereas the generally accepted account of statutory interpretation posits a 
judicial choice between lawmaking and the discovery of law, the pragmatic 
theory of law advanced in this thesis rejects the existence of this choice by 
maintaining that adjudication is inevitably a creative process. To many 
'modem' judges, this conclusion may seem unremarkable, as they may point to 
1 A metaphor which figures prominently in the Whig interpretation of history which underpins 
liberal legal theory. For a general critique of the Whig interpretation of history, and discussion 
of the 'Dark Ages' metaphor, see: Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History 
(1965) 28-9. 
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their numerous public acknowledgments of their 'lawmaking' role. Indeed, 
while he was the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Sir Anthony 
Mason observed that: 
In Australia we have moved away from the declaratory theory and the 
doctrine of legalism to a species of legal realism. Appellate courts no 
longer articulate principles of law by reference exclusively to inductive 
and analogical reasoning from established rules of law. Judges take 
account of relevant policy considerations (for principles of law 
ultimately rest on underlying considerations of policy) and they have an 
eye to the practical consequences of the rules they apply and the 
decisions they make. 2 
However, this modem recognition of judicial activism is flawed on two counts. 
Firstly, such pragmatic theories of law suggest that this 'judicial activism' is 
undertaken within the context of the constraint of one guiding maxim,3 one 
homogeneous communal morality4 or a legal institution which governs the 
scope of judicial pragmatism.5 However, it has been argued that a recognition 
of social pluralism and the politics of identity requires a rejection of such 
homogenising interpretations of legal practice. Once it is accepted that such 
pluralism defines the very nature of the human condition, the prospect of a 
critical standpoint transcending this pluralism must be rejected. Accordingly, 
adjudication upon meaning must be theorised in terms of a pragmatic choice 
between competing interpretations engendered by alternative standpoints in a 
multicultural lifeworld. This is not to say that competing interpretations ought 
be conceptualised in terms of static entities which crash into each other in a 
manner akin to some 'last one standing' crash and bash derby. Competing 
2 Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Role of the Courts at the Turn of the Century' (1993) 3 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 156. 
3 For examples of such accounts of legal practice see: Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law 1780-1860 (1977); John Passant, 'Tax Avoidance and the Judiciary' (1990) 7 
Law in Context 24. 
4 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986). 
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interpretations may freely assume some rhetorical aspects of another 
interpretation in an ongoing discursive interplay which is fundamentally 
rhetorical. Swayed by often quite disparate discourses, judges have adopted the 
interpretation with the strongest rhetorical appeal assessed from their particular 
standpoint. Thus, at times the importance of accommodating business 
understandings of legislative terms has been recognised, at other times the 
perceived need to protect the government revenue, on some occasions the 
significance of the 'rule of law' has been stressed, while at other times the 
courts have accepted the rhetoric of legalism in resolutely maintaining that they 
must adopt the 'technical' legal meaning of legislative terms. Little has changed 
since the times of the window tax, when the courts accepted the rhetoric of 
national exigency in construing the window tax legislation in favour of the 
Crown. 
The second shortcoming of the account of judicial activism is that it reinforces 
the liberal legal history of the law by accepting that judges once discovered the 
law and could have continued to discover the law were it not for their collective 
choice to embark upon a path of judicial activism. The preceding chapters 
illustrate the weakness of this account. Once granted jurisdiction to hear 
window tax appeals, the eighteenth century courts in fact rejected a literalist 
approach and adhered to the maxim of interpreting the window tax legislation in 
favour of the Crown without regard to literal meanings. If anything, the 
eighteenth century courts interpreted the window tax legislation pragmatically, 
influenced by the perceived imperative of buttressing what was considered to be 
a weak central government threatened by war, internal dissent and fiscal crisis. 
After the courts were granted jurisdiction to hear income tax appeals in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the judicial appeals to a literalist methodology 
5Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies (1989); Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and it's 
a good thing too (1994), 
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belied a thoroughgoing judicial pragmatism in the interpretation of tax 
legislation. Grappling with legislation which could be interpreted in any 
number of ways from the standpoints of a multiplicity of competing discourses, 
the courts were compelled to choose from among any number of competing 
interpretations in what was ultimately an act of power rather than a discovery of 
'the law'. Even during the first sixty years of the Commonwealth income tax, in 
what is often portrayed as the highpoint of literalism, it is apparent that the 
interpretation of tax legislation was anything but literalist. Once again, the 
Australian courts confronted tax legislation which could be interpreted in any 
number of ways from the respective standpoints of competing discourses. 
Although there was often no overt reference to such competing discourses, the 
exercise of judicial discretion in the framing of what was perceived by the judge 
to be a 'just' income tax may nevertheless be discerned in the interpretation of 
the 'sufficient distribution' requirement, despite the frequent recourse to the 
rhetoric of literalism. The literalism to which the courts referred was therefore a 
myth. There was no acontextual or conventionally determined meaning of the 
statutory language, but rather always a fresh choice to be made from among 
competing interpretations born of rhetorical discourses vying for supremacy. 
Even after the rhetorical shift to a purposive interpretation in the 1980's, the . 
courts continued to confront an array of competing interpretations of Part IV A, 
framed from alternative standpoints. Again, the choice between those 
competing interpretations was not expressly or impliedly guided by the 
discovery of the one legislative intention, but rather constituted an exercise of 
judicial discretion. 
But as Dworkin notes,6 one critical question confronts the theorisation of law as 
a pragmatic institution depicted in this thesis. How can the disorder within the 
field of taxation law, portrayed by this pragmatic theory of interpretation, have 
been contained by the discourse of legal determinacy and liberal legalism for so 
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long? Has there been a monumental confidence trick perpetrated by the courts?7 
In an explanation consistent with the theory of adjudication developed in this 
thesis, the answer lies with the ability of those promoting the discourse of liberal 
legalism to garner sufficient support and subdue competing theories of law. 
Perhaps this manner of stating the reply suggests that the promotion of liberal 
legalism and the determinacy thesis is necessarily a conscious choice undertaken 
by individuals within the community after having surveyed the rival theories. 
Occasionally it may have been. In a recent discussion with one serving Federal 
Court judge I asked whether he thought judges made law. 'Of course we do' 
was the reply. I then asked why it was that there was no reference to this 
lawmaking function in any of the judges decisions. 'Because we wouldn't get 
away with it', he replied. Occasionally judges have been prepared to make 
similar statements for the public record: 
Personally, I think that judges will serve the public interest better if they 
keep quiet about their legislative function. No doubt they will discreetly 
contribute to changes in the law, because ... they cannot do otherwise, 
even if they would. The judge who shows his hand, who advertises what 
he is about, may indeed show that he is a strong spirit, unfettered by the 
past; but I doubt very much whether he is not doing more harm to 
general confidence in the law as a constant, safe in the hands of the 
judges, than he is doing good to the law's credit as a set of rules nicely 
attuned to the sentiments of the day.8 
But it is not necessarily the case that all judges consciously engage in such 
deception. Indeed, it is more likely that the determinacy thesis and liberal 
legalism are widely perceived as the 'natural' way of understanding the modern 
Australian legal institution. 'Natural' because it draws upon a number of 
rhetorically appealing discourses. Many want the law to have a formal 
6 Dworkin, above n 4, 46-7. 
7 Yuri Grbich, 'The Duke of Westminster's Graven Idol on Extending Property Authorities into 
Tax and Back Again' (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 183, 195-6. 
8 Lord Radcliffe, 'The Lawyer and his Times' in Not in Feather Beds (1968) 265; see also: Lord 
Edmund-Davies, 'Judicial Activism' (1975) 28 Current Legal Problems 1, 3. 
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existence because of the fear of the anarchy and arbitrariness which it is thought 
would flow from acknowledging pragmatic theories of law. Legal formalism is 
also appealing because it is considered to be fundamental to principles of 
democracy embodied in the doctrine of the separation of the judicial from the 
political power9 and the faith in the rational discovery of objective facts which 
is one key characteristic of modernism. Thus, judges may not be consciously 
choosing to adopt theories of interpretation consistent with the determinacy 
thesis in preference to pragmatic theories. Rather, judges may simply adopt the 
rhetoric of legal determinacy because it seems more 'natural' or more 
appropriate than the contenders. It is for this reason that judges regularly refer 
to literalism and intentionalism as if they are the one right method of 
interpretation, because for that particular judge who holds that view objectivism 
describes the one right way of understanding judicial practice. 
However, notwithstanding this repeated judicial preference for the determinacy 
thesis, the preceding discussion of the interpretation of tax law suggests that the 
interpretation of taxation law has been and must be pragmatic in a most radical 
sense. The act of judging represents an exercise of power which is only 
constrained by the limits of what can be cast as plausible in any number of ways 
at the time. 10 To many this will be an unsatisfactory conclusion. It cannot be 
doubted that the prospect of a formal law is alluring, and it is for this reason that 
many would prefer this thesis to conclude with some proposals for reforming 
the legal system to bring it closer to the ideal of formality. However, this would 
be to misunderstand the import of this thesis. Once it is accepted that legal 
formality is a forlorn hope, it is irrational to cling to the formalist ideal because 
that ideal is unachievable. The only conclusion of this thesis can be to point to 
9 Although the separation of powers is not a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy. 
10 Contra PS Atiyah, 'Judges and Policy' (1980) 15 Israel Law Review 346, 346 ('Nobody 
would deny that in a considerable proportion of cases which come before a judge for decision, 
the law is clear'). 
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some implications of the pragmatic account of interpretation outlined in the 
preceding chapters, and highlight those matters requiring further research. 
From the preceding case studies it is clear that there is much work to be done in 
reconsidering the history of tax interpretation. The dominance of the prevailing 
account of literalist tax interpretation has meant that the interrelationship of 
interpretative practice and the social context in which interpretation of tax 
legislation is conducted has been largely ignored. Legal historians have 
expected to find a historical record which reflects judicial decisionmaking in 
accordance with the constraints of legal formality, and have seemingly ceased 
further inquiry once they have found the odd judicial statement which supports 
that conclusion. Even when tax interpretation has been considered from a 
critical perspective, such research has generally only compared the judicial 
interpretation of a particular matter to an alternative answer founded upon what 
is assumed to be a universal alternative standpoint. 11 The conclusion of such 
critical appraisals of the judicial interpretation of the income tax is generally 
founded upon some determinist theory of law in which judges respond to a 
narrowly defined context governed by the interests of a ruling elite. 12 As with 
the literature sustaining the formalist theory of tax interpretation, the interaction 
of the standpoint of the judge(s) deciding the relevant cases and the social 
context in which those cases are decided is ignored or viewed narrowly in the 
quest to validate the commentator's a priori assumption(s). The questions 
which are ignored in all of these accounts is 'why did the result seem right to the 
judge - what made it the 'natural' conclusion?' What voices were excluded? 
Why was it 'natural' for the judge to exclude those voices? How could the 
judge maintain the legitimacy of the courts while excluding those voices. 
11 See, for example: Richard Krever, 'Avoidance Evasion and Reform: Who Dismantled and 
Who's Rebuilding the Australian Income Tax System' (1987) 10 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 215; Jeffery Waincymer, 'If at first you don't succeed ... Reconceptualising the 
Income Concept in the Tax Arena' (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 977 
12 See the material referred to above at n 3. 
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Answering these questions will compel a consideration not only of the social 
context in which the decision is being made, but also a close reading of the 
judgment in order to identify those discourses which were considered to justify 
the erasure of plurality which lead to the conclusion. 
The second implication of this thesis is the need to re-examine the legitimacy of 
the courts in the context of the administration of taxation law. At present the 
debate within mainstream Australian jurisprudence with respect to the 
legitimacy of the courts centres upon the identification of the most appropriate 
path to what is assumed to be a determinate outcome that is portrayed as 
morally right. As we have seen, many espouse the view that judges merely 
discover the literal meaning or the legislative intention, while some suggest that 
judges make law in accordance with the community's moral norms. Both 
accept that there is a choice between law as it is and lawmaking in some sense, 
and develop their theories of legitimacy accordingly. 
Those that advocate the judicial discovery of law according to the literal 
meaning or the legislative intention of the legislative text maintain that the 
legitimacy of the courts is founded upon the prospectivity of law. To this group, 
the onus is upon the legislature to create legislation which accurately expresses 
the correct moral outcome. This group therefore remain optimistic that the 
legislative text can express what is taken to be 'morally' right in determinate 
language. 
Those that champion judicial 'lawmaking' are less optimistic about the capacity 
of language itself to convey a determinate meaning. This group therefore 
maintains that the legitimacy of the courts depends upon the identification of a 
'right' outcome, which is 'right' because it reflects communal expectations 
rather than reflecting the meaning that is intrinsically in the text. 
Both theorisations accept that there is one right answer but disagree upon the 
path to that right answer. This competition between competing theorisations of 
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the proper scope of judicial practice in the context of taxation law was 
considered by McBarnet and Whelan, who suggested that the fundamental 
tension within modern law is the conflict between formalism and anti 
formalism: McBarnet and Whelan then conclude that there is insurmountable 
resistance to an anti formal means of arriving at the 'right' answer. 13 In arriving 
at this conclusion, McBarnet and Whelan assume that the control of tax 
avoidance is universally 'right', although nowhere do they acknowledge the 
problematic nature of the tax avoidance concept and hence the problematic 
character of the universal standpoint which they assume. From the discussion of 
tax interpretation in the preceding chapters, it may be seen that the existence of 
one right outcome is always problematic when consideration of the optimal tax 
system is located within the plethora of competing discourses extant within any 
community. In other words, if anti formalism or indeterminacy is taken 
seriously, judges can never be morally or legally 'right' because there can never 
be agreement upon the ideal, 'right' outcome in a pluralist lifeworld devoid of 
the universalising standpoint sought by critical monists such as Habermas. The 
pragmatic theory of law advanced in this thesis therefore calls for a 
reconsideration of the legitimacy of the courts, and in particular the 
constitutional doctrines of the rule of law and the separation of powers which 
underpin the alternative theorisations of judicial legitimacy outlined here. If the 
judges are not discovering and applying law which is in some way determinate, 
and have no prospect of doing so, should the courts retain any role in the tax 
administration? 
13 Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan, 'The Elusive Spirit of the law: Formalism and the 
Struggle for Legal Control' (1991) 54 Modern Law Review 848. For a similar view see: Graeme 
Macdonald, 'Substance, Form and Equity in Taxation and Accounting' (1991) 54 Modern Law 
Review 830. Just one example of a critique of judicial interpretation from what is assumed to be 
the universal discourse of economics see: Yuri Grbich, 'Is Economics any use to Tax Lawyers? 
Towards a More Substantial Jurisprudence to Replace Legalism' (1980) 12 Melbourne 
University Law Review 340. 
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In his non legalist theory of tax administration Grbich and others have argued 
that the function of the courts ought be restricted to that of enforcing due 
process, leaving the determination of substantive tax issues to the Australian 
Taxation Office.14 Grbich's proposal is founded upon what he considers to be 
the pragmatic need to eliminate tax avoidance by vesting broad discretions in 
the tax office. However, it may be doubted whether entrenching the 
Commissioner of Taxation as judge in his own cause, by effectively eliminating 
any substantive role for the courts, will achieve the effect that Grbich desires. It 
is generally accepted that any tax system depends for its success upon voluntary 
compliance, and that voluntary compliance is in tum dependent upon the 
perceived fairness of the system. The perception of fairness of the tax system is 
dependent upon the perceptions of the substantive law, and also the perceptions 
of the process by which that law is enforced.15 With respect to the latter, the 
displacement of the judiciary by the executive arm of government in relation to 
tax disputes could be expected to have a deleterious impact upon the perception 
of the fairness of the tax system, even if a pragmatic theory of interpretation 
advanced in this thesis were generally accepted. This is because the pragmatic 
theory of interpretation advanced here, and the interpretation of tax legislation 
according to the imperatives of the state, are not necessarily synonymous. A 
pragmatic judge may quite reasonably find the perceived need to protect the 
citizen from 'unfair' taxation laws to be of greater rhetorical appeal than 
enhancing the revenue of the state in a particular case. The point is that the 
perceived independence of the judiciary remains an important aspect to the 
rationalisation of the legitimacy of the courts, even if a pragmatic theory of 
14 Yuri Grbich, Institutional Renewal in the Australian Tax System (1984); Yuri Grbich and 
Robin Woellner, 'New Foundations of the Australian Tax System' (1987) 10 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 125; Yuri Grbich, 'Operational Strategies for Improving Australian 
Tax Legislation' (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 266. 
15 For a discussion of the Australian tax administration from this perspective see VC Webb, 'The 
Taxation Rulings System - A Helpful Child or a Potential Bully?' (1990) 7 Australian Tax 
Forum 217. 
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interpretation is adopted. There is therefore good reason to retain the role of the 
courts, notwithstanding the endorsement of a pragmatic theory of interpretation. 
If the courts are to remain a viable part of the tax administration, how would a 
judge pragmatically interpret the legislation in a world where the portrayal of 
determinate law is no longer adopted? If there is no right legal answer or 
standpoint from which a judgment may be assessed, how can we know whether 
the courts deserve to be considered legitimate on the basis that they are 
independent? What is to stop a judge from deciding cases according to a 
reading of tarot cards, or an observation of shooting stars, or the size of 'the 
Chancellors foot' as the common lawyers used to disparagingly observe 
regarding the resolution of disputes in Chancery? In the past, judges were 
inevitably pragmatic, but at least the judges could maintain their claims to 
legitimacy by more or less convincing recourse to the concept of legal 
formality. 16 Clearly, under a pragmatic theory of interpretation the facade of 
formalism must be dispelled. However, the recognition of pragmatic 
adjudication does not necessarily equate with arbitrary adjudication, the 
judiciary will only retain their claim to legitimacy for as long as they are able to 
sustain the belief in the community that a judge is an independent adjudicator 
committed to resolving disputes according to a plausible account of justice. It 
would therefore still be necessary for a judge to give a detailed statement of 
reasons which would be susceptible to close scrutiny along the lines noted 
above. Under the pragmatic theory of law advanced here, very little would 
change in the process of judging. The judge would remain a rhetorician who 
must demonstrate the plausibility of any decision by recourse to any number of 
discourses. Judges always have been, and always will be, rhetoricians who have 
only retained their legitimacy by this process. 
16 PS Atiyah, 'Judges and Policy' (1980) 15 Israel Law Review 346 (arguing that the law is 
inevitably pragmatic in at least a good proportion of cases, and, albeit reluctantly, considering 
the implications of the open acknowledgment of the lawmaking aspect of the judicial function). 
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A further implication of the recognition of the rhetorical nature of adjudication 
in the context of the income tax is that it would be necessary to reconsider the 
nature and function of legislation and the legislative process. At present the 
Commonwealth Government is engaged in a massive project directed at 
simplifying the tax legislation. This project was founded upon the view that tax 
legislation ought prospectively declare in clear terms how a person's tax liability 
might be ascertained.17 In doing so, the Parliamentary Committee collapsed 
what had previously been thought to be a binary opposition - legislative 
precision and legislative simplicity. It had formerly been repeated that the more 
the legislature strove for detailed elaboration of the income tax base in the name 
of certainty, the more complex the legislation would be. 18 Nevertheless, 
adopting the rhetoric of simple English and literal interpretation, it was 
proposed that the legislation could be rewritten in order to fulfil these goals.19 
However, a key contention of this thesis is that the discovery of the plain 
meaning of legislation or the legislative intention envisaged in this model of tax 
reform is a forlorn ambition. No matter how detailed the legislation becomes, 
there will always be room for the courts to interpret the legislation in any 
number of plausible ways. If the legislation is expressed more briefly in 'plain 
English', on the basis that the detailed elaboration of the extent of the legislative 
scope is impossible and that the legislature may safely make numerous 
assumptions, once again the court may choose from among any number of 
competing plausible interpretations borne of alternative interpretative 
standpoints. This scepticism with respect to the prospects of the tax 
simplification process raises a number of issues concerning the legislative 
17 
18 Simon James and Alan Lewis, 'Fiscal Fog' [1977] British Tax Review 371; John Clark, 
'Statutory Drafting' [1980] British Tax Review 326. 
19 To others, the simplification of the income tax system is only achievable by substantive 
income tax reform. These commentators suggest that the legislature must clearly express its 
purpose by adopting a cohesive income principle framed upon the economic concept of income, 
and then legislating for specific exemptions; see: Krever, above n 11. 
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process. If judges do not discover statutory meaning in the legislative text, is it 
farcical to suggest that Parliament ought labour over proposed legislation and 
debate the minutiae of the bill in the belief that the meaning will be fixed when 
the bill is passed into law? Does a pragmatic theory of legal interpretation as 
rhetoric mean that a legislature wanting to impose a tax upon 'wealth' might 
just as well express itself in terms of imposing a tax upon 'elephants', given that 
the judges will make of it what they will? In other words, does the recognition 
of a pragmatic theory of interpretation plunge the community into an anarchic 
morass? 
Once again it must be emphasised that adjudication upon tax legislation has 
always been pragmatic, and that in many important respects nothing would 
change if the exercise of judicial power was generally accepted to be pragmatic. 
In interpreting the window tax, judges willingly accepted that coal chutes were a 
'window', in interpreting 'profits and gains' judges of the Victorian era 
excluded the economic concept of profits promoted by contemporary 
economists and in the interpretation of the sufficient distribution requirement 
the courts at times rejected the 'literal' meaning of the provision in favour of an 
alternative interpretation. Such judgments illustrate the rhetorical aspect of 
adjudication. Judges retained their legitimacy by presenting solutions which at 
least appeared plausible according to one or more discursive standpoints with 
sufficient weight within their community. The recognition of the rhetorical 
aspect of adjudication therefore locates any legislation within a multi-
dimensional matrix of overlapping and competing discursive fields with which 
the legislation itself interacts in a dialectic way. Legislation is a part of the 
context in which the legislative text is interpreted and itself contributes to the 
maintenance of the discursive standpoints from which it is interpreted. 
In 1915 the Commonwealth Government responded to what I have called the 
discourse of the welfare state in part by including a progressive rate scale within 
the income tax. In a small but nevertheless significant way this strengthened the 
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claim of the welfare state discourse which in tum was accorded greater 
discursive weight in debates regarding the interpretation not only of other 
aspects of the income tax legislation, but other legislation overall. Shortly after, 
in 1922, the Government moved to impose some limits upon the 
Commissioner's discretion under the sufficient distribution requirement. This 
reform responded to the calls for reform primarily from the standpoint of the 
rule of law discourse, and in tum readjusted the weighting within the discursive 
matrix in favour of that discourse and to the detriment of the discourse of tax 
equity engendered by the discourse of the welfare state. The point of these 
examples is that, once it is recognised that the legislative text is a response to 
and impacts upon its social context, the legislative text ceases to be conceived in 
terms of a formal endpoint and is reconfigured as a point on a continuum in 
which legislative meaning is created, recreated and recreated again. In a sense, 
then, a legislature wishing to tax 'wealth' might express itself in terms of taxing 
'elephants', and the judiciary might very well interpret this tax upon 'elephants' 
as a tax upon wealth if the discursive fields into which this new tax is 
introduced support the conclusion that such an interpretation is plausible. After 
all, since Saussure it has been recognised that the naming of a thing is a purely 
arbitrary affair, and so a community (or at least a substantial part of a 
community) which is prepared to accept as plausible an interpretation which 
holds that a tax upon 'elephants' is a tax upon 'wealth' is free to manufacture 
this new meaning for 'elephant'. 
Conceptualising legislation as a point on a continuum of the creation of meaning 
rather than an endpoint necessarily entails a considerable degree of scepticism 
regarding the prospects for success of the current income tax simplification 
project. It will never be possible for the legislative process to achieve the 
determinacy of meaning envisaged at the inception of the tax simplification 
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project.20 Nevertheless, the tax simplification project may make a substantial 
contribution to the development of the income tax legislation in several ways 
deserving of further research. 
Firstly, the tax simplification project may make a significant contribution to the 
discursive matrix in which the tax legislation is interpreted by developing some 
discourses at the expense of others. For example, in a rebuff to the discourse of 
purposive interpretation of legislation sustained by ss15AA -AD of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and the decision in Cooper Brookes, the emphasis 
upon the plain and simple meaning of the legislation may be expected to lend 
additional authority to the literalist discourse by emphasising the validity of 
interpreting legislation on its terms. Further, in recognition of the concern for 
the rule of law posed by the expansion of administrative discretion, and in a 
rebuff to those that have argued for broad administrative discretions in the fight 
against what is perceived as tax avoidance, one of the objectives of the 
simplification project is to reduce the number of administrative discretions. 
Finally, a pragmatic theory of interpretation is consistent with the proposition 
that there is a difference between writing which is readable and writing which 
has determinate meaning. Although a pragmatic theory of interpretation 
suggests that the objective of producing determinate law must be viewed with 
considerable scepticism, it may well be that the simplification project will make 
a substantial contribution to the accessibility of the legislation and thereby 
promote wider debate upon its meaning to the community. 21 
In many respects, then, the recognition of a pragmatic theory of interpretation 
would entail little practical change from the interpretative practice adopted by 
20 For a similarly sceptical outlook upon the prospects of simplification founded upon 
institutional constraints upon any move towards simplification, rather than language theory, see: 
Werner Hirsch, 'Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity' (1974) 21 UCLA Law Review 
1233. 
21 For a discussion of tax simplification in terms of the readability of income tax legislation see: 
James and Lewis, above n 18. 
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the courts for the past three hundred years. If anything, it might be expected that 
a recognition of the pragmatism of the judicial interpretation of tax legislation 
will foster a closer scrutiny of tax decisions, rather than the simplistic 
characterisation of judgments according to the various versions of the 
determinacy thesis. 
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